IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO 8928 OF 2015 Etc. Etc.

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR  FCI AND ORS            ..APPELLANTS  

VERSUS

JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA AND ORS           ..RESPONDENTS  

WITH  

C. A. No.9155/2015  

C. A. No.9157/2015  

C. A. No.9160/2015  

C. A. Nos.9203-9204/2015  

C. A. No.8926/2015  

C. A. No.1918/2010  

C. A. No.9154/2015  

C. A. Nos. 9158-9159/2015  

C. A. Nos.8604-05/2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.33864-33865/2015   

C. A. No.8601/2017 @ SLP(C) No.289/2016  

C. A. Nos.8602-03/2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.529-530/2016  

C. A. No.8607/2017 @ SLP(C) No.14830/2015  

C. A. No.8609/2017 @ SLP(C) No. 13409/2015  

C. A. No.8606/2017 @ SLP(C) No.19992/2015  

C. A. No. 9107/2015  

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REPORTABLE

PART A

C. A. No. 7187/2013  

C. A. No.8598/2017 @ SLP(C) No.18925/2014  

C. A. No.8597/2017 @ SLP(C) No.16852/2016  

C .A. Nos.8599-8600/2017 @ SLP(C) Nos.29388-29389/2016  

C. A. No.8610/2017 @ SLP(C) No.2299/2017  

C.A. No.8608/2017 @ S.L.P.(C)...CC No.10889/2015  

J U D G M E N T

Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J

1. Delay condoned in SLP (C)……CC No.10889/2015.

2. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions.

A The perspective  

3. The framers of the Constitution conceived of a policy of affirmative action

to  redress  the  social  exclusion,  economic  deprivation  and  political  alienation

suffered by historically disadvantaged classes of Indian society.  Reservation of

posts in public employment and seats for admission in educational institutions

and  the  setting  apart  of  seats  in  electoral  bodies  was  envisaged  by  the

Constitution for the fulfilment of a constitutional aspiration of social justice to the

Scheduled Castes and Tribes and to socially and educationally backward classes

of  citizens.   In  pursuit  of  the  constitutional  goal  of  substantive  equality,

reservations  have  been  envisaged  as  a  means  of  enabling  members  of

beneficiary groups to realise, in a true sense, dignity, freedom and liberty which

the Constitution guarantees as its basic philosophy. But the problem which has

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confronted legislatures, policy makers as well as courts (as enforcers of the rule

of law) is a capture of the benefits of affirmative action programmes by persons

who do not genuinely belong to the beneficiary groups.  This kind of  capture

poses a serious dimension.  When a person who does not belong to a caste,

tribe or class for whom reservation is meant, seeks to pass off as its member,

such a stratagem constitutes a fraud on the Constitution. For one thing a person

who is disentitled to the benefit of a welfare measure obtains the benefit.  For

another  this deprives a beneficiary who is  genuinely entitled to receive those

benefits of a legitimate entitlement. This constitutes an egregious constitutional

fraud.  It  is  a  fraud  on  the  statutes  which  implement  the  provisions  of  the

Constitution.  It  is  a  fraud  on  state  policy.  Confronted  with  this  problem,  the

legislatures have intervened with statutory instruments while the executive has,

in implementation of law, set down administrative parameters and guidelines to

prevent the usurpation of benefits.

  4 The batch of cases with which the court is confronted involves individuals

who sought the benefit of public employment on the basis of a claim to belong to

a  beneficiary  group  which  has,  upon  investigation  been  found  to  be  invalid.

Despite the invalidation of the claim to belong to a Scheduled Caste or, as the

case may be, a Scheduled Tribe or backward community, the intervention of the

Court is invoked in the exercise of the power of judicial review.  The basis for the

invocation of jurisdiction lies in an assertion that equities arise upon a lapse of

time and these equities are capable of being protected either by the High Court

(in  the exercise of  its jurisdiction under Article 226) or by this Court  (when it

discharges  the  constitutional  function  of  doing  complete  justice  under  Article

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142).   The  present  batch  of  cases  then  raises  the  fundamental  issue  as  to

whether such equities are sustainable at law and, if so, the limits that define the

jurisdiction of the court to protect individuals who have secured access to the

benefit of reservation inspite of the fact that they do not belong to the caste, tribe

or class for whom reservation is intended.

5     A large body of precedent has evolved both in the High Courts as well as in

this Court in seeking to find answers to pleas raised by individuals that they are

entitled to protection by a constitutional court, even after the invalidation of their

caste or tribe claims.  The decided cases reflect a profound awareness on the

part  of  courts  of  the  human  element  involved.  Assessment  of  human

consequences case by case has resulted in a conflicting line of approach, in the

effort of the court to balance the letter of law with a sense of compassion.  Since

this Bench of three Judges is called upon to seek a median, through the body of

judicial precedent, it is, at the outset, necessary to set out the fundamental values

and vision which the court must pursue.  Those values as well as the vision is

charted out to the court by the Constitution and it is the Constitution which the

court  expounds. The constitutional policy of  creating reservations subserves a

high constitutional value of providing social redress and a life of dignity to castes,

tribes and classes which were in  a historical  sense oppressed by a systemic

pattern  of  social  exclusion  and  human  deprivation.  The  benefits  which  the

Constitution has conferred on beneficiary groups cannot be dissipated by allowing

others who do not belong to the designated castes or tribes to secure the benefit.

Public employment is a significant source of social mobility. Access to education

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opens the doors to secure futures.  As a matter of principle, in the exercise of its

constitutional jurisdiction, the court must weigh against an interpretation which will

protect  unjust  claims  over  the  just,  fraud  over  legality  and  expediency  over

principle.  As the nation evolves, the role of the court must be as an institution

which abides by constitutional principle, enforces the rule of law and reaffirms the

belief  that  claims  based  upon  fraud,  expediency  and  subterfuge  will  not  be

recognised.  Once  these  parameters  are  established  with  a  clear  judicial

formulation individual cases should pose no problem.  Usurpation of constitutional

benefits by persons who are not entitled to them must be answered by the court

in the only way permissible for an institution which has to uphold the rule of law.

Unless the courts were to do so, it  would leave open a path of incentives for

claims  based  on  fraud  to  survive  legal  gambits  and  the  creativity  of  the

disingenuous.    

B The regulatory regime : Madhuri Patil  

6 On 24  February  1981,  the  Government  of  Maharashtra  issued  a  G.R.

which  prescribed  the  procedure  for  obtaining  (i)caste  certificates  from  the

Sub-divisional Officers; and (ii) validity certificates from a Scrutiny Committee.   

7 In  1994,  the  systemic  usurpation  of  benefits  by  persons  who  did  not

belong to the beneficiary groups came to the fore before this Court. There was

before this Court, an urgent need expressed to set down a framework to regulate

the grant of caste certificates and to scrutinise claims.  The need for scrutiny and

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verification of caste claims was addressed in a judgment of this Court, speaking

through  a  bench  of  two  judges,  in  Kumari  Madhuri  Patil Vs. Additional

Commissioner, Tribal  Development  1.  The  judgment  was  delivered  on  2

September 1994. While emphasizing the need to ensure that claims to belong to

a beneficiary group must be carefully scrutinized, this Court observed thus :  

“…13.  The  admission  wrongly  gained  or  appointment  wrongly obtained on the  basis  of  false  social  status  certificate  necessarily have  the  effect  of  depriving  the  genuine  Scheduled  Castes  or Scheduled Tribes or OBC candidates as enjoined in the Constitution of the benefits conferred on them by the constitution.  The genuine candidates are also denied admission to educational institutions or appointments to office or posts under a State for want of social status certificate.   The ineligible  or  spurious  persons  who  falsely  gained entry resort to dilatory tactics and create hurdles in completion of the inquires  by  the  Scrutiny  Committee….” (Id. at p. 254)

8 Detailed guidelines were formulated in the judgment of this Court for the

constitution of committees by the State Governments for scrutinizing claims of

candidates to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe or, as the case may be, to a

backward community designated for reservations. The directions issued by this

Court  envisaged the constitution of  Vigilance Cells  which would conduct local

enquiries to determine the authenticity of a claim to belong to a designated caste

or tribe. The court, among other things, issued the following directions :

“13……(14). In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed is  found  to  be  false,  the  parent/guardian/the  candidate  should  be prosecuted  for  making  false  claim.  If  the  prosecution  ends  in  a conviction and sentence of the accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices under the State or the Union or elections to any local body, legislature or Parliament;

1  (1994) 6 SCC 241

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(15). As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee holding that the  certificate  obtained  was  false,  on  its  cancellation  and  confiscation simultaneously,  it  should  be  communicated  to  the  educational  institution concerned    or    the    appointing    authority    by  registered  post  with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the admission or the appointment. The  Principal  etc.  of  the  educational  institution  responsible  for  making  the admission or the appointing authority, should cancel the admission/appointment without any further notice to the candidate and debar the candidate from further study or continue in office in a post.”                                    (Id. at p. 256-257)

C The Halba / Halbi controversy  

9 The  Constitution  (Scheduled  Castes)  Order  1950  and  the  Constitution

(Scheduled  Tribes)  Order  1950  provide  in  relation  to  each  State  a  list  of

Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled  Tribes  for  the  purpose  of  constitutional

reservations.  In the list of Scheduled Tribes for the State of Maharashtra, Entry

19 is : “Halba, Halbi”

10 In  the  State  of  Maharashtra,  the ambit  of  Entry  19 became a  bone of

contention particularly with persons belonging to the  Halba-Koshti community

claiming to be a sub-tribe of the designated tribe. A Division Bench of the High

Court spoke on the issue on 4 September 1985 in  Milind Sharad Katware Vs.

State of Maharashtra  2. The Division Bench held that Halba-Koshti constituted a

sub-division of  the tribe “Halba-Halbi”  under Entry 19 of the Scheduled Tribes

Order, 1950. Halba-Koshtis were, in the view of the Division Bench, entitled to the

status of a Scheduled Tribe on the ground that they were comprehended within a

designated tribe namely, Halba-Halbi. In coming to this conclusion, the Division

Bench opined that it is permissible to enquire whether a sub-division of a tribe

2  (1986) 1 Bom CR 403

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which is not mentioned in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 is nevertheless a

part and parcel of a tribe which is designated.  

11 Upon a challenge by the State of Maharashtra before this Court, the issue

was referred to a Constitution Bench and eventually resulted in the judgment in

State  of  Maharashtra Vs. Milind  3.  The  Constitution  Bench  held  that  the

Scheduled Tribes Order had to be read as it is; and no evidence could be let in to

urge that a tribe or tribal community or its part constituted a part of a tribe which

was specifically designated. In other words :

“36…(1). It is not at all permissible to hold any inquiry or let in any evidence to decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe or tribal community is included in the general name even though it is not specifically mentioned in the entry concerned in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950.

(2). The Scheduled Tribes Order must be read as it is. It is not even permissible to say that a tribe, sub-tribe, part of or group of any tribe or  tribal  community  is  synonymous  to  the  one  mentioned  in  the Scheduled Tribes Order if they are not so specifically mentioned in it.

(3). A notification issued under clause (1) of Article 342, specifying Scheduled  Tribes,  can  be  amended  only  by  law  to  be  made  by Parliament. In other words, any tribe or tribal community or part of or group within any tribe can be included or excluded from the list  of Scheduled  Tribes  issued  under  clause  (1)  of  Article  342  only  by Parliament by law and by no other authority.

(4). It is not open to State Governments or courts or tribunals or any other authority to modify, amend or alter the list of Scheduled Tribes specified in the notification issued under clause (1) of Article 342.” (Id at p. 30-31)

The judgment of the Bombay High Court holding that Halba-Koshti formed a part

of the designated scheduled tribe, Halba-Halbi was reversed. The declaration of

3  (2001) 1 SCC 4

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law by this Court under Article 141, negated the position of law enunciated by the

Bombay High Court. This was, it must be emphasised, not a case of prospective

over-ruling.   

12 The Constitution Bench in Milind dwelt on the dangers in allowing benefits

which are reserved to designated castes and tribes being usurped by individuals

who  do  not  belong  to  them.  Allowing  the  benefits  which  are  reserved  by

Presidential  orders  issued  under  Articles  341  and  342  to  be  usurped  by  an

imposter  would  negate  the  purpose  of  the  reservation.  This  was  succinctly

emphasized in the following observations of the Constitution Bench  :  

“35….The Presidential Orders are issued under Articles 341 and 342 of  the  Constitution  recognizing  and  identifying  the  needy  and deserving  people  belonging  to  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled Tribes  mentioned therein  for  the  constitutional  purpose of  availing benefits of reservation in the matters of admissions and employment. If  these benefits  are taken away by those for  whom they are not meant, the people for whom they are really meant or intended will be deprived of the same and their sufferings will continue. Allowing the candidates not belonging to Scheduled tribes to have the benefits or advantage of reservation either in admissions or appointments leads to making mockery of the very reservation against the mandate and the scheme of the Constitution.”  (id. at p. 30)

13 Milind Sharad Katware whose cause had travelled from the Bombay High

Court in 1985 to this Court had, by the time that the Constitution Bench resolved

the issue on 28 November 2000 qualified as a doctor. He claimed the benefit of

equities  which had intervened in  the meantime.  They were recognized in  the

ultimate directions which were issued by this Court in the following observations :

“38. Respondent 1 joined the medical course for the year 1985-86. Almost 15 years have passed by now. We are told he has already

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completed the course and may be he is practicing as a doctor. In this view and at this length of time it is for nobody's benefit to annul his admission. Huge amount is spent on each candidate for completion of  medical  course.  No doubt,  one Scheduled Tribe candidate was deprived  of  joining  medical  course  by  the  admission  given  to Respondent 1. If any action is taken against Respondent 1, it  may lead to  depriving  the  service  of  a  doctor  to  the  society  on  whom public money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment  shall  not  affect  the  degree  obtained  by  him  and  his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong  to  the  Scheduled  Tribe  covered  by  the  Scheduled  Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantage of the Scheduled Tribes  Order  any  further  or  for  any  other  constitutional  purpose. Having regard to the passage of time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C) No. 16372 of 1985 and other related matters, we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment.”               (Id. at p. 31)

The latter part of the above extract covered other cases before the court.  

Reading these observations there can be no manner of doubt that this Court took

recourse to its constitutional power under Article 142 to protect benefits which had

accrued to a candidate who had qualified as a doctor though with the caveat that

he would not be entitled to claim the status of belonging to a Scheduled tribe in

the future. The latter part protected, having regard to the passage of time and

interim orders passed in the batch of cases, appointments and admissions which

had  become  final.  These  directions  were  evidently  under  Article  142  of  the

Constitution.

D The legislation in Maharashtra  

14 The  legislature  in  the  State  of  Maharashtra  enacted  the  Maharashtra

Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  De-Notified  Tribes  (Vimukta  Jatis),

Nomadic  Tribes,  Other  Backward  Classes  and  Special  Backward  Category

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(Regulation  of  Issuance  and  Verification  of)  Caste  Certificate  Act,  2000.  The

legislation  essentially  takes  care,  for  that  state  of  the  concerns  that  were

expressed in the decision of this Court in Madhuri Patil by providing a statutory

framework to regulate the issuance of caste certificates, scrutiny and verification

of claims and the consequences to ensue upon the invalidation of a claim. The

legislation received the assent of the President and was published in the gazette

on 23 May 2001. By a notification dated 17 October 2001, the Act came into force

from 18 October 2001, in terms of Section 1(2). Section 3 requires every person

claiming to belong to a Scheduled caste or tribe, other backward class or any

other designated tribe or community seeking to obtain public employment or an

admission to an educational institution or contesting an electoral seat in a local

authority or a co-operative society to apply for the issuance of a caste certificate

to a competent authority named by the State Government. Section 4 empowers

the competent authority to issue a caste certificate upon being satisfied of the

genuineness of the claim. Section 6 requires the State Government to constitute

Scrutiny  Committees  for  the  verification  of  caste  certificates  issued  by  the

competent authorities constituted under Section 4(1). Sub-Section (2) of Section

6 requires  the beneficiary  of  a  caste  certificate  to  submit  an application to  a

Scrutiny Committee for the verification of the caste certificate and for issuance of

a validity certificate. The appointing authority is similarly required by sub-Section

(3)  to  make  an  application  to  the  Scrutiny  Committee  to  verify  the  caste

certificate. Section 6 provides thus :

“6. (1) The Government shall constitute by notification in the official Gazette, one or more Scrutiny Committee(s) for verification of Caste Certificates issued by the Competent  Authorities under sub-section (1) of section 4 specifying in the said notification the functions and the

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PART A

area  of  jurisdiction  of  each  of  such  Scrutiny  Committee  or Committees.

(2) After obtaining the Caste Certificate from the Competent Authority, any  person  desirous  of  availing  of  the  benefits  or  concessions provided  to  the  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  De-notified Tribe (Vimukta Jatis),  Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special Backward Category for the purposes mentioned in section 3 may make an application,  well  in  time,  in  such form and in  such manner as may be prescribed, to the concerned Scrutiny Committee for the verification of such Caste Certificate and issue of a validity certificate.

(3) The appointing authority of the Central or State Government, local authority,  public  sector  undertakings,  educational  institutions, Co-operative  Societies  or  any  other  Government  aided institutions shall, make an application in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed by the Scrutiny Committees for the verification of the Caste Certificate and issue of a validity certificate, in case a person selected  for  an  appointment  with  the  Government,  local  authority, public  sector  undertakings,  educational  institutions,  Co-operative societies  or  any  other  Government  aided institutions  who has not obtain such certificate.   

(4)  The  Scrutiny  Committee  shall  follow  such  procedure  for verification of the Caste Certificate and adhere to the time limit for verification and grant of validity certificate, as prescribed.”    

Section 7  provides for  the confiscation and cancellation  of  “false  certificates”.

