Bhupendra Nath Hazarika Vs State of Assam .

30 November 2012
Supreme Court
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BHUPENDRA NATH HAZARIKA Vs STATE OF ASSAM .

Bench: K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN,DIPAK MISRA
Case number: C.A. No.-008514-008515 / 2012
Diary number: 35822 / 2008
Advocates: PRASHANT BHUSHAN Vs CORPORATE LAW GROUP

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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8514-8515 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) Nos. 19707-19708 of 2009)

Bhupendra Nath Hazarika and another ... Appellants

Versus

State of Assam and others ... Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.8516 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 963 of 2010)

Bibekananda Das ... Appellant

Versus

State of Assam and others ... Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.

Leave granted.

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2. In these appeals, the challenge is to the common

judgment and order dated 9.9.2008 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Gauhati, Assam in WA Nos. 448

of 2004, 459 of 2004 and 465 of 2004 whereby stamp of

approval has been given to the judgment and order dated

19.11.2004 passed by the learned single Judge in WP(C)

Nos. 7482 of 2002, 7843 of 2002, 7564 of 2002, 8081 of

2002 and 298 of 2003 whereunder the learned single Judge

had maintained the order dated 11.10.2002 passed by the

Assam Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati (for short “the

tribunal”) in Appeal Case No. 79ATA of 1999, and dismissed

WP(C) Nos. 4028 of 2003, 4129 of 2003 and 1031 of 2003

which were preferred directly for issuance of mandamus

commanding the respondent authorities to consider the

previous services rendered by the petitioners therein prior to

their appointments in the Assam Police Service (Junior

Grade) in the year 1993 and to determine their inter se

seniority in the promotional cadre accordingly and further

disposed of WP(C) 69 of 2003 preferred by an Additional

Superintendent of Police, Guwahati for quashing of the

appointment to the promotional post of the private

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respondents therein on the foundation that they had been

promoted in violation of the provisions of the Assam Police

Service Rules, 1966 (for brevity “the 1966 Rules”).

3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts which are

requisite to be stated are that the Assam Public Service

Commission (for short “the Commission”) issued an

advertisement No. 9/92 dated 23.6.1992 inviting

applications for preliminary examination for the Combined

Competitive Examination, 1992-93 for selecting candidates

for various posts and services including thirty vacancies in

the Assam Police Service (Junior Grade) (for short “the APS”)

as requisitioned by the Commissioner-cum-Secretary to the

Government of Assam in the Department of Personnel on

5.9.1992. On 29.8.1992, the Commission published

another advertisement No. 12/92 inviting applications for

filling up of 20 posts in the APS under Rule 5(1)(c) of the

1966 Rules. There is no dispute that the initial 30

vacancies were put in the compartment of “regular batch” or

“direct recruitment” and the other 20 vacancies, which were

sought to be filled up by way of special drive, were kept in

the category of “special batch” or “promotional recruits”.

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The main examination for the regular batch was held on

15.11.1992 for total marks of 1400. The examination for

the special batch was held on 22.11.1992 for 650 marks.

The Commission declared the result in respect of regular

batch on 23.4.1993 and, vide letter dated 24.4.1993,

recommended 30 candidates for appointment in order of

merit. Despite the recommendation by the Commission, no

appointment was made till 13.8.1993. At this juncture, the

Commissioner-cum-Secretary to the Government of Assam

in the Department of Home requested the Commission to

furnish the select list of the special recruits at the earliest.

On the basis of the aforesaid letter of request, the

Commission sent its recommendations in respect of the

candidates belonging to the special batch and on the basis

of the said recommendation, vide notification No.

HMA.478/86/Pt-I/17 dated 3.7.1993, the respondent Nos.

6 to 24 before the tribunal were appointed. The respondent

No. 25 was appointed on 31.81994. Thereafter, the

Competent Authority, vide notification No. HMA.110/93/43

dated 13.8.1993, appointed 28 persons from the regular

batch. As the recruits of the special batch were appointed

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earlier, they were treated senior to the recruits belonging to

the regular batch.

4. The facts, as further uncurtained, are that the

determination of seniority came to the notice of the recruits

of the regular batch at the time of their confirmation of

service in the year 1999. Being dissatisfied with the action

of the authorities, they immediately submitted a

representation. When the representation was pending

consideration, a provisional gradation list showing the inter

se seniority as on 31.12.1992 was published on 12.3.1999.

In the said provisional gradation list, the recruits of the

special batch were shown as senior to the recruits of the

regular batch. As warranted, the recruits belonging to the

regular batch filed their objections to the fixation of

seniority on 24.9.1999, but without publishing the final

gradation list, the respondent No. 3, namely, the Secretary

in the Department of Home, promoted 14 officers belonging

to the special batch and 16 officers belonging to the regular

batch to the Senior Scale of APS (Grade-II). In the

promotional order, the officers belonging to the regular

batch were shown below the officers belonging to the special

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batch. Because of the aforesaid situation, the direct

recruits invoked the jurisdiction of the tribunal for the

apposite determination of seniority claiming to be senior to

the respondent Nos. 6 to 24.

5. The claim of the appellants before the tribunal was

resisted by the respondent-State and the private

respondents therein on many a ground including the one

that the appeal was barred by limitation. It is worthy to

note that in an affidavit, the Secretary to the Commission

asseverated that the Government had not consulted the

Commission before publishing the provisional gradation list;

that when the selection process for the regular batch was

already underway, there was no justification whatsoever to

go for special recruitment; that the recourse taken to fill up

the posts by way of special recruitment was in gross

violation of the rules and procedure inasmuch as all

vacancies could have been filled up by resorting to the

usual and regular procedure of recruitment; that the

Competent Authority of the State Government should have

acted on the list sent by the Commission relating to the

regular candidates in quite promptitude but delayed it for

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no apparent reason and called for the recommendation for

the special batch and issued letters of appointment in their

favour which exhibited unwarranted interest; and that the

inter se seniority deserved to be refixed and the regular

batch should be treated to be senior to the special batch.

6. The tribunal dealt with the issue of limitation and

observed that the appeal did not concern itself with the

validity or propriety of the appointments of the respondent

Nos. 6 to 25 but fixation of inter se seniority and hence, the

appeal was not barred under the provisions of the Assam

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1977. It further opined that it

was curious that despite the fact that the recommendation

in respect of the regular batch had already been forwarded

to the Government by the Commission, no steps were taken.

