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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3672 OF 2007

BISWANATH GHOSH (Dead) by LRs. AND OTHERS     …     APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GOBINDA GHOSH ALIAS  GOBINDHA CHANDRA GHOSH  AND OTHERS …   RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

M.Y. EQBAL, J.:

1.   This appeal is directed against the judgment and order  

dated  28.3.2005  passed  by  Calcutta  High  Court  in  S.A.  

No.244 of 1987 whereby the judgment and decree passed by  

the Trial Court as also the Appellate Court has been reversed  

and the suit was dismissed holding that the suit itself was  

barred  by  limitation  and  lack  of  relevant  pleading  and  

evidence disentitle the plaintiff-appellant to get a decree for  

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specific  performance  and  for  re-conveyance  of  the  suit  

property.

2. The facts of the case lie in a narrow compass.   

3. The plaintiffs-appellants in need of money took a loan of  

Rs.3,000/- from the defendants-respondents and executed a  

registered  Kobala dated 24.11.1964.  On the same day, a  

registered Ekrarnama was also executed between the parties  

stipulating the terms of re-conveyance on payment  of the  

loan amount by the appellants to the respondents.

4. In the year 1970, the appellants filed a suit being Title  

Suit No.215 of 1970 against the defendants before the Sub-

Divisional Munsif, Bangaon under Section 36 of the Bengal  

Money Lenders Act, 1940.  The said suit was resisted by the  

defendants-respondents,  stating  therein  that  the  aforesaid  

sale deed executed by the plaintiffs was out an out-sale of  

the suit property and possession was also delivered to the  

respondents.  The learned Munsif in terms of the judgment  

dated 20.12.1973 dismissed the suit.  The plaintiffs then filed  

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appeal against the said judgment being Title Appeal No.350  

of 1974.  The learned Additional District Judge, upon hearing  

the parties,  allowed the appeal  and remanded the matter  

back to the Trial Court with a direction to the Trial Court to  

allow the plaintiffs-appellants an opportunity for  amending  

the plaint and to add prayer for specific performance of the  

contract and to pass fresh judgment in accordance with law.

5. Consequent upon the remand, the appellants amended  

the plaint by filing application on 1.3.1975 adding prayer for  

specific performance of contract to transfer the suit property  

in  terms  of  the  agreement  for  re-conveyance.   The  said  

application  for  amendment  was  allowed  and  the  learned  

Munsif  framed additional  issues,  and after  considering the  

evidence on record finally decreed the suit holding that the  

suit was not barred by limitation.  The court of Munsif held  

that the order for amendment related back to the date of  

institution of the suit and, therefore, the suit cannot be held  

to be barred by limitation.  Aggrieved by the said judgment  

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and decree, the defendants-respondents filed appeal being  

Title Appeal No.836 of 1983, which was dismissed on merit  

by  the  First  Appellate  Court.   The  respondents  then  filed  

Second Appeal,  which was finally allowed in favour of the  

defendant-respondents and the judgment and decree passed  

by both the courts of Munsif and the Additional District Judge  

have been set aside.  Hence, this appeal by special leave by  

the plaintiff-appellants.

6. From the impugned judgment passed by the High Court  

it  appears  that  the  High  Court  formulated  the  following  

substantial questions of law and considered the same while  

allowing the appeal:  

“1) Whether  the  Learned  Courts  below  erred  in  law  in  granting a decree for specific performance of contract  notwithstanding the fact that the necessary averment as  required by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act  were absent in the plaint.

2)Whether  from the  materials  on  records  both  the  learned  Courts  below ought  to  have held  that  the  plaintiffs  had  failed  to  plead  and  prove  that  they  were  ready  and  willing  to  perform  their  part  of  contract. 3)Whether  the  prayer  for  specific  performance  of  contract in the instant case is barred by limitation.

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4)Whether the amendment as prayed for was rightly  allowed  and  whether  on  the  basis  of  the  said  amendment  both  the Courts  below rightly  decreed  the suit.”

