REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL/CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 852  OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 36253 of 2016]

Chairman/Managing Director,  

U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. & others

..... Appellant(s)

                            VERSUS

Ram Gopal  .....Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 204  OF 2020 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 2014 of 2017]

JUDGMENT

Leave granted.  

2. Uttar Pradesh Power Corp. Ltd. (hereinafter, “UPPCL”) has preferred

this  appeal, assailing  an  order  dated  29.04.2016  passed  by  a  Division

Bench  of the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Allahabad (Lucknow Bench)

which  in turn upheld the order  dated 05.04.2016 passed by a learned

Single Judge whereby Ram Gopal (Respondent)’s writ petition for setting

aside his termination order and directing his consequent re­instatement,

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was allowed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

3. UPPCL conducted selections for certain Class IV positions of Junior

Meter Tester & Repairer, Mate and Meter Coolie/Chaukidar and declared

results on 31.08.1978 through an Office Memorandum. The Respondent

emerged as one of the successful candidates for being appointed as Meter

Cooli/Chaukidar. Owing to subsequent discovery of certain irregularities in

the selection process, UPPCL cancelled these selections on 03.11.1978 and

consequently terminated services of all appointees on 07.11.1978.  

4. Shyam Behari Lal, another successful candidate whose services too

had been terminated, promptly approached the jurisdictional High Court

which allowed his writ petition on 26.10.1989 observing that no reasons

had  been assigned for the termination.  UPPCL  unsuccessfully filed an

intra­court appeal, and thereafter approached this Court by way of  Civil

Appeal No. 7123 of 1993  (U.P. State Electricity Board and Others v.

Shyam Behari Lal).   The said appeal was allowed vide order dated

22.11.1993 with an observation that the reason for termination was ‘writ

large’ on the order itself,  namely, “cancellation of result of selection of

operating staff”, and the matter was accordingly remitted to the High Court

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for disposal on merits.

5. Thereafter,  a  Division Bench of the High Court  considered Shyam

Behari Lal’s case and held that though the writ petition was liable to be

dismissed on merits, however, considering the peculiar circumstances

wherein Shyam Behari  Lal had already served the UPPCL for 17 years,

rendering him jobless might be too harsh a consequence.   The relevant

operative part of the order dated 30.05.1997 reads as follows:   

“In  view  of  what  has  been  discussed  above,  is  true  that  the petitioner  is  liable  to  be  dismissed,  but  in  the  peculiar circumstances  of  the  case  and  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the petitioners are continuing in service for last seventeen years, it would  be  too  harsh  to  render  him jobless  at  this  stage.   We would,  therefore,  only  provide  that  the  opposite  parties  may consider his continuance in service and take a suitable decision as may be thought appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case expeditiously.”                        

                                                                    (emphasis supplied)

6. After the initial round of litigation in which Shyam Behari Lal had

obtained relief from the High Court in 1989, the present Respondent also

filed  WP  No. 7897 of 1990 in July, 1990, impugning the order dated

07.11.1978 terminating his services.   A learned Single Judge of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad summarily allowed the Respondent’s writ

petition on 05.04.2007 on the premise that the matter was “squarely

covered” by the decision of  the High Court dated 26.10.1989 in Shyam

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Behari Lal’s case.      

7. The aggrieved UPPCL preferred Special Appeal No. 643 of 2007 which

was dismissed by a Division Bench vide the impugned order dated

29.04.2016. Although the Court noted that the order of 1989 relied upon

by the learned Single Judge had been set­aside by this Court and during

fresh consideration of the matter  a co­ordinate  Bench had held  Shyam

Behari Lal’s  case being devoid of any merit;  yet it laid emphasis on the

equitable considerations  which  were  pressed into  aid in  Shyam Behari

Lal’s  case for his resultant continuation in service. The Division Bench,

thus, dismissed UPPCL’s appeal and held as follows:

“The  case  of  the  respondent  is  similarly  situated  as  his appointment pertains to the same selection and no reason has been assigned in the order of cancellation of appointment of the respondent.   Therefore,  learned  Single  Judge  has  rightly extended the parity of the aforesaid judgment and order to the respondent while allowing the Writ Petition.”

