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Reportable

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NOS.6609-6613 OF 2014

Brijesh Kumar & Ors.  … Petitioners

Versus

State of Haryana & Ors.      …Respondents

O R D E R

1. These petitions have been filed challenging the judgment and  

order  dated  22.11.2013,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  

Haryana  at  Chandigarh  dismissing  the  Civil  Misc.  Applications  in  

RFA No.5793 of 2012 for condonation of delay of more than10 years  

in filing the appeal  under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act,  

1894 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’).

2. The  land  of  the  petitioners  alongwith  the  lands  of  others  

admeasuring  134 acres,  5  kanals  and 10 marlas  situate  in  revenue  

estate of village Manakpur, Hadbast No.386, Tehsil Jagadhri, District  

Yamuna Nagar stood notified under Section 4 of the Act on 8.9.1993.  

In respect of the same, the award was made by the Land Acquisition  

Collector on 8.10.1997 assessing the market value of the land of the  

petitioners @ Rs.1,75,000/- per acre.

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3. Aggrieved,  the  petitioners  and  other  persons  interested  filed  

references  under  Section  18  of  the  Act  for  enhancement  of  

compensation and the Reference Court made the award on 7.9.2001  

assessing the market value of the land @ Rs.1,85,000/- per acre and  

they were also given other statutory benefits.

4. Aggrieved, some of the persons interested filed appeals before  

the High Court, however, petitioners had chosen not to file appeal at  

the initial stage but filed the same in the year 2012 after a lapse of 10  

years 2 months and 29 days.  The High Court refused to condone the  

delay in spite  of  the fact  that  other  persons who had preferred the  

appeals in time had been given a higher compensation.   

Hence, these petitions.  

  5. Shri  Shish  Pal  Laler,  learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  

petitioners has submitted that it was a fit case where the delay ought  

to have been condoned and the High Court has committed an error in  

not entertaining the appeal on merit.

6. The High Court had given cogent and valid reasons and relied  

upon  large  number  of  judgments  of  this  Court  while  rejecting  the  

application for condonation of delay including Mewa Ram (Deceased  

by L.Rs)  & Ors. v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 45;  State of  

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Nagaland  v.  Lipok  AO  &  Ors.,  AIR  2005  SC  2191;  and  D.  

Gopinathan Pillai v. State of  Kerala & Anr., AIR 2007  SC 2624.   

7. The  issues  of  limitation,  delay  and  laches  as  well  as  

condonation of such delay are being examined and explained every  

day by the Courts.

The law of limitation is enshrined in the legal maxim “Interest   

Reipublicae Ut Sit Finis Litium” (it is for the general welfare that a  

period  be  put  to  litigation).  Rules  of  Limitation  are  not  meant  to  

destroy the rights  of  the parties,  rather  the idea is  that  every legal  

remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.

8. The  Privy  Council  in  General  Fire  and  Life  Assurance  

Corporation Ltd. v. Janmahomed Abdul Rahim, AIR 1941 PC 6,  

relied upon the writings of Mr. Mitra in Tagore Law Lectures 1932  

wherein it has been said that “a law of limitation and prescription may  

appear to operate harshly and unjustly in a particular case, but if the  

law provides for a limitation, it is to be enforced even at the risk of  

hardship  to  a  particular  party  as  the  Judge  cannot,  on  applicable  

grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation,  

or introduce exceptions not recognised by law.”  

9. In P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., AIR 1998  

SC 2276,  the Apex Court while considering a case of condonation of  

delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation much less a reasonable or  

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satisfactory explanation for condonation of delay had been given, held  

as under:–  

“Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular  party but  it  has to  be applied  with all  its  rigour  when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have  no  power  to  extend  the  period  of  limitation  on  equitable grounds.”  

10. While  considering  a  similar  issue,  this  court  in  Esha  

Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12  

SCC 649 laid down various principles inter alia:

“ x x x v) Lack  of  bona  fides  imputable  to  a  party  seeking condonation of delay is a significant and  relevant fact

vi) The  concept  of  liberal  approach  has  to  encapsule the conception of reasonableness  and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered  free play

         x x x ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party  relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant  factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the  fundamental  principle  is  that  the  courts  are  required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in  respect  of  both  parties  and  the  said  principle  cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal  approach.  

x x x

xvii) The  increasing  tendency  to  perceive  delay  as  a  non-serious  mater  and,  hence,  lackadaisical  propensity  can  be  exhibited  in  a  

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nonchalant  manner  requires  to  be  curbed,  of  course, within legal parameters.”  

(See also:  Basawaraj v. Land Acquisition Officer (2013) 14 SCC  81)

11. The courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in  

rejecting the application for condonation of delay. However the court  

while  allowing such  application  has  to  draw a  distinction  between  

delay and inordinate delay for want of bona fides of an inaction or  

negligence would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 of the  

Limitation  Act,  1963. Sufficient  cause  is  a  condition precedent  for  

exercise  of  discretion by the Court  for  condoning the delay.   This  

Court has time and again held that when mandatory provision is not  

complied  with  and  that  delay  is  not  properly,  satisfactorily  and  

convincingly  explained,  the  court  cannot  condone  the  delay  on  

sympathetic grounds alone.   

12. It is also a well settled principle of law that if some person has  

taken  a  relief  approaching  the  Court  just  or  immediately  after  the  

cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take benefit thereof  

approaching the court at a belated stage for the reason that they cannot  

be permitted to take the impetus of the order passed at the behest of  

some diligent person.

13. In  State  of  Karnataka & Ors.  v.  S.M.  Kotrayya & Ors.,  

(1996) 6 SCC 267, this Court rejected the contention that a petition  

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should be considered ignoring the delay and laches on the ground that  

he filed the petition just after coming to know of the relief granted by  

the  Court  in  a  similar  case  as  the  same  cannot  furnish  a  proper  

explanation for delay and laches. The Court observed that such a plea  

is wholly unjustified and cannot furnish any ground for ignoring delay  

and laches.  

14. Same view has been reiterated by this Court in Jagdish Lal &  

Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366, observing as  

under:–

“Suffice it to state that appellants kept sleeping over  their  rights  for  long and elected to wake-up when  they had the impetus from Vir Pal Chauhan and Ajit  Singh’s ratios…Therefore desperate attempts of the  appellants  to  re-do  the  seniority,  held  by  them in  various  cadre....  are  not  amenable  to  the  judicial  review  at  this  belated  stage.  The  High  Court,  therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on  the ground of delay as well.”

15. In M/s. Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR  

1989 SC 674, this  Court considered a case where petitioner wanted to  

get the relief on the basis of the judgment of this Court wherein a  

particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the  

petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under:–

“There is one more ground which basically sets the  present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims  which  they  have  not  pursued  for  several  years.  Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be  

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dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody  else’s case came to be decided.”  

16. In the instant case, after considering the facts and circumstances  

and the reasons for inordinate delay of 10 years 2 months and 29 days,  

the High Court did not find sufficient grounds to condone the delay.

17. In view of the facts of the case and the above-cited judgments,  

we do not find any fault with the impugned judgment.  The petitions  

lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.

       ………………………J.         (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)

      ………………………J.      (J. CHELAMESWAR)

New Delhi March 24, 2014.

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