7. Before we proceed with the matter, it would be proper  

to first go through the judgment of remand passed by the  

Additional District Judge in first round of appeal being Title  

Appeal  No.350  of  1974,  which  was  preferred  against  the  

judgment  passed  by  Munsif  dismissing  the  suit  of  the  

plaintiffs-appellants.   From  perusal  of  the  judgment,  it  

reveals  that  both  parties  made  their  submission  on  the  

interpretation  of  two  documents,  namely  Kobala and  the  

agreement of re-conveyance.  It also reveals that there were  

exchange  of  letters  (Exhibit  ‘B’  and  ‘B1’)  whereupon  the  

defendants-respondents  in  the reply letter  expressed their  

willingness  to  reconvey  the  land  but  after  harvest  of  

aushpaddy on the suit land.  Thereafter, the plaintiff issued  

another letter dated 6.6.1968 agreeing to have conveyance  

of  the  suit  land  after  harvest  on  payment  of  Rs.3000/-  

(Exhibit  ‘B2’).   The  defendant  also  replied  to  such  letter  

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(Exhibit  ‘B3’)  agreeing to reconvey the suit  land after  the  

harvest.

8. On the basis of these exchanges of letters and in the  

facts and circumstances of the case, the Appellate Court held  

that the plaintiff-appellants should be given opportunity to  

have  specific  performance  of  contract  in  terms  of  the  

agreement.  The relevant portion of the finding and the order  

passed in the appeal is extracted hereinbelow:

“The learned advocate for the plaintiffs- appellants submits in view of the facts  and circumstances the plaintiffs should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  have  a  specific  performance  of  contract  in  terms of an agreement  (ext.1).   Under  the law time is not essence of contract in  case  of  sale  of  land.   The  parties  mutually  extended  the  time  as  the  letters  passed  between  them  indicate.  The evidence on record does not speak  for the fact that the plaintiffs are keen to  treat the transaction as a loan under the  

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provision of Bengal Money Lenders Act.  They are, on the other hand, keen to fall  back upon the agreement of repurchase  Ext.1.  But the suit has been framed as  one under section 36 of Bengal  Money  Lenders Act and as such no relief can be  given to the plaintiffs by way of specific  performance.  So far the end of justice  the  plaintiff  should  be  given  an  opportunity  to  include  a  prayer  for  specific  performance  of  contract  by  effecting  amendment  of  the  plaint  appropriately  and  on  payment  of  the  requisite court fees and on compliance  with the formalities of a suit for specific  performance.

The  learned  advocate  for  the  respondents  has  objected  to  giving  of  such opportunity to the plaintiffs as the  proposed  amendment  will  alter  the  nature of the suit.  I do not think so. The main prayer  of the plaintiffs  is  for  restoration of the land in  terms of the  agreement  either  by  reopening  the  

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transaction or by specific performance of  contract.   

Considering all these, I for the ends  of justice remand the suit for giving the  plaintiffs  an  opportunity  to  amend  the  plaint  in  the light  of observation made  above in my judgment.  The result the  appeal  succeeds.   Memo  of  appeal  is  correctly stamped.  Hence,

O R D E R E D that  the  appeal  be  allowed on contest  without costs.  The judgment and decree  of  the  learned  Munsif  are  hereby  set  aside.  The suit be remanded to the trial  court  for  allowing  the  plaintiff  an  opportunity  to  amend  the  plaint  for  making  a  prayer  for  specific  performance  of  contract.   The  plaintiff  shall  pay  a  cost  of  Rs.30/-  (Rupees  Thirty)  to  the  defendants  for  making  such amendment.  The defendants shall  get opportunity to file additional written  statement.   The  amendment  shall  be  effected  within  two  months  from  the  

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receipt of record of this suit.  In default,  the plaintiffs’ suit shall stands dismissed.  After the amendment the learned Munsif  shall  decide  the  suit  on  taking  further  evidence  if  the  parties  like  to  adduce  and on the basis of evidence on record  in  terms  of  the  added  prayer  of  the  plaintiffs.”