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

8. Vehemently refuting the  Respondent’s  claim of illegal termination,

UPPCL has preferred this Civil Appeal both against the Division Bench’s

order  dated  29.04.2016, as  well as the contempt  proceedings initiated

before the High Court by the Respondent. UPPCL has painstakingly urged

that there is no correlation in law or any similarity in facts between the

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case of Shyam Behari Lal and the present case of Ram Gopal.  

9. On the other hand, counsel for the Respondent defends the judgment

of the Division Bench, maintaining that both Shyam Behari Lal and Ram

Gopal  were recruited through the same  office  memorandum,  and their

services were terminated through the same order. It was urged that what

holds true for one candidate must necessarily also hold true for the other;

and it would be iniquitous and unequal to give rise to a situation where

similarly placed persons end up in vastly different situations.

ANALYSIS

10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at a considerable length,

we find that the impugned order of the High Court is legally untenable and

cannot be sustained for at least three glaring reasons.  

i) Erroneous conclusion of termination order being non-speaking

11. First, the Division Bench’s finding that “no reason has been assigned

in the  order  of cancellation  of  appointment  of the respondent”,  is vividly

erroneous.  This Court had earlier vide order dated 22.11.1993 passed in

Civil Appeal No. 7123 of 1993 overruled the High Court’s finding of non­

reasoned termination in Shyam Behari Lal’s case and had held that the

termination order was in fact a speaking order, with the reason for

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termination being writ large and clearly given. The High Court’s findings

thus undoubtedly fall foul of the observations made by this Court and the

impugned order hence ought to be set­aside on this count alone.

ii) Lack of similarity between Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal

12. Second, Quite palpably, the High Court has erred in concluding that

the Respondent’s claim fell squarely within the four corners of its previous

decision in Shyam Behari Lal’s case. The relied­upon judgment dated

30.05.1997 determined unequivocally that there was no merit in the writ

petition and that Shyam Behari Lal’s claim was “liable to be dismissed”.  It

was only on account of pending litigation and interim directions of courts

that  Shyam Behari Lal had spent 17 years in employment of  UPPCL.

Paying heed to these equitable considerations, and not as a matter of any

legal right, the High Court urged the employer to sympathetically consider

his case for retention in employment. This conclusion of the High Court

was  not appealed  by  any  party and  has  undoubtedly attained finality.

Hence, it is clear in law that Shyam Behari Lal’s termination was legal, and

that he had no right of continuation in service, let alone reinstatement as

sought in the  present case. The only question  which thus survives is

whether the Respondent, Ram Gopal, could seek parity?  

13. At the outset, it is apparent that Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal

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share little similarity. Whereas the former had remained in service for over

seventeen  years (except  a  brief  period  between  August to  November in

1978) and had  fought his case tooth and nail, the Respondent has not

been in the employment of UPPCL since 1978. The fact­situation in Shyam

Behari Lal’s case was unique and altogether different  from that of  Ram

Gopal, and there arises no reason to seek or grant parity. Even otherwise,

it is a settled canon of common law that equity acts in personam and not

in rem. Hence, there could be no extension of parity between the case of

Shyam Behari Lal and Ram Gopal (Respondent).

iii) Inordinate delay in filing writ petition

14. Finally, the prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been

overlooked or condoned. Services of the Respondent were terminated

within months of his appointment, in 1978. Statedly, the Respondent made

a representation and served UPPCL with a legal notice in 1982, however

such feeble effort does little to fill the gap between when the cause of action

arose and he chose to seek its redressal (in 1990).  

15. Seen from a different perspective also, it is clear that the Respondent

has shown little concern to the settled legal tenets. Even a civil suit

challenging termination of services, if filed by the Respondent, would have

undoubtedly  been barred by  limitation  in  1990.   In  a  similar  situation

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where the appellant  belatedly  challenged the promotion of  his junior(s),

this  Court in  P.S. Sadasivaswamy v.  State of Tamil Nadu1,  held  as

follows:

“2.   …  if  the  appellant  was  aggrieved  by  it  he  should  have approached  the  Court  even  in  the  year  1957,  after  the  two representations made by him had failed to produce any result. One  cannot  sleep  over  the  matter  and  come  to  the  Court questioning  that  relaxation  in  the  year  1971.  …  In  effect  he wants to unscramble a scrambled egg. It is very difficult for the Government  to  consider  whether  any  relaxation  of  the  rules should have been made in favour of the appellant in the year 1957.  The  conditions  that  were  prevalent  in  1957,  cannot  be reproduced now. …It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief  and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach  the  Court  to  put  forward  stale  claims  and  try  to unsettle settled matters…...”

