REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1186 OF 2005

Chairman and M.D. Indian Overseas Bank & Ors.      … Appellants

Versus

Tribhuwan Nath Srivastava      … Respondent

J U D G M E N T

AFTAB ALAM, J.

1. This  appeal  by  special  leave  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  

order dated September 3, 2003 passed by a division bench of the Allahabad  

High Court on a writ petition (Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.6162 of  

2003) filed by the respondent who was at that time working as an officer in  

the appellant-bank. The High Court allowed the writ petition filed by the  

respondent,  quashed the decision of the bank rejecting his application for

voluntary  retirement  under  the  bank’s  scheme  and  directed  the  

appellant-bank to accept his application for voluntary retirement forthwith.  

2. This  Court  while  granting  special  leave  to  appeal,  by  order  dated  

February  11,  2005,  stayed  the  operation  of  the  order  of  the  High  Court  

coming under appeal. As a result, the respondent continued in service and  

eventually retired on reaching the age of superannuation on June 6, 2009. He  

has been paid his terminal dues and is also getting regularly his monthly  

pension.  In  view  of  this  material  change  in  circumstances  during  the  

pendency of the appeal, we suggested that the parties should negotiate and  

try to come to some amicable settlement.  They were, however,  unable to  

come to terms and the respondent insisted that the appeal be heard on merits  

and in case  it  is  finally  dismissed,  then,  the Court  may consider  how to  

appropriately mould the relief in his favour. We, accordingly, proceeded to  

examine the respondent’s claim for grant of voluntary retirement under the  

scheme of the bank on merits.   

3. In order to examine the case of the rival sides in perspective, it would  

be useful to briefly state the relevant facts.  The board of directors of the  

appellant-bank  in  its  meeting  held  on  November  25,  2000  approved  a  

voluntary  retirement scheme for  the  officers  and employees of  the  bank,  

called the IOB Officers/Employees  Voluntary Retirement  Scheme -  2000  

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(“the scheme” for short). The object of the scheme was “to adopt measures  

to  have  optimum human resources  at  various  levels  in  keeping  with  the  

business strategies, skill profile to achieve balanced age and requirement of  

the bank.” The scheme remained in operation for 5 weeks from December  

15, 2000 to January 19, 2001.

4. The eligibility to apply for voluntary retirement under the scheme was  

laid down in Clause 4. Clause 4.1 provided that all permanent employees  

with 15 years of service or 40 years of age would be eligible to apply for  

voluntary  retirement  under  the  scheme.  Clause  4.2  enumerated  the  six  

categories (from sub-clauses ‘a’ to ‘f’) that would not be eligible to seek  

voluntary  retirement  under  the  scheme.  Under  the  heading  ‘General  

Conditions’  it  was  stated,  in  paragraph  4,  that  depending  upon  the  

requirement  of  the  bank,  the  competent  authority  would  have  absolute  

discretion, subject to recording the reasons for the decision, either to accept  

or  reject  the  request  of  an officer/employee  seeking voluntary  retirement  

under  the  scheme.  Paragraph  10  provided  that  the  cases  of  

officers/employees opting for voluntary retirement under the scheme against  

whom disciplinary proceedings were contemplated would be considered by  

the respective disciplinary authorities having regard to the facts of each case  

before forwarding the request of such officers/employees to the competent  

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authority. Under the heading ‘Clarifications’ (in Annexure II to the Scheme),  

it was stated, in paragraph 2, that disciplinary proceedings would be deemed  

to be pending for the purpose of VRS, if the member had been placed under  

suspension  or  any  notice  had  been  issued  to  him  to  show  cause  why  

disciplinary proceedings should not be instituted against him and would be  

deemed to  be pending  until  final  orders  were  passed  by  the  disciplinary  

authority.

5. On December 15, 2000, the respondent made an application seeking  

voluntary retirement from the service of the bank under the scheme. At that  

time, the respondent was working as Chief Manager (in Scale IV), Indian  

Overseas Bank, Allahabad. It is not disputed that he was quite eligible for  

making the application in that he was a permanent employee with more than  

15 years of service and was over 40 years of age. Nevertheless, the bank did  

not accept his request and intimated him by letter dated February 21, 2001  

that  “the  Competent  Authority  has  decided  not  to  accept  his  application  

considering  (the)  business/organizational  requirements  and  administrative  

exigencies of the bank”.  