9. From  the  finding  recorded  by  the  Additional  District  

Judge  in  the  aforementioned  judgment  of  remand,  it  is  

evidently  clear  that  a  direction was issued to  the  learned  

Munsif to allow the plaintiff to amend the plaint on payment  

of cost of Rs.30/-.  The Appellate Court also gave opportunity  

to  the  defendants-respondents  for  filing  additional  written  

statement.

10. In  terms  of  the  aforesaid  judgment,  the  plaint  was  

amended and a relief for a decree of specific performance  

was added in the said suit.  The learned Munsif, after framing  

additional issue and considering the facts and evidence on  

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record, decreed the suit for specific performance holding that  

the  suit  was  not  barred  by  limitation.   While  passing  the  

decree,  the  plaintiff-appellant  was  directed  to  deposit  

consideration amount of Rs.3,000/-.

11. Learned  Munsif  held  that  after  the  amendment  was  

allowed and  relief  for  decree  of  specific  performance  was  

added,  it  should  be  deemed  that  the  suit  for  specific  

performance was filed on the date of institution of the suit  

i.e. 7.5.1970.

12. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by  

the Munsif, the defendants-respondents preferred an appeal  

being  Title  Appeal  No.836 of  1983.   The said  appeal  was  

heard  and  finally  dismissed  by  the  First  Appellate  Court  

holding that the suit was well within the period of limitation  

and  it  was  not  barred  by  limitation  inasmuch  as  the  

amendment  of  the  plaint  related  back  to  the  date  of  the  

presentation of the plaint.

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13. The  defendants-respondents  then  assailed  the  

judgment by filing second appeal being S.A. No.244 of 1987.  

The High Court, as stated above, reversed the finding given  

by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court and set aside the  

same by allowing the appeal.

14. From perusal of the judgment passed by the High Court,  

it reveals that the High Court, after referring Section 16 and  

Section  20  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act  and  relying  on  the  

decision of the Supreme Court, came to the conclusion that  

since the readiness and willingness have not been averred  

and proved, both the Trial  Court and First Appellate Court  

committed  error  in  decreeing  the  suit  for  specific  

performance.   The  High  Court  further  observed  that  by  

converting  a  suit  under  Section  36  of  the  Bengal  Money  

lenders Act into a suit for specific performance, basically the  

nature  and  character  of  the  suit  was  changed  and  such  

amendments  have  been  wrongly  allowed  in  favour  of  the  

plaintiffs-appellants.   

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15. Mr. S.B. Sanyal, learned senior counsel appearing  for  

the  appellant,  vehemently  contended  that  the  impugned  

judgment of the High Court is vitiated in law for not following  

the mandatory requirements of Section 100 of the Code of  

Civil Procedure (in short “Code”).  As a matter of fact, the  

High Court has adopted wrong procedure in dealing with the  

second appeal.   

16. Mr. Sanyal further contended that the High Court while  

entertaining  the  appeal  for  admission  has  to  formulate  

substantial  question of law involved in the said appeal  for  

consideration and only after giving notice to the respondents  

an opportunity of hearing on those substantial questions of  

law,  shall  finally  decide  the  appeal.   In  this  connection,  

learned senior counsel relied upon the decision of this Court  

in the cases of Sasikumar & Ors vs. Kunnath Chellappan  

Nair & Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 588 and Gurdev Kaur & Ors.  

vs. Kaki & Ors., (2007) 1 SCC 546.  We find force in the  

submission of Mr. Sanyal.

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17. Section 100 of the Code lays down the provision with  

regard to second appeal which reads as under:-

“100. Second appeal:- (1) Save as otherwise  expressly provided in the body of this Code or  by any other law for the time being in force, an  appeal shall  lie to the High Court from every  decree  passed  in  appeal  by  any  Court  subordinate  to  the  High  Court,  if  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  the  case  involves  a  substantial question of law.