Section 7 is in the following terms :   

“7.  (1)  Where, before or after the commencement of this Act, a person not  belonging to  any of  the  Scheduled Castes,  Scheduled Tribes,  De-notified  Tribes  (Vimukta  Jatis),  Nomadic  Tribes,  Other Backward  Classes  or  Special  Backward  Category  has  obtained  a false Caste Certificate to the effect that either himself or his children belong to such Castes,  Tribes or Classes, the Scrutiny Committee may, suo motu, or otherwise call for the record and enquire into the correctness  of  such  certificate  and  if  it  is  of  the  opinion  that  the certificate was obtained fraudulently, it shall, by an order cancel and confiscate the certificate by following such procedure as prescribed, after giving the person concerned an opportunity of being heard, and communicate the same to the concerned person and the concerned authority, if any

(2) The order passed by the Scrutiny Committee under this Act shall be final and shall not be challenged before any authority or court except the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

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Section 8 relates to the burden of proof and envisages that in any application for

the issuance of  a caste certificate by the competent  authority;  in  any enquiry

conducted  by  the  competent  authority  or  Scrutiny  Committee  or  appellate

authority; and in the trial of any offence under the Act, the burden of proving that

the  person  belongs  to  such  caste,  tribe  or  class  shall  be  on  the  claimant  -

applicant. Section 10 provides for the consequence of the invalidation of a caste

certificate and reads thus :  

“10.  (1)  Whoever  not  being  a  person  belonging  to  any  of  the Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  De-notified  Tribes  (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other backward Classes or Special Backward Category secures admission in any educational institution against a seat  reserved for  such Castes,  Tribes or  Classes,  or  secures any appointment  in  the  Government,  local  authority  or  in  any  other Company or Corporation, owned or controlled by the Government or in any Government aided institution or Co-operative Society against a post reserved for such Castes, Tribes or Classes by producing a false Caste Certificate shall, on cancellation of the Caste Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee,  be  liable  to  be  debarred  from the  concerned educational institution, or as the case may be, discharged from the said employment forthwith and any other benefits enjoyed or derived by  virtue  of  such  admission  or  appointment  by  such  person  as aforesaid shall be withdrawn forthwith.

(2) Any amount paid to such person by the Government or any other agency by  way of  scholarship,  grant,  allowance  or  other  financial benefit  shall be recovered from such person as an arrears of land revenue.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any Act for the time being in force, any Degree, Diploma or any other educational qualification acquired by such person after securing admission in any educational institution on the basis of a Caste Certificate which is subsequently proved to be false shall also stand cancelled, on cancellation of such Caste Certificate, by the Scrutiny Committee.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a person shall  be disqualified for being a member of any statutory  body if  he  has  contested  the  election  for  local  authority, co-operative society or any statutory body on the seat reserved for any  of  Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  De-notified  Tribes (Vimukta Jatis) Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special

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Backward  Category  by  procuring  a  false  Caste  Certificate  as belonging  to  such  Caste,  Tribe  or  Class  on  such  false  Caste Certificate  being  cancelled  by  the  Scrutiny  Committee,  and  any benefits obtained by such person shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue and the election of  such person shall  be deemed to have been terminated retrospectively.”

Section 11 deals with offences and penalties and provides thus :

“11.(1)  Whoever, -

(a) obtains a false Caste Certificate by furnishing false information or filing  false  statement  or  documents  or  by  any  other  fraudulent means ; or

(b) not being a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes (Vimukta Jatis), Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes or Special Backward Category secures any benefits  or  appointments  exclusively  reserved  for  such  Castes, Tribes, or Classes in the Government,  local authority or  any other company or corporation owned or controlled by the Government or in any  Government  aided  institution,  or  secures  admission  in  any educational  institution against  a seat  exclusively reserved for  such Castes, Tribes or Classes or is elected to any of the elective offices of any  local  authority  or  Co-operative  Society  against  the  office, reserved for  such  Castes  Tribes  or  Classes  by  producing  a  false Caste Certificate;

Shall, on conviction, be punished, with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend upto two years or with fine which shall not be less than two thousand rupees or both.

(2)  No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this section except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the Scrutiny Committee or  by any other officer  duly authorized by the Scrutiny Committee for this purpose.”

Offences  punishable  under  Section  11 have  been  made  cognizable  and  non

bailable under Section 12. Section 13 imposes criminal penalties upon a person

discharging the functions of a competent authority who intentionally issues a false

caste certificate.  

14

PART A

15 Legislative intervention in the State of Maharashtra by the enactment of

2000 puts into place a statutory framework covering the area from the issuance of

caste / tribe certificates and traversing the scrutiny and verification of caste / tribe

claims and withdrawal of benefits accruing upon a false claim. Stringent penalties

are provided against violators by creating a regime of criminal offences which are

punishable at law. An application for a caste certificate is required to be made to a

designated  authority  constituted  by  the  State  Government.  The  competent

authority has to be satisfied about the genuineness of the claim before it issues a

caste certificate. Issuance of a caste certificate does not in itself conclude the

level of scrutiny. The next stage of scrutiny is contemplated before the Scrutiny

Committee which is conferred with a statutory status by the provisions of the Act.

Section 6 mandates in sub-section (2) that a person who desires to avail of a

benefit or concession provided to a designated caste, tribe or class must make an

application well  in time to the Scrutiny Committee for verification of  the caste

certificate  and  for  the  issuance  of  a  validity  certificate.  Not  only  this,  the

appointing authority is obligated to move the Scrutiny Committee to conduct a

verification  of  the  caste  certificate  of  a  person  who  has  been  selected  for

appointment.  Section 7 empowers the Scrutiny Committee either  suo motu or

otherwise to enquire into the correctness of a caste certificate and, if it is of the

opinion  that  the  certificate  was  obtained  fraudulently,  it  shall  cancel  and

confiscate  it  after  furnishing  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  be heard.  Section  7

operates in respect of all caste certificates whether obtained before or after the

15

PART A

commencement of the Act. If a caste certificate has been obtained falsely by a

person either claiming himself or his children to belong to a designated caste,

tribe or class, the Scrutiny Committee is empowered to cancel it upon an opinion

formed that  it  was obtained fraudulently. The fact  that  a person belongs to a

designated caste, tribe or class is based on facts which are to the knowledge of

the applicant and hence the burden of proof is placed on the claimant by Section

8.

16 The state legislature was evidently not content with a mere invalidation of a

caste certificate which is founded on a false claim made by a candidate to belong

to a designated caste, tribe or class. Section 6 (2) provides that a candidate who

desires to obtain a benefit must apply well in time to the Scrutiny Committee for

verification and similarly the appointing authority of a candidate who has been

selected for appointment but has not obtained a validity certificate must apply to

the Scrutiny Committee for verification. The legislature however was cognizant of

the fact that by the time a scrutiny takes place before the Scrutiny Committee the

candidate may have obtained the benefit of a concession reserved for a caste,

tribe or class. As a matter of  public interest,  the legislation stipulates that the

benefits which have been obtained on the basis of a false caste certificate shall

be withdrawn upon the invalidation of the claim by the Scrutiny Committee. The

ambit of Section 10 (1) extends, among other things, to an admission which is

secured  in  an  educational  institution  against  a  seat  reserved  for  one  of  the

designated castes, tribes or classes;  an appointment in the government,  local

authority  or  corporation  owned  or  controlled  by  the  government  or  any

government institution or co-operative society against a reserved post. A benefit

16

PART A

which  is  obtained  on  the  foundation  of  a  false  caste  claim  which  has  been

invalidated is not permitted to be retained by the candidate. There is a legislative

mandate that the benefit of an admission granted or an appointment to a post

shall be withdrawn forthwith on the cancellation of a caste / tribe certificate. Any

amount which is paid by way of scholarship, grant, allowance or financial benefits

has to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. Sub-Section (3) of Section 10

contains a non-obstante provision as a result of which notwithstanding anything

contained in any Act for the time being in force a degree, diploma or educational

qualification acquired by a person after  securing admission on the basis  of  a

caste  certificate  which  is  proved  to  be  false  and  is  cancelled  would  also  be

invalid. Similarly, by sub-Section (4) a disqualification from holding an electoral

office has been stipulated where a person has contested an election on the basis

of a false caste certificate which is since cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee. To

ensure that the stringent provisions made by it impose a sufficient deterrent, the

legislature considered it fit in its wisdom to create offences and to impose criminal

penalties in Section 11.

17 The  consequences  which  emanate  from  the  cancellation  of  a  caste

certificate are distinct. The first is the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis

of a claim to belong to a designated tribe, group or class which has been held to

be invalid.  This  is  of  a  civil  nature  by which  the applicant  is  deprived  of  the

benefits of a false caste certificate which is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee.

The second consequence is the liability to be subject to a criminal prosecution.

This is a criminal liability arising from an offence created by the legislature.

17

PART A

E Precedent  

18 Several decisions of this Court have considered whether a person who has

secured  the  benefit  of  public  employment  or  admission  to  an  educational

institution on a reserved quota is entitled to retain the benefits obtained despite

the invalidation of the claim to belong to the tribe or caste. In all  such cases,

equities are pressed in aid, chief among them being the lapse of time since the

acquisition of benefits on the basis of a claim to belong to a designated caste or

tribe. As decided cases indicate, the claim for equity is coupled with a “voluntary”

undertaking that the person would not secure or claim any future benefits on the

basis that he or she belongs to the Scheduled Caste, Schedule Tribe or socially

and educationally backward class on the basis of which the original appointment

or admission was obtained. In the case of admissions to educational institutions,

particularly institutions of  higher learning,  the additional  ground which is  often

urged is that the withdrawal of benefits obtained in the past would amount to a

societal  loss  since  scarce  productive  resources  of  the  nation  are  invested  in

providing  for  training  and  education  to  professionals  in  a  discipline  such  as

medicine.  

19 In  Madhuri  Patil (supra),  a  Bench  of  two  learned  Judges  set  down  a

principled rationale as to why a claim for equity by a person who is not found to

belong to the designated caste, tribe or class cannot be countenanced. The Court

observed :

18

PART A

“16. Whether appellants are entitled to their  further  continuance in the  studies  is  the  further  question.  Often  the  plea  of  equities  or promissory  estoppel  would  be  put  forth  for  continuance  and completion of further course of studies and usually would be found favour  with  the  courts.  The  courts  have  constitutional  duty  and responsibility, in exercise of the power of its judicial review, to see that constitutional goals set down in the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of the Constitution, are achieved. A party  that  seeks  equity, must  come with  clean  hands.  He who comes to the court with false claim, cannot plead equity nor the court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. There is no estoppel as no promise of the social status is made by the State when a false plea was put forth for the social status recognised and declared  by  the  Presidential  Order  under  the  Constitution  as amended by the SC & ST (Amendment)  Act,  1976,  which is  later found to be false. Therefore, the plea of promissory estoppel or equity have no application. When it is found to be a case of fraud played by the concerned, no sympathy and equitable considerations can come to his rescue. Nor the plea of estoppel is germane to the beneficial constitutional  concessions  and  opportunities  given  to  the  genuine tribes  or  castes.  Courts  would  be  circumspect  and  wary  in considering such cases.”                            (Id. at p. 257)

However, on the facts of that case the Bench of two Judges while upholding the

cancellation  of  the  status  of  Mahadeo  Koli which  was  fraudulently  obtained,

directed that the student who had completed the course of medical studies be

allowed to appear for the final year examination of the M.B.B.S. degree course

but not as a candidate belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.  The circumstance which

weighed with the Court was that the student had approached the High Court for

the grant of a caste certificate since the Additional Commissioner was not dealing

with the matter.  The student obtained admission pursuant to a   direction of the

High Court.  It  was the parents  of  the student  who had put  the career  of  the

student in jeopardy and since she had completed her course of study except to

appear  for  the  examination;  she  should  be  permitted  to  do  so.   The  above

19

PART A

directions were issued in the case of one of the two appellants, Suchita Laxman

Patil. However, her sister Madhuri (who was the first appellant) was found to have

approached an officer without jurisdiction and after showing the order of the High

Court  in  the  case  of  her  sister  Suchita,  secured  a  caste  certificate  and  got

admission. This Court observed that though she was in the midst of her B.D.S.

studies in the second year, she could not continue as a student  belonging to

Mahadeo Koli Scheduled Tribe. She could only obtain admission as a general

candidate  and  continue  her  studies.  These  directions  are  referable  to  the

jurisdiction conferred on this Court under Article 142.

20 The next decision which is of relevance on the issue, is a judgment of three

Judges of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai Vs. State of Kerala  4. In that case

the appellant who did not belong to a designated reserved community obtained a

caste certificate and was selected as a Deputy Superintendent of Police on a seat

reserved for the Scheduled Castes.  However, it was found upon a complaint that

the appellant did not belong to a Scheduled Caste and the Scrutiny Committee

rejected his claim.  The order of the Scrutiny Committee was upheld by the High

Court and by this Court. Subsequently at the behest of the appellant the Central

Administrative Tribunal directed that he should not be terminated from service

without following the procedure under Article 311.  The High Court reversed that

decision and the appellant was dismissed from service.  Before this Court the

appellant  inter alia   sought protection since he had rendered nearly 27 years of

service.  Rejecting the submission this Court held that :

4  (2004) 2 SCC 105

20

PART A

“15. This apart, the appellant obtained the appointment in the service on the basis that he belonged to a Scheduled Caste community. When  it  was  found  by  the  Scrutiny  Committee  that  he  did  not belong to the Scheduled Caste community, then the very basis of his  appointment  was  taken  away.  His  appointment  was  no appointment in the eyes of law. He cannot claim a right to the post as  he  had  usurped  the  post  meant  for  a  reserved  candidate  by playing a fraud and producing a false caste certificate. Unless the appellant can lay a claim to the post on the basis of his appointment he cannot claim the constitutional guarantee given under the Article 311 of the Constitution. As he had obtained the appointment on the basis of a false caste certificate he cannot be considered to be a person who holds a  post  within  the  meaning  of  Article 311 of  the  Constitution  of  India, Finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee that the appellant got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate has become final. The position, therefore, is that the appellant has usurped the post which should have gone to a member of the Scheduled Caste. In view of the finding recorded by the Scrutiny Committee and upheld upto this Court he has disqualified himself to hold the post. Appointment was  void  from  its  inception. It  cannot  be  said  that  the  said  void appointment would enable the appellant to claim that he was holding a civil post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, As appellant had obtained the appointment by playing a fraud he cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud in entering the service and claim that he was holder of the post entitled to be dealt with in terms of Article 311 of the Constitution of India or the Rules framed thereunder. Where an appointment in a service has been acquired by practising fraud or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law, in service and in such a situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted at all.”   (Id. at p. 115)        (emphasis suppled)

The Bench of three Judges also rejected the submission that since the appellant

had rendered 27 years of service, the order of dismissal should be substituted

with  an  order  of  compulsory  retirement  or  removal  to  protect  his  pensionary

benefits. The Court observed :

“19..…The  rights  to  salary,  pension  and  other  service  benefits  are entirely  statutory  in  nature  in  public  service.  Appellant  obtained  the appointment against a post meant for a reserved candidate by producing a false caste certificate and by playing a fraud. His appointment to the post  was void and non est  in  the eyes of  law. The right  to salary or pension after retirement flow from a valid and legal appointment. The consequential right of pension and monetary benefits can be given only if the appointment was valid and legal. Such benefits cannot be given in a case  where  the  appointment  was  found  to  have  been  obtained

21

PART A

fraudulently and rested on false caste certificate. A person who entered the  service  by  producing  a  false  caste  certificate  and  obtained appointment for the post meant for Scheduled Caste thus depriving the genuine Scheduled Caste of appointment to that post does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. A person who, seeks equity must come with clean hands.  He. who comes to the Court  with false claims, cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour. A person who seeks equity must act in a fair and equitable manner. Equity jurisdiction cannot be exercised in the case of a person who got the appointment on the basis of false caste certificate by playing a fraud. No sympathy and equitable consideration can come to his rescue. We are of the view that equity or compassion cannot be allowed to bend the arms of law in a case where an individual acquired a status by practising fraud.”               (Id. at p. 116)

21 In  Bank  of  India Vs.  Avinash  D.  Mandivikar  5 the  first  respondent

obtained an appointment in the service of the bank in October 1976 on a post

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes. The Scrutiny Committee found that he did not

belong  to  a  Scheduled  Tribe  and,  therefore,  invalidated  the  caste  certificate.

Following the termination of  his services the first  respondent moved the High

Court which accepted his plea that the initiation of proceedings against him by

the  Scrutiny  Committee  for  verification  of  the  caste  certificate  in  1987  was

beyond a reasonable period.  The High Court, while allowing the plea, reinstated

him in service with back-wages.  In an appeal by the employer, this Court held

that once a claim of the employee to belong to a Scheduled Tribe had been

rejected, the employment was “no appointment in eye of law” and that he had

“absolutely no justification for his claim” in respect of the post he usurped.

Distinguishing the directions issued in Milind (under Article 142), this Court held

that :

“10.The protection under the Milind's case (supra) cannot be extended to the respondent No. 1-employee as the protection was given under the peculiar factual background of that case. The employee concerned was a

5  (2005) 7 SCC 690

22

PART A

doctor and had rendered long years of service. This Court noted that on a  doctor  public  money  has  been  spent  and,  therefore,  it  will  not  be desirable to deprive the society of a doctor's service. Respondent No. 1-employee in the present case is a bank employee and the factor which weighed with this Court cannot be applied to him.”              (Id. at p. 698)

The above observations of the court are also an indication that para 38 of the

decision in Milind was construed as consisting of directions issued under Article

142. For it was on that basis that the court in Avinash Mandivikar held that no

case was made out  for  protecting the services of  a bank employee who had

obtained employment on the basis of a false claim. Besides, this Court also held

that the first respondent having perpetrated a fraud, a claim for protection will not

be legally sustainable and a person who had obtained employment by illegitimate

means could not continue to enjoy the fruits of the appointment despite the clear

finding by the Scrutiny Committee that “he does not even have a shadow of  a

right even to be considered for appointment”. This Court relied upon the earlier

decision in Vishwanatha Pillai (supra) in coming to its conclusion.   

22 Another  decision  of  two  learned  Judges  was  in  Additional  General

Manager/Human  Resources,  Bharat  Heavy  Electricals  Ltd. Vs.   Suresh

Ramakrishna Burde  6  where a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had

ordered reinstatement subject to the condition that the employee would not stake

a claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe in future. The claim of the employee to

belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee.

The employee had been appointed in May 1982 to a clerical post and in August

6  (2007) 5 SCC 336

23

PART A

the effect of the judgment of this Court as also the provisions of a statute in the light of the constitutional provisions contained in Articles  341  and  342  of  the  Constitution  of  India  cannot  be diluted  by  reason  of  a  government  resolution  or  otherwise.” (Id. at p. 487)                                                 (emphasis supplied)      

In the view of this Court :

“18. We may also notice that ordinarily a person, who has obtained appointment on the basis of a false certificate, cannot retain the said benefit.  (See Bank of India v. Avinash D. Mandivikar [(2005) 7 SCC 690  :  2005  SCC  (L&S)  1011]  , Ram  Saran v. IG  of  Police, CRPF [(2006) 2 SCC 541 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 351 : (2006) 2 Scale 131] and Supdt. of Post Offices v. R. Valasina Babu [(2007) 2 SCC 335] .) In a situation of this nature, whether the Court will refuse to exercise  its  discretionary  jurisdiction  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution  of  India  or  not  would  depend  upon  the  facts  and circumstances  of  each  case.  This  aspect  of  the  matter  has  been considered  recently  by  this  Court  in Sandeep  Subhash Parate v. State of Maharashtra [(2006) 7 SCC 501 : (2006) 8 Scale 503] .” (Id. at p. 487)

Finally this Court held that the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 must

apply.  Though at one point in time indulgence had been shown to students or to

persons who were found to have acted bona fide this “would not mean that this

Court would pass an order contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions

of a legislative act”.