The aforesaid act of the authority, observed the tribunal, on

one hand, exposited lackadaisical attitude in dealing with

the case of the regular batch and, on the other,

unreasonable alacrity in the appointment of the special

batch. The tribunal attributed motive to such an action and

proceeded to opine that there was no administrative

decision by the appropriate authority for making

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appointment to the service by resorting to the process of

special recruitment in preference to general recruitment.

7. It is apt to note that the tribunal referred to various

departmental communications including the letter dated

17.8.1991 which emanated from the Office of the DGP

proposing to enlist 20 Deputy Superintendent of Police from

other departments under Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules.

The tribunal referred to Rules 5, 7 and 8 of the 1966 Rules

and came to hold that a close perusal of the provisions of

the service Rules clearly show that recruitment by resorting

to clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 should be made only in

special cases and at all time such recruitment must be

limited only to 5 per cent of the total number of posts in the

cadre and such special recruitment must be limited only to

one post in a particular year. It further stated that the 1966

Rules are quite silent as regards carry forward of such posts

and, therefore, there could not have been accumulation of

vacancies to be filled up by resorting to the provision

contained in clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and as such,

the question of selecting and appointing as many as 20

persons in a year did not arise. The tribunal further held

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that as per Rule 8(1), the Governor is required to call for

recommendations from the recommending authorities for

the purpose of recruitment to the service under clause (c) of

sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 and the recommending authorities are

also required to submit recommendations in respect of the

persons having regard to the laid down criteria but in the

instant case, the said procedure was given a total go by

which is not permissible. The tribunal further noticed that

Rule 8(2), which is mandatory, provides that all the

recommendations are required to be submitted before the

selection committee constituted under Rule 7(1) and the

selection committee is required to interview the

recommended candidates and prepare the select list and,

therefore, the Commission, in no circumstance, could have

been entrusted with the responsibility of interviewing,

testing, selecting and recommending any candidate for

special recruitment under clause (c) of sub-rule (1) of Rule

5. In this backdrop, the tribunal observed that, admittedly,

all the processes undertaken by the Commission and the

third respondent were in gross violation of the mandatory

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provisions of the Rules and hence, the selection was not

valid.

8. After so stating, the tribunal proceeded to hold that as

the respondent Nos. 6 to 25 had been appointed in violation

of the rules, they could not be treated as regular recruits

within the meaning of Rule 5(1)(a) of the 1966 Rules. It also

stated that had the appeal been filed earlier in a different

form, the selection and appointment of the special batch

recruits could have possibly been set aside. Eventually, the

tribunal placing reliance on State of U.P. v. Rafiquddin

and others1 and Dalilah Sojah v. State of Kerala and

others2, came to hold that due to unreasonable delay and

inaction on the part of the Government in notifying the

appointments, the regular batch candidates, who were

earlier recommended by the Commission, could not be put

in jeopardy and lose their seniority and accordingly directed

for refixation of the seniority list. It further directed that

the regular batch shall be allowed consequential benefits

with effect from the date on which the senior most member

1 AIR 1988 SC 162 2 (1998) 9 SCC 641

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of the special batch availed of any benefit even by creating

supernumerary duty post in the cadre.

9. Being dissatisfied with the order passed by the

tribunal, as has been stated earlier, certain writ petitions

were preferred and some writ petitions were directly filed

before the High Court seeking quashment of the

appointment of the private respondents as Deputy

Superintendent of Police. The prayer in the other batch of

writ petitions was to treat the direct recruits as per the rules

regard being had to their date of appointment and to extend

the benefit of earlier services as stipulated under Rule 18 of

the 1966 Rules.

10. The learned single Judge adverted to the facts in

detail, the proposal before the Cabinet for appointment of

20 officers in the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police by

taking resort to Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules and basically

posed three questions, namely, (i) whether the appeal

preferred before the tribunal was barred by limitation; (ii)

whether the members of the regular batch could be treated

as senior when their appointments were violative of the

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recruitment process as envisaged under the relevant

recruitment rules; and (iii) whether the tribunal was

justified in directing rectification in the gradation list when

there was no appeal seeking removal of the special batch

recruits being in violation of the rules. Be it noted, as far as

question No. (iii) is concerned, the learned single Judge

framed five ancillary questions.

11. While dealing with the facet of limitation, the learned

single Judge referred to the relevant provisions of the Act

and expressed the view that the appellants before the

tribunal having the remedy which was available to them in

terms of the directions contained in the circular dated

1.4.1999 were entitled to prefer the appeal in terms of the

proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the AAT Act, 1977

and hence, the appeal was not barred by limitation.

12. Adverting to the facet of appointment, the learned

single Judge scanned the anatomy of the 1966 Rules and

came to hold that the number of persons who got selected

as members of the special batch were not eligible for

consideration for appointment in terms of Rule 5(1)(c) and

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further the procedure engrafted under the said sub-rule was

not followed and, in fact, was mutilated and flouted in every

conceivable manner leading, eventually, to the appointment

of the members of the special batch. Dwelling upon the

issue that the appointments were arbitrary, malafide and

discriminatory vis-à-vis the appointment of the direct batch,

the learned single Judge referred to the factual matrix

pertaining to the recommendations sent for recruitment by

special drive, the Cabinet Memorandum and the Cabinet

decision and eventually held that notwithstanding the fact

that the proposal for recruitment of twenty Dy.

Superintendents of Police, as a special case, was submitted

by the Home Department and the Government did not agree

to the proposal, yet the decision to make the recruitment

and the manner and modalities for holding of the interview

and the test for the purpose of recruitment of the Special

Batch was taken in the chamber of the Chairman of the

Commission, on the basis of a discussion held between the

then DGP, Assam, and the Chairman of the Commission

and, therefore, the decision, so reached, could not be

termed as a decision of the Government. He also observed

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that the members of the Special Batch were selected

throwing over-board, in entirety, the relevant recruitment

rules. Regard being had to chronology of events leading to

the appointment of the members of the Special Batch, the

learned single Judge opined that the entire exercise for

selecting the Special Batch was wholly de hors the relevant

recruitment rules. The urgency shown by the Government

to obtain the result of the examination held in respect of the

Special Batch was an indication that the Government was

waiting, for no justified and valid reason, to, first, make

appointment of the members of the Special Batch, though

selected in complete disregard of the Rules, and, then, issue

appointment in respect of the members of the Direct Batch,

whose process of selection was never questioned. After so

stating, the learned single Judge held that contrary to the

provisions of Rule 5(1)(c), which prescribes upper age limit

for selection to be 35 years and throwing to the wind the

very purpose for which special recruitment was sought to be

made, the age was relaxed to 45 years and persons, who

were born in 1942, came to be selected in the year 1992,

and thereby many of the officers recruited under the special

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drive were as old as 50 years, whereas proposal for the

special drive was made on the pretext of recruiting young

officers. He also opined that the whole process of selection

of the special batch recruited was malafide and arbitrary.