6. The respondent challenged the decision of the bank communicated to  

him vide letter dated February 21, 2001 in a Writ Petition (CMWP No.4167  

of 2001) before the Allahabad High Court.  In the supplementary counter  

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affidavit filed in the case on behalf of the bank, it was stated that in Scale  

IV, to which the respondent belonged, there were 187 posts out of which 80  

persons had applied for VRS under the scheme. The management accepted  

the applications of only 22 officers and the rest  of the applications were  

rejected taking into account the various considerations, and the merits and  

demerits  of  the  officers.  In  paragraph  6  of  the  supplementary  counter  

affidavit, it was asserted that it was purely within the discretion of the bank  

to accept or not to accept the application of any particular officer for grant of  

voluntary retirement under the scheme. The High Court took exception to  

the stand of the bank that the matter lay purely within the discretion of the  

competent authority and criticised it as opposed to the mandate of Article 14  

of  the  Constitution.  The  High  Court  also  took  the  view  that  the  words  

“taking into account the various considerations and merits and demerits of  

the officers” provided a very vague basis to decide whether or not to accept  

the  application  for  VRS  made  by  different  officers.  It  also  noted  the  

allegations  made  on behalf  of  the  respondent  that  the  bank had allowed  

voluntary retirement even to officers against whom disciplinary proceedings  

were pending or contemplated and who, therefore, were not eligible under  

the  scheme.  It,  accordingly,  allowed  the  respondent’s  writ  petition  by  

judgment and order dated November 27, 2002 holding that the bank had  

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acted  arbitrarily  in  his  case  and  had  rejected  his  application  without  

according good reasons. The High Court quashed the order dated February  

21,  2001  and  directed  the  bank  to  reconsider  the  matter  in  light  of  the  

observations  made  by  it  and  take  a  fresh  decision,  on  the  respondent’s  

application for grant of VRS in accordance with the law and the scheme,  

within 6 weeks from the date of production of a certified copy of its order.

7. The respondent submitted a copy of the High Court order to the bank  

along with his representation dated December 7, 2002 whereupon the board  

of directors of the bank in its meeting held on January 11, 2003 constituted a  

committee consisting of the Chairman and Managing Director, the Executive  

Director and the General Manager (Personnel) to reconsider his request for  

voluntary retirement as directed by the High Court. The Committee in its  

meeting held on January 11, 2003 reconsidered the matter in great detail,  

taking into account  the service record of the respondent.  The Committee  

noted that the respondent was an agricultural engineering graduate and was  

appointed as a clerk in the bank on October 26, 1970. For his sincere and  

hard work, he was promoted as officer in Junior Management Grade Scale I  

on June 1, 1975, within 5 years of his appointment as clerk. His performance  

in  the  post  was  exemplary.  The  bank,  therefore,  decided  to  utilize  his  

services  abroad  and  posted  him  to  the  Hong  Kong  branch.  Ordinarily,  

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overseas assignments are given to Middle Management Grade Officers in  

Scale II and above but in the case of the respondent, who was at that time an  

officer in the Junior Management Grade I, he was given the assignment in  

view of his dedicated work and educational background. Even while serving  

abroad he was promoted to Middle Management Grade Scale II on July 1,  

1982. After completing foreign assignment for a term, he was posted to the  

Lucknow  region  in  August,  1982  and  his  services  were  utilized  at  the  

Varanasi Cantonment and Lucknow Branches. While working at Lucknow,  

the respondent was able to canvass a good number of deposit accounts and  

provided satisfactory customer service which earned him appreciation from  

the Zonal Manager. In view of his rich experience in Lucknow, the bank  

elevated him in position and posted him as Senior Manager in the Kankhal  

branch, which was selected by the Bank Management as the  best branch  

during  his  tenure.  The  Committee  further  noted  that  considering  his  

potential and ability the bank provided him various in-house and external  

trainings.  He was promoted to the Middle Management  Grade III  during  

1992 and further promoted to the Senior Management Grade Scale IV in the  

year 1998. His services were well utilized not only to core banking but also  

in specialized areas like foreign exchange, overseas trading, etc. and he had  

a track record of  unblemished  service.  He had scored good ratings in all  

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confidential  reports.  He had been given  good exposure including foreign  

postings and had a lot of potential. Therefore, the bank did not want to lose  

the benefit of his services. The Committee concluded that keeping in view  

the  past  track  record,  the  specialized  skill  expertise,  potential,  training  

imparted,  organizational  requirement  and  administrative  exigencies,  the  

services of the respondent were required for the development of the bank  

and hence, resolved not to accept the voluntary retirement application under  

the  scheme.  The  decision  of  the  Committee  was  communicated  to  the  

respondent  who once again challenged  it  before the  High Court  in  Civil  

Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.6162 of 2003.