24 The position in law was reaffirmed in a subsequent decision of a Bench of

three Judges in Union of India Vs. Dattatray  8.   The respondent was appointed

as an Assistant Professor of Psychiatry in a government hospital on the strength

of a claim to belong to a Scheduled Tribe. The Scrutiny Committee in an order of

March 1999 found that the claim that he belonged to the Halba Tribe was false.

8  (2008) 4 SCC 612

26

PART A

The  High  Court  upheld  the  invalidation  of  the  tribe  claim  but  held  that  the

respondent would not be entitled to any benefit as a member of the Scheduled

Tribe  from  the  date  of  its  decision.   In  consequence,  the  services  of  the

respondent were directed not to be disturbed.  This Court held that the High Court

had misconstrued the decision of the Constitution Bench in  Milind (supra) and

adverted to the peculiar circumstances in which protection was granted in that

case to a student who had been admitted to a medical course over 15 years ago.

Distinguishing that decision with the case at hand this Court observed that :

“5…When a person secures employment by making a false claim regarding  caste/tribe,  he  deprives  a  legitimate  candidate belonging to scheduled caste/tribe,  of  employment.  In  such a situation,  the  proper  course  is  to  cancel  the  employment obtained on the basis of the false certificate so that the post may be  filled  up  by  a  candidate  who  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of reservation.”                        (Id  at  p.  614)

(emphasis supplied)

The judgment of the High Court directing the continuance of the first respondent

in service was accordingly set aside.

25 In  Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs.  The State of Maharashtra  9, the

direction contained in paragraph 38 of the decision of the Constitution Bench in

Milind (supra) for protecting a student who had completed his medical studies,

when  nearly  15  years  had  elapsed,  was  held  to  be  referable  to  the  power

conferred  upon  by  this  Court  by  Article  142  of  the  Constitution.  This  Court

observed :

9  (2008) 5 SCC 652

27

PART A

“7. There may however be cases where it will not be proper to permit the student to retain the degree obtained by making a false claim. One example  is  where  the  candidates  secure  seats  by  producing forged or fake caste certificates. There may be cases, where knowing full  well  that  they  do  not  belong  to  a  Scheduled  Tribe/Caste, candidates may make a false claim that they belong to a Scheduled Tribe/Caste. There may also be cases where even before the date of admission, the caste certificates of the candidates might have been invalidated on verification by the Scrutiny Committee. There may be cases where the admissions may be in pursuance of interim orders granted by courts subject to final decision, making it  clear that the candidate will not be entitled to claim any equities by reason of the admission.  The benefit  extended in Milind [(2001) 1 SCC 4 :  2001 SCC (L&S) 117] and Vishwanatha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC 105 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 350] cannot obviously be extended uniformly to all such cases.  Each case may have to  be  considered on its  own merits. Further what has precedential value is the ratio decidendi of the decision and not the direction issued while moulding the relief in exercise  of  power under  Article  142 on the special  facts  and circumstances  of  a  case.  We  are  therefore  of  the  view that Milind [(2001)  1  SCC  4  :  2001  SCC  (L&S)  117] and Vishwanatha Pillai [(2004) 2 SCC 105 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 350] cannot be considered as laying down a proposition that in every case  where  a  candidate's  caste  claim is  rejected  by  a  Caste Verification  Committee,  the  candidate  should  invariably  be permitted  to  retain  the  benefit  of  the  admission  and  the consequential  degree,  irrespective  of  the  facts.”  (Id  at  p.  654) (emphasis supplied)   

In the case at hand, though the Scrutiny Committee had rejected the claim of the

appellant  even  prior  to  his  admission  to  the  professional  degree  course  in

engineering,  the  High  Court  had  directed  by  an  interim  order  the  grant  of

provisional  admission.   This  Court  observed  that  since  the  admission  to  an

engineering course had been obtained nearly 13 years earlier and the candidate

had already secured a degree, he should be permitted to retain the benefit of the

degree subject to the condition that he would not claim any further benefit as a

member  of  a  Scheduled  Tribe  and  any  expenditure  incurred  in  terms  of  an

exemption from the fee or a grant of scholarship, would be recovered.

28

PART A

he not only plays a fraud on the society but in effect and substance plays a fraud on the Constitution. When, therefore, a certificate is granted to a person who is  not  otherwise  entitled  thereto,  it  is  entirely  incorrect  to contend that the State shall be helpless spectator in the matter."

(iii) Similar  observations  are

contained in the judgment of

this  court  in  Regional

Manager, Central Bank  Vs.

Madhulika  Guru  Prasad

Dahir  12:

“13…It would suffice to state that except in a few decisions, where the admission/appointment  was  not  cancelled  because  of  peculiar  factual matrix obtaining therein, the consensus of judicial opinion is that equity, sympathy or generosity has no place where the original appointment rests on a false caste certificate. A person who enters the service by producing a false caste certificate and obtains appointment for the post meant for a Scheduled  Caste  or  Scheduled  Tribe  or  OBC,  as  the  case  may  be, deprives a genuine candidate falling in either of the said categories, of appointment to that post, does not deserve any sympathy or indulgence of this Court. He who comes to the Court with a claim based on falsity and deception cannot plead equity nor the Court would be justified to exercise equity jurisdiction in his favour…..”  

26 We may now advert to a line of precedent, upon which reliance has been

placed by the private  party  claimants,  to  indicate  the circumstances  in  which

recourse has been taken by this Court to its jurisdiction under Article 142. Sandip

Subhash Parate Vs.  State of Maharashtra  13, is a decision of a Bench of two

Judges  of  this  Court.   The  claim  of  the  appellant  to  belong  to  the  Halba

12  AIR (2008) SC 3266

13  (2006) 7 SCC 501  

30

PART A

Scheduled Tribe formed the basis of his admission to the B.E. degree course at

the University of Pune. The claim was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee. In a

writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the appellant had the

benefit  of  an interim order.  Eventually the Writ  Petition was allowed and the

proceedings were remanded to the Scrutiny Committee. The Scrutiny Committee

on  remand  rejected  the  claim  against  which  another  writ  petition  was  filed.

Though no interim relief was granted in the writ petition the appellant was allowed

to continue with his studies and he completed engineering studies in 2004.  Both

the Writ Petition and the Review Petition before the High Court were dismissed.

On these facts, the bench of two judges held that  prima facie  the case of the

appellant indicated that he was under a bona fide belief that Koshti - Halbas were

members of a Scheduled Tribe particularly since he had obtained admission prior

to the decision in  Milind (supra). Hence in the exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 142 the Bench observed that it did not find any lack of bona fides on his

part. The decision then holds that :

“15…We, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, are not inclined to go into the question as regards purported commission of fraud by the appellant, particularly, when the University admitted him without any demur whatsoever. We are doing so having regard to the doctrine of proportionality. The appellant has suffered a lot. He might not  be  entirely  responsible  therefor.  He  might  have  been  under a bona  fide belief  that  he  comes  within  the  purview  of  notified category.  We,  therefore, albeit with  much  reluctance  accept  the fervent  and  impassionate  plan  made  by  the  learned  counsel appearing for the appellant that he be allowed to obtain the degree. The same shall,  however, be subject  to  payment  of  Rs 1 lakh in favour of the State of Maharashtra so as to recompense the State to some extent the amount spent on him for imparting education as a reserved category candidate.” (Id at p. 507)

31

PART A

27 In  Central  Warehousing  Corporation Vs.  Jagdishkumar  Vithalrao

Panjankar  14, decided on 16 January 2007, a Bench of two Judges of this Court in

the  exercise  of  its  jurisdiction  under  Article  142 protected the  services  of  the

respondent who had worked from 1984 on the strength of a claim to belong to the

Halba  Scheduled  Tribe  though  it  was  found  that  he  was  a  Koshti.  A similar

protection has been granted in State of Maharashtra Vs. Om Raj  15  by a Bench

of two Judges where admission, or as the case may be, appointment to a service

was obtained on the basis of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe

though the individuals concerned were found to be Koshti. The decision dealt with

a batch of cases which were held to be covered by Milind.

28 The long tenure of an employee was pressed in aid in a judgment of a

Bench of two Judges of this Court in Raju Ramsing Vasave Vs. Mahesh Deorao

Bhivapurkar  16 as a ground for the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. In

that case the first respondent was, on the strength of a Scheduled Tribe certificate

of August 1987, employed in the State Pollution Control Board and his status as a

member of a Scheduled Tribe was confirmed in a decision of the High Court in

August  1988.  The  Scrutiny  Committee,  however,  invalidated  the  claim  of  the

respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. However, the High Court held

that its earlier decision of August 1988 had attained finality and that the status of

the first respondent could not be questioned again. This Court by its judgment

held  that  when  an  advantage  is  obtained  by  a  person  in  violation  of  the

14  C. A .No. 233 of 2007 15  (2007) 14 SCC 488 16  (2008) 9 SCC 54

32

PART A

constitutional scheme a constitutional fraud is committed. The earlier decision of

the High Court which was rendered without a factual foundation was held not to

operate as res judicata. However, since the Bombay High Court had allowed the

writ petition filed by the respondent in 1988 and he had continued in service since

long,  recourse  was  taken  to  the  jurisdiction  under  Article  142,  to  protect  his

service albeit on the basis that he belongs to the general category. The benefit of

the protection of service was again granted by a Bench of two judges in Punjab

National Bank   Vs.  Vilas Govindrao Bokade  17. A similar protection has been

extended in Vijaykumar Vs. State of Maharashtra  18,  Damodhar  Vs. Secretary  ,

Industrial, Energy & Labour Department  19, Raiwad Manojkumar Nivruttirao

Vs.  State  of  Maharashtra  20 and  Dattu  Namdev  Thakur   Vs.  State  of

Maharashtra  21.

29 A decision rendered by this Court in 2012 in the case of  Kavita Vasant

Solunke  Vs.  State of Maharashtra  22 involved a situation where the appellant

applied  for  the post  of  a  teacher  in  a  high  school  which  was reserved  for  a

Scheduled Tribe claiming to  be a  Halba.  She  was appointed on probation in

August 1995 and was confirmed in service. The proceeding before the Scrutiny

Committee revealed that the appellant was a Koshti by caste and not a Halba as

a result of which the caste certificate was cancelled. This led to the termination of

the services of the appellant on 23 February 2008. The School Tribunal dismissed

17  (2008) 14 SCC 545 18  (2010) 14 SCC 489 19  (2010) 15 SCC 537  20  (2011) 9 SCC 798 21  (2012) 1 SCC 549 22  (2012) 8 SCC 430

33

PART A

the appeal filed by the appellant on 28 September 2008 and the writ  petition

before the High Court resulted in an order of rejection. This Court held that the

Scrutiny Committee had not found that the caste certificate was false, fabricated

or manipulated or  that  the Scrutiny Committee found any fraud, fabrication or

misrepresentation. In the circumstances, this Court directed that the services of

the  appellant  be  protected  but  that  she  would  not  be  entitled  to  any  further

benefits  on  the  basis  of  the  caste  certificate  cancelled  by  the  Scrutiny

Committee :

“22. Applying  the above to  the case at  hand  we do not  see any reason to hold that the appellant had fabricated or falsified the particulars of being a Scheduled Tribe only with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment as a teacher. There  is,  therefore,  no  reason  why  the  benefit  of  protection against ouster should not be extended to her subject to the usual condition that the appellant shall not be ousted from service and shall be reinstated if already ousted, but she would not be entitled to any further benefit on the basis of the certificate which she has obtained and which  was  10 years  after  its  issue cancelled  by  the  Scrutiny Committee.”                             (Id. at p. 440)        (emphasis supplied)

This  decision  of  two  learned  judges  does  not  indicate  that  the  provisions  of

Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were noticed.  

30 The  issue  was  revisited  in  another  decision  of  two  judges  in  Shalini

Gajananrao Dalal Vs. New English High School Association  23. The appellant

obtained a certificate of belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in July 1974. On

the strength of a claim that the Gadwal Koshti caste (to which she belonged) had

consanguinity to the Halba Scheduled Tribe, she was appointed as an Assistant

23  (2013) 16 SCC 526

34

PART A

Teacher and was confirmed in 1984. She was promoted as a Head Mistress in

1994.  The  Scrutiny  Committee  in  August  2003  held  that  the  caste  certificate

obtained by the appellant was invalid. A learned Single Judge of the High Court

granted  protection in  service  on the strength  of  a  G.R.  dated 15 June 1995.

Thereafter  protracted  litigation  ensued  which  eventually  resulted  in  a  Single

Judge of the High Court setting aside the order of reinstatement passed by the

School Tribunal. This order was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the

High Court.  Summarising the position which emerged from earlier decisions of

two judges, this Court has held that :

“7.1. If any person has fraudulently claimed to belong to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe and has thereby obtained employment, he would be disentitled from continuing in employment. The rigour of this conclusion  has  been  diluted  only  in  instances  where  the  court  is confronted with the case of  students who have already completed their  studies  or  are  on  the  verge  of  doing  so,  towards  whom sympathy is understandably extended.

7.2. Where there is some confusion concerning the eligibility to the benefits  flowing  from Scheduled  Caste  or  Scheduled  Tribe  status, such as issuance of relevant certificates to persons claiming to be “Koshtis”  or  “Halba-Koshtis”  under  the  broadband  of  “Halbas”, protection of employment will  be available with the rider that these persons will  thereafter be adjusted in the general category thereby rendering  them  ineligible  to  further  benefits  in  the  category  of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe as the case may be.

7.3. This  benefit  accrues  from the  decision  of  this  Court  inter  alia in Raju  Ramsing  Vasave v. Mahesh  Deorao  Bhivapurkar [(2008)  9 SCC 54 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 802] which was rendered under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Realising the likely confusion in the minds of even honest persons the Resolutions/Legislation passed by the State Governments should spare some succour to this section of persons.  This  can  be  best  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  it  was in Milind [State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 : 2001 SCC (L&S)  117]  that  the  Constitution  Bench  clarified  that  “Koshtis”  or “Halba-Koshtis”  were  not  entitled  to  claim  benefits  as  Scheduled Tribes and it was the “Halbas” alone who were so entitled. A perusal of  the  judgment  in Vilas[Punjab  National  Bank v. Vilas,  (2008)  14 SCC  545  :  (2009)  2  SCC  (L&S)  143]  by  Sirpurkar,  J.,  as  well

35

PART A

as Solunke [Kavita  Solunke v. State  of  Maharashtra,  (2012)  8  SCC 430 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 609] makes it clear that this protection is available by virtue of the decisions of this Court; it is not exclusively or  necessarily  predicated  on  any  Resolution  or  Legislation  of  the State Legislature.”  (Id. at pgs. 533-534)

The High Court in that case had while rejecting the claim of the appellant relied

upon the decision of three Judges in Dattatray (supra). However, this Court held

that  the  decision  in  Dattatray cannot  be  construed  to  have  overruled  earlier

decisions of two Judges. In that context this Court has held that :

“8. A reading of the impugned judgment [Shalini v. New English High School Assn., LPA No. 527 of 2009, order dated 25-11-2009 (Bom)] requires  us  to  clarify  an  important  aspect  of  the  doctrine  of precedence. Dattatray [Union  of  India v. Dattatray,  (2008)  4  SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is the only three-Judge Bench decision, and therefore indisputably holds pre-eminence. However, by that time several decisions had already been rendered by two-Judge Benches some of which have already been discussed above. It was within the competence of Dattatray [Union of  India v. Dattatray,  (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] Bench to overrule the other two-Judge Benches. Despite the fact that it has not done so the per incuriam principle  would  not  apply  to  the  decision  because it  was a larger Bench.  However,  no  presumption  can  be  drawn  that the Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] three-Judge Bench decision was of the opinion that the earlier  two-Judge Bench decisions had articulated an incorrect interpretation of the law. That being so, the two-Judge Bench views may still  be relied upon so long as the ratio of Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] is not directly in conflict with their ratios. It is therefore imperative to distil the ratio of Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] , which we have already discussed in some detail. We need only reiterate therefore that the three-Judge Bench was perceptibly incensed with the falsity of the claim of the employee to  Scheduled  Caste/Scheduled  Tribe  status.  That  was  not  a  case where a legitimate claim of consanguinity to a “Halba-Koshti”, “Koshti” or “Gadwal Koshti”, etc. had been made, which was at the inception point considered to be eligible to beneficial treatment admissible to Scheduled  Tribes,  later  to  be  reversed  by  the  Constitution  Bench decision in Milind [State of Maharashtra v. Milind,  (2001) 1 SCC 4 :

36

PART A

2001 SCC (L&S) 117] and declared to be the entitlement of Halbas only.”   (Id. at p. 534)

In the view of this Court, Section 10 of the Act cancels any benefit which may

have been derived by a person on the basis of a false caste certificate. Explaining

the ambit of the provision, the Court has held that :

“11.….Whilst “Caste Certificate” has been defined in Section 2(a) of the 2000 Act, “False Caste Certificate” has not been dealt with in the Definitions clause.  There is always an element of deceitfulness, in order  to  derive  unfair  or  undeserved  benefit  whenever  a  false statement  or  representation  or  stand  is  adopted  by  the  person concerned.  An  innocent  statement  which  later  transpires  to  be incorrect may be seen as false in general sense would normally not attract punitive or detrimental consequences on the person making it, as it is one made by error. An untruth coupled with a dishonest intent however requires legal retribution. It appears to us that Section 10 applies in Dattatray [Union of India v. Dattatray, (2008) 4 SCC 612 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 6] mould only.” (Id. at p. 536)

The above extract indicates that this Court has in Shalini imported a requirement

of dishonest intent, before the withdrawal of benefits mandated by Section 10 of

the State legislation can take effect.  

Since there was no falsity in the claim of the appellant, the Court held that Section

10 would not apply to her case. The appellant was accordingly reinstated without

any back-wages subject to the condition that she would not be entitled to any

further promotion as a Scheduled Tribe candidate.  