13. After so stating, the learned single Judge dealt with

issues whether the appointments were ab-initio void,

whether the relevant rules of recruitment were relaxed in

respect of the special batch at the time of making their

recruitment and what was the permissible limit of

relaxation and whether there can be deemed relaxation.

Delving into the said aspects, the learned single Judge

ruled that while appointing the special batch, the rules of

recruitment were completely shelved, no order of relaxation

was passed under Rule 23 relaxing the provisions contained

in Rule 5(1)(c) of the 1966 Rules; and that there could not

have been any deemed relaxation. The learned single Judge

referred to various pronouncements of this Court with

regard to relaxation and deemed relaxation and expressed

the view that the Special Batch was recruited, ostensibly,

on the ground that the department was in need of young

officers in the grade of Deputy Superintendent of Police, but

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the officers recruited were as old as 50 years, and, thus, the

very purpose for which the proposal was mooted stood

defeated. The writ court discussed the ratio laid down in

Bachan Singh v. Union of India3, Narender Chadha v.

Union of India4 and J.C. Yadav v. State of Haryana5 and

held that contrary to the facts of the case of J.C. Yadav

(supra), wherein the relaxation of the rules could be

justified by the Government, the State-respondent had, in

the obtaining factual matrix, miserably failed to show any

justification to relax the rules and in any case could not

have relaxed the rules to such an extent to make it

nugatory. It was also observed that when the Cabinet

Memorandum had failed to receive the approval of the

Cabinet, the then DGP, Assam, in consultation with the

Chairman of the Commission, could not have, through the

back-door and with the help of an authority like the

Commission, flouted the relevant rules and made the

appointments.

3 (1972) 3 SCC 489 4 (1986) 6 SCC 157 5 (1990) 2 SCC 189

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14. The learned single Judge ruled that the appointment in

the promotional cadre was de hors the rules and, therefore,

the court cannot direct that the period of service rendered in

the promotional post by virtue of illegal promotional

appointment should be counted for the purpose of seniority.

Relying on the pronouncement in Raffiquddin (supra), the

learned single Judge held that the case in hand is more akin

to the facts of Raffiquddin (supra) and ruled that it is

possible that without setting aside and quashing the

appointment of an irregular appointee, the Court or tribunal

may direct the appointing authority to treat a regular

appointee in service, though appointed later in point of time

than the irregular appointee, as senior to the irregular

appointee.

15. It is worthy to note that the learned single Judge

referred to Rule 18 of the 1966 Rules which clearly states

that the seniority of the members of the service shall be

determined on the basis of their respective dates of

appointment to the service. He distinguished the

applicability of Rule 18 and ultimately maintained the order

passed by the tribunal and dismissed the writ petitions

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challenging the order of the tribunal. It is apt to note that in

WP(C) 69 of 2003 wherein the petitioner had directly

approached the High Court for quashment of the

appointments of the special batch recruits, the learned

single Judge observed that the appointments of the special

batch deserved to be set aside and quashed, but he

refrained from doing so considering the period of service

which they had rendered.

16. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the special

recruits preferred WA Nos. 448 of 2004 and 465 of 2004.

WA 459 of 2004 was filed by the recruits under Rule 5(1)(a)

of the 1966 Rules. The Division Bench noted the facts,

adverted to the orders passed by the tribunal and the

learned single Judge, dealt at length with the submissions

canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties and came

to hold that the tribunal had jurisdiction to deal with the

appeals and thereafter, dealing with the stand that the

appointments having not been challenged the delineation

thereof by the tribunal and the learned single Judge was

barred by the doctrine of res judicata, repelled them on the

base that the memorandum of appeal before the tribunal

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had graphically challenged the appointments to be non est

being in violation of the rules though that there was no

prayer for cancellation of the appointments. The Division

Bench analysed the scheme of the rules and stated that

Rule 5(1)(c) envisages a selection in special cases from

amongst the limited categories of persons referred to and the

number of vacancies to be filled up by that procedure has

also been restricted. The Division Bench referred to Rule 8

and regarded it as unequivocal on the conditions of

eligibility, commencement of the process contemplated and

the culmination thereof, and observed that the assessment

of eligibility by the Recommending Authority of the person is

a sine qua non for consideration of his candidature to be

recruited. The candidate, as per the mandate of Rule 8, has

to be of outstanding merit and ability, possessing the

academic qualification as prescribed by Rule 10, should not

be above 35 years of age on the first day of the year in which

the recommendations are called for and should have not less

than two years of experience in duties comparable in status

and responsibility to that of the Deputy Superintendent of

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Police or 8 years of experience in duties comparable in

status and responsibility to that of the Inspector of Police.

17. After so stating, the Division Bench referred to various

authorities and, eventually, came to hold that though the

appointments of the special recruits had been made in

deviation of the Rules, yet the same cannot by any means be

branded as de hors any procedure whatsoever known to

public employment. Their induction of the special recruits

cannot be equated with ad hoc, casual or temporary

recruitments or an entry through the backdoor and hence,

their appointment cannot be regarded as de hors the rules.

Dealing with the aspect of seniority it ruled that their

appointments not being in observance of the statutory

provision stricto sensu, the fixation of their batch wise

seniority over the direct recruits of the same year is

impermissible and the benefit as stipulated under the

proviso to Rule 18(1) was not extendable.

18. The Division Bench further opined that at such a

belated time their appointments could not be annulled. In

the ultimate analysis, the Division Bench concurred with

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the view expressed by the learned single Judge on the issue

of fixation of seniority.