(2) An appeal may lie under this section from  an appellate decree passed ex parte.

(3)  In  an  appeal  under  this  section,  the  memorandum  of  appeal  shall  precisely  state  the substantial question of law involved in the  appeal.

(4)  Where  the  High  Court  is  satisfied  that  a  substantial question of law is involved in any  case, it shall formulate that question.

(5) The appeal shall be heard on the question  so formulated and the respondent shall, at the  hearing of the appeal, be allowed to argue that  the case does not involve such question:  

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall  be deemed to take away or abridge the power  of  the  Court  to  hear,  for  reasons  to  be  recorded, the appeal on any other substantial  question  of  law,  not  formulated  by  it,  if  it  is  satisfied that the case involves such question.”

18. From  bare  reading  of  the  aforesaid  provision  it  is  

manifestly clear that an appeal  shall  lie to the High Court  

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from an appellate decree only if the High Court is satisfied  

that  the  case  involves  a  substantial  question  of  law.   It  

further mandates that the memorandum of appeal precisely  

states the substantial question of law involved in the appeal.  

If such an appeal is filed, the High Court while admitting or  

entertaining  the  appeal  must  record  its  satisfaction  and  

formulate  the  substantial  question  of  law  involved  in  the  

appeal.  The appeal shall then be heard on the questions so  

formulated  and  the  respondent  shall  be  allowed to  argue  

only on those substantial questions of law.  However, proviso  

to this section empowers the court to hear on any substantial  

question of law not formulated after recording reasons.   

19. Order  XLI,  Rule  (3)  of  the  Code  is  also  worth  to  be  

quoted hereinbelow:-

“3.Rejection  or  amendment  of  memorandum:-(1)  Where  the  memorandum  of  appeal  is  not  drawn  up  in  the  manner  hereinbefore prescribed, it may be rejected, or  be returned to the appellant for the purpose of  being amended within  a  time to be fixed by  the Court or be amended then and there.

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(2)  Where  the  Court  rejects  any  memorandum, it  shall  record  the reasons for  such rejection.

(3)  Where  a  memorandum  of  appeal  is  amended,  the  Judge,  or  such  officer  as  he  appoints in this behalf, shall sign or initial the  amendment.”

20. It is, therefore, clear that if a memorandum of appeal  

arising out from an appellate decree is not drawn up in the  

manner  provided  in  the  Code,  the  Court  may  reject  the  

memorandum of appeal or return the same for the purposes  

of being amended within the time fixed by the Court.

21. In  the instant  case what  the  High  Court  has  done is  

evident from its order dated 13.1.1987.  The order reads as  

under:-

“This appeal will be heard on all the grounds  and issue a Rule and stay as prayed for”

22. The aforesaid  order  shows that  the  High  Court  while  

admitting  the  appeal  has  not  formulated  any  substantial  

question of law and it  was only after  the arguments were  

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concluded some questions of law were formulated and the  

appeal was decided by passing the impugned judgment.

23.   The law is well  settled by catena of decisions of this  

Court that jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a second  

appeal  is  confined  only  to  such  appeals  which  involves  

substantial question of law.  Section 100 of the Code casts a  

mandate  on  the  High  Court  to  first  formulate  substantial  

question of law at the time of admission of the appeal.  In  

other words, a duty is cast on the High Court to formulate  

substantial question of law before hearing the appeal.  Since  

the  same  has  not  been  done,  the  impugned  judgment  is  

vitiated in law.

24. On the question of readiness and willingness, the High  

Court after relying upon some decisions of this Court allowed  

the appeal  and set aside the judgment and decree of the  

Trial Court and the First Appellate Court.  The only finding  

recorded by the High Court is extracted hereinbelow:-

“In  my  view,  both  the  Courts  below  totally  neglected and failed to consider the point of readiness  

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and willingness which must be continuous and both the  Courts below also failed to consider that this readiness  and willingness have not been averred and/ or not been  proved.  The Learned Appellate  Court  below without  scanning  the  judgment  and  decree  passed  by  the  Learned Trial Judge wrongly dittoed the judgment and  decree passed by the Learned Trial Judge and failed to  perform its statutory obligations and/ or duties.