31 In R. Unnikrishnan Vs. V. K. Mahanudevan  24 the respondent applied for

the grant of a Scheduled Caste certificate on the basis that he was a Thandan

which was a notified Scheduled Caste. The Tahsildar found that the respondent

24  (2014) 4 SCC 434

37

PART A

did  not  belong  to  the  Scheduled  Caste  in  question.   In  the  course  of  writ

proceedings, the High Court  directed the Tahsildar  to  issue a caste certificate

following  which  the  respondent  was  appointed  as  an  Assistant  Executive

Engineer in a Special Recruitment Drive for Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe

candidates. Subsequently, following the decision of a Full  Bench of the Kerala

High Court, the caste certificate of the respondent came under scrutiny and it was

found that the respondent actually belonged to the Ezhuva community which fell

in the OBC category. The respondent challenged the enquiry proceedings in a

Writ Petition. The High Court  quashed the enquiry. The Division Bench of the

High  Court  in  appeal  directed  a  fresh  enquiry  into  the  caste  status  of  the

respondent.  A  fresh  enquiry  resulted  in  the  finding  that  the  claim  of  the

respondent to belong to a Scheduled Caste was invalid. Following the order of

the High Court the State Government held that the respondent did not belong to a

Scheduled Caste but belonged to a community which was designated as an OBC

and  if  any benefits  have  been  obtained  on  a  wrongful  basis,  they would  be

recovered. Both the learned single Judge of the Kerala High Court and in appeal

the  Division  Bench  held  that  the  caste  status  of  the  respondent  had already

attained finality and could not be reopened. This Court observed that in Palghat

Jilla Thandan Samudhaya Samrakshna Smithi  Vs.  State of Kerala  25, it  had

held that the Thandan community being listed in the Scheduled Castes Order

1950, it was not open to the State to embark upon an enquiry whether a section

of Ezhuva / Thiyya which was called Thandan in the Malabar area was excluded

from the benefits of the Order.  This Court noted that by an amendment of 2007 to

the Constitution Scheduled Castes Order,  Ezhuvas and Thiyyas in the erstwhile

25  (1994) 1 SCC 359

38

PART A

Cochin and Malabar areas are no longer Scheduled Castes with effect from 30

August 2007 and would no longer be entitled to be treated as a Scheduled Caste

nor will the benefits of reservation be admissible. However, after adverting to the

decisions in Milind, Kavita Solunke and  Sandeep Parate this Court held that :

“41. In the instant case there is no evidence of lack of bona fides by the respondent. The protection available under the decision of Milind case [State of  Maharashtra v. Milind,  (2001)  1 SCC 4 :  2001 SCC (L&S) 117] could, therefore, be admissible even to the respondent. It follows  that  even  if  on  a  true  and  correct  construction  of  the expression  “Thandan”  appearing  in  the  Constitution  (Scheduled Castes) Order, 2007 did not include “Ezhuvas” and “Thiyyas” known as “Thandan” and assuming that the two were different at all relevant points  of  time,  the  fact  that  the  position  was  not  clear  till  the Amendment Act of 2007 made a clear distinction between the two, would entitle all those appointed to serve the State up to the date the amending Act came into force, to continue in service.”                  (Id. at pgs. 453-453)

32 We may also at this stage advert to a judgment of two learned judges of

this Court in  B. H. Khawas  Vs. Union of India  26. In that case, the appellant was

appointed as a Chemical Engineer Grade-I in the Customs and Central Excise

Department in June 1995 against a vacancy reserved for a Scheduled Tribe. The

letter of appointment provided that the appointment was provisional and subject

to  verification  of  the  caste  certificate.  His  services  were  terminated  in  2004

following a decision of the Scrutiny Committee that he belonged to the Koshti

which  is  not  a  Scheduled  Tribe  in  the  State  of  Maharashtra.  The  appellant

submitted a representation on the receipt of the order of the Scrutiny Committee

claiming that he had not furnished false information and the caste certificate was

obtained by him bona fide on the basis of the school record. The appellant also

26  (2016) 8 SCC 715

39

PART A

claimed that  the issue as to whether  the Koshti  caste  is  a part  of  the Halba

Scheduled Tribe was the subject matter of intense debate until it was resolved on

28 November 2000 by the Constitution Bench in  Milind (supra). Eventually he

moved the Central Administrative Tribunal which directed that the appointment of

the appellant which was made prior to the decision in  Milind (supra) should be

protected. When the decision of the Tribunal was assailed, the Division Bench of

the High Court relied on the decision in Dattatray (supra) and restored the order

of termination dated 8 June 2004. In appeal before this Court, it was urged that

the  decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Milind (supra)  protected  all

appointments which had become final. This Court observed that in paragraph 38

of the decision of the Constitution Bench in  Milind it has been made clear that

“the  admissions  and  appointments  that  have  become  final,  shall  remain

unaffected  by  this  judgment”.  The  appointment  of  the  appellant  as  Chemical

Engineer Grade-I was, it was held, provisional and subject to the verification of

his caste claim. It was not treated as being final by the department till the order of

termination was issued. Since the appointment was made on a  provisional basis

subject to the verification of the caste certificate it was held that the appellant was

not entitled to the protection of his service. Both the earlier decisions in  Kavita

Solunke and in Shalini   were distinguished on the ground that in the former the

appointment  had  attained  finality  and  could  not  be  disturbed  while  in  the

subsequent decision also, the appointment as an Assistant Teacher had attained

finality and she had been confirmed in service. Similarly in  Unnikrishnan the

Court was held to be dealing with a matter where the caste claim was already a

40

PART A

subject  matter  of  challenge  before  the  Court  and  had  been  upheld.  In  this

background, this Court in Khawas held as follows :

“14. In none of the cases pressed into service by the appellant, the appointment, as in this case, was on provisional basis and subject to verification of caste certificate through proper channel. It necessarily follows that the principle expounded in the three decisions referred to above, can have no application to the case on hand. Indubitably, if the argument of the appellant was accepted, it would inevitably mean that  all  appointments  made  before  28-11-2000  must  be  protected even though it had not become final. That would also mean that all caste certificates issued to persons belonging to Koshti community, as being Halba Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra, prior to 28-11-2000 (the day on which Milind case [State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 117] was decided by the Constitution Bench),  have  been  validated  irrespective  of  the  opinion  of  the Scrutiny  Committee  qua  those  certificates.  That  cannot  be countenanced. For caste Koshti is neither a synonym nor part of a notified Scheduled Tribe Halba in Maharashtra.”    (Id. at p. 721)

Following this principle, it was held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief

on the finding that his appointment as Chemical Engineer had not attained finality.

Once the Scrutiny Committee held that the appellant did not belong to the Halba

community the High Court was held to be justified in allowing the writ petition filed

by the Department. The order of termination was hence restored.  

The decision of this Court in Khawas specifically rejects the submission that the

decision of the Constitution Bench in Milind would protect all appointments made

before 28 November 2000 even though they were not final.  If the appointment

was  yet  to  be  subject  to  scrutiny  by  the  Caste  Scrutiny  Committee  it  would

evidently not have attained finality prior to the date of  the judgment in  Milind

(supra).

41

PART A

F Decisions of the Bombay High Court   

33 In Ramesh Suresh Kamble v. State of Maharashtra  27, a Full Bench of the

Bombay High Court consisting of Mr Justice R M Lodha (as the learned Chief

Justice then was), Mr Justice S A Bobde (as the learned Judge then was) and

Mr Justice S B Deshmukh considered the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of

2001,  particularly  Sections  7(1)  and  10(1)  in  the  context  of  the  electoral

disqualification of a Councillor elected under the Mumbai Municipal Corporation

Act  following  the  invalidation  of  the  caste  certificate.  After  adverting  to  the

decision  of  an  earlier  Full  Bench  in  Sujit  Vasant  Patil Vs. State  of

Maharashtra  28, the Full Bench held thus :  

3

“24….The inquiry under section 7(1) of Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of  2001  by  the  Caste  Scrutiny  Committee  is  focussed  on  the correctness of the Caste Certificate obtained by such person from the Competent Authority. The, Caste Certificate is issued by the Competent  Authority  on  the  application  made  by  the concerned person disclosing certain information. If the Caste Certificate is cancelled by the Caste Scrutiny Committee, it obviously means that the Caste Certificate has been obtained by that  person from the Competent  Authority  on incorrect facts  or  erroneous representation.  It  is  not  necessary  that such  claim or  declaration  must  involve  turpitude  of  mind. There may not be any deliberateness in it. The failure on the part of the candidate to establish his caste claim before the Scrutiny Committee and the declaration that the Certificate obtained from the Competent Authority is invalid and thereby cancelled  leads  to  necessary  inference  that  such  person made a false claim of his caste belonging to the reserved category  to  which  he  did  not  belong and,  thus,  incurring disqualification under section 16(1C)(a).”                      (Id at p. 438)                                                    (emphasis supplied)

Again, in the view of the Full Bench :  

“26. A candidate who sets  up a claim as belonging to a particular caste  by  making  an  application  to  the  Competent  Authority  and

27  (2007) 1  Mh. L.J 423 28  (2004)   3  Mh. L J 1109  

42

PART A

obtains the Caste Certificate based on such claim and information and contests the election of the Councillor from the reserved seat and gets elected and if, ultimately, the Scrutiny Committee upon inquiring into  the  correctness  of  such  certificate  declares  such  certificate invalid and cancels the same, it is obvious that such Caste Certificate has been obtained by that person on the basis of the declaration or information  or  claim  which  was  not  correct  or  true  and  upon invalidation and cancellation of the Caste Certificate by the Scrutiny Committee, such person incurs disqualification automatically. There is no escape from it.”                                                                  (Id. at p. 438)

Another Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale Vs.

State  of  Maharashtra  29 held  that  the  directions  which  were  issued  by  the

Constitution Bench of this Court in paragraph 38 of its decision in Milind were in

exercise of the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution.

34 A Division  Bench  of  the  Bombay  High  Court  in  Priyanka  Omprakash

Panwar Vs. State of Maharashtra  30  has construed the provisions of Section 10

of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 in holding thus :  

“3….The balance between the equitable consideration of protecting the  interest  of  a  student  who  has  pursued  his  education  and the public  interest  in  protecting  the  reserved  categories  against  the usurpation of their constitutional entitlements by imposters has now been  made  by  the  State  Legislature.  …  The  Legislature  has expressly stipulated that a degree or diploma obtained on the basis of a caste claim which is invalidated shall stand cancelled. In the face of an express legislative provision,  this Court  shall  not  be justified in exercising  its  equitable  jurisdiction.   Considerations  of  equity  that guide the Court in constitutional adjudication under Article 226 of the Constitution  must  be  in  accordance  with  the  law  enacted  by  the Legislature. … Stringent provisions have been made to protect the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other reserved categories. To dilute those provisions by importing equitable considerations for a candidate who has usurped benefits would be to defeat the law.  The legislation was in this case conceived in the interests of protecting the constitutional scheme of reservations from usurpation by those who are not entitled.”                                                (Id. at p. 848)

29  (2009) 2 Mh. L.J. 788 30  (2009) 4 Mh L.J. 847

43

PART A

This  decision  has  been followed in  a  subsequent  decision  in  Apurva  Ashok

Gokhale Vs. State of Maharashtra  31.  

35 In Arun Vishwanath Sonone Vs. State of Maharashtra  32, two questions

were referred for decision to a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court  :   

“1. Whether the relief of protection of service after invalidation of the caste claim can be granted by the High Court on the basis of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kavita Solunke v. State of  Maharashtra  and other, 2012(5)  Mh.  L.J.  (S.C)  921 = 2012 (8) SCC 430 ?...  

2.  If the answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, can such relief of protection of service be granted by the High Court in a case where the same relief has been earlier refused by the High Court?”                      (Id at p. 465)”

The Full Bench has held that a caste certificate whether issued prior to or after

the  coming  into  force  of  Maharashtra  Act  XXIII  of  2001  is  valid  subject  to

verification and the grant of a validity certificate by the Scrutiny Committee. The

Full  Bench has taken the view that Section 10 of the State Act regarding the

withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate operates

with effect from 18 October 2001. Section 10, in the view of the High Court is

“essentially penal in nature” and shall have no effect on the benefits secured or

an appointment obtained prior to the coming into force of the enactment. Hence,

the view of the High Court is that :  

“27….The  consequences  of  discharge  from  employment  or withdrawal of benefits secured or obtained by producing a false caste certificate shall  not  operate in respect  of  benefits  or  appointments obtained or secured prior to coming into force of the said Act.”  (Id. at p. 475)

31  (2013) 1 Mh. LJ 139 32  (2015) 1 Mh L.J. 457

44

PART A

The Full Bench has taken the view that the observations of this Court in Shalini

Gajananrao  Dalal Vs. New  English  High  School  Association  33 impliedly

overruled the earlier judgments of the Full  Benches of the High Court in  Sujit

Vasant Patil and  Ganesh Rambhau Khalale (supra).  In  the view of  the Full

Bench an innocent statement made by error should not in the absence of an

element of deceitfulness operate to deprive a candidate of the benefits obtained

on the foundation of a false certificate. The Full Bench held, following decision of

this Court in Kavita Solunke , that :  

“From the decision of the Apex Court in Kavita Solunke’s case, it can be gathered that the protection granted in Milind’s case would not be available where any fraud or any fabrication or any misrepresentation is made with a view to obtain an undeserved benefit in the matter of appointment.  If there is no accusation that the certificate was false, fabricated or manipulated by concealment or otherwise, the refusal of benefit flowing from the decision in Milind’s case may not be justified.”

The judgment of the Full Bench also holds that the directions which were issued

by the Constitution Bench in Milind are in two parts - the first being to save the

admission and degree secured while the other is of a general nature invoking the

doctrine of prospective overruling to save admissions and appointments that have

become final.  Hence, according to the Full  Bench, the ratio of  the earlier  Full

Bench  judgment  in  Ganesh  Rambhau  Khalale holding  that  the  clarificatory

directions  in  Milind were  referable  to  Article  142  would  run  contrary  to  the

decisions  in  Kavita  Solunke and  Shalini and  would  cease  to  be  a  binding

precedent. Consequently,  the first question which was referred to the Full Bench

has been answered in the affirmative by holding that the relief of the protection of

33  (2013) 16 SCC 526

45

PART A

services after the invalidation of a caste claim can be granted by the High Court

on the basis of the decisions of this Court in Kavita Solunke and Shalini.  

G Submissions

36 In the present batch of cases, the almost uniform facet is that the claim to

belong to a reserved category has been rejected upon scrutiny.  

37 On behalf of the persons whose caste or tribe claims have been rejected,

the following submissions have been urged :  

(i) The issue with regard to caste certificates granted prior to 28 November

2000 is not res integra in view of the dictum laid down in paragraph 38

of the judgment of this Court in  Milind. The decision in  Milind gave a

positive direction to the effect that appointments that had become final

on or  before  28  November  2000 (the date  when the  judgment  was

delivered) shall  remain unaffected. The Constitution Bench dealt with

appointments  as  well  as  admissions  to  educational  institutions.

Following the decision in  Milind this Court disposed of several cases

relating to Halba-Koshti  and did not  disturb appointments which had

been made prior to 28 November 2000. The directions in  Milind are

based on the doctrine of prospective overruling;  

(ii) No  issue  was  joined  before  the  High  Court  to  the  effect  that  the

provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 are retrospective and would

interdict admissions or appointments made prior to the enforcement of

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PART A

the Act.  In  any case such a stand would be contrary to the binding

circulars issued by the State Government; and

(iii) Maharashtra Act  XXIII  of  2001 is  not retrospective  in  operation.  The

statute  being  of  a  penal  nature,  it  cannot  be  construed  to  be

retrospective since that would render it violative of Article 20(1) of the

Constitution. The Act was notified on 17 October 2001 with effect from

18 October 2001 which is the relevant date under Section 1 (2).  

(iv) While  Section  7  empowers  the  Scrutiny  Committee  to  cancel  any

certificate which has been obtained before or after the commencement

of the Act, the expression “before or after the commencement of this

Act” is absent in Sections 10 and 11. Consequently, though Section 7

may be retroactive in operation, Sections 10 and 11 which relate to the

withdrawal of benefits ard in regard to penal offences are prospective.  

Besides  the  above  submissions  it  has  also  been  urged  that  in  so  far  as

Halba-Koshtis are concerned :

(i) Though  in  Entry  19  of  the  Scheduled  Tribes  Order,  1950  only  “

Halba-Halbi”  has  been  recognised  as  a  Scheduled  Tribe,  until  the

decision  of  the  Constitution  Bench  in  Milind,  Halba  -  Koshtis  were

“socially  and  officially”  recognized  and  accepted  as  a  sub-tribe  of

Halba-Halbi.  This  may  have  been  as  a  result  of  the  judicial

pronouncement  made by the  High  Court  from 1956 or  the circulars

issued by the State Government;

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PART A

(ii) It was on 28 November 2000 that the Constitution Bench in Milind held

that Halba - Koshtis do not fall within the purview of Entry 19 of the

Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950. Hence, it  cannot be said that a caste

certificate issued at any time prior to 28 November 2000 in favour of a

citizen who was a Halba Koshti was false or a fraud and it can only be

held  that  such  a  person  ceased  to  be  recognized  as  Halba-Halbi

Scheduled Tribe;  

(iii) Section 11 of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 which is in the nature of a

penal provision will not be applicable to caste certificates which were

issued prior to 18 October 2001;

(iv) On  15  January  1995,  a  government  resolution  was  issued  by  the

Government of Maharashtra that appointments made prior to that date

against reserved posts would remain protected even if the caste/tribe

claim of the appointee was invalidated or found to be false;

(v) Where an appointment in service has been acquired by practicing fraud

or deceit such an appointment is no appointment in law and in such a

situation Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted. This position will

not be applicable to claimants of the Halba - Koshtis caste to whom

caste certificates were issued and appointments were made prior to 28

November 2000; and

(vi) On 10 August 2010, the Union Government in the Ministry of Personnel,

Public Grievances and Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training

issued an office memorandum to the effect that persons belonging to

the Halba, Halbi / Koshti castes who got appointment against a vacancy

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of certificates issued by

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PART A

the competent authority and whose appointments have been rendered

final prior to 28 November 2000 shall not be affected.  

(vii) On  21  October  2015,  the  State  of  Maharashtra  issued  a  circular

directing  that  employees  who  have  been  appointed  against  posts

reserved  for  Scheduled  Tribes  in  government  services  between  15

January  1995  and  17  October  2001,  whose  claims  have  been

invalidated,  shall  not  be disbanded/terminated until  further  orders.  In

view of this circular, the State Government is estopped from challenging

the Full Bench decision of the High Court in Arun Sonone.  

H PART II : Analysis  

38 Having  put  together  the  body of  material  on the  subject,  including  the

precedents  and  legislation  governing  the  area,  the  stage for  analysis  is  now

reached. That is what this judgment now seeks to embark upon.  