8. In the second round of litigation, the appellant-bank, while resisting  

the writ petition filed by the respondent before the High Court on merits,  

once again referred to paragraph 4 of the General Conditions of the scheme,  

taking the stand that the acceptance or rejection of the request for voluntary  

retirement  under  the  scheme  lay  within  the  absolute  discretion  of  the  

competent authority.

9. The rejection of the respondent’s application for voluntary retirement  

by the bank for the second time and the reiteration that the matter was within  

the absolute discretion of the competent authority, seems to have offended  

the  High  Court  and  it  wrote  a  rather  angry  judgment.  The  High  Court  

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observed  that  the  bank  and  its  officers  had  acted  in  a  highly  arbitrary,  

discriminatory and  malafide manner and had not shown any respect to the  

High Court by totally flouting its earlier judgment. It further said that despite  

the clear observation in its earlier judgment, the bank authorities had again  

“dared” to take the stand that it was the absolute discretion of the competent  

authority either to accept or reject the application. The court went on to say  

that  the  Chief  Regional  Manager  of  the  bank who had filed  the  counter  

affidavit had absolutely no respect for the High Court and further that the  

court was at first inclined to issue a notice of contempt to him for invoking  

the absolute discretion of the competent authority which, according to the  

High Court, amounted to grossly contemptuous averments. The High Court,  

however, refrained from issuing any contempt notice assuming in his favour  

that he was probably not able to understand what he said in the affidavit.  

Adverting  to  the  merits  of  the  case,  the  court  accepted  the  respondent’s  

allegations that even while his request was turned down many officers who  

were not eligible were granted voluntary retirement under the scheme. The  

court held that the bank authorities had adopted a ‘pick and choose’ policy in  

accepting  and  rejecting  the  applications  made  by  different  

officers/employees for grant of voluntary requirement. The High Court in its  

judgment (at page 19 of the SLP paper book) gave a list of employees, who,  

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according to the respondent, were allowed voluntary retirement even though  

they were charge-sheeted or given show cause notice in contemplation of  

disciplinary  proceedings  and  who  were,  therefore,  ineligible  in  terms  of  

Clause  4.2(c)  of  the  scheme.  The  High  Court  gave  another  list  of  

officers/employees (at page 20 of the SLP paper book) who, according to the  

respondent, were granted voluntary retirement even though they were given  

specialized training in the area of credit and foreign exchange and were, for  

that  reason,  ineligible in terms of clause 4.2(e)  of  the scheme.  The High  

Court observed that the bank acted in a highly arbitrary and discriminatory  

manner by allowing voluntary retirement to officers/employees who were  

ineligible  under  the  scheme  and  on  the  other  hand  denying  it  to  the  

respondent who according to its own showing had a sterling record. In this  

connection, the High Court made the following observation:

“In our opinion the petitioner is fully eligible for VRS, 2000,  and his application has been rejected arbitrarily and has been  discriminated again.  He has also been unnecessarily harassed  by the respondents, as stated in para 18 of the petition by first  transferring him to  Chennai  during the  pendency of  his  writ  petition  and  then  posting  him  under  an  officer  3  years  his  junior.

The respondents themselves have admitted that the petitioner  has  been  working  with  utmost  sincerely  (sic),  honestly  and  diligence in discharging his duties in the bank.  It seems that  the policy  of  the  bank is  to  punish the good,  honest  and  competent officers and to reward those who are not. This, in  our opinion, will lead to total demoralization of the good,  

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honest and competent officers and employees of the bank if  it  is  permitted to continue any further.  The VRS scheme  was floated for giving the benefit to the good officers and  not for those who are having a bad service record, but it  seems that the Bank in total disregard of the scheme has  adopted a policy of pick and choose. Thus merit has in fact  become demerit in the Bank. Those who are competent are  denied VRS but those having a bad record are being given  benefit of the VRS.”                                                                          (emphasis added)

10. Proceeding  thus,  the  High  Court  allowed  the  respondent’s  writ  

petition and by judgment and order dated September 3, 2003, set aside the  

decision  of  the  appellant-bank not  to  accept  the  respondent’s  request  for  

voluntary retirement and observing that any further remand would not serve  

any useful purpose, the High Court went on to direct the bank to accept the  

respondent’s application for grant of voluntary retirement.  