19. It is worthy to note that in compliance of the judgment

and order passed by the learned single Judge, a notification

No. HMA.154/2004/Pt.1/176 was issued on 6.12.2004

wherein the direct recruits of the 1993 batch were placed

above the special recruits of the same year in the APS Senior

Grade-II. The Bench also perused file No. H.M.A. 10/99 of

the Home Department from which it transpired that the

names of the candidates to the promotional posts were

recommended in order of preference following the same

seniority in which their names appeared in the provisional

gradation list dated 12.3.1999 as the Selection Committee

did not find any reason justifying supersession of a senior

by a junior. The Division Bench noticed that as the inter se

seniority of promotees was a replication of that in the

provisional gradation list which has been unsettled, the

challenge to the notification dated 6.12.2004 was

unsustainable. Being of this view, the Division Bench

dismissed all the appeals.

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20. We have heard Mr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel

representing the special batch recruits, and Mr. V. Shekhar,

learned senior counsel appearing for the direct recruits in all

the appeals.

21. The fundamental questions that emanate for

consideration before this Court are, namely, whether the

appointments have been made in violation of the rules;

whether the selection of the special batch recruits if

accepted to be in violation of the rules, can be treated to be

de hors the rules; and whether the concept of relaxation has

been extended to them or is extendable to them and further

whether they can avail the benefit under the second proviso

to Rule 18 of the Rules and whether the tribunal as well as

the High Court is justified in refixing the seniority without

quashing the appointment of the special batch recruits.

22. Regard being had to the aforesaid issues, we think it

seemly to refer to certain authorities in the field. In Roshan

Lal and others v. International Airport Authority of

India and others6, a two-Judge Bench, while entertaining a

petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, held that when

6 1980 (Supp) SCC 449

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the appointments were made in 1975 and the writ petition

was filed in 1978, it would not be justified in reopening the

question of legality of the appointments of the respondents

therein. The Bench also noticed that the prayer in the writ

petition was also confined primarily to the seniority list and

the consequences flowing from the seniority list.

23. We have referred to the said pronouncement only for

the purpose that before the tribunal, the challenge was not

for the quashment of the appointments on the foundation

that they were made in violation of the rules and the

propriety in the matter of appointment of the special recruits

was not maintained and that apart, the appeal was filed

after a span of nine years after the selection and

appointment and hence, the principle stated therein is

squarely applicable to the case at hand.

24. Be it noted, the tribunal as well as the High Court has

placed reliance on Rafiquddin and others (supra) to refix

the seniority and justify the direction for refixation of

seniority by putting the direct recruits over and above the

special recruits on the foundation that it was necessitous to

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strike the balance. In Rafiquddin case (supra), the U.P.

Public Service Commission published a notification on

September 3, 1970 inviting applications for recruitment to

85 posts of Munsifs. It recommended names of 46

candidates for appointment on October 25, 1971. The State

Government requested the Commission to recommend some

more candidates by suggesting that minimum of 40% marks

may be reduced to 35%. Considering the said request, the

Commission forwarded another list of 33 candidates on April

25, 1972. All the 79 candidates were appointed between

May 1972 to June 12, 1973. Thereafter, on July 17, 1973, a

notification was issued determining the inter se seniority of

all the 79 candidates under Rule 19 of the U.P. Civil Service

(Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951. In the meantime, the UP

Public Service Commission held another competitive

examination for appointment to the posts of 150 Munsifs

and, eventually, they were appointed on different dates

between 1975 to 1977. As the factual narration would

show, a proposal was sent by the State Government to the

Commission requesting it to reconsider the result of the

examinations of 1967, 1968, 1969 and 1970 for

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appointment to the service of persons/candidates who might

have obtained 40% of marks or more in the aggregate even if

they had failed to secure the minimum marks in the viva

voce test. The Commission declined to accede to the said

request. A meeting was held by the High Level Committee

and, eventually, a third list of 37 candidates was sent by the

Commission for the aforementioned years in which list the

name of Rafiquddin featured. As out of 37 candidates, 16

had already appeared in the 1972 examination and had

been selected, the Government requested the Commission to

select 16 more candidates from the 1972 examination. In

pursuance of the Government’s request, the Commission

forwarded the list of 16 candidates for appointment. In this

factual matrix, in March, 1977, the State Government

published a seniority list of successful candidates of the

competitive examination of 1970. The candidates belonging

to the third list made a representation to the High Court for

determining their seniority in accordance with Rule 22 of the

Rules on the footing that they were recruited to service in

pursuance of the 1970 examination and, therefore, they

were entitled to the seniority as candidates belonging to that

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examination irrespective of their appointment made in 1975.

They claimed seniority above the recruits of the 1972

examination. As the representation was rejected, a writ

petition was filed and the High Court allowed the same on

the ground that as the third category candidates were

appointed on the basis of the result of the 1970

examination, they were to be treated as senior in accordance

with the stipulates engrafted under Rule 22 of the Rules.

While dealing with such a situation, this Court scanned the

anatomy of the Rules and its purport, the role of the

Commission and held that the selection and appointment of

21 Munsifs at the later stage was invalid. However, it

declined to strike down their appointments in view of the

fact that they had already rendered 12 years of service.

25. After so holding, the Bench proceeded to deal with the

issue as to what seniority should be assigned to the

unplaced candidates who were appointed. In that context,

the Bench came to hold that as they were appointed not in

accordance with the rules, they could not be treated as

selectees under the 1970 examination for the purpose of

determining their seniority under Rule 22 of the Rules and,

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accordingly, the Bench directed that the said candidates

have been placed below the candidates of recruits of the

1972 examination. In the 1972 examination, 16 candidates

were appointed to the service on the basis of the result of

the 1972 examination and their appointment did not suffer

from any legal infirmity and they were entitled to seniority of

the recruits of the 1972 examination on the basis of their

position in the merit list but they were not entitled to be

treated as senior on the basis of the 1970 examination.

26. We have referred to the facts in detail and what this

Court had ultimately held only for the purpose that where

recruitment of service is regulated by the statutory rules, the

recruitment must be made in accordance with those rules

and if any appointment is made in breach of the rules, the

same would be illegal and the persons so appointed have to

be put in a different class and they cannot claim seniority.

27. In The Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers’

Association and others v. State of Maharashtra and

others7, the Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue

of seniority between direct recruits and the promotees under

7 AIR 1990 SC 1607

Page 28

the Maharashtra Service of Engineers (Regulation of

Seniority and Preparation and Revision of Seniority Lists for

Specified Period) Rules, 1982. The Constitution Bench

referred to the decision in A.K. Subraman v. Union of

India8 and ruled that if a rule fixing the ratio for

recruitment from different sources is framed, it is meant to

be respected and not violated at the whims of the authority.