39 The backdrop for the decision in Madhuri Patil (supra) was provided by

the significant scale on which benefits were secured by imposters by passing

themselves off as members of castes, tribes and classes for whom reservations

have been earmarked pursuant  to  constitutional  provisions.   By its  directions

which  this  Court  issued  on  2  September  1994  provision  was  made  for  the

constitution of committees for verification of claims  belonging to a designated

caste, tribe or class. This Court explained the modalities to be followed by the

Scrutiny Committees and the manner in which action would be taken if a claim

was found to be false. The directions which were issued by this Court envisaged

that upon a claim being found to be false or spurious :  

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PART A

(i)  the  Caste  Scrutiny  Committee  should  pass  an  order  cancelling  and

confiscating the certificate;

(ii) the cancellation of the certificate should be communicated to the educational

institution where the candidate has been admitted or to the appointing authority

where the candidate is employed;

(iii) upon this, the head of the institution or the appointing authority should cancel

the admission or appointment without further notice and debar the candidate from

further study or continuance in office; and

(iv) a prosecution should be launched against the candidate or, as the case may

be, the parents or guardians responsible for making the false claim. The regime

postulated in the judgment of this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra) took effect from

2 September 1994, which was the date of the judgment. Eventually in the State

of  Maharashtra  these  directions  received  legislative  recognition  upon  the

enactment of the Maharashtra Act XXIII  of 2001 which came into force in the

State on 18 October 2001.  However, it is important to notice that even before the

State Legislature stepped in to confer a statutory form to the directions which

were issued by this Court in Madhuri Patil (supra) the regime, as it then obtained

prior to the enactment of the law, also envisaged consequences upon a caste or

tribe claim being found to be false upon a verification by the Scrutiny Committee.

The cancellation of a certificate would, as a necessary consequence, involve the

invalidation  of  the  appointment  to  a  post  or  admission  to  an  educational

institution.  Where a candidate had been appointed to a reserved post  on the

basis  of  the claim that  he or  she was a member of  the group for  which the

reservation  is  intended,  the  invalidation  of  the  claim  to  belong  to  that  group

50

PART A

would, as a necessary consequence, render the appointment void ab initio. The

rationale for this is that a candidate who would otherwise have to compete for a

post in the general pool of unreserved seats had secured appointment in a more

restricted competition confined to the reserved category and usurped a benefit

meant for a designated caste, tribe or class. Once it was found that the candidate

had obtained admission upon a false representation to belong to the reserved

category, the appointment would be vitiated by fraud and would be void ab initio.

The falsity of the claim lies in a representation that the candidate belongs to a

category of persons for whom the reservation is intended whereas in fact the

candidate does not so belong.  The reason for depriving the candidate of the

benefit which she or he has obtained on the strength of such a claim, is that a

person cannot retain the fruits of a false claim on the basis of which a scarce

public resource is obtained. The same principle would apply where a candidate

secures admission to an educational institution on the basis of a false claim to

belong to a reserved category.  A candidate who does so causes detriment to a

genuine candidate who actually belongs to the reserved category who is deprived

of the seat. For that matter a detriment is caused to the entire class of persons

for whom reservations are intended, the members of which are excluded as a

result of an admission granted to an imposter who does not belong to the class.

The withdrawal of benefits, either in terms of the revocation of employment or the

termination of an admission was hence a necessary corollary of the invalidation

of the claim on the basis of which the appointment or admission was obtained.

The withdrawal of the benefit was not based on mens rea or the intent underlying

the assertion of a false claim.  In the case of a criminal prosecution, intent would

51

PART A

be necessary. On the other hand, the withdrawal of civil  benefits flowed as a

logical result of the invalidation of a claim to belong to a group or category for

whom the reservation is intended. This was the position under the regime which

prevailed following the decision in Madhuri Patil.

40 The Constitution Bench of this Court which decided Milind (supra) was on

a reference whether it is permissible to hold an enquiry and let in evidence to

decide or declare that any tribe or tribal community or a part or group within the

tribe or community is included in the general  name, even though it  is  not so

specifically  mentioned  in  the  entry  contained  in  the  Constitution  (Scheduled

Tribes)  Order, 1950.  The Constitution  Bench held  that  it  was not  permissible

either to hold an enquiry or to allow evidence to decide that though a tribe (or its

sub group) is not specifically included in the Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950 it

must, nonetheless, be treated or deemed to be included in the general name.

The view of this Court is that an entry in the Order has to be read as it stands.

However, the Constitution  Bench in  paragraph 38 of  its  decision,  having due

regard to the circumstances of the individual cases before the Court, protected

the degree obtained by the candidate concerned.  This Court also provided that

having regard to the passage of time including interim orders which were passed,

the  admissions  and  appointments  that  have  become  final  would  remain

unaffected by the judgment. The observations in paragraph 38 of the decision of

the Constitution Bench have been construed in at least the following judgments

of this Court as directions referable to Article 142 of the Constitution :

(i) Bank of India  Vs. Avinash D.Mandivikar  34;

34  (2005) 7 SCC 690 at para 10

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PART A

(ii) Additional General Manager- Human Resource, Bharat Heavy Electricals

Ltd. Vs. Suresh Ramkrishna Burde  35;

(iii) Union of India Vs. Dattatray, S/o. Namdeo Mendhekar  36 ; and

(iv) Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi Vs. State of Maharashtra  37.

41 Since the decision of the Bench of three judges in R. Vishwanatha Pillai

Vs. State of Kerala (supra) the position of law which has been laid down by this

Court  is that where an appointment to a post or admission to an educational

institution is made against a vacancy which is reserved for a Scheduled Caste or

Tribe or a socially and educationally backward class, the invalidation of the claim

of the candidate would result in the appointment or, as the case may be, the

admission being  void and non est.  This principle has been followed by another

judgment of three Judges in  Dattatray (supra).   The same position has been

propounded by a two judge bench in  Bank of India Vs.  Avinash Mandivikar

(supra).  The formal termination of an employment or the withdrawal of admission

is a necessary consequence which flows out of the invalidation of the caste or

tribe claim. The only exception to this principle consists of those cases where, in

exercise  of  the  power  conferred  by  Article  142,  the  Court  considered  it

appropriate and proper to protect the admission which was granted or, as the

case may be, the appointment to the post.  

42 In  Kavita  Solunke (supra)  the  appellant  had  been  appointed  on  the

strength of a claim to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in August 1995. After

the  tribe  claim was  verified  by the Scrutiny Committee it  was  found that  the

35  (2007) 5 SCC 336 at paras 7-9  and 13 36  (2008) 4 SCC 612 at paras 5-7 37  (2008) 5 SCC 652 at paras 5 & 6

53

PART A

appellant was in fact a Koshti and not a member of the Halba Scheduled Tribe

following which an order of termination was issued. The sole ground on which the

termination was challenged and which was accepted by the bench of two judges

was that since the appointment of the appellant had attained finality, it could not

have  been  set  aside  on  the  ground  that  the  appellant  did  not  belong  to  a

Scheduled Tribe. Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 was evidently not placed before

the  court  in  Kavita  Solunke (supra)  and  has  not  been  noticed.  Upon  the

enactment  of  the  Act,  the  invalidation  of  a  caste  certificate  by  the  Scrutiny

Committee would as a statutory mandate result in the withdrawal of the benefits

which had accrued on the strength of the claim and where a candidate had been

appointed  to  a  reserved  post,  termination  would  follow  the  finding  that  the

candidate did not belong to the category for whom the post was reserved. If the

provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 were to be considered by the bench

of two judges, it would be apparent that under the provisions of Section 7 the

Scrutiny Committee is empowered to verify a caste certificate whether issued

before or after the commencement of the Act and if it comes to the conclusion

that the caste certificate is false and is obtained fraudulently it is empowered to

order its cancellation and confiscation. Section 10 provides for the withdrawal of

benefits secured when a caste certificate is concerned for its falsity. Falsity is

adjudicated upon when an order of cancellation is passed under Section 7. Once

a caste certificate is cancelled by the Scrutiny Committee under Section 7, the

individual affected by the order has a remedy to challenge its cancellation before

the High Court under Article 226. If the challenge fails or if the challenge is given

up, and the only relief sought is of the protection of service, or of the admission to

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PART A

the course, the grant of such protective relief simpliciter would be impermissible.

The withdrawal of the benefit under Section 10 follows an order of cancellation

under Section 7. Once the conditions for cancellation are fulfilled and an order of

cancellation  is  passed under  Section 7  withdrawal  of  all  benefits  which have

accrued on the basis of the claim (which stands invalidated) cannot be opposed

on a theory that there was an absence of dishonest intent.  

43 The rationale which weighed with the Bench of two Judges which decided

Kavita Solunke (supra) was that if the Halba Koshti had been treated as Halba

even before the appellant had joined the service and if the only ground for ouster

was the law declared in  Milind  (supra),  there  was no reason why protection

against ouster to appointees whose applications had become final be not also

extended to the appellant. Placing reliance on the decision in  Kavita Solunke

(supra) another Bench of two Judges of this Court in Shalini  (supra) propounded

a test of dishonest intent for the grant or denial of protection to persons whose

caste  claims had been invalidated.  The  view of  the  Court  emerges from the

following extract contained in para 9 of the decision which reads thus :

“9. It is not the intent of law to punish an innocent person and subject him to extremely harsh treatment. That is why this Court has devised and consistently followed that taxation statutes, which almost always work to the pecuniary detriment of the assessee, must be interpreted in favour of the assessee. Therefore, as we see it, on one bank of the Rubicon are the cases of dishonest and mendacious persons who have deliberately claimed consanguinity with the Scheduled Castes or  Scheduled  Tribes,  etc.  whereas  on  the  other  bank  are  those marooned persons who honestly and correctly claimed to belong to a particular Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe but were later on found by  the  relevant  authority  not  to  fall  within  the  particular  group envisaged  for  protected  treatment.  In  the  former  group,  persons would  justifiably  deserve  the  immediate  cessation  of  all  benefits, including termination of services. In the latter, after the removal of the nebulousness and uncertainty, while the services or benefits already

55

PART A

enjoyed would not be negated, they would be disentitled to claim any further or continuing benefit  on the predication of  belonging to the said Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe.”             (Id. at pgs. 534-535)    

The  above  observations  must  be  read  together  with  those  in  paragraph  11

(extracted earlier)  where the Court  held that  a dishonest  intent  requires legal

retribution.  In Shalini (supra) the Court noticed the provisions of Section 10 of

Maharashtra Act  XXIII  of  2001 (which the earlier  decision in  Kavita Solunke

(supra)  had  not  noticed)  but  nonetheless  held  that  in  order  to  attract  the

provisions of Section 10 a dishonest intent for the purpose of claiming a benefit

reserved for the Scheduled Castes or Tribes or a designated backward class is

necessary. The expression “false” contained in Section 10 of the Maharashtra Act

XXIII of 2001 is construed to necessarily require the presence of mens rea or a

dishonest intent.  

44 The object and purpose underlying the enactment of the state legislation is

to regulate the issuance of caste certificates and to deal with instances which had

come to light where persons who did not belong to the Scheduled Castes or

Tribes or reserved categories were seeking appointments or admissions to the

detriment  of  genuine  candidates.  The  basic  purpose  and  rationale  for  the

legislation  is  to  secure  the  just  entitlements  of  legitimate  claimants.   The

judgment in Shalini (supra) is with respect in error in imputing the requirement of

a dishonest intent into the provisions of Section 10.  Sections 7 and 10 have to

be construed in  harmony.  Section 7 provides for  the cancellation of  a caste

certificate where before or after commencement of the Act, a person who does

not belong to a reserved category has obtained a false caste certificate and the

Scrutiny  Committee,  after  enquiry,  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  certificate  was

56

PART A

obtained  fraudulently.   These  requirements  have  to  be  fulfilled  before  the

certificate is cancelled. The falsity of the caste certificate and the opinion of the

Scrutiny  Committee  of  its  being  fraudulently  obtained  form  the  basis  of  a

cancellation under Section 7. Section 10 prescribes that a person who does not

belong to a reserved category and secures admission or obtains appointment

against  a  reserved  post  by  producing  a  false  caste  certificate  shall  upon  its

cancellation by the Scrutiny Committee be debarred from the institution or as the

case may be discharged from employment and the benefits  derived shall  be

withdrawn.   Sub-section (2)  provided for  the recovery of  all  financial  benefits

while  sub-section  (3)  provides  for  the  cancellation  of  a  degree,  diploma  or

educational  qualification.   Sub-section  (4)  provides  for  disqualification  from

electoral office. The falsity of the certificate is the basis of an order under Section

7.  Section  10  provides  the  consequence.  The  challenge  to  an  order  of  the

Scrutiny Committee (invalidating a caste or tribe certificate) may fail or succeeds.

If the challenge before the High Court succeeds, no question of the consequence

under Section 10 arises. If the challenge fails, the consequence under Section 10

follows  the  finding  in  the  order  under  Section  7  that  the  certificate  is  false.

Similarly, if  the order under Section 7 is not challenged, or if  the challenge is

given up, there is no occasion to protect the benefits secured on the basis of a

certificate  which  is  invalidated.   The expression  “false”  must  be construed  in

contra-distinction to that which is true, genuine or authentic.  Falsity in this sense

means the setting up of a claim to belong to a reserved category.

 45 Section 10, it must be noted, provides for the withdrawal of civil benefits

which have accrued to an individual on the strength of a claim to belong to a

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PART A

reserved  category,  when  the  claim  upon  due  enquiry  and  verification  is

invalidated. Section 10, as its marginal note indicates, provides for the withdrawal

of benefits secured on the basis of a false caste certificate.  Section 11 provides

for offences and penalties. The invalidation of a caste certificate may result in two

consequences : (i) immediate cancellation or withdrawal of the benefits received

by the candidate on the basis of a false caste certificate; (ii) prosecution of a

claimant who procures a certificate which is found to be false by the Scrutiny

Committee.  The intent  of  a candidate  may be of  relevance only  if  there  is  a

prosecution  for  a  criminal  offence.  However,  where  a  civil  consequence  of

withdrawing the benefits which have accrued on the basis of a false caste claim

is in issue, it would be contrary to the legislative intent to import the requirement

of a dishonest intent. In importing such a requirement, the bench of two Judges in

Shalini (supra) has, with great respect, fallen into error.  The judgment in Shalini

(supra) must, therefore, be held not to lay down the correct principle. In the very

nature of things it would be casting an impossible burden to delve into the mental

processes of an applicant for  a caste certificate.  As the provisions of  the Act

indicate, a person, who claims to belong to a reserved category and who seeks

the  benefit  of  an  appointment  to  a  reserved  post  or  of  admission  to  an

educational institution against a reserved seat or any other benefit provided by

the provisions of Article 15(4), has to apply for the grant of a caste certificate. The

burden of proof that he or she belongs to such a caste, tribe or class lies with the

claimant.  The legislature has legitimately assumed that a person who seeks a

caste certificate must surely be aware of the caste, tribe or class to which he or

she belongs and must establish the claim. If the claim to belong to the reserved

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category is found to be untrue, the caste certificate has to be cancelled on the

ground that it has been obtained falsely.  The grant of the benefit to the candidate

is fraudulent because the candidate has obtained a benefit reserved exclusively

for  a  specified  caste,  tribe  or  class  to  which  he or  she is  not  entitled.   The

decision  in  Shalini (supra)  would  result  in  serious  consequences  and  would

eviscerate the statutory provision.  The interpretation which has been placed on

the  provisions  of  Section  10  by  the  judgment  in  Shalini (supra)  is  evidently

incorrect.  

46 Service  under  the  Union  and  the  States,  or  for  that  matter  under  the

instrumentalities of  the State subserves a public purpose. These services are

instruments of governance. Where the State embarks upon public employment, it

is  under  the  mandate  of  Articles  14  and  16  to  follow  the  principle  of  equal

opportunity.  Affirmative  action  in  our  Constitution  is  part  of  the  quest  for

substantive equality. Available resources and the opportunities provided in the

form of  public  employment  are  in  contemporary times short  of  demands and

needs.  Hence  the  procedure  for  selection,  and  the  prescription  of  eligibility

criteria has a significant public element in enabling the State to make a choice

amongst competing claims.  The selection of ineligible persons is a manifestation

of a systemic failure and has a deleterious effect on good governance. Firstly,

selection of a person who is not eligible allows someone who is ineligible to gain

access to scarce public resources.  Secondly, the rights of eligible persons are

violated since a person who is not eligible for the post is selected. Thirdly, an

illegality is perpetrated by bestowing benefits upon an imposter undeservingly.

These effects upon good governance find a similar echo when a person who

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PART A

does not belong to a reserved category passes of as a member of that category

and  obtains  admission  to  an  educational  institution.   Those  for  whom  the

Constitution  has  made  special  provisions  are  as  a  result  ousted  when  an

imposter who does not belong to a reserved category is selected. The fraud on

the constitution precisely lies in this. Such a consequence must be avoided and

stringent steps be taken by the Court to ensure that unjust claims of imposters

are not protected in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142. The nation

cannot live on  a lie. Courts play a vital institutional role in preserving the rule of

law. The  judicial  process  should  not  be  allowed  to  be  utilised  to  protect  the

unscrupulous and to preserve the benefits which have accrued to an imposter on

the specious plea of  equity. Once the legislature has stepped in,  by enacting

Maharashtra  Act  XXIII  of  2001,  the  power  under  Article  142  should  not  be

exercised  to  defeat  legislative  prescription.  The  Constitution  Bench  in  Milind

spoke on 28 November 2000. The state law has been enforced from 18 October

2001. Judicial directions must be consistent with law. Several decisions of two

judge benches noticed earlier, failed to take note of Maharashtra Act XXIII  of

2001. The directions which were issued under Article 142 were on the erroneous

inarticulate premise that the area was unregulated by statute. Shalini noted the

statute but misconstrued it.       

47 Cooley’s  Treatise  on  Constitutional  Limitations38 places  the  matter

succinctly in the following terms :

“An officer de jure is one who, possessing the legal qualifications, has been lawfully chosen to the office in question, and has fulfilled any conditions precedent to the performance of its duties. By being thus

38  8th Ed.Vol.2 pages1355-1358

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chosen  and  observing  the  precedent  conditions,  such  a  person becomes of  right  entitled to  the possession and enjoyment  of  the office,  and  the  public,  in  whose  interest  the  office  is  created,  is entitled of right to have him perform its duties. If he is excluded from it, the exclusion is both a public offence and a private injury.”   