In  view of  the  discussions  made above  and  in  view  of  the  decisions  of  the  Hon'ble  Apex  Court  referred  to  above,  both  the  judgments and decrees passed by the Learned  Trial  Judge  as  well  as  the  Learned  Appellate  Court are set aside.  

The suit is therefore, dismissed.  Let a decree be drawn up accordingly.  In  the  substantially  of  the  facts  and  

circumstances  the  parties  are  to  bear  their  respective costs.

Let the lower Court records be sent down  to the Courts below forthwith.

Urgent  Xerox  certified  copy,  if  applied  for,  will  be  given  to  the  parties  as  expeditiously as possible.”

25. In  our  considered  opinion,  the  High  Court  has  

committed error of law in setting aside the judgment  and  

decree of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court on the  

basis of aforesaid finding.

26. It  is  well  settled  proposition of  law that  in  a  suit  for  

specific performance the plaintiff must be able to show that  

he is ready and willing to carry out those obligations which  

are in fact part of the consideration for the undertaking of  

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the defendant.   For the compliance of Section 16(c) of the  

Act it is not necessary for the plaintiff to aver in the same  

words used in the section i.e. ready and willing to perform  

the contract.   Absence of the specific words in the plaint  

would not result in dismissal of the suit if sufficient fact and  

evidence  are  brought  on  record  to  satisfy  the  court  the  

readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.  

In the case of Kedar Lal Seal & Anr. vs. Hari Lal Seal, AIR  

(39) 1952 SC 47, this Court has held that the Court would be  

slow  to  throw  out  the  claim  on  mere  technicality  of  the  

pleading.  The Court observed:

“51. I would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere  technicality of  pleading when the substance of  the  thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other  side, however clumsily or inartistically the plaint may  be worded. In any event, it is always open to a court  to give a plaintiff  such general  or other relief as it  deems  just  to  the  same  extent  as  if  it  had  been  asked for,  provided  that  occasions no prejudice  to  the other side beyond what can be compensated for  in costs.”

27. In the case of Syed Dastagir vs. T.R. Gopalakrishna  

Setty, (1999) 6 SCC 337, this Court dealing with a similar  

issue observed:

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“9. So the whole gamut of the issue raised is, how to  construe a plea specially with reference to Section  16(c) and what are the obligations which the plaintiff  has  to  comply  with  in  reference  to  his  plea  and  whether  the  plea  of  the  plaintiff  could  not  be  construed  to  conform  to  the  requirement  of  the  aforesaid  section,  or  does  this  section  require  specific words to be pleaded that he has performed  or has always been ready and is willing to perform  his part of the contract. In construing a plea in any  pleading, courts must keep in mind that a plea is not  an expression of art and science but an expression  through words to place fact and law of one’s case for  a relief. Such an expression may be pointed, precise,  sometimes vague but still it could be gathered what  he  wants  to  convey  through  only  by  reading  the  whole pleading, depending on the person drafting a  plea.  In  India  most  of  the  pleas  are  drafted  by  counsel  hence  the  aforesaid  difference  of  pleas  which inevitably differ from one to the other. Thus,  to gather true spirit behind a plea it should be read  as  a  whole.  This  does  not  distract  one  from  performing  his  obligations  as  required  under  a  statute.  But  to  test  whether  he  has performed his  obligations, one has to see the pith and substance of  a  plea.  Where  a  statute  requires  any  fact  to  be  pleaded then that has to be pleaded maybe in any  form.  The  same  plea  may  be  stated  by  different  persons through different words; then how could it  be  constricted  to  be  only  in  any  particular  nomenclature or word.  Unless a statute specifically  requires a plea to be in any particular form, it can be  in any form. No specific phraseology or language is  required  to  take  such  a  plea.  The  language  in  Section  16(c)  does  not  require  any  specific  phraseology  but  only  that  the  plaintiff  must  aver  that  he  has  performed or  has  always  been and is  willing  to  perform his  part  of  the  contract.  So the  compliance of “readiness and willingness” has to be  in spirit and substance and not in letter and form. So  to  insist  for  a  mechanical  production  of  the  exact  words  of  a  statute  is  to  insist  for  the  form rather  than  the  essence.  So  the  absence  of  form  cannot  dissolve an essence if already pleaded.”