It ought to be strictly followed and not arbitrarily ignored. A

deviation may be permissible to meet the exigencies. The

Constitution Bench posed the question as to what would be

the consideration if the quota rule is not followed at all

continuously for a number of years and it becomes

impossible to adhere to the same. The Constitution Bench

opined that if the rule fixes the quota and it becomes

impracticable to act upon, it is of no use insisting that the

authorities must continue to give effect to it. But the

Government, before departing from the rule, must make

every effort to respect it and only when it ceases to be

feasible to enforce it, then it has to be ignored. In such a

situation, if appointments from one source are made in

excess of the quota but in a regular manner and after 8 AIR 1975 SC 483

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following the prescribed procedure, there is no reason to

push down the appointees below the recruits from other

sources who are inducted in the service subsequently. A

reference was made to the rules that permitted the

Government to relax the provisions fixing the ratio. In the

said case, the Court observed that there was no justification

to urge lack of bona fide on the part of the State.

Eventually, the Bench summed up its conclusions and we

proceed to reproduce some of them which are relevant for

our purpose: -

“(A) Once an incumbent is appointed to a post according to rule, his seniority has to be counted from the date of his appointment and not according to the date of his confirmation. The corollary of the above rule is that where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stop-gap arrangement, the officiation in such post cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority.

(B) If the initial appointment is not made by following the procedure laid down by the rules but the appointee continues in the post uninterruptedly till the regularisation of his service in accordance with the rules, the period of officiating service will be counted.

xxx xxx xxx

Page 30

(D) If it becomes impossible to adhere to the existing quota rule, it should be substituted by an appropriate rule to meet the needs of the situation. In case, however, the quota rule is not followed continuously for a number of years because it was impossible to do so the inference is irresistible that the quota rule had broken down.

(E) Where the quota rule has broken down and the appointments are made from one source in excess of the quota, but are made after following the procedure prescribed by the rules for the appointment, the appointees should not be pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date.”

28. In Madan Gopal Garg v. State of Punjab and

others9, the controversy related to inter se seniority of

promotees and direct recruits in respect of the posts,

namely, District Food and Supplies Controller and Deputy

Director, Food and Supplies in the State of Punjab governed

by the Punjab Food and Supplies Department (State Service

Class II) Rules, 1966. After analyzing the facts and the

appointments in excess of quota, the Court observed that

the appointment of the controller was in excess of the quota

and it continued to be so till the respondent No. 2 therein

9 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 366

Page 31

was appointed by direct recruitment. In that context, the

Bench opined: -

“Once it is held that the appointment of the appellant was in excess of the quota fixed for promotees and officers appointed by transfer, the said appointment has to be treated as an invalid appointment and it can be treated as a regular appointment only when a vacancy is available against the promotion quota against which the said appointment can be regularized. In other words, any such appointment in excess of the quota has to be pushed down to a later year when it can be regularized as per the quota and such an appointment prior to regularization cannot confer any right as against a person who is directly appointed within the quota prescribed for direct recruits.”

29. In Maharashtra Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan

v. State of Maharashtra and another10, a two-Judge

Bench took note of the fact that when promotions are made

in excess of the prescribed quota and the Government had

not taken any conscious decision in accordance with law to

treat the promotions of excess promotees on regular basis, it

would be wrong to assert that such promotions were on

regular basis. In that context, the Bench further proceeded

to state thus: -

10(2000) 2 SCC 552

Page 32

“Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that some of the appellants have put in more than 17 years of service when a few of the direct recruits were either schooling and/or not born in the cadre. If the appellants were to be pushed down, it would cause great hardship to them. We are unable to subscribe to this contention because if there is patent violation of the quota rule, the result must follow and the appellants who remained in the office for all these years cannot take the advantage of this situation. This submission is, therefore, devoid of any substance.”

30. In D. Ganesh Rao Patnaik and others v. State of

Jharkhand and others11, a three-Judge Bench was dealing

with inter se seniority between the direct recruits and the

promotees under the Bihar Superior Judicial Service Rules,

1946. The Bench also dealt with the concept of temporary

posts and the computation of posts under Rule 6 therein,

the definition of cadre and posed a question whether the

temporary posts of Additional District and Sessions Judges

are to be included in the cadre. After referring to various

decisions, the Court opined that for determining the quota of

direct recruits, both the temporary and permanent posts

have to be counted and taken into consideration and their

quota cannot be confined to permanent posts alone. In the

11 (2005) 8 SCC 454

Page 33

said case, the promotees had exceeded their quota and

entrenched into the quota of direct recruits and, in that

context, the Court held that the promotion given to the

promotees was not in accordance with law. The Court

further proceeded to state that it did not lie in the mouth of

the respondent therein to contend that the quota rule had

broken down or that though their promotions were made

beyond the quota fixed for promotees, yet the same should

be treated not only perfectly valid but also in a manner so as

to give them the benefit of seniority over the direct recruits.

Eventually, the Bench ruled that the inevitable conclusion

was that the contesting respondent could not claim seniority

over the appellant.

31. We have referred to the aforesaid pronouncements to

restate the legal principle that if the quota rule has been

broken down, the appointee should not be pushed down

below the appointees from other source; but, the

Government before departing from the rule must make every

effort to respect it and then only it may proceed to appoint

from other source.

Page 34

32. At this juncture, it is necessary to state that the

decision in The Direct Recruit Class II Engineering

Officers’ Association (supra) was clarified by a three-Judge

Bench in State of W.B. and others v. Aghore Nath Dey

and others12 as the later Bench perceived an apparent

contradiction in conclusions (A) and (B). While clarifying,

the Bench has stated thus: -

“19. The constitution bench in Maharashtra Engineers case (supra), while dealing with Narender Chadha (supra) emphasised the unusual fact that the promotees in question had worked continuously for long periods of nearly fifteen to twenty years on the posts without being reverted, and then proceeded to state the principle thus: (SCC p. 726, para 13)

“We, therefore, confirm the principle of counting towards seniority the period of continuous officiation following an appointment made in accordance with the rules prescribed for regular substantive appointments in the service.”

