Page 1

Reportable  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1331 OF 2014 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 1565 of 2013)

Bhuwan Mohan Singh … Appellant

Versus

Meena & Ors.        …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

2. The two issues  that  pronouncedly emanate in this  

appeal  by  special  leave  are  whether  the  Family  Court  

while  deciding  an  application  under  Section   7  of  the  

Family  Court  Act,  1984   (for  brevity,  “the  Act”)  which  

includes  determination of  grant  of  maintenance  to  the  

persons  as  entitled  under  that  provision,   should  allow

Page 2

adjournments in  an extremely  liberal  manner  remaining  

oblivious   of  objects  and  reasons  of  the  Act  and  also  

keeping the windows of wisdom closed and the sense of  

judicial  responsiveness  suspended  to  the  manifest  

perceptibility  of  vagrancy,  destitution,  impecuniosity,  

struggle for survival and the emotional fracture,  a wife  

likely  to  face  under  these  circumstances  and  further  

exhibiting  absolute  insensitivity  to  her  condition,  who,  

after  loosing  support  of  the  husband who has  failed  to  

husband  the  marital  status  denies  the  wife  to  have  

maintenance for almost nine years as that much time is  

consumed to decide the lis and, in addition, to restrict the  

grant of maintenance to the date of order on some kind of  

individual notion.  Both the approaches, as we perceive,  

not only defeat the command of the legislature but also  

frustrate the hope of wife and children who are deprived  

of adequate livelihood and whose aspirations perish like  

mushroom and  possibly  the  brief  candle  of  sustenance  

joins  the  marathon  race  of  extinction.   This  delay  in  

adjudication  by  the  Family  Court  is  not  only  against  

2

Page 3

human rights but also against the basic embodiment of  

dignity of an individual.  

3. Be it  ingeminated that  Section 125 of the Code of  

Criminal Procedure (for short “the Code”) was conceived  

to ameliorate the agony, anguish, financial suffering of a  

woman who  left  her  matrimonial  home for  the  reasons  

provided  in  the  provision  so  that  some  suitable  

arrangements  can  be  made  by  the  Court  and  she  can  

sustain herself and also her children if they are with her.  

The concept of sustenance does not necessarily mean to  

lead  the  life  of  an  animal,  feel  like  an  unperson  to  be  

thrown  away  from  grace  and  roam  for  her  basic  

maintenance somewhere else.  She is entitled in law to  

lead a life in the similar manner as she would have lived in  

the house of her husband.  That is where the status and  

strata come into play, and that is where the obligations of  

the husband, in case of a wife, become a prominent one.  

In a proceeding of this nature, the husband cannot take  

subterfuges  to  deprive  her  of  the  benefit  of  living  with  

dignity.  Regard being had to the solemn pledge at the  

time  of  marriage  and  also  in  consonance  with  the  

3

Page 4

statutory law that governs the field, it is the obligation of  

the  husband  to  see  that  the  wife  does  not  become  a  

destitute, a beggar.  A situation is not to be maladroitly  

created whereunder she is compelled to resign to her fate  

and  think  of  life  “dust  unto  dust”.   It  is  totally  

impermissible.  In fact, it is the sacrosanct duty to render  

the financial  support even if  the husband is  required to  

earn  money  with  physical  labour,  if  he  is  able  bodied.  

There is no escape route unless there is an order from the  

Court that the wife is not entitled to get maintenance from  

the husband on any legally permissible grounds.

4. Presently  to  the  facts  which  lie  in  an  extremely  

small compass.  The marriage between the appellant and  

the husband was solemnized on 27.11.1997 as per Hindu  

rites and ritual,  and in  the wedlock a  son was born on  

16.12.1998.   The  respondent,  under  certain  

circumstances,  had  to  leave  the  marital  home  and  

thereafter filed an application on 28.8.2002 under Section  

125 of the Code  in the Family Court, Jaipur, Rajasthan,  

claiming Rs.6000/- per month towards maintenance.  The  

Family  Court  finally  decided  the  matter  on  24.8.2011  

4

Page 5

awarding  monthly  maintenance  of  Rs.2500/-  to  the  

respondent-wife and Rs.1500/- to the second respondent-

son.  Be it stated, during the continuance of the Family  

Court proceedings, number of adjournments were granted,  

some taken by the husband and some by the wife. The  

learned Family Judge being dissatisfied with the material  

brought on record came to hold that the respondent-wife  

was entitled to maintenance and,  accordingly,  fixed the  

quantum and directed that  the maintenance to be paid  

from the date of the order.

5. Being  dissatisfied  with  the  aforesaid  order  the  

respondent-wife preferred S.B. Criminal Revision Petition  

No. 1526 of 2011 before the High Court of Judicature at  

Rajasthan and the learned single Judge, vide order dated  

28.5.2012,  noted  the  contention  of  the  wife  that  the  

maintenance should have been granted from the date of  

application, and that she had received nothing during the  

proceedings  and  suffered  immensely  and,  eventually,  

directed that the maintenance should be granted from the  

date of filing of the application.