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28. In the case of Mst. Sugani vs. Rameshwar Das and  

Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2172, this Court observed that

“17.  It  is  not  within  the  domain  of  the  High  Court to investigate the grounds on which the  findings were arrived at,  by the last  court  of  fact.  It  is  true that  the lower  appellate  court  should  not  ordinarily  reject  witness  accepted  by the trial  court  in respect of  credibility  but  even  where  it  has  rejected  the  witnesses  accepted  by  the  trial  court,  the  same  is  no  ground  for  interference  in  second  appeal,  when it is found that the appellate court  has  given  satisfactory  reasons  for  doing  so.  In  a  case where from a given set of circumstances  two inferences are possible. One drawn by the  lower  appellate  court  is  binding  on  the  High  Court  in  second  appeal.  Adopting  any  other  approach  is  not  permissible.  The  High  Court  cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of  the first appellate court unless it is found that  the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate  court  were  erroneous  being  contrary  to  the  mandatory  provisions  of  law applicable  or  its  settled  position  on  the  basis  of  pronouncements made by the Apex Court,  or  was  based  upon  inadmissible  evidence  or  arrived at without evidence.

18.  If  the  question  of  law  termed  as  a  substantial question stands already decided by  a larger Bench of the High Court concerned or  by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or  by  the  Supreme  Court,  its  merely  wrong  application on the facts of the case would not  be termed to be a substantial question of law.  Where a point of law has not been pleaded or  is found to be arising between the parties in  the  absence of  any factual  format,  a  litigant  should not be allowed to raise that question as  

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a substantial question of law in second appeal.  The  mere  appreciation  of  the  facts,  the  documentary  evidence  or  the  meaning  of  entries  and  the  contents  of  the  document  cannot  be  held  to  be  raising  a  substantial  question of law. But where it is found that the  first  appellate  court  has  assumed jurisdiction  which  did  not  vest  in  it,  the  same  can  be  adjudicated in the second appeal, treating it as  a substantial question of law. Where the first  appellate court is shown to have exercised its  discretion  in  a  judicial  manner,  it  cannot  be  termed  to  be  an  error  either  of  law  or  of  procedure  requiring  interference  in  second  appeal.  This  Court  in Reserve  Bank  of  India vs. Ramkrishna Govind Morey, AIR 1976  SC  830,  held  that  whether  the  trial  court  should  not  have  exercised  its  jurisdiction  differently  is  not  a  question  of  law justifying  interference.”

29.  In the case of Ardeshir Mama vs. Flora Sassoon, 55  

IA  (PC)  360,  their  Lordships  of  the  Judicial  Committee  

observed that

“Where  the  injured  party  sued  at  law  for  a  breach, going,  as in the present  case, to the  root  of  the  contract,  he  thereby  elected  to  treat the contract as at an end and himself as  discharged  from  his  obligations.  No  further  performance by him was either contemplated  or  had  to  be  tendered.  In  a  suit  for  specific  performance,  on  the  other  hand,  he  treated  and  was  required  by  the  Court  to  treat  the  contract as still subsisting. He had in that suit  to allege, and if the fact was traversed, he was  required to prove a continuous readiness and  willingness,  from the  date  of  the  contract  to  the  time  of  the  hearing,  to  perform  the  

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contract on his part. Failure to make good that  averment  brought  with  it  the  inevitable  dismissal of his suit.”