11. Mr.  C.U.  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant-bank  submitted  that  the  High  Court  was  in  grave  error  in  

reviewing the bank’s decision on the respondent’s application for voluntary  

retirement as an appellate authority and substituting its own decision for that  

of the bank. Mr. Singh further submitted that the High Court was equally in  

error  in  denying  to  the  competent  authority  in  the  bank  the  absolute  

discretion  for  accepting  or  rejecting  the  request  for  voluntary  retirement  

made  by  an  officer  of  the  bank  as  expressly  stipulated  in  the  scheme.  

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Learned counsel asserted that in the matter of voluntary retirement under the  

scheme, the bank has an absolute discretion to grant or reject the request and  

the legal position in this regard was settled by this Court. In support of the  

submission he referred to  a  decision of  this  Court  in  Board of  Trustees,   

Vishakhapatnam Port Trust and Ors. v. T.S.N. Raju and Anr., (2006) 7 SCC  

664, and relied upon the observations made in paragraphs 22, 33 and 34,  

which are as under:

“22.  In our opinion,  under the Scheme, the Chairman of  the  Port Trust has an absolute right either to accept or not to accept  the applications filed by the employees for retirement under the  voluntary retirement scheme…

33.  In  our  opinion,  the  Chairman is  competent  to  frame the  scheme having regard to the exigencies of work and no one can  claim voluntary retirement as of right. The learned Judges of  the  High  Court  have  also  not  seen  that  the  respondent's  application  for  voluntary  retirement  cannot  be  considered  in  view of the seniority of service of the employees concerned.

34.  In  our  opinion,  the  request  of  the  employees  seeking  voluntary retirement was not to take effect until and unless it  was accepted in writing by the Port Trust Authorities. The Port  Trust Authorities had the absolute discretion whether to accept  or  reject  the  request  of  the  employee  seeking  voluntary  retirement under the scheme. There is no assurance that such an  application would be accepted without any consideration. The  process of acceptance of an offer made by an employee was in  the  discretion  of  the  Port  Trust.  We,  therefore,  have  no  hesitation  in  coming  to  the  conclusion  that  VRS was  not  a  proposal or an offer but merely an invitation to treat and the  applications filed by the employees constituted an offer.”  

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12. The  decision  relied  upon  by  Mr.  Singh  evidently  supports  his  

contention but the observations made by this Court as quoted above need to  

be understood in the context of the case.  In the case of  T.S.N. Raju,  the  

Chairman of the Port  Trust  made a review on the implementation of the  

scheme for voluntary retirement and keeping in view the concern expressed  

by the Secretary, Department of Shipping, Ministry of Surface Transport,  

Government  of  India,  took  the  decision  that  the  request  for  voluntary  

retirement under the scheme should be considered only in case of employees  

who were below the age of 58 years. The application of T.S.N. Raju (and  

another respondent in that case) came up for consideration after they had  

crossed the age of 58 years and were accordingly rejected on the basis of the  

decision of the Chairman. They challenged the action of the Port Trust in  

rejecting their request for voluntary retirement, taking the plea before the  

court  that  the Port  Trust  had no discretion to reject  their  request  to take  

retirement  under  the  voluntary  retirement  scheme  except  in  cases  of  the  

exigencies of service or the compelling necessities or the indispensability of  

the employees concerned.  It was to rebut such sweeping assertion of right  

that this Court made the observation that under the scheme, the Chairman of  

the Port Trust had the absolute right to accept or not accept the request for  

voluntary retirement under the scheme.  

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13. The observations made in  T.S.N. Raju do not mean that this Court  

endorsed or approved the discretion vested in the employer (be it the Port  

Trust or the bank) as absolute in the manner of an unruly horse prancing  

beyond the control of anyone or anything. In the 62nd year of the Republic, it  

is  rather  late  in  the  day  for  the  State  or  any  of  the  State’s  agencies  or  

instrumentalities to claim absolute discretion, like the discretion of a despot  

or a discretion completely divorced from reasonableness.  