5

Page 6

6. Criticizing the aforesaid order, it is submitted Mr.  

Jay  Kishor  Singh  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  that  

when number of adjournments were sought by the wife,  

grant  of  maintenance  from  the  date  of  filing  of  the  

application  by  the  High  Court  is  absolutely  illegal  and  

unjustified. It is his submission that the wife cannot take  

advantage of her own wrong.

7. Mr.  Mohit  Paul,  learned  counsel  for  the  

respondents would submit that the Family Court adjourned  

the matter sometimes on its own and the enormous delay  

took place because of non-cooperation of the husband in  

the  proceedings  and,  therefore,  the  wife  who  was  

compelled to sustain herself  and her son with immense  

difficulty should not be allowed to suffer.  It is proponed by  

him  that  the  High  Court  by  modifying  the  order  and  

directing  that  the  maintenance should  be  granted from  

the date of filing of the application has not committed any  

legal infirmity and hence, the order is inexceptionable.

8. At  the  outset,  we  are  obliged  to  reiterate  the  

principle of law how a proceeding under Section 125 of the  

Code has to be dealt with by the court, and what is the  

6

Page 7

duty of a Family Court after establishment of such courts  

by the Family Courts Act, 1984.  In Smt. Dukhtar Jahan  

v.  Mohammed  Farooq1,  the  Court  opined  that  

proceedings under Section 125 of  the Code,  it  must  be  

remembered, are of a summary nature and are intended  

to enable destitute wives and children, the latter whether  

they are legitimate or illegitimate, to get maintenance in a  

speedy manner.

9. A  three-Judge  Bench  in  Vimla  (K.)  v.  

Veeraswamy  (K.)2,  while  discussing  about  the  basic  

purpose  under  Section  125  of  the  Code,  opined  that  

Section  125  of  the  Code  is  meant  to  achieve  a  social  

purpose.   The  object  is  to  prevent  vagrancy  and  

destitution.  It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of  

food, clothing and shelter to the deserted wife.

10. A two-Judge Bench in Kirtikant D. Vadodaria v.  

State of Gujarat and another3, while adverting to the  

dominant purpose behind Section 125 of the Code, ruled  

that:

1 (1987) 1 SCC 624 2 (1991) 2 SCC 375 3 (1996) 4 SCC 479

7

Page 8

“While dealing with the ambit and scope of the  provision contained in Section 125 of the Code,  it  has to be borne in mind that the dominant  and primary object  is  to  give social  justice to  the woman, child and infirm parents etc. and to  prevent destitution and vagrancy by compelling  those who can support those who are unable to  support themselves but have a moral claim for  support. The provisions in Section 125 provide a  speedy remedy to those women, children and  destitute  parents  who  are  in  distress.  The  provisions  in  Section  125  are  intended  to  achieve  this  special  purpose.  The  dominant  purpose  behind  the  benevolent  provisions  contained in Section 125 clearly is that the wife,  child and parents should not be left in a helpless  state of distress, destitution and starvation.”

11. In  Chaturbhuj  v.  Sita Bai4, reiterating the legal  

position the Court held: -

“Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice  and is specially enacted to protect women and  children and as noted by this Court in  Captain  Ramesh  Chander  Kaushal v.  Veena  Kaushal5  falls within constitutional sweep of Article 15(3)  reinforced by Article 39 of  the Constitution of  India. It  is meant to achieve a social purpose.  The  object  is  to  prevent  vagrancy  and  destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the  supply  of  food,  clothing  and  shelter  to  the  deserted  wife.  It  gives  effect  to  fundamental  rights and natural duties of a man to maintain  his  wife,  children  and  parents  when  they  are  unable  to  maintain  themselves.  The aforesaid  position was highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai  Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat6.”

4 (2008) 2 SCC 316 5 (1978) 4 SCC 70 6 (2005) 3 SCC 636

8

Page 9

12. Recently  in  Nagendrappa  Natikar  v.  

Neelamma7, it has been stated that it is a piece of social  

legislation which provides for a summary and speedy relief  

by way of maintenance to a wife who is unable to maintain  

herself and her children.

13. The  Family  Courts  have  been  established  for  

adopting and facilitating the conciliation procedure and to  

deal  with  family  disputes  in  a  speedy  and  expeditious  

manner.   A  three-Judge Bench in  K.A. Abdul Jaleel  v.  

T.A.  Shahida8,  while  highlighting  on  the  purpose  of  

bringing in the Family Courts Act by the legislature, opined  

thus: -

“The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide  for  the establishment  of  Family  Courts  with  a  view  to  promote  conciliation  in,  and  secure  speedy  settlement  of,  disputes  relating  to  marriage  and  family  affairs  and  for  matters  connected therewith.”

14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in  

the case at hand the proceeding before the Family Court  

was  conducted  without  being  alive  to  the  objects  and  

reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions under  

7 2013 (3) SCALE 561 8 (2003) 4 SCC 166

9

Page 10

Section 125 of the Code.  It is unfortunate that the case  

continued for nine years before the Family Court.  It has  

come to the notice of the Court that on certain occasions  

the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a  

routine  manner  as  a  consequence  of  which  both  the  

parties suffer or, on certain occasions, the wife becomes  

the  worst  victim.   When  such  a  situation  occurs,  the  

purpose  of  the  law  gets  totally  atrophied.   The  Family  

Judge is expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is  

dealing  with  extremely  delicate  and  sensitive  issues  

pertaining  to  the  marriage and issues  ancillary  thereto.  