30. Following the aforesaid principle, the Pakistan Supreme  

Court in the case of Maksud Ali & Ors.

vs. Eskandar Ali, 16 DLR (1964) 138, observed as under:

“25.  So  far  as  the  question  of  making  any  express  averment  in  the  pleading  of  such  readiness and willingness is concerned, we are  of the view that although there can be doubt  that this is the invariable practice of pleading,  and if we may say so, a desirable practice, de- signed to  give  a  clear  and express notice  to  the opponent of the case sought to be made  out, it cannot be said that this is a rule of law  which would  render  the  structure  of  the  suit  itself  defective  or  that  without  it  a  proper  cause of action would not appear on the plaint.  We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  accept  the  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  that  the  present suit was bound to fail in the absence  of such an averment.”   

31. In  the  case  of  Cort  and Gee vs.  The Ambergate,  

Nottingham and Boston and Eastern Junction Railway  

Company, (1851) 17 Queen's Bench Reports 127, the Court  

observed that

“In  common  sense  the  meaning  of  such  an  averment of readiness and willingness must be  that  the  non-completion  of  the  contract  was  

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not  the  fault  of  the  plaintiffs,  and  that  they  were disposed and able to complete it if it had  not been renounced by the defendants. What  more  can  reasonably  be  required  by  the  parties  for  whom  the  goods  are  to  be  manufactured? If, having accepted a part, they  are  unable  to  pay  for  the  residue,  and have  resolved  not  to  accept  them,  no  benefit  can  accrue  to  them  from  a  useless  waste  of  materials  and  labour,  which  might  possibly  enhance  the  amount  of  damages  to  be  awarded against them. “

32. In sum and substance, in our considered opinion, the  

readiness  and  willingness  of  person  seeking  performance  

means that the person claiming performance has kept the  

contract subsisting with preparedness to fulfill his obligation  

and accept the performance when the time for performance  

arrive.

33. In  the  background  of  the  principles  discussed  

hereinbefore,  we  shall  now  consider  the  conduct  of  the  

plaintiffs-appellants  and  the  act  done  by  them  in  

performance  of  their  part  of  obligations.   These  may  be  

summarized as under:

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i) Admittedly  on  1.12.1964,  two  documents  were  executed viz. the sale deed in favour of the defendants  on payment of Rs.3,000/-. ii) An agreement of re-conveyance was also executed  on the  same day whereby  the  defendants  agreed  to  return back the property within the stipulated time; iii) Before the expiry of the time stipulated in the deed  

of  re-conveyance,  the  plaintiffs  send  a  notice  through a lawyer informing the defendants that as  per the terms of the agreement of re-conveyance  the  plaintiffs  tendered  the  amount  of  Rs.3,000/-  and requested them to execute the sale deed.  The  defendants  deferred  the  date  and  time  on  one  pretext  or  another.   In  the  same  notice,  the  plaintiffs reminded the defendants to execute the  sale deed after receiving the aforesaid amount.

iv) The  defendants-respondents  on  29.4.1968  sent  reply to the plaintiffs’ notice stating that that they  are ready to execute and register the sale deed in  favour of the plaintiffs, but because of the paddy  grown on  the  land  it  could  be  done after  some  time.   The  reply  dated  29.4.1968  is  reproduced  hereinbelow:

“NOTICE To 1. Sree Biswanath Ghosh  

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2. Sri Guru Pada Ghosh 3. Tarak  Dasi  Ghosh  of  Village  Narikela,  P.O.  

Gaighata

Under instructions and advice of my clients Sri  Narendra Nath Ghosh, and Sri Harendra Nath Ghosh  and in reply of the said notice dated 22.4.68. I am  to intimate you that the averments and contents of  the said notice under  reply  regarding  offer  of  Rs.  3000/-  by  you  and  to  requesting  them that  after  harvesting of the crops after the expiry of moth of  Pous  in  respect  of  the  land  in  question  and  to  execute  and  register  the  said  sale  deed  are  altogether false.