14. But at the same time, it must also be realized that reasonableness is  

not something in the abstract. The reasonableness of a decision or an action  

can only be judged in the totality of the facts and circumstances and having  

regard to the object and purpose sought to be achieved. For example, if the  

object is  to select  someone for public  employment or for promotion to a  

higher post,  the only reasonable  thing to do would be to select  the most  

suitable and meritorious among the candidates. The selection of a person of  

inferior  merit  or  someone  who  is  not  even  eligible  would  be  wholly  

unreasonable if the object is to choose the best as it should be in case of  

selection for public employment or promotion to a higher post. But in case  

an organisation undertakes manpower planning with a view to downsize the  

personnel  and cut  down the overhead costs,  very different  considerations  

would apply and in that case the application of the yard stick for selection  

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for  public  employment  or  for  promotion to  a  higher  post  would  lead  to  

results opposed to the very object of the exercise.  

15. We feel that the High Court committed the fundamental mistake in  

completely misconstruing the object and purpose of the voluntary retirement  

scheme. As wrongly assumed by the High Court, the object of the scheme  

was not to reward the good officers or to punish the bad ones. Even though  

depending  upon  personal  circumstances,  voluntary  retirement  under  the  

scheme  might  have  appeared  to  some  individual  officers  as  personally  

beneficial,  it  was not envisaged by the bank as a means to give personal  

rewards or to punish individual employees by granting or refusing to grant  

voluntary retirement to them. The objective of the scheme as stated in the  

circular issued by the bank was “to adopt measures to have optimum human  

resources  at  various  levels  in  keeping  with  the  business  strategies,  skill  

profile to achieve balanced age and requirement of the bank”.  

16. In  Bank of India and Anr. v. K. Mohandas and Ors., (2009) 5 SCC  

313,  one of  us  (Lodha,  J.)  had the  occasion to  examine  the  genesis  and  

raison d'être of the voluntary scheme framed by the banks; in that judgment  

it was observed, in paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 36, as follows:

“3. In the month of May, 2000, Government of India, Ministry  of Finance (Banking Division), advised the nationalized banks  

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to carry out detailed manpower planning as these banks were  found to have 25% of their  manpower  as surplus.  A Human  Resource Management Committee was constituted to examine  the said issue and to suggest suitable remedial measures.

4.  The  Committee  so  constituted  observed  that  high  establishment cost and low productivity in public sector banks  affect their profitability and it was necessary for these banks  to convert their human resources into assets compatible with  business strategies.  Inter alia, the Committee placed the draft  voluntary  retirement  scheme  with  the  Central  Government  that would assist the banks in their efforts to optimize their  human resources and achieve a balanced age and skills profile  in keeping with their business strategies.

5.  With  the  approval  of  the  Central  Government,  Indian  Banks’  Association  (IBA)  circulated  salient  features  of  the  draft scheme to the nationalized banks for consideration and  adoption by their respective boards vide its letter dated 31-8- 2000.  The  Board  of  Directors  of  each  of  the  nationalized  banks,  keeping  in  view the objectives,  considered  the  draft  scheme and adopted it separately.

36.  Any interpretation of the terms of VRS 2000, although  contractual in nature, must meet the test of fairness. It has to  be  construed  in  a  manner  that  avoids  arbitrariness  and  unreasonableness on the part of the public sector banks who  brought out VRS 2000 with an objective of rightsizing their  manpower.  The banks decided to shed surplus manpower.  By  formulation  of  the  special  scheme  (VRS  2000),  the  banks intended to achieve their objective of rationalising  their force as they were overstaffed. The special Scheme  was,  thus,  oriented  to  lure  the  employees  to  go  in  for  voluntary retirement.  In this background, the consideration  that was to pass between the parties assumes significance and  a  harmonious  construction  to  the  Scheme  and  the  Pension  Regulations, therefore, has to be given.”

                                                                       (emphasis added)

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17. Bearing in mind the object and purpose of the scheme as explained in  

the decision in Bank of India  it is not difficult to see how the competent  

authority  in  the  bank  would  deal  with  the  applications  for  voluntary  

retirement made by individual  officers;  other  things being equal  between  

two applicants he would like to let go the one with the inferior service record  

and lower potential and consequently he would accept the application of the  

officer with the lower merit and may not accept the request of the officer  

with  superior  merit.  This  is  for  the  simple  reason that  in  the  process  of  

shedding  surplus  manpower  no  organisation would  like  to  lose  its  best  

people.