20. The constitution bench having dealt with Narender Chadha (supra) in this manner, to indicate the above principle, that decision cannot be construed to apply to cases where the initial appointment was not according to rules .

xxx xxx xxx

12 (1993) 3 SCC 371

Page 35

22. There can be no doubt that these two conclusions have to be read harmoniously, and conclusion (B) cannot cover cases which are expressly excluded by conclusion (A). We may, therefore, first refer to conclusion (A). It is clear from conclusion (A) that to enable seniority to be counted from the date of initial appointment and not according to the date of confirmation, the incumbent of the post has to be initially appointed ‘according to rules’. The corollary set out in conclusion (A), then is, that ‘where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules and made as a stopgap arrangement, the officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for considering the seniority’. Thus, the corollary in conclusion (A) expressly excludes the category of cases where the initial appointment is only ad hoc and not according to rules, being made only as a stopgap arrangement. The case of the writ petitioners squarely falls within this corollary in conclusion (A), which says that the officiation in such posts cannot be taken into account for counting the seniority.”

Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state as follows: -

“Admittedly, this express requirement in Rule 11 was not followed or fulfilled subsequently, and, therefore, the initial ad hoc appointments cannot be treated to have been made according to the applicable rules. These ad hoc appointments were clearly not in accordance with the rules, and were made only as a stopgap arrangement for fixed period, as expressly stated in the appointment order itself.”

[Emphasis supplied]

Page 36

33. Recently, in State of Haryana and others v. Vijay

Singh and others13, the question arose with regard to the

fixation of seniority in the backdrop of ad hoc initial

appointment made de hors the statutory rules but later on

services were regularized by the State Government. The

Court took note of the fact that the respondents therein were

neither appointed by the competent authority on the

recommendations made by the Board which was constituted

by the Governor of Haryana nor were they placed on

probation as required under the rules and, therefore, their

ad hoc period could not be counted for the purpose of

fixation of seniority. Thus, emphasis was laid that when

appointment is made without following the procedure

prescribed under the rules, the appointees are not entitled

to have the seniority fixed on the basis of the total length of

service. In essence, it has been ruled that when the

appointment is made de hors the rules, the appointee

cannot claim seniority even if his appointment is later on

regularized.

13 (2012) 8 SCC 633

Page 37

34. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law

pertaining to fixation of seniority when the initial

appointment is made in breach of rules and further

departure from provision pertaining to quota in their

essential nature, it is apposite to refer to the relevant rules

of the 1966 Rules. Rule 4 defines the ‘Cadre’. Rule 4(1)(a)

deals with the categories of posts in the junior grade and

Rule 4(1)(b) deals with the senior grade posts. Rule 5

provides for the recruitment and procedure of selection, etc.

Rule 5(1), being pertinent, is reproduced below: -

“5. Methods of recruitment to the service. (1) Recruitment to the service, after the commencement of these rules, shall be by the following methods, namely:

(a) by a competitive examination conducted by the Commission;

(b) by promotion of confirmed Inspectors of Police; and

(i) persons other than Inspectors of Police serving in connection with the affairs of the Government; and

(ii) other persons having qualifications and experiences eminently suitable for service in the Police Department in the rank

Page 38

of Deputy Superintendent of Police :

Provided that fifty per cent of the total number of posts in the cadre shall be filled up by recruitment under Cls. (a) and (c) and the other fifty per cent exclusively under Cl. (b), and that the number of posts filled up under Cl. (c) above shall not at any time exceed five per cent of the total number of posts in the cadre and one post in any particular year.”

35. On scanning of Rule 5(1), it is evident that various

methods have been stipulated for recruitment. In the case

at hand, the direct recruits have been recruited by way of

competitive examination conducted by the Commission. The

special batch has been selected under Rule 5(1)(c). In that

context, the proviso to Rule 5(1) of the 1966 Rules is

significant. It clearly lays a postulate that the number of

posts filled up under clause (c) shall not, at any time, exceed

five per cent of the total number of posts in the cadre and

one post in any particular year. As has been stated

hereinabove, there was a requisition for 20 posts to be filled

up by special drive. On a query being made during hearing,

it was fairly conceded before us that five per cent in the

cadre could not have exceeded four posts. Thus, there has

been selection in excess of the quota provided in the Rule

Page 39

and nothing had been shown to justify the departure since

nothing really could have been demonstrated as the

commission had already recommended the names of the

candidates meant for direct recruits.

36. Rule 8 deals with recruitment by selection. It is

reproduced hereunder: -

“8. Recruitment by selection. (1) The Governor may, from time to time, for the purpose of recruitment to the service under Cl. (c) of sub-R. (1) of R. 5, call upon the recommending authorities to submit recommendations in respect of persons who-

(a) are of outstanding merit and ability;

(b) have to their credit not less than 2 years of experience in duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of Deputy Superintendent of Police or 8 years of experience in duties comparable in status and responsibility to that of Inspectors of Police;

(d) are not above the age of 35 years on the 1st day of the year in which the recommendations are called for; and

(e) are otherwise eligible, in the opinion of recommending authorities to be appointed to the service.

Page 40

(2) On receipt of the recommendations, the Governor shall refer them and also simultaneously send the character rolls/ testimonials of character and service records/other relevant records of the persons recommended to the committee which will, after examination of the records forwarded to it and interviewing, such of the persons recommended as it considers necessary, draw up a list of persons in order of the preference who are considered suitable for appointment to the service. The procedure details in sub-Rr. (4) to (7) of R. 7, mutatis mutandis be followed in regard to the list of persons prepared under this sub- rule.

(3) For every recruitment a separate list shall be drawn up and the list once approved by the Commission shall lapse immediately on the year’s quota of posts for persons under Cl. (c) of sub-R. (1) of R. 5 having been filled up from the list.”

37. On a perusal of the aforesaid Rule, it is graphically

clear that the recommending authority has to submit the

recommendations to the Governor regard being had to

certain aspects which have been prescribed under Rule 8(1).

Rule 8(1)(d) prescribes the age limit on the first date of the

year in which the recommendations are called for. Sub-rule

(2) of Rule 8 stipulates that the procedure detailed in sub-

rules (4) to (7) of Rule 7 mutatis mutandis be followed in

regard to the list of persons prepared. In this context, it is

Page 41

necessary to reproduce sub-rules (4) to (7) of Rule 7 which

are as follows: -

“(4) The list prepared by the Committee shall give the names in order of preference and the total number of such names shall not be more than double the number of vacancies that may arise in the promotion quota of the cadre and the ex-cadre temporary posts of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police during a period of approximately one year thereafter. In every case, where in drawing up the list the committee changes the order of seniority of any person in the rank of Inspector of Police or supersedes any one in that rank by omission of his name, the Committee shall record in writing the reason for such change or supersession.