When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts  

should  show undue haste or  impatience,  but  there is  a  

distinction between impatience and to be wisely anxious  

and conscious about dealing with a situation.  A Family  

Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is  

the greatest assassin of the lis before it.  It not only gives  

rise  to  more  family  problems  but  also  gradually  builds  

unthinkable and Everestine bitterness.  It leads to the cold  

refrigeration  of  the  hidden  feelings,  if  still  left.   The  

delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the  

10

Page 11

awareness  and balance.   Dilatory  tactics  by any of  the  

parties has to be sternly dealt with, for the Family Court  

Judge has to be alive to the fact that the lis before him  

pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can feed it  

to grow.  We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges  

shall  remain  alert  to  this  and  decide  the  matters  as  

expeditiously as possible keeping in view the objects and  

reasons of the Act and the scheme of various provisions  

pertaining to  grant  of  maintenance,  divorce,  custody of  

child, property disputes, etc.

15. While  dealing with the relevant date of  grant  of  

maintenance,  in  Shail  Kumari  Devi  and  another  v.  

Krishan Bhagwal Pathak alias Kishun B. Pathak9, the  

Court  referred  to  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  

(Amendment) Act, 2001 (Act 50 of 2001) and came to hold  

that  even  after  the  amendment  of  2001,  an  order  for  

payment of  maintenance can be paid by a court  either  

from the date of order or when express order is made to  

pay maintenance from the date of application, then the  

amount of maintenance may be paid from that date, i.e.,  

9 (2008) 9 SCC 632

11

Page 12

from the  date  of  application.  The Court  referred  to  the  

decision in Krishna Jain v. Dharam Raj Jain10 wherein it  

has been stated that to hold that, normally maintenance  

should be made payable from the date of the order and  

not from the date of the application unless such order is  

backed by reasons would amount to inserting something  

more  in  the  sub-section  which  the  legislature  never  

intended.  The High Court had observed that it was unable  

to read in sub-section (2) laying down any rule to award  

maintenance from the date of the order or that the grant  

from the date of the application is an exception.  The High  

Court  had  also  opined  that  whether  maintenance  is  

granted from the date of the order or  from the date of  

application,  the  Court  is  required  to  record  reasons  as  

required under sub-section (6) of Section 354 of the Code.  

After referring to the decision in Krishna Jain (supra), the  

Court adverted to the decision of the High Court of Andhra  

Pradesh in  K. Sivaram  v.  K. Mangalamba11 wherein it  

has been ruled that the maintenance would be awarded  

from the date of the order and such maintenance could be  

10 1992 Cri LJ 1028 (MP) 11 1990 Cri LJ 1880 (AP)

12

Page 13

granted from the date of the application only by recording  

special reasons.  The view of the learned single Judge of  

the  High  Court  of  Andhra  Pradesh  stating  that  it  is  a  

normal rule that the Magistrate should grant maintenance  

only from the date of the order and not from the date of  

the application for maintenance was not accepted by this  

Court.  Eventually, the Court ruled thus: -

“43. We, therefore, hold that while deciding an  application  under  Section  125  of  the  Code,  a  Magistrate  is  required  to  record  reasons  for  granting  or  refusing  to  grant  maintenance  to  wives,  children  or  parents.  Such  maintenance  can be awarded from the date of the order, or, if  so ordered, from the date of the application for  maintenance, as the case may be. For awarding  maintenance from the  date  of  the  application,  express order is necessary. No special reasons,  however,  are  required  to  be  recorded  by  the  court. In our judgment, no such requirement can  be read in sub-section (1) of Section 125 of the  Code  in  absence  of  express  provision  to  that  effect.”

16. In  the  present  case,  as  we  find,  there  was  

enormous  delay  in  disposal  of  the  proceeding  under  

Section 125 of the Code and most of the time the husband  

had taken adjournments and some times the court dealt  

with the matter showing total laxity.  The wife sustained  

herself as far as she could in that state for a period of nine  

13

Page 14

years.   The  circumstances,  in  our  considered  opinion,  

required  grant  of  maintenance  from  the  date  of  

application  and  by  so  granting  the  High  Court  has  not  

committed any legal infirmity.  Hence, we concur with the  

order of the High Court.  However, we direct, as prayed by  

the learned counsel for the respondent, that he may be  

allowed to  pay the arrears  along with  the maintenance  

awarded at present in a phased manner.  Learned counsel  

for the appellant did not object to such an arrangement  

being made.  In view of the aforesaid, we direct that while  

paying the maintenance as fixed by the learned Family  

Court Judge per month by 5th of each succeeding month,  

the arrears shall be paid in a proportionate manner within  

a period of three years from today.

17. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merits,  

stands dismissed.

.............................J. [Dipak Misra]

.............................J.

14

Page 15

[V. Gopala Gowda] New Delhi; July 15, 2014.

15