16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings

under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such

rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time.

Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always

be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant

in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept

1 (1975) 1 SCC 152.

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over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence­sitters cannot be

allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience,

and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists.

On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit

limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu

v. State of Kerala2, this Court observed thus:

“17.  It  is  also well-settled principle  of  law that “delay defeats equity”.  …It  is  now a  trite  law that  where  the  writ  petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay,  reliefs prayed for may  be  denied  to  them  on  the  ground  of  delay  and  laches irrespective  of  the fact  that  they are similarly  situated to  the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment.”

(emphasis supplied)

17. Similarly, in Vijay Kumar Kaul v. Union of India3 this Court while

considering  the claim of  candidates who,  despite being higher  in merit,

exercised their right to parity much after those who were though lower in

merit but were diligently agitating their rights, this Court observed that:

“27. …It  becomes an obligation to take into consideration the balance  of  justice  or  injustice  in  entertaining  the  petition  or declining it on the ground of delay and laches. It is a matter of great significance that at one point of time equity that existed in favour of one melts into total insignificance and paves the path of extinction with the passage of time.”

18. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply

2 (2009) 2 SCC 479 3 (2012) 7 SCC 610

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to judgments which are delivered in­rem. The State and its

instrumentalities are expected In such  category of cases to themselves

extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed

employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of

courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to

judgments delivered in­rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State

of Uttar Pradesh v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava4, laying down that:

“  22.1.  The  normal  rule  is  that  when  a  particular  set  of employees  is  given  relief  by  the  court,  all  other  identically situated  persons  need  to  be  treated  alike  by  extending  that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be  violative  of  Article  14  of  the  Constitution  of  India.  This principle  needs  to  be  applied  in  service  matters  more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that  merely  because  other  similarly  situated  persons  did  not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2.  However,  this  principle  is  subject  to  well-recognised exceptions  in  the  form  of  laches  and  delays  as  well  as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after  long  delay  only  because  of  the  reason  that  their counterparts  who  had  approached  the  court  earlier  in  time succeeded in  their  efforts,  then such employees cannot  claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters  and laches  and  delays,  and/or  the  acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3.  However,  this  exception  may  not  apply  in  those  cases

4 (2015) 1 SCC 347

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where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem  with  intention  to  give  benefit  to  all  similarly  situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement  the  obligation  is  cast  upon  the  authorities  to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such  a  situation  can  occur  when  the  subject-matter  of  the decision  touches  upon  the  policy  matters,  like  scheme  of regularisation  and  the  like  (see K.C.  Sharma v. Union  of India [K.C.  Sharma v. Union of  India,  (1997) 6 SCC 721 :  1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence.”      (Emphasis applied)

19. The order passed by the High Court for retention of Shyam Behari Lal

in service, does not possess any ingredient of a Judgment in­rem.   The

above cited exception, therefore, does not come to the Respondent’s rescue.

It is also pertinent to mention that neither has it been pleaded nor is it

apparent from the material on record that the Respondent was unable to

approach the court­of­law in time on account of  any social or  financial

disability.  Had such been the case, he ought to have availed free legal aid

and should have ventilated his grievances in a timely manner. Instead, he

seems to be under the assumption that the termination order is  illegal,

that he consequently has a right to be reinstated, and that he can agitate

the same at his own sweet­will.  Neither of  these three assumptions are

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true, as elaborated by us earlier.

CONCLUSION

20. For the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are allowed. The

impugned order delivered by the learned Single Judge on 05.04.2007 as

well as the order dated 29.04.2016 of the Division Bench upholding it, are

set aside. Respondent’s writ petition is consequently dismissed. As a sequel

thereto, the High Court’s interim order dated 02.11.2016 in Contempt No.

1271 of 2016, which is under challenge in SLP (Crl.) No. 2014 of 2017, is

also quashed and the contempt petition stands dismissed. No order as to

costs.  

……………………….. CJI.    (S. A. BOBDE)

 ………………………… J. (B.R. GAVAI)

…………………………. J. (SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI DATED : 30.01.2020  

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