(5) The Committee shall forward the list to the Governor and on receipt of the list the Governor shall forward the same to the Commission together with the character rolls and other relevant papers.

(6) The Commission shall consider the list prepared by the Committee along with other documents received from the Governor or on receipt of other documents as may be called for by the Commission unless it considers any change necessary, approve the list. If the Commission considers any change necessary, it shall inform the Governor of the changes proposed and after taking into account the comments, if any, by the Governor, may approve the list finally with such modification, if any, as may in its opinion be just and proper.

Page 42

(7) The list, as finally approved by the Commission, shall be forwarded to the Governor along with all the papers received under sub-Rr. (5) and (6).”

38. It needs to be noted that under Rule 8(2), the Governor

is required to send the character rolls/testimonials of the

character and service records/other relevant records of the

persons recommended to the Committee which would, after

examination of the records forwarded to it and interviewing

such of the persons recommended as it considers necessary,

draw up a list of persons in order of the preference who are

considered suitable for appointment to the service.

“Committee” has been defined in Rule 2(c) and it reads as

follows: -

“(c) “Committee” means a committee constituted in accordance with sub-R. (1) of R. 7.”

The aforesaid definition makes sub-rule (1) of Rule 7

important. The said sub-rule reads as follows: -

“7. Recruitment by promotion. (1) There shall be a Selection Committee consisting of the following, namely :

(a) Chairman, Assam Public Service Commission, or, where the Chairman is unable to attend, a Member, Assam

Page 43

Public Service Commission nominated by him;

(b) Chief Secretary to the Government;

(d) A Senior Deputy Inspector General of Police to be nominated by Chief Secretary;

(e) Secretary to the Government of Assam in the Home Department or any other officer of the Home Department nominated in this behalf by the Chief Secretary. The Chairman, Assam Public Commission or the Member, Assam Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall preside at the meeting of the Selection Committee at which he is present.”

In the obtaining factual matrix, the Selection

Committee had not recommended the case of the special

batch recruits to the Commission. As the affidavit filed by

the Secretary to the Commission before the tribunal clearly

stated that the procedure was not followed and the same

has been accepted by the tribunal and concurred with by

the High Court, there is no reason to differ with the same.

Therefore, we give the seal of imprimatur to the said

conclusion. At the risk of repetition, we state that the

selection has been made in excess of the quota and in the

absence of a recommendation of the Selection Committee as

Page 44

prescribed under the rules. Plainly speaking, a maladroit

effort was made to appoint the special batch recruits first

despite the recommendation of the direct recruits pending

before the State Government. It is also disturbing that

though the Cabinet had not approved the proposal for

special drive to appoint from other source yet the Director

General of Police impressed upon the Commission to

recommend 20 names. It is also equally perplexing that the

concept of the special drive was meant to have young

officers but in the ultimate eventuate, officers were nearing

fifty got the appointment. It is obvious that it was totally

arbitrary and exhibits indecent enthusiasm to confer

benefits on the special batch by making the rules

comatosed.

39. At this stage, it is requisite to clarify one aspect. The

learned single Judge has treated the selection of the special

batch recruits totally de hors the rules and the Division

Bench has opined that it is not de hors the rules on the

foundation that they were not casual appointees and their

recommendation had been made by the Commission and

Page 45

further they had not played any overt act in getting their

selection done.

40. In University of Kashmir and others v. Dr. Mohd.

Yasin and others14, this Court expressed the view that an

equitable ground does not clothe an appointment with a

legal status. Similar view was also expressed in Swapan

Kumar Pal and others v. Samitabhar Chakraborty and

others15.

41. In State of Haryana v. Haryana Veterninary and

AHTS Association and another16, a three-Judge Bench,

after x-ray of the relevant rules, came to hold that when

appointments are made in violation of the recruitment rules,

the said appointments cannot be treated to be regular.

42. The aforesaid authorities clearly lay down the principle

that when there is violation of the recruitment rules, the

recruitment is unsustainable. Whether any active part is

played by a selectee or not has nothing to do with the

appointment made in contravention of the rules. In the case

at hand, the special batch recruits have encroached into the

14 (1974) 3 SCC 546 15 (2001) 5 SCC 581 16 (2000) 8 SCC 4

Page 46

quota of the direct recruits. The whole selection process is

in violation of the rules and, therefore, we are inclined to

concur with the opinion expressed by the learned single

Judge that the selection was made de hors the rules. The

Division Bench was not justified in stating that the selection

could not be said to be de hors the rules. However, we

accept the conclusion of the tribunal as well as the High

Court that as there had been long delay in challenging the

selection of the special batch recruits and some of them

have already retired, it would not be apposite to annul their

appointments.

43. Presently, we shall refer to Rule 18 which deals with

seniority. Mr. Prashant Bhushan, during the course of

hearing, has laid immense emphasis on the said Rule to

buttress the stance that if the service rendered in the

previous posts by the special batch recruits are taken into

consideration on the anvil of Rule 18, they should be treated

as senior to the direct recruits. Regard being had to the said

submission, it becomes necessitous to refer to the said Rule

in entirety. It reads as follows: -

Page 47

“18. Seniority. (1) The seniority of a member of the service shall be determined on the basis of his date of appointment to the service :

Provided that inter se seniority of the persons recruited under Rr. 5(1)(a), 5(1)(b) and 5(2) on the same date shall be according to the following order :

(i) Persons recruited under R. 5(2);

(ii) Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(b);

(iii) Persons recruited under R. 5(1)(a);

Provided further that in the case of a person recruited under R.5(1)(c) the Governor may, in consideration of his previous service and/or experience, fix a deemed date of appointment for the purpose of seniority after taking into consideration half the period of continuous service in completed years subject to a maximum of 4 years rendered in previous service.

(2) Inter se seniority of persons appointed under any of the three clauses of R. 5(1), shall be in the order in which their names appear in the list from which the appointment is made.