In  a  recent  judgment  of  this  Court  in  Anurag  Kumar  Singh Vs.  State  of

Uttarakhand  39,  it  has been held that judicial  discretion can be exercised only

when  there  are  two  or  more  possible  lawful  solutions.  Courts  cannot  give  a

direction contrary to a statute in the purported exercise of judicial discretion. The

power  under  Article  142  of  the  Constitution  is  one  which  is  wielded  with

circumspection and not in a manner which would defeat statutory intent, purpose

and language. Aharon Barak in his book titled “Judicial Discretion (1989)” states

thus:

“16……Discretion assumes the  freedom to choose among several lawful alternatives. Therefore, discretion does not exist when there is but one lawful option. In this situation, the Judge is required to select that option and has no freedom of choice. No discretion is involved in the choice between a lawful act and an unlawful act. The Judge must choose the lawful act, and he is precluded from choosing the unlawful act. Discretion, on the other hand, assumes the lack of an obligation to choose one particular possibility among several.”  (Id at p. 430)

48 The Full  Bench judgment  of  the Bombay High Court  in  Arun Sonune

(supra) has essentially construed the judgments in Kavita Solunke (supra) and

in Shalini (supra) as having impliedly overruled the earlier Full Bench judgments

in Ganesh Rambhau Khalale  and Ramesh Kamble. In view of the conclusion

which we have arrived at in regard to the earlier decisions rendered by the two

Judge Benches in Kavita Solunke (supra) and Shalini (supra), we are unable to

subscribe to the view expressed by the Full Bench in Arun Sonone (supra). The

39   (2016) 9 SCC 426

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PART A

judgment of the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Arun Sonone (supra)

holds that

(i)  mere invalidation of  the caste claim by the Scrutiny Committee would  not

entail the consequences of withdrawal of benefits or discharge from employment

or cancellation of appointments that have become final prior to the decision in

Milind (supra) on 28 November 2000;  

(ii)  the benefit  of  protection in  service upon invalidation of  the caste claim is

available not only to persons belonging to Koshti and Halba Koshti but is also

available to persons belonging to the special backward category on the same

terms. The High Court has even gone to the extent of holding that the decision in

Milind (supra) was in the nature of prospective overruling of the law which was

laid down by the Bombay High Court. The above view of the Bombay High Court

is clearly unsustainable.  Neither the judgment in  Milind (supra) nor any of the

judgments of this Court which have construed it have held that  Milind (supra)

was an exercise in prospective overruling. The High Court was in error in holding

so. The decision of the Full Bench in  Arun Sonone  (supra) is unsustainable.

The Full Bench had evidently failed to notice that cases where the protection was

granted by this Court following the invalidation of a caste claim was in exercise of

the power conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution, depending upon the facts

and circumstances of each case. The jurisdiction under Article 142 is clearly not

available to the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226.

The High Court erred in arrogating that jurisdiction to itself.  

49 We do not  find any merit  in  the submission which has been urged on

behalf  of  the persons whose castes/ tribes claims have been invalidated that

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PART A

Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 cannot apply to admissions or appointments which

were made prior to the date on which the Act came into force.  

50 The submission based on retrospectivity overlooks certain crucial links in

the analysis. It is a cardinal principle of construction that every statute is  prima

facie prospective unless it is expressly or by necessary implication made to have

a retrospective operation. However, the rule in general is applicable where the

object of the statute is to affect vested rights or to impose new burdens or to

impair existing obligations. Equally the rule against retrospective construction is

not applicable to a statute merely because a part of the requisites for its action is

drawn from a time antecedent to its passing40.  Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001

provides in Section 1 (2) that it shall come into force on such dates as the State

Government may, by notification in the official  gazette,  appoint  upon receiving

assent of the President. The Act was notified to come into force by a government

notification dated 17 October 2001 with effect from 18 October 2001. Prior to the

enforcement  of  the  Act,  the regime which  held  the  field  was  in  terms of  the

directions that were issued by this Court in its judgment dated 2 September 1994

in Madhuri Patil. The directions which were issued by this Court comprehended :

(i) Applications for the grant of caste certificates being made to a notified

officer;

(ii) Submission of an affidavit together with relevant particulars in support

of the application;

40  G P Singh, On the  Interpretation of Statutes -4 Edition pages 580, 583

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PART A

(iii) Submission  of  an  application  for  verification  of  the  caste  certificate

before a Scrutiny Committee well in advance of seeking admission to

an educational institution or appointment to a post ;

(iv) Grant of provisional admission or a provisional appointment where the

verification by the Scrutiny Committee was likely to take time;

(v) Constitution of Scrutiny Committees for verification of caste certificates;  

(vi) Constitution of Vigilance Cells for the purpose of investigating the social

status of the candidate and affinity with the tribal group; (vii) Modalities to be followed for revoking caste certificates when the claim

for  social  status  was found to  be not  genuine,  doubtful,  spurious or

falsely or wrongly claimed;

(viii) Passing  of  an  order  of  cancellation  and  confiscation  of  the  caste

certificate if the claim was found to be false;

(ix) Prosecution of the candidate or, as the case may be, the parent or the

guardian who had made a false claim;

(x) Cancellation of the admission granted or the appointment made where

the caste certificate is invalidated and debarment of the candidate from

further studies or to continue in a post.

51 The regime which obtained since 2 September 1994 under the directions in

Madhuri Patil was granted a statutory status by the enactment of Maharashtra

Act XXIII of 2001. Section 7 provides for the cancellation and confiscation of a

false caste certificate whether it was issued before or after the commencement of

the Act. The expression “before or after the commencement of this Act” indicates

that the Scrutiny Committee constituted under Section 6 is empowered to cancel

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PART A

a caste certificate whether it was issued prior to 18 October 2001 or thereafter.

Section 10 which provides for the withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a

false  caste  certificate  which is  withdrawn is  essentially  a  consequence of  the

cancellation of the caste certificate. Where a candidate has secured admission to

an educational institution on the basis that he or she belongs to a designated

reserved category and it is found upon investigation that the claim to belong to

that  category  is  false,  admission  to  the  institution  necessarily  falls  with  the

invalidation of the caste certificate. Admission being founded on a claim to belong

to a specified caste, tribe or class, it is rendered void upon the claim being found

to  be untrue.  The same must  hold  in  the case of  an appointment  to  a  post.

Therefore, the absence of the words “before or after the commencement of this

Act”  in  Section  10  makes  no  substantive  difference  because  a  withdrawal  of

benefit  is  an event  which  flows naturally  and as a  plain  consequence of  the

invalidation of the claim. Moreover, as we have seen even prior to the enactment

of the state legislation, the benefit which was secured on the basis of a caste

claim was liable to be withdrawn upon its invalidation. The Act has hence neither

affected vested rights nor has it imposed new burdens. The Act does not impair

existing obligations in Sections 7 and 10.

However,  an  analysis  of  the  provisions  of  Section  11 demonstrates  that  the

provision creates offences and provides for penalties. Under Section 11 (1) (a)

the  offence  consists  of  obtaining  a  false  caste  certificate  (by  furnishing  false

information), filing a false statement or document or by any fraudulent means.

Under Section 11 (1)(b)  the offence consists  in  securing a benefit  exclusively

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PART A

reserved  for  designated  castes,  tribes  or  classes  by  a  person  who  does  not

belong to that category in terms of  

(i) Appointment;  

(ii) Admission in an educational institution against a reserved seat; or

(iii) Election to  a  local  authority  or  cooperative  society  against  an office

which is reserved for that category.  

52 The  provisions  of  Section  11  (1)  must  be  read  and  construed  in  a

prospective sense having regard to the guarantee contained in Article 20 (1) of

the Constitution. The offence having been created by Maharashtra Act XXIII of

2001, the Act which constitutes the offence must relate to a period after the date

of the enforcement of the Act. In terms of the penal provisions of Section 11, the

statute in so far as it creates offences and provides for penalties must hence be

construed prospectively.

53 Administrative  circulars  and  government  resolutions  are  subservient  to

legislative  mandate  and  cannot  be  contrary  either  to  constitutional  norms  or

statutory principles.  Where a candidate has obtained an appointment to a post

on the solemn basis that he or she belongs to a designated caste, tribe or class

for  whom the post  is  meant  and it  is  found upon verification by the Scrutiny

Committee that the claim is false, the services of such an individual cannot be

protected by taking recourse to administrative circulars or resolutions. Protection

of claims of a usurper is an act of deviance to the constitutional scheme as well

as  to  statutory  mandate.  No  government  resolution  or  circular  can  override

constitutional or statutory norms. The principle that government is bound by its

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PART A

own circulars is well-settled but it  cannot apply in a situation such as present.

Protecting  the  services  of  a  candidate  who  is  found  not  to  belong  to  the

community or tribe for whom the reservation is intended substantially encroaches

upon legal rights of genuine members of the reserved communities whose just

entitlements are negated by the grant of a seat to an ineligible person. In such a

situation where the rights of genuine members of reserved groups or communities

are liable to be affected detrimentally, government circulars or resolutions cannot

operate to their detriment.   

54 One  of  the  considerations  which  is  placed  in  store  before  the  court

particularly  when  an  admission  to  an  educational  institution  is  sought  to  be

cancelled upon the invalidation of a caste or tribe claim is that the student has

substantially progressed in the course of studies and a cancellation of admission

would result in prejudice not only to the student but to the system as well. When

the  student  has  completed  the  degree  or  diploma,  a  submission  against  its

withdrawal  is  urged  a fortiorari.  In  our  view, the state legislature has made a

statutory  decision  amongst  competing  claims,  based  on  a  public  policy

perspective which the court must respect. The argument that there is a loss of

productive societal resources when an educational qualification is withdrawn or a

student is compelled to leave the course of studies (when he or she is found not

to belong to the caste or tribe on the basis of which admission to a reserved seat

was  obtained)  cannot  possibly  outweigh  or  nullify  the  legislative  mandate

contained in Section 10 of the state legislation. When a candidate is found to

have put forth a false claim of belonging to a designated caste, tribe or class for

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PART A

whom a benefit is reserved, it would be a negation of the rule of law to exercise

the jurisdiction under Article 142 to protect that individual. Societal good lies in

ensuring probity. That is the only manner in which the sanctity of the system can

be preserved. The legal system cannot be seen as an avenue to support those

who make untrue claims to belong to a caste or tribe or socially and educationally

backward class. These benefits are provided only to designated castes, tribes or

classes in accordance with the constitutional scheme and cannot be usurped by

those who do not belong to them. The credibility not merely of the legal system

but  also of  the judicial  process will  be eroded if  such claims are protected in

exercise of the constitutional power conferred by Article 142 despite the state law.

55 This aspect has been considered in a recent judgment rendered by one of

us in  Nidhi Kaim and Another V. State of Madhya Pradesh And Others  41 ,

wherein, speaking for a Bench of three Judges, in a case of systemic fraud in

relation to medical admissions in the State of Madhya Pradesh. It was observed

as  follows :  

“92…We are  of  the  considered  view  that  conferring  rights  or benefits on the appellants, who had consciously participated in a well  thought  out,  and  meticulously  orchestrated  plan,  to circumvent well  laid down norms, for  gaining admission to the MBBS course,  would  amount  to  espousing  the  cause  of  “the unfair”.  It  would seem like allowing a thief  to retain the stolen property. It would seem as if the Court was not supportive of the cause of  those who had adopted and followed rightful  means. Such a course would cause people to question the credibility of the justice-delivery system itself.  The exercise of jurisdiction in the manner suggested on behalf of the appellants would surely depict the Court's support in favour of the sacrilegious. It would also compromise the integrity of the academic community. We

41  (2017) 4 SCC 1

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PART A

are of the view that in the name of doing complete justice it is not possible  for  this  Court  to  support  the  vitiated  actions  of  the appellants  through which they gained admission to  the MBBS course.”

Explaining the matter further, this Court held that :

“99…..Besides the consideration recorded by us in the foregoing paragraphs, we may confess, that we felt persuaded for taking the view  that  we  have,  for  a  very  important  reason  —  national character.  There is a saying—when wealth is lost, nothing is lost;  when  health  is  lost,  something  is  lost;  but  when character is lost, everything is lost. …..

The issue in hand has an infinitely vast dimension. If we were to keep in mind immediate social or societal gains, the perspective of consideration  would  be  different.  The  submission  canvassed needs  to  be  considered  in  the  proper  perspective.  We  shall venture to drive home the point by an illustration. We may well not have won our freedom, if freedom fighters had not languished in jails … and if valuable lives had not been sacrificed. Depending on the situation,  even civil  liberty or  life itself,  may be too trivial  a sacrifice, when national interest is involved. It all depends on the desired goal. The Preamble of the Indian Constitution rests on the foundation of governance on the touchstone of justice. The basic fundamental right of equality before law and equal protection of the  laws  is  extended to  citizens  and non-citizens  alike through Article 14 of the Constitution on the fountainhead of fairness. The actions of the appellants are founded on unacceptable behaviour, and  in  complete  breach  of  the  Rule  of  Law.  Their  actions constitute  acts  of  deceit  invading  into  a  righteous  social  order. National character, in our considered view, cannot be sacrificed for benefits — individual or societal. If we desire to build a nation on the touchstone of ethics and character and if our determined goal is to build a nation where only the Rule of Law prevails, then we cannot  accept  the  claim  of  the  appellants  for  the  suggested societal gains. Viewed in the aforesaid perspective, we have no difficulty whatsoever in concluding in favour of the Rule of Law. Such being the position, it is not possible for us to extend to the appellants any benefit under Article 142 of the Constitution.”

We are in respectful agreement with the above principle and statement of the

legal position.      

56 Medical  education  is  what  middle-class  parents  across  the  length  and

breadth of the county aspire for their children (whether this will continue to be so

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PART A

in future is a moot question). There is intense competition for a limited number of

under-graduate,  post-graduate  and super-speciality  seats.  This  can furnish no

justification  for  recourse  to  unfair  means  including  adopting  a  false  claim  to

belong  to  the  reserved  category.  The  fault  –  lines  of  our  system,  be  it  in

education, health or law, are that its lethargy and indolence furnish incentives for

the few who choose to break the rules to gain an unfair advantage. In such a

situation, the court as a vital institution of democratic governance must be firm in

sending  out  a  principled  message  that  there  is  no  incentive  other  than  for

behaviour compliant with rules and deviance will meet severe reprimands of the

law.   

I Conclusion   

57 For these reasons, we hold and declare that  

(i) The directions  which  were  issued  by the  Constitution  Bench  of  this

Court in paragraph 38 of the decision in  Milind were in pursuance of

the powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution;

(ii) Since the decision of this Court in  Madhuri Patil which was rendered

on 2 September 1994, the regime which held the field in pursuance of

those directions envisaged a detailed procedure for (a) the issuance of

caste certificates; (b) scrutiny and verification of caste and tribe claims

by Scrutiny Committees to be constituted by the State Government; (c)

the procedure for the conduct of investigation into the authenticity of the

claim; (d) Cancellation and confiscation of the caste certificate where

the claim is found to be false or not genuine; (e) Withdrawal of benefits

in  terms  of  the  termination  of  an  appointment,  cancellation  of  an

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PART A

admission  to  an  educational  institution  or  disqualification  from  an

electoral office obtained on the basis that the candidate belongs to a

reserved category; and (f) Prosecution for a criminal offence;    

(iii) The decisions of this Court in R. Vishwanatha Pillai and in Dattatray

which  were  rendered  by  benches  of  three  Judges  laid  down  the

principle of law that where a benefit is secured by an individual – such

as an appointment to a post or admission to an educational institution –

on  the  basis  that  the  candidate  belongs  to  a  reserved  category  for

which the benefit is reserved, the invalidation of the caste or tribe claim

upon verification would result in the appointment or, as the case may

be, the admission being rendered void or non est.  

(iv) The exception to the above doctrine was in  those cases where this

Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to render

complete justice;

(v) By Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 there is a legislative codification of

the  broad  principles  enunciated  in  Madhuri  Patil.  The  legislation

provides  a  statutory  framework  for  regulating  the  issuance  of  caste

certificates  (Section  4);  constitution  of  Scrutiny  Committees  for

verification  of  claims  (Section  6);  submission  of  applications  for

verification of caste certificates (Section 6(2) and 6(3);  cancellation of

caste certificates (Section 7); burden of proof (Section 8); withdrawal of

benefits obtained upon the invalidation of the claim (Section 10); and

initiation of prosecution (Section 11), amongst other things;  

(vi) The  power  conferred  by  Section  7  upon  the  Scrutiny  Committee  to

verify a claim is both in respect of caste certificates issued prior to and

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PART A

subsequent to the enforcement of the Act on 18 October 2001. Finality

does not attach to a caste certificate (or to the claim to receive benefits)

where the claim of the individual to belong to a reserved caste, tribe or

class is yet to be verified by the Scrutiny Committee;  

(vii) Withdrawal of benefits secured on the basis of a caste claim which has

been found to be false and is invalidated is a necessary consequence

which flows from the invalidation of  the caste claim and no issue of

retrospectivity would arise;

(viii) The decisions in  Kavita Solunke   and  Shalini of two learned Judges

are  overruled.  Shalini in  so  far  as  it  stipulates  a  requirement  of  a

dishonest intent for the application of the provision of Section 10 is, with

respect, erroneous and does not reflect the correct position in law;

(ix) Mens rea is an ingredient of the penal provisions contained in Section

11. Section 11 is prospective and would apply in those situations where

the act  constituting the offence has taken place after  the date of  its

enforcement;  

(x) The judgment of  the Full  Bench of the Bombay High Court  in  Arun

Sonone is manifestly erroneous and is overruled; and  

(xi) Though  the  power  of  the  Supreme  Court  under  Article  142  of  the

Constitution is a constitutional power vested in the court for rendering

complete justice and is a power which is couched in wide terms, the

exercise of the jurisdiction must have due regard to legislative mandate,

where a law such as Maharashtra Act XXIII of 2001 holds the field.

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58 We will,  now  in  the  light  of  the  reasons  indicated  above,  proceed  to

dispose of the individual cases in the following terms :    

1 Chairman  and  Managing   Director    FCI Vs.   Jagdish  Balaram

Bahira  42 :

      On 6 December 1984, Food Corporation of India offered appointment to the

respondent  on  the  post  of  Messenger  –  Depot  which  was  reserved  for  the

Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate dated 28 August 1978 issued

by  the  Executive  Magistrate,  Panvel,  stating  that  the  applicant  was  a  Hindu

Mahadev Kohli and hence belonged to a Scheduled Tribe. Upon a declaration

submitted by the respondent he was appointed to the post on 8 January 1985 in

the Scheduled Tribe quota.  The respondent received promotional benefits in the

post  of  Dusting  Operator  (13  August  1990),  Senior  Dusting  Operator  (30

December 2000), Picker (1 December 2003) and Senior Picker (20 December

2005). The caste certificate submitted by the respondent was invalidated by the

Scrutiny Committee, Konkan Division, Thane.  The claim of the respondent to

belong to the Mahadeo Koli Scheduled Tribe was found not to be established and

the  certificate  was  accordingly  invalidated  and  cancelled.   Following  this  his

services were terminated on 4 October 2013.