That the land in question under the said notice  my clients has shown Aush Paddy on the 4 th day of  Baisak  within  the  knowledge  of  you  and  without  any  objection  and  the  said  paddy  seeds  have  grown  to  some  extent my clients are ready to execute and register the sale  deed in favour of you at our own cost after acknowledged  receipt  of  the  said amount  of  Rs.  3000/-  from my clients  within ensuring month of Bhadra after harvesting the said  paddy dated 29.4.68.

Sd/- Rabindra Nath Dutta Advocate 29.4.68”

v) The  plaintiffs  again  sent  a  notice  on  6.6.1968  referring the reply dated 29.4.1968 and requesting  the  defendants  to  execute  the  sale  deed  after  harvesting  the  paddy.   The  said  letter  is  also  extracted hereinbelow:    “From:

NirendraNath Basu, Advocate, Bongaon,  P.O. Dt. 24 Parganas

To, 1 .Sri Narendra Nath Ghosh)    Sons of Late  Hazari Lai Ghosh  

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2. Sri Harendra Nath Ghosh) Residents  of  Village  Narikela,  P.O.  Gaighata,  Dt.  24  Parganas,  Dated  at  Bongaon on the 6th day of June, 1968.

Sir, In  pursuance of  the letter  dated 29/4/1968 sent  on behalf of your Advocate Rabindra Nath Dutta  under  instruction  of  my  clients  Sri  Biswanath  Ghosh, Sri Gurupada Ghosh, Sri Tarak Basi Ghosh.  You  are  informed  that  after  harvest  the  'Aush  Paddy' within the month of Bhadra and within the  said  month  acknowledged  receipt  a  sum of  Rs.  3000/-  in  cash from my client  and execute  and  register  a  sale  deed  in  favour  of  my client  and  deliver vacant possession in favour of my clients  otherwise  you  will  be  liable  for  all  costs  and  damages dated 6.6.68.

Sd/- Narendra Nath Basu Advocate, Bongaon

Dated 6.6.68

P.S. Gaighata, Mouza-  Narikela

Settlement Plot No. 189 of .46 decimals. Settlement Plot No. 566 of .42 decimals out of .84 dec. Settlement Plot No. 416 of .14 decimals Settlement 413 of. 15 decimals.

Total 1.17 acre of land.  Sd/-

vi) In spite of assurance, when the defendants failed  to execute the sale  deed,  the plaintiffs  filed the  suit  on  7.5.1970  before  the  Munsif,  Bongaon  stating therein that the plaintiffs have every right  to  reconvey  and  to  take  possession  of  the  suit  land.   Although  the  suit  was  dismissed,  but  in  appeal the First Appellate Court while dismissing  the  appeal  by  Judgment  dated  16.12.1985  

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mentioned  in  the  order  that  the  plaintiffs  have  deposited the money as per directions of learned  Munsif  before  the  date  fixed  in  the  judgment  passed for specific performance.

34. From the aforementioned sequence of facts and events,  

it  can be safely inferred that the plaintiffs-appellants were  

always ready and willing to discharge their  obligation and  

perform  their  part  of  the  agreement.   In  our  considered  

opinion,  the  undisputed  facts  and  events  referred  to  

hereinabove  shall  amount  to  sufficient  compliance  of  the  

requirements of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act.

35. Taking  into  consideration  the  entire  facts  and  

circumstances  of  the  case  and  the  law  discussed  

hereinabove,  in  our  considered  opinion  the  impugned  

judgment passed by the High Court cannot be sustained in  

law.   

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36. For  the  aforesaid  reasons,  the  appeal  is  allowed,  the  

impugned judgment passed by the High Court is set aside  

and the judgment  and decree of the First Appellate  Court  

confirming the judgment and decree passed by the Munsif  

are restored.  However, in the facts of the case, there shall  

be no order as to costs.

…………………………….J.                                                      (Jagdish Singh  

Khehar)   

…………………………….J.                                                      (M.Y. Eqbal) New Delhi, March 14, 2014.  

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