(3) The date of appointment for the purposes of this rule shall be, if a date is specified in the notification of appointment, such date, or if no such date is specified, the date on which such notification is issued.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-Rr. (1) to (3) the seniority of a person who does not join the service within three months of the date of appointment as defined in sub-R.(3), shall be determined on

Page 48

the basis of the actual date of his joining the service.

(5) If the confirmation of a member of the service is delayed on account of his failure to qualify for such confirmation, he shall lose his post in the order of seniority vis-à- vis such of his juniors as may be confirmed earlier than he. His original position shall, however, be restored on his confirmation subsequently but any benefits of promotion, etc., shall not accrue to him with retrospective effect on such confirmation.

(6) Inter se seniority of persons promoted to the senior grade of the service shall be in the order in which their names appear in the list from which the promotion is made.”

44. The two facets which emerge from the scanning of the

aforesaid Rule are that the seniority of a member of the

service is to be determined on the basis of the date of

appointment to the service and the seniority has to follow a

particular order as has been stipulated therein. The other

significant aspect is that power has been conferred on the

Governor to consider the previous service of an incumbent

and fix a deemed date of appointment for the purpose of

seniority by adopting a specific method. As far as the first

part is concerned, the tribunal as well as the High Court has

not accepted the stipulation that in the present case the

Page 49

seniority should be determined on the basis of the date of

appointment as the same has been made in flagrant

violation of the rules and we have already concurred with

the same. As far as the computation of the previous service

is concerned, the learned single Judge as well as the

Division Bench, after adequate ratiocination, has expressed

the view that the appointments had been made in

contravention of the rules, the question of conferment of the

benefit under the second proviso to Rule 18(1) did not arise.

In our considered view, the said conclusion is absolutely

defensible for the simon pure reason when the

infrastructure is founded on total illegal edifice, the

endeavour to put forth a claim for counting the previous

service to build a pyramid is bound to founder.

45. Another specious contention has been urged that

power is vested with the Governor to dispense with or relax

any rule and in the case at hand, it should be treated that

the authority by its conduct has relaxed the rules. In this

context, it is appropriate to refer to Rule 23 which reads as

follows: -

Page 50

“Power of the Governor to dispense with or relax any rule. Where the Governor is satisfied that the operation of any of these rules may cause undue hardship in any particular case, he may order to dispense with or relax the requirements of that rule to such an extent and subject to such conditions as he may consider necessary for dealing with the case in a just and equitable manner :

Provided that the case of any person shall not be dealt with in any manner less favourable to him than that provided by any of these rules.”

46. As has been observed by the learned single Judge

which has been accepted by the Division Bench, there was

no decision to relax the rules in favour of the special batch

recruits. That apart, whenever there has to be relaxation

about the operation of any of the rules, regard has to be

given to the test of causation of undue hardship in any

particular case. That apart, the authority is required to

record satisfaction while dispensing or relaxing the

requirements of any rule to such an extent and subject to

such conditions as he may consider necessary for dealing

with the case in a just and equitable manner. The language

of the Rule really casts a number of conditions. It provides

guidance. It cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner so

Page 51

as to dispense with the procedure of selection in entirety in

respect of a particular class, for it has to be strictly

construed and there has to be apposite foundation for

exercise of such power. It is to be borne in mind that if a

particular rule empowers the authority to throw all the rules

overboard in all possibility, it may not withstand close

scrutiny of Article 14 of the Constitution. Be that it may, no

decision was taken to relax the rules and, the concept of

deemed relaxation is not attracted and, therefore, the relief

claimed by the special batch recruits has no legs to stand

upon.

47. From the aforesaid analysis, there can be no scintilla of

doubt that the selection of the special batch recruits was

totally de hors the Rules; that there was a maladroit effort to

go for a special drive when there was no need for the same

by the State which is supposed to be a model employer; that

neither the concept of relaxation nor the conception of

benefit of Rule 18 would be attracted for grant on conferring

any privilege to the special batch recruits; that their

seniority has to be pushed down and, hence, the directions

given by the tribunal and the High Court in that regard are

Page 52

absolutely flawless; and that regard being had to the delayed

challenge and long rendering of service in the posts and

further promotions having been effected, it would be

inapposite to quash their appointments.

48. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to

reiterate the oft-stated principle that the State is a model

employer and it is required to act fairly giving due regard

and respect to the rules framed by it. But in the present

case, the State has atrophied the rules. Hence, the need for

hammering the concept.

49. Almost a quarter century back, this Court in Balram

Gupta vs Union of India & Anr. [1987 (Supp) SCC 228]

had observed thus:

“As a model employer the Government must conduct itself with high probity and candour with its employees.”

50. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh and Ors.

[(1992)4SCC118], the Court had clearly stated:

“The main concern of the court in such matters is to ensure the rule of law and to see that the Executive acts fairly and gives a fair deal to its employees consistent with the requirements of Articles 14 and 16”.

Page 53

51. In Secretary, State Of Karnataka And vs. Umadevi

And Others [(2006)4SCC1], the Constitution Bench, while

discussing the role of state in recruitment procedure, stated

that if rules have been made under Article 309 of the

Constitution, then the Government can make appointments

only in accordance with the rules, for the State is meant to

be a model employer.

52. In Mehar Chand Polytechnic & Anr. vs. Anu Lamba

& Ors. [(2006) 7 SCC 161] the Court observed that public

employment is a facet of right to equality envisaged under

Article 16 of the Constitution of India and that the

recruitment rules are framed with a view to give equal

opportunity to all the citizens of India entitled for being

considered for recruitment in the vacant posts.

53. We have stated the role of the State as a model

employer with the fond hope that in future a deliberate

disregard is not taken recourse to and deviancy of such

magnitude is not adopted to frustrate the claims of the

employees. It should always be borne in mind that

legitimate aspirations of the employees are not guillotined

and a situation is not created where hopes end in despair.

Page 54

Hope for everyone is gloriously precious and a model

employer should not convert it to be deceitful and

treacherous by playing a game of chess with their seniority.

A sense of calm sensibility and concerned sincerity should

be reflected in every step. An atmosphere of trust has to

prevail and when the employees are absolutely sure that

their trust shall not be betrayed and they shall be treated

with dignified fairness then only the concept of good

governance can be concretized. We say no more.

54. Consequently, all the appeals are dismissed leaving

the parties to bear their respective costs.

……………………………….J. [K. S. Radhakrishnan]

……………………………….J. [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; November 30, 2012.