The respondent instituted writ proceedings before the Bombay High Court

to  challenge  the  order  of  the  Scrutiny  Committee  and  his  termination  from

service.  By  a  judgment  dated  4  April  2014  the  High  Court  noted  that  the

respondent was seeking only protection of his services and was willing to give up

42  C. A. No.8928 of 2015

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PART A

the claim of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe.  By its judgment, the High Court

accepted  the  contention  of  the  respondent  and  held  that  he  was  entitled  to

protection of services with continuity while the management would be at liberty to

withdraw such benefits as were granted after 28 September 2000.  The employer

moved a Special Leave Petition and in pursuance of an interim order dated 11

August 2014, the respondent was reinstated in service and was granted further

promotions.  Eventually  upon  his  superannuation  on  31  August  2015  the

respondent was granted his terminal benefits including gratuity, arrears of wage

revision, medical reimbursement, leave encashment, contributory provident fund

and productivity linked incentive.

During the pendency of the litigation, the respondent is retired from service

and has even been paid his terminal dues. Hence, at this stage, all that can be

observed is that no claim by a member of Mahdeo Koli, Scheduled Caste shall be

made or entertained on behalf of the respondent or any member of his family on

the strength of the caste certificate which has been invalidated by the Scrutiny

Committee. No further benefits of any nature whatsoever would be admissible to

the respondent on the basis of his claim which has been invalidated. However, in

the peculiar facts, we are not inclined to order recovery has to be made from the

respondent. The Civil Appeal is disposed of.     

2 Shri  Shivaji  Shikshan  Sanstha  &  Anr.  Vs.  Raju  Laxman Gadekar & Ors.  43  

and

3 State of Maharashtra Vs. Raju Laxman Gadekar & Ors  44 :

43  (Civil  Appeal  No.  9155  of 2015) 44  (Civil Appeal No. 9157 of 2015)

74

PART A

In September 1981, Raju Laxman Gadekar obtained a caste certificate

that he belonged to the Halba Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra.  On the strength

of  the  caste  certificate,  he was appointed  as  an Assistant  Teacher  in  a  post

reserved for a Scheduled Tribe in Shri Shivaji High-School, Dongaon on 24 June

1989.  On 2 March 2005, he filled up an application in Form E and submitted an

affidavit in Form F through his employer to the Scrutiny Committee, which was

invalidated  on  20  February  2008.   Since  the  claim  that  he  belonged  to  a

Scheduled Tribe was invalidated, his services were terminated by the employer

on 26 February 2008.  The challenge to the order of termination failed before the

School Tribunal. The writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee

was  dismissed  on  7  August  2009.  The  order  of  the  School  Tribunal  was

challenged in a separate Writ Petition which was allowed by a learned Single

Judge of the High Court on 16 October 2009 and the employee was directed to

be reinstated. In an appeal by the employer, the Division Bench set aside the

judgment of the learned Single Judge on 17 April 2010 and dismissed the writ

petition.  A Special Leave Petition filed by the employee under Article 136 of the

Constitution was dismissed by this Court  as not pressed on 1 October 2010.

Thereafter the respondent filed a writ petition praying for his reinstatement and

protection of  his  service.  By the judgment dated 5/8/9/10 July 2013 the High

Court held that the employee was entitled to the protection of his services.   

From the narration of the facts it is clear that the Writ Petition filed by the

employee challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee was dismissed on 7

August  2009  and  it  has  been  held  that  he  does  not  belong  to  the  Halba

75

PART A

Scheduled Tribe. The caste certificate which was obtained by the respondent has

been demonstrated to be a false caste certificate. The challenge to the order of

termination  also  attained  finality  since  the  Special  Leave  Petition  against  the

judgment of the High Court was dismissed as not pressed. In the circumstances,

the High Court has clearly erred in allowing protection of service to the employee.

Such a direction is also contrary to the provisions of Maharashtra Act XXIII of

2001. The appointment secured by the respondent on the basis of a false caste

claim was required to be withdrawn in terms of provisions of Section 10. There

has been a complete misuse of the process by the Respondent.  

We, therefore, allow the Civil Appeals and set aside the judgments and

orders of the High Court dated 10 April 2013 and 5/8/9/10 July 2013.  

In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

4 State  of  Maharashtra Vs. Ku.  Chhaya  D/o.Hemraj  Nimje  & Ors.  45   :  

Chhaya  Nimje  obtained  a  caste  certificate  on  20  July  1991  from  the

Executive  Magistrate,  Narkhed  to  the  effect  that  she  belongs  to  the  Halba

Scheduled Tribe. On the basis of the caste certificate she obtained appointment

as an Assistant  Teacher  on 24 December  1996 in  Bhimrao Bapu Deshmukh

Adarsh Vidyalaya. On 9 March she filled up an application in Form E together

with an affidavit in Form F under Rule 11 of the Maharashtra ST (Regulation of

Issuance  &  Verification  of)  Caste  Certificate  Rules,  2003.  The  Vigilance  Cell

submitted  a  report  showing  that  her  records  were  of  the  Koshti  community.

Before the Scrutiny Committee could decide her claim she approached the High

Court in a writ petition seeking protection of service. The High Court disposed of 45  (Civil  Appeal No.9160 of 2015)

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PART A

the writ petition  on 30 January 2013, on the statement of the employer that her

services will not be terminated unless the caste certificate is invalidated by the

Scrutiny Committee. She again filed a Writ Petition before the High Court seeking

protection of her services.  

The  respondent  has  no  right  to  claim  protection  of  her  services.  The

respondent has misused the process of law by filing successive writ petitions to

pre-empt an adjudication by the Scrutiny Committee and then confining the claim

only to the protection of her services.  

For the reasons which are indicated in the body of the judgment and for

the above reasons, the Civil Appeal is allowed and impugned judgment and order

of the High Court is set aside. No other submission is urged.

In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

5 State  of  Maharashtra  &  Anr.  Vs. Mrs.Arundhati  Suresh Ninawe & Anr.  46:  

 The respondent was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved for the

Scheduled Tribes on 20 March 1997 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 18

May 1995 stating that she belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe.  The Scrutiny

Committee has invalidated the caste certificate and directed it to be confiscated.

The High Court by its order dated 26 November 2012 has confirmed the order of

invalidation but  has granted protection of  service.  By a subsequent  order the

High Court has ordered the State to consider revision/refixation of pay scales.  

For the reasons indicated by this court  while disposing of  Civil  Appeal

Nos.9155 and 9157 of 2015 and for those contained in the body of the judgment,

46  (Civil  Appeal Nos. 9203-04 of  2015)     

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PART A

the Civil Appeals are allowed. The impugned judgments and orders of the High

Court are set aside. No other submission is urged.

There shall, however, be no order as to costs.

6 Mahatma  Fule  Krishi  Vidyapeeth Vs. Nagnath  Baburao Mangrule & Ors.  47  :  

The  respondent  was  appointed  as  an  Agricultural  Assistant  on  a  post

reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Tribes  on  22  July  1996 on  the  basis  of  a  caste

certificate dated 3 February 1991 stating that he belongs to the Mahadeo Koli

tribe. On 26 August 2011 the respondent submitted his caste certificate and other

documents  for  verification  of  the  caste  claim,  which  were  forwarded  to  the

Scrutiny  Committee.  In  the  meantime  the  appellant  initiated  a  departmental

enquiry against the respondent and terminated the services of the respondent by

its  order  dated  18  December  2012.  Subsequently  the  Scrutiny  Committee

invalidated the caste claim of the respondent by its order dated 3 October 2013.

The  High  Court  by  its  order  dated  4  April  2014  has  confirmed  the  order  of

invalidation but has granted protection of service.  

For the reasons indicated in the body of the judgment and those indicated

while allowing Civil  Appeal Nos.9155 and 9157 of 2015, the Civil  Appeal shall

stand allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside

insofar as it protects the services of the respondent.

There shall be no order as to costs.

47  (Civil  Appeal No.8926 of 2015)

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PART A

7 Suresh  S/o.Dewaji  Vairagade Vs. The  Controller  General, Indian Bureau of Mines, Indira Bhavan, Civil Lines, Nagpur & Anr.  48   :

The  appellant  was  appointed  as  an  Assistant  Store  Keeper  on  a  post

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 14 November 1988 on the strength of a

caste  certificate  dated 14 January 1985 stating that  he belongs to  the Halba

Schedule  Tribe.  The  Scrutiny  Committee  by  its  order  dated  30  August  2005

invalidated  the  caste  claim  of  the  appellant.  Subsequently  the  respondent

terminated the services of the appellant in pursuance of the proviso to Sub Rule 1

of  Rule  5  of  the  Central  Services  (Temporary  Services)  Rules,  1965.  Being

aggrieved, the appellant filed a writ  petition which was dismissed by the High

Court by its order dated 3 August 2009.

Having due regard for the reasons contained in the body of this judgment,

we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeal shall stand

dismissed. No other submission is urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

8 Rajendra  S/o.  Ramaji  Mahisbadwe  Vs. The  Joint Commissioner  and  Vice-Chairman  Scheduled  Tribe,  Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee & Anr  49  :  

The appellant was appointed as a trainee technician in Air India on a post

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 6 August 1997 on the basis of a caste

certificate dated 9 August 1988 stating that he belongs to the Halba Schedule

Tribe. Thereafter the appointment of the appellant was confirmed on 1 March

1999. The second respondent sought a clarification from Tehsildar, Nagpur to

48  (Civil  Appeal No.1918 of 2010) 49  (Civil  Appeal No.  9154 of  2015)

79

PART A

ascertain whether the caste certificate is genuine or not. The Tehsildar by a letter

dated 17 October 2008 stated that the name of the appellant is not borne in the

records.  Accordingly  the  second  respondent  terminated  the  services  of  the

appellant by an order dated 3 November 2009. The Scrutiny Committee by its

order dated 5 October 2012 invalidated the caste claim of the appellant.  

The High Court  by its judgment dated 11 March 2013 has declined to

grant protection to the services of the appellant upon the invalidation of his claim

to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe by the Scrutiny Committee on 5 October

2012. There is a clear and patent misuse of process by the Appellant.  In the

absence of the caste validity certificate, the appointment of the Appellant cannot

be held to have attained finality. Having due regard to the reasons contained in

the body of this judgment, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The

Civil Appeal shall stand dismissed. No other submission is urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

9 Chhaya  d/o.Yadaorao  Barapatre  @  Chhaya  W/o.  Rajeev Dhakate Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.  50  :  

The appellant was appointed as a Junior Lecturer in the fourth respondent

High School on a post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 2 July 1991 on the

basis of a caste certificate dated 23 July 1984 stating that she belongs to the

Halba  Schedule  Tribe.  On  14  March  1997  the  appellant’s  appointment  as  a

Junior Lecturer was confirmed by the fourth respondent. The Scrutiny Committee

invalidated the caste claim of the appellant by its order dated 8 November 2012.

The High Court  by its  impugned judgment and order  dated 5 April  2013 has

50  (Civil  Appeal Nos. 9158-59  of  2015)

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PART A

declined to grant protection of services. The appellant preferred a review which

was  dismissed  by  the  High  Court  by  its  order  dated  10  May  2013.  For  the

reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due regard to the

invalidation of the claim of the respondent by the Scrutiny Committee, we find no

error  in  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court.  The  Civil  Appeals  are  accordingly

dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.

10 Ravindra  Govindrao  Nagpurkar  Vs. Secretary,  Rajasthan Education Society Washim & Ors.  51   :

The appellant was appointed as a Lecturer on a post reserved for the

Scheduled Tribes on 14 August 1995 on the basis of a caste certificate dated 13

May 1982 stating that he belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The caste claim

of the appellant was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 18

January 2005. Thereafter the appellant was issued a show cause notice dated 3

January 2006 by the first respondent to explain why his services should not be

terminated. On 16 January 2006 the appellant filed a writ petition and challenged

the  show cause  notice.  However, on  the  same day the first  respondent  had

already  issued  an  order  of  termination.  Thereafter  the  High  Court  granted

permission  to  withdraw  the  writ  petition  and  liberty  was  granted  to  file

proceedings before  the appropriate  forum. The appellant  preferred an appeal

before the University & College Tribunal, Nagpur which was dismissed by the

tribunal by its order dated 30 December 2012. The High Court by its impugned

judgment and order dated 18.3.2013 has declined to grant protection of services.

The Review Petition was also dismissed on 29 November 2013.  51  (Civil  Appeal Nos.8604-05/17  @ SLP (C) Nos. 33864-65  of 2015)

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PART A

 For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due

regard  to  the  invalidation  of  the  claim  of  the  respondent  by  the  Scrutiny

Committee, we find no error in the judgment of the High Court. The Civil Appeals

are accordingly dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

11 Shri  Shivaji  Education  Society  &  Anr. Vs. State  of Maharashtra & Ors.  52:

The third respondent was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on a post

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate showing him

as belonging to the Thakur Scheduled Tribe. By its order dated 23 April 2008 the

Scrutiny Committee invalidated the tribe claim and confiscated his certificate. The

services  of  the  third  respondent  were  terminated  on  12  May  2008.  While

dismissing the writ petition challenging the order of the Scrutiny Committee the

High Court  by its order dated 15 December 2015 has none the less directed

reinstatement of the third respondent subject to an undertaking that he would not

claim the benefit of belonging to the Scheduled Tribe in future. Once the tribe

claim of the respondent has been held to be false, the judgment of the High Court

is unsustainable for the reasons indicated in the body of this judgment. The Civil

Appeal  is accordingly allowed and the judgment and order of  the High Court

dated 15 December 2015 is set aside. In consequence the Writ Petition filed by

the third respondent shall stand dismissed.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

52  (Civil  Appeal No.8601/17 @  SLP (C) No. 289  of 2016)

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PART A

12 Hindustan Aeronautics Limited  Vs. Murlidhar Arjun Neware and Anr.  53:

The respondent was appointed on the post of Assistant Engineer (Grade-I)

reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on 11 March 1992 on the strength of a caste

certificate  stating  that  he  belongs  to  the  Gondgowari  tribe.  The  Scrutiny

Committee  initially  by  an  order  dated  23  June  2004 rejected  the  tribe  claim.

Subsequently in pursuance of order of remand passed by the High Court,  the

Scrutiny Committee investigated into the matter again and invalidated the tribe

claim by its order dated 2 January 2006 and ordered the tribe certificate to be

cancelled. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the respondent on

10  November  2006  and  the  review  petition  was  also  dismissed  for  want  of

prosecution on 5 April  2006.  However, subsequently  the review petition,  after

restoration, was allowed on 30 January 2015 and while the cancellation of the

caste  certificate was upheld protection to the services of  the respondent  was

granted.

For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment and having due

regard to the fact that the claim of the respondent has been found to be false, we

find merit in the appeals which have been filed by the appellant. The impugned

judgments of the High Court dated 30 January 2015 are accordingly set aside.

The writ proceedings filed by the respondent shall, in the circumstances, stand

dismissed. The Civil Appeals are allowed in these terms. No other submission is

urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

53  (C.A. Nos. 8602-03/17 @ SLP  (C) Nos.529-30 of 2016)

83

PART A

13 India  Trade  Promotion  Organisation Vs. Vivekkumar Lajjashankar Chaurasiya  54:

The Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 March 2013 has found that

the respondent does not belong to the Nagawanshi tribe. The respondent was

appointed on a  post  reserved for  the Scheduled Tribes on the strength of  a

certificate that he belongs to the Nagawanshi tribe. The Division Bench of the

High Court, placing reliance on the judgment of the Full Bench in Arun Sonone’s

case (supra), has by its judgment dated 16 February 2015 granted reinstatement

to the respondent.  

For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment, the appeal filed by

the employer shall have to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned

judgment  of  the  High  Court  dated  16  February  2015  is  set  aside.  No  other

submission is urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

14 Mumbai  Metropolitan  Region  Development  Authority  Vs. Rajendra Ramchandra Dhakate & Anr.  55  :

The claim of the respondent to belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe has

been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 30 July 1998. The

Scrutiny  Committee  has  found  that  the  documents  submitted  by  the  first

respondent were manipulated and fabricated. The respondent was appointed to a

54  (C.A.No.8607/17 @ SLP  ©No.14830 of 2015) 55  (Civil Appeal 8609/17 @ SLP  (C) No.13409 of 2015)

84

PART A

post reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate stating

that he belongs to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. The termination of the services the

respondent has followed upon the cancellation of the caste certificate.  

In  the circumstances and for  the reasons contained in  the body of  the

judgment, the High Court erred in allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent

and  directing  the  appellant  to  reinstate  him.  The  Civil  Appeal  is  accordingly

allowed by setting aside the impugned judgment and order of  the High Court

dated 20 January 2015. The writ  petition filed by the respondent shall,  in the

circumstances, stand dismissed.

There shall be no order as to costs.

15 State of Maharashtra Vs.Vasant, s/o.Gyandeo Gonnade  56 :

The respondent was appointed on the post of Junior Engineer on 21 July

1982 on the basis of a claim of belonging to the “Halba Koshti” Scheduled Tribe.

The  Scrutiny  Committee  invalidated  his  claim  on  19  August  1985.  In  the

meantime,  the  Maharashtra  Public  Service  Commission  recommended  the

respondent for appointment in the cadre of Assistant Engineer in 1984 and 1986

but  he  was  not  granted  placement.  The  respondent  filed  a  writ  petition  to

challenge the order of the Scrutiny Committee dated 19 August 1985 which was

dismissed by the High Court on 4 July 1986. Thereafter the respondent filed an

appeal (Caste Appeal) 11/1986-87 before the Divisional Commissioner, Nagpur

against the order of the Scrutiny Committee. The appeal was disposed of on 23

August 1985 by remanding the proceedings back to the Scrutiny Committee. On

56  (Civil Appeal 8606/17 @ S.L.P. (C)No. 19992 of 2015)

85

PART A

remand, the Scrutiny Committee, by its order dated 28 August 1989 found that

the respondent does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe and cancelled his caste

certificate.  The  respondent  filed  an  appeal  before  the  Additional  Divisional

Commissioner,  Nagpur  which  was  dismissed  on  12  November  1990.  The

respondent filed a writ petition challenging the invalidation of his caste claim and

to seek relief in respect of his service conditions. By an order dated 23 March

1995 the writ petition was allowed by holding that the respondent belongs to the

Halba Koshti caste but that was made subject to the decision in Milind (supra).