18. From a purely subjective point of view the decision of the competent  

authority may appear to be “unfair” or even a ‘punishment” to the officer  

with the superior merit nevertheless it would be the proper and reasonable  

exercise of discretion in view of the basic objective of the scheme. We are  

not  unconscious that  the  denial  of  request  for  voluntary retirement to an  

officer  in  practice  may  result  in  souring  of  relationship  between  the  

concerned officer and the bank (as it actually happened in this case) and as a  

consequence  the  concerned  officer  in  future  may  not  show  the  same  

competence and efficiency in the discharge of his duties for which he was  

sought  to  be  retained  in  service.  But  that  is  a  matter  of  personnel  

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management  and  the  competent  authority  is  expected  to  factor  in  such  

considerations  while  taking  a  decision  on  individual  applications.  Such  

considerations would certainly not be a ground for the court to interfere with  

the  decision  of  the  competent  authority.  The  discretion  vested  in  the  

competent authority as stipulated in paragraph 4 under the heading ‘General  

Conditions’ (of the scheme) must be understood in this way and not absolute  

in the sense of being completely uncontrolled, whimsical or capricious.

19. Seen  in  this  light  even  the  grant  of  voluntary  retirement  to  an  

employee  who  may  not  be  strictly  eligible  under  the  scheme  may  not  

improve the claim of another applicant who might not only be eligible but  

with  highly  superior  credentials.  An  employee  facing  a  disciplinary  

proceeding and, therefore, ineligible under the scheme may otherwise also  

be completely useless. The bank may try to get rid of him by dropping the  

disciplinary proceeding or even by waiving the eligibility clause in his case.  

At worst the action of the bank may be irregular or even invalid in case of  

that  particular  employee.  But  unlike  a  selection  for  appointment  or  

promotion to a superior post, this in itself would not provide a ground to  

another employee (legible and with superior credentials) to claim retirement  

as a matter of right.  

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20. In this case, however, we need not go into that aspect of the matter  

because it was the definite case of the bank before the High Court that no  

person ineligible  under  the  scheme was granted voluntary retirement.  As  

regards  the  officers/employees  who  were  allegedly  allowed  voluntary  

retirement even though they were given charge-sheets or show cause notices  

in  contemplation  of  disciplinary  proceedings,  the  bank  in  its  counter  

affidavit had explained that the decision on their application for voluntary  

retirement  was  taken  by  the  competent  authority  after  “disposal”  of  the  

charge-sheets.  The  High Court  brushed  aside  the  plea  by  observing  that  

charge-sheets were not “disposed of”; a charge-sheet may be recalled or a  

proceeding arising from the charge-sheet may lead either to exoneration or  

the finding of guilt of the concerned employee. It further observed that the  

statement was made for obfuscation of the matter in issue.  

21. We are of the view that the High Court took a highly technical view of  

the matter. What perhaps was meant by the bank was that the decision to  

accept their request for voluntary retirement was taken after the proceedings  

against  those  officers/employees  were  closed/dropped.  Here,  it  may  be  

recalled that this was quite in accordance with paragraph 10 of the “General  

Conditions”.  

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22. As regards the officers who were allegedly given special training and  

were,  therefore,  ineligible  for  voluntary  retirement,  only  Mr.  Anthony  

Joseph, Pondicherry Branch, was in Scale IV, i.e. in the same scale as the  

respondent. In regard to Anthony Joseph, the bank in its rejoinder affidavit  

denied that he was given training in foreign exchange. We see no reason not  

to accept the statement made by the bank in this regard.  

23. In light of the discussion made above, we are clearly of the view, that  

the  bank  had  properly  appraised  the  respondent’s  claim  for  voluntary  

retirement under the scheme and its decision not to accept the request was  

within  the  legitimate  exercise  of  discretion  that  did  not  warrant  any  

interference by the High Court. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that  

the judgment of the High Court coming under appeal is quite unsustainable.

24. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment  

and order passed by the High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed by the  

respondent.  

25. There will be no order as to costs.

26.    We are told that some other case(s) between the parties are pending  

before the High Court on some other issues.  Needless to say that that case  

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will be decided on its own merits and the decision in this appeal will not  

prejudice the case of the respondent.   

.……….……...................J.                                                     (AFTAB ALAM)          

………..……...................J.                                                   (R.M. LODHA)         

New Delhi February 4, 2011

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