The  respondent  was  granted  placement  in  the  seniority  of  Assistant

Engineer  with  effect  from  29  July  1987,  subject  to  the  final  outcome  of  the

proceedings  in  Milind (supra).  On  18  October  1995  the  respondent  was

appointed  as  Assistant  Executive  Engineer  subject  to  the  decision  in  Milind

(supra) and he joined on 4 December 1995. On 4 October 1999 the respondent

was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer subject to the final disposal of

the  proceedings  before  this  Court  in  Milind (supra).  It  was  directed  that  the

seniority would be fixed after the final decision of this Court. On 15 September

2000 the respondent was given a deemed date of  29 May 1987. On 15 April

2005, considering the judgment of this Court in Milind (supra), the appointment of

the respondent to the post of Assistant Executive Engineer was protected and he

was regularized on the post considering it as an open category post. His seniority

was directed to be fixed from the date of appointment and it was ordered that he

shall not get the benefit of belonging to a Scheduled Tribe. On 6 August 2005 the

earlier deemed date of 29 May 1987 was modified and his seniority on the post of

Assistant Executive Engineer was fixed from 4 December 1995. On 5 June 2006

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PART A

a G.R. was issued by which the deemed date was modified to 29 May 1987 on

the post of Assistant Executive Engineer for the purpose of seniority. On 1 August

2009 a G.R. was issued by which the deemed date for the purpose of seniority on

the post of Executive Engineer was set as 29 May 1991 subject to approval of the

M.P.S.C. On 28 April 2014 the State Government published a seniority list from 1

January 2011 to 13 December 2013 for Executive Engineer.

The respondent who was aggrieved by the G.R. dated 28 April 2014 filed a

writ petition before the High Court at its Nagpur Bench praying for an appropriate

writ for the declaration of the date of his seniority. The High Court by its judgment

dated 27 February 2015 has adverted to the decision in  Arun Sonone and has

come to the conclusion that the G.R. dated 6 August 2005 is not sustainable and

the  state  government  has  been directed  to  give  effect  to  its  G.R.s  dated  15

September 2000 and 15 April  2005 by placing the respondent in the cadre of

Assistant Engineer with effect from 29 May 1987.

From a  reading  of  the judgment  of  the High  Court,  it  is  clear  that  the

primary consideration which weighed with it was the decision of its Full Bench in

Arun Sonone. In view of the reasons contained in the body of this judgment, this

basis of the impugned decision of the High Court is erroneous. The Respondent

does not belong to the Halba Scheduled Tribe. It is also clear that the benefits

obtained by the Respondent were subject to the decision in Milind. In Milind, this

Court has held that Halba – Koshti is not a   Scheduled Tribe, the relevant entry

in the Scheduled Tribes Order 1950 being ‘Halba, Halbi’ .

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PART A

We  accordingly  allow  the  Civil  Appeal  and  set  aside  the  impugned

judgment dated 27 February 2015.   

There shall be no order as to costs.

16 State  of  Maharashtra Vs.Ku.Vijaya  Deorao  Nandanwar  & Anr.  57:

The claim of the respondent of belonging to the Halba Scheduled Tribe

has been invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee by its order dated 7 November

2009. The respondent was appointed as an Assistant Teacher on a post reserved

for the Scheduled Tribes. Following the invalidation of the claim, the services of

the respondent were terminated. The High Court by its impugned order dated 5

July 2013 set aside the order of termination and granted protection to the service

of the respondent.  

For the reasons contained in the body of the judgment,  the impugned

order of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside. The writ

petition filed by the respondent shall, in the circumstances, stand dismissed. The

Civil Appeal is allowed in these terms. No other submission has been urged.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

17 Ishwar Shrawan Nikhare Vs.State of Maharashtra & Ors.  58  :

The  appellant  was  appointed  as  an  Assistant  Teacher  in  a  vacancy

reserved  for  the  Scheduled  Tribes  on  30  January  1999.  The  Caste  Scrutiny 57  (C. A. No.9107 of 2015) 58  (Civil Appeal No.7187 of 2013)

88

PART A

Committee invalidated the claim of the appellant on 1 July 2008.  The Division

Bench of the High Court, by its order dated 30 January 2009 allowed the request

for  the withdrawal of  the writ  petition filed by the appellant keeping open the

validity  of  the  observations  made  by  the  Scrutiny  Committee  whereby

prosecution was ordered. The services of  the appellant were terminated on 8

February 2009. The appellant filed an appeal before the School Tribunal which

was dismissed on 19 October 2011 on the ground that the appointment of the

appellant  was not  a valid  appointment  in  the eye of  law. The learned Single

Judge dismissed the writ petition challenging the order of the Tribunal. A Letters

Patent Appeal has been dismissed by the Division Bench by its judgment dated 7

May 2012. Having regard to the fact that the claim of the appellant to belong to a

Scheduled Tribe was invalidated by the Scrutiny Committee, the School Tribunal

cannot be faulted in  declining to entertain the appeal against the consequential

order of termination of service. Moreover, for the reasons contained in the body

of the present judgment, we find no merit in the Civil Appeal. The Civil Appeal is

accordingly dismissed. No other submission has been urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

18 Eknath  Barikrao  Dhanwade  Vs.Divisional  Controller,  State

Transport Corporation & Anr.59  :

The appellant was appointed as a driver in 1999 with the respondent on a

post reserved for Scheduled Tribes on the basis of a caste certificate that he

belongs to the Mahadeo Koli tribe. The appellant’s caste claim was rejected by

the Scrutiny Committee holding that the appellant does not belong to the said

59  (Civil Appeal 8608/17 @  SLP (C)… CC No. 10889 of 2015)

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tribe. A writ petition was filed by the appellant. The High Court by an order dated

11 January 2000 remanded the matter to the Scrutiny Committee. On 2 March

2001 the Scrutiny Committee invalidated the tribe claim of the appellant.  The

appellant filed a Writ Petition before the High Court. By an order dated 30 June

2014,  the  High  Court  dismissed the  petition.  The  appellant  filed  another  writ

petition which was dismissed with costs by an order dated 19 September 2014.

Subsequently on 19 November 2014 the first respondent terminated the service

of the appellant. Being aggrieved, the appellant filed another writ petition which

was  dismissed  by the  High  Court  by  its  order  19  January  2015.  The  above

narration indicates a complete abuse of process by the appellant.    

For the reasons contained in the body of the present judgment and in

view of the above, we find no merit in the appeal. The Civil Appeal is accordingly

dismissed. No other submission is separately urged.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

19 Pradip Gajanan Koli Vs.State of Maharashtra & Ors.60 :

The  appellant  was  appointed  to  the  post  of  Fireman  in  the  reserved

category  for  the  Scheduled  Tribes  on  12  March  1996.  Thereafter  a  caste

certificate  dated  22  June  2000  certifying  that  the  appellant  belongs  to  the

Mahadeo Koli Scheduled Tribe was issued. The caste certificate was referred to

the  Scrutiny  Committee  for  verification.  The  appellant  submitted  an  affidavit

stating  that  he  belongs  to  the  said  caste  and  also  appeared  before  the

Committee. By an order dated 7 July 2012 the Scrutiny Committee invalidated

the caste certificate of the appellant. The appellant filed a writ petition which was

60  (Civil Appeal No.8598/17 @  SLP (C) 18925 of 2014)

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disposed of by the High Court, by its judgment and order dated 20 November

2013 with a direction that in case the appellant is still in service as on that date,

his employment shall not be terminated for a period of three months from the

date of its order.  For the reasons contained in the body of the present judgment, we find no

error in the impugned judgment. The Civil Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No

other submission is separately urged.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

20 Union of India & Ors. Vs.Suryakant & Ors.  61  :

The Director General, Vigilance, New Delhi by an order dated 1 July  2005,

initiated the verification of  tribe certificates of  employees who were appointed

from 1995. Accordingly, the original tribe certificate of the respondent was asked

to be produced. The respondent was appointed on the post of Lower Division

Clerk reserved for the Scheduled Tribes on the strength of  a caste certificate

stating that he belongs to the Mahadeo Koli tribe. The certificate was issued by

the  Tahsildar,  Akola  on  13  May  1985.  Subsequently  on  enquiry  about  the

authenticity of the tribe certificate, the Tahsildar, Akola informed that the register

for  the  year  1985 was  not  traceable  and  hence  it  cannot  be  stated  whether

certificate was issued by office or otherwise. Instead of submitting his original

caste certificate the respondent produced a fresh tribe certificate dated 21 July

2005 issued by S.D.O., Bhusawal wherein it was stated that he belongs to the

Mahadeo Koli tribe. By an order dated 10 October 2011 the Scrutiny Committee

invalidated the caste claim of the respondent. The respondent filed a writ petition

61  (Civil Appeal No.8597/17 @  SLP (C) No. 16852 of 2016)

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before the High Court. The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated

20 October 2015 allowed the writ petition, relying upon its Full Bench judgment in

Arun Sonone (supra) with a direction that  the respondent  is  entitled to claim

service protection and shall not be entitled to claim promotion in employment.  

The  narration  of  facts  reveals  a  complete  misuse  of  process  by  the

Respondent.  For  the  reasons  contained  in  the  body  of  the  judgment,  the

impugned order of the High Court is unsustainable and is accordingly set aside.

The Civil Appeal is accordingly allowed in these terms. No separate submission

is urged.  

There shall be no order as to costs.

21 Executive  Director  (Lubes),  Indian  Oil  Corporation  Ltd. Vs. Ashok Mahadeorao Pathrabe & Ors.62  :

The respondent joined IOCL in 1976 at its R & D Centre, Faridabad. At the

time of the appointment, the respondent has shown himself as belonging to the

Halba  Scheduled  Tribe.  The  appointment  was  subject  to  the  information

submitted by the respondent being true and correct. The respondent submitted

his caste certificate along with a prescribed form/documents on 15 December

2006 which were forwarded for verification. The Scrutiny Committee rejected the

caste  claim  of  the  respondent  on  4  October  2010.  Being  aggrieved,  the

respondent preferred an internal appeal and also a writ petition before the High

Court. By its order dated 1 March 2011 the appellant rejected the appeal of the

62  (Civil Appeal  Nos.8599-8600/17 @ SLP (C) Nos. 29388-89  of 2016)

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respondent upholding the dismissal order. Subsequently on 7 December 2011 the

High Court also dismissed the petition of the respondent upholding the dismissal

order. Being aggrieved, the respondent filed a Special Leave Petition before this

Court which was dismissed by an order dated 27 February 2012. The appellant

filed another writ petition before the High Court which was allowed by an order

dated 24 November 2015 to the extent that the services of the respondent were

protected till his superannuation.  

The facts narrated above reveal a complete misuse of process by the

Respondent.  For  the  reasons  contained  in  the  body  of  the  judgment,  the

impugned orders of the High Court are unsustainable and are accordingly set

aside.  The  Civil  Appeals  are  accordingly  allowed  in  these  terms.  No  other

submission is urged.

There shall be no order as to costs.

22 The State  of  Maharashtra  &  Ors. Vs.  Rupesh  s/o.Teksingh Shinde  63 :

The respondent  was appointed as a clerk on a post earmarked for the

Vimukta Jatis on 26 March 1999 claiming that he belongs to the Rajput Bhamta

Vimukta Jati.  The caste claim of  the respondent  was referred to the Scrutiny

Committee for verification and was invalidated by an order dated 29 July 2011. As

the caste claim was invalidated the respondent was terminated from service by

an order  dated 16 August  2011.  Being aggrieved,  the respondent  filed  a writ

petition before the High Court. After hearing both the parties, the court remanded

the  matter  back  to  the  Scrutiny  Committee.  The  caste  certificate  was  again

63  (Civil Appeal Nos.8610/17 @  SLP (C) No.2299  of 2017)

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PART A

invalidated by an order dated 21 January 2014 and the Committee observed that

the respondent obtained a false caste certificate and directed the registration of

an FIR against the respondent, pursuant to which the services of the respondent

were terminated. Being aggrieved the respondent filed a writ petition before the

High  Court.  The  High  Court  by  its  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  3

February 2016 allowed the writ petition relying upon its Full Bench judgment in

the case of  Arun Sonone Vs.  State of Maharashtra (supra) with a direction to

the appellant to reinstate the respondent on his original post.

The facts narrated above indicate the manner in which the process has

been abused by the Respondent. For the reasons contained in the body of the

judgment,  the  impugned  order  of  the  High  Court  is  unsustainable  and  is

accordingly set aside. The Civil Appeal is accordingly allowed in these terms. No

other submission is urged.  

There shall be no order as to costs.   

..........................................CJI           [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR]

...........................................J           [N V RAMANA]

                                                   ...........................................J           [Dr D Y  CHANDRACHUD]

New Delhi; July  06, 2017  

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PART A

ITEM NO.1501            COURT NO.1               SECTION III (For Judgment)                S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A                        RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal  No(s).8928/2015

CHAIRMAN AND MANAGING DIRECTOR FCI                Appellant(s)

                               VERSUS

JAGDISH BALARAM BAHIRA                           Respondent(s)

(HEARD BY : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE  N.V. RAMANA AND HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD) WITH C.A.No.7187/2013 (III) C.A.No.1918/2010 (IX) C.A.Nos.9158-9159/2015 (III) C.A.No.9154/2015 (III) C.A.No.9107/2015 (III) C.A.No.9157/2015 (III) C.A.No.9155/2015 (III) C.A.No.9160/2015 (III) C.A.Nos.9203-9204/2015 (III) SLP(C)No.33864-33865/2015 (IX) SLP(C)No.18925/2014 (IX) C.A.No.8926/2015 SLP(C)Nos.12440-12442/2015 SLP(C)No.13409/2015 SLP(C)No.14830/2015

95

PART A

SLP(C)....CC No.10889/2015 SLP(C)No.19992/2015 SLP(C)Nos.529-530/2016 SLP(C)....CC 19479/2015 SLP(C)No.57/2016 SLP(C)No.289/2016 SLP(C)No.16852/2016 SLP(C)No.21888/2016 SLP(C)No.2299/2017 SLP(C)Nos.29388-29389/2016 Date : 06-07-2017 These appeals/petitions were called on for judgment today. For Appellant(s)  Mr.S.S.Shamshery, Adv.

Mr.A.K.Srivastava, Adv.  Ms.B.Sunita Rao, Adv.  Mr.B. Krishna Prasad, AOR

                    Mr.Ravindra Keshavrao Adsure, AOR

                    Ms.Anagha S. Desai, AOR

Mr.Sushil Karanjkar, Adv.                      Mr.K. N. Rai, AOR

Mr.Aniruddha Joshi, Adv.                      Mr.Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy, AOR

                    Mr.Piyush Sharma, AOR                    

Mr.Rahul Chitnis, Adv.

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PART A

Mr.Aaditya Pande, Adv.                      Mr.Chander Shekhar Ashri, AOR

Mr.Kishor Lambat, Adv.                      For M/s. Lambat And Associates, AOR

                    Ms.Indra Sawhney, AOR

                    Mr.Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, AOR

                    Mr.Sunil Kumar Verma, AOR

                    Ms.Shobha Ramamoorthy, Adv.  Mr.Sri Ram J.Thalapathy, Adv.  Mr.V.Adhimoolam, Adv.  Mr.Shilp Vinod, Adv.

Mr.Kishor Lambat, Adv.                       Mr.Rabin Majumder, AOR

                    Mr.Gopal Balwant Sathe, AOR

                    Mr.Debesh Panda, AOR

                    Mr.Uday B. Dube, AOR                       For Respondent(s)  Mr.Gagan Sanghi, Adv.                      Mr.Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR

                    Mr.C. G. Solshe, AOR 97

PART A

                    Ms.Anagha S. Desai, AOR

                    Mr.Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, AOR

                    Ms.Shubhangi Tuli, AOR

                    M/s. S.M. Jadhav And Company, AOR

Mrs.Gunjan Sinha, Adv.                      For M/s. M. V. Kini & Associates, AOR

                    Mr.E. C. Agrawala, AOR

Mr.Kishor Lambat, Adv.                      For M/s. Lambat And Associates, AOR

                    Ms.Manju Jetley, AOR                      Mr.D. S. Mahra, AOR

Mr.Suhas Kadam, Adv.                      For M/s Lemax Lawyers & Co., AOR

                    Mr.Nirnimesh Dube, AOR

Mr.Rahul Chitnis, Adv.  Mr.Aaditya Pande, Adv.  

                    Mr.Chander Shekhar Ashri, AOR

                    Mr.Sudhanshu S. Choudhari, AOR            

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PART A

SLP(C)Nos.12440-12442/2015,  SLP(C)No.....CC  No.19479/2015, SLP(C)No.57/2016 and SLP(C)No.21888/2016

Issue fresh notice. Dasti service, in addition, is permitted. List on 2nd August, 2017 (Wednesday).

______________________________________________________________ Hon'ble  Dr.Justice  D.Y.Chandrachud  pronounced  the

judgment of the Bench comprising Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, Hon'ble Mr.Justice N.V.Ramana and His Lordship.

Delay condoned in SLP(C)......CC No.10889/2015. Leave granted in the special leave petitions.

C.A.No.8928/2015

The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed judgment.

C.A.No.9155/2015 and C.A.No.9157/2015 The  appeals  are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed

judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.9160/2015

The  appeal  is  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed judgment.

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PART A

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.Nos.9203-04/2015

The  appeals  are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8926/2015

The  appeal  stand  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.1918/2010

The appeal stand dismissed in terms of the signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs. C.A.No.9154/2015

The appeal stand dismissed in terms of the signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs. C.A.Nos.9158-59/2015

The  appeals  are  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs. C.A.Nos.8604-05/2017 @ SLP(C)Nos.33864-65/2015

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PART A

The  appeals  are  dismissed  in  terms  of  the  signed judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8601/2017 @ SLP(C)No.289 of 2016

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.Nos.8602-03/2017 @ SLP(C)Nos.529-30/2016

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8607/2017 @ SLP(C)No.14830/2015

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8609/2017 @ SLP(C)No.13409/2015

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

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C.A.No.8606/2017 @ SLP(C)No.19992/2015

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.9107/2015

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.7187/2013

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8608/2017 @ SLP(C)....CC 10889/2015

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8598/2017 @ SLP(C)No.18925/2014

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PART A

The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8597/2017 @ SLP(C)No.16852/2016

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.Nos.8599-8600/2017 @ SLP(C)Nos.29388-89/2016

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

C.A.No.8610/2017 @ SLP(C)No.2299/2017

The appeal is allowed in terms of the signed  judgment.

There shall be no order as to costs.

(SATISH KUMAR YADAV)                    (RENUKA SADANA)     AR-CUM-PS                         ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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104