1    

REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1763  OF  2018  (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.1532 of 2018)  

  Bharati Reddy           …..Appellant(s)          

:Versus:    

The State of Karnataka & Ors.       ....Respondent(s)    

J U D G M E N T  

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.  

1. This appeal, by special leave, takes exception to the  

judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High  

Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench dated 04.12.2017 in Writ  

Appeal No.5872 of 2017.   

 2. Briefly stated, pursuant to notification dated 04.12.2015,  

elections were held and the appellant was elected on  

28.03.2016 as a member of the Zilla Panchayat from 13-

2    

Badanahatti Constituency, Ballari District, Karnataka which  

was reserved for General (Women) Category. Later, the State  

Government published a notification on 15.04.2016 declaring  

the reservation for the post of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha  

of Zilla Panchayats in the State. In Ballari Zilla Panchayat, the  

post of Adhyaksha was reserved for the category of Backward  

Caste-B (Women). After the said notification, since the  

appellant intended to contest the election to the post of  

Adhyaksha of Ballari Zilla Panchayat, she made an application  

on 22.04.2016 to the jurisdictional Tahshildar for issuance of  

Income and Caste Certificate, a certificate which was a  

prerequisite for submitting the nomination form for the  

election to the post of Adhayaksha. That certificate was issued  

by the Tahshildar on 26.04.2016 on the basis of which the  

appellant contested the election held on 29.04.2016 and was  

declared elected. As required in terms of the Karnataka  

Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward  

Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 and the  

Rules framed thereunder, the Income and Caste Certificate  

has been forwarded to the District Caste Verification

3    

Committee Ballari.  The process of verification thereof is still in  

progress.   

 3. According to the appellant, at the behest of the  

unsuccessful candidates who could not file any election  

petition to challenge the election of the appellant, respondent  

Nos.6 to 9 filed a writ petition before the High Court of  

Karnataka, Dharwad being Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016,  

about 3 months after the election of the appellant as  

Adhyaksha. The substance of the allegation made in the said  

writ petition against the appellant was that she played fraud  

on the Government and public by submitting a false affidavit  

before the Tahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste  

Certificate, on the basis of which she contested the election for  

the post of Adhyaksha Zilla Panchayat and got elected to the  

said post, to which she was otherwise not entitled to or  

qualified for.  The allegation about the nature of fraud  

committed by the appellant can be discerned from the  

assertions made in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition,  

which read thus:  

4    

 “6. It is submitted that the 6th Respondent in order to  

grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat has  submitted a bogus and false caste certificate to show  

that she belongs to the Backward community-B Category  obtained from the 5th Respondent.  It is further submitted  that in the application filed by 6th Respondent to 5th  

Respondent for issuance of caste certificate, she filed an  affidavit stating that her livelihood is agriculture and that  she owns 1.03 acres of agricultural land in Badanahatti  

village and 3.50 Acres of land in Sy. No. 36A in Yarrangaligi  village.  Further she also declared that her family income is  

not more than Rs.3,50,000/- per annum from all other  sources and that she and her husband are not assessed to  Income Tax and Commercial Tax. The said declaration  

made by the 6th Respondent is totally false to the  knowledge of herself, which is clear from the Affidavit filed  

by the 6th Respondent before the 2nd Respondent while  contesting for the member of Bellary Zilla Panchayat General  Elections.  It is further submitted that the 6th Respondent in  

her affidavit dated 06.02.2016 declared that she is getting  rent of Rs.1,40,000/- per annum  and her husband getting  4,80,000/- per annum, which details are found in paragraph  

4-A.  This itself shows that her family income from one  source only is more than 3,50,000/- as declared in the  

affidavit dated 26.04.2016 filed before the 5th Respondent for  issuance of Caste and Income Certificate.  That apart she  has also declared in the said affidavit dated 26.04.2016 that  

she and her husband are not assessed to the Income Tax  and Commercial Tax, which are also contrary to the  declaration made in the affidavit dated 06.02.2016 filed  

before 2nd Respondent that she has been assessed to Income  Tax and has paid Income Tax, the said details are stated in  

paragraph 5 of the said affidavit.  It is also reliably learnt  that the husband of the 6th Respondent is Class-I contractor  and is having more than income of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- per  

annum and is assessed to Income Tax and Commercial  Taxes. True copies of the Affidavit dated 06.02.2016,  

26.04.2016 and Caste and Income Certificate issued by the  5th Respondent dated 26.04.2016 are produced herewith as  Annexure-E,F and G respectively.   

 7. It is further submitted that in the proceedings held on  29.04.2016 under the Chairmanship of Regional  

Commissioner, Kalburgi Division, Kalburgi, the 6th  Respondent was successful in getting elected as

5    

Adhyaksha under the Category-Backward Community-B  based on the above said false Caste and Income  

Certificate which was issued by the 5th Respondent on  the same day of application without any proper enquiry   

as required under the law.  A true copy of the said  proceedings dated 29.04.2016 is produced herewith as  Annexure-H.”   

(emphasis supplied)       

On the basis of these allegations, the respondent Nos.6 to 9  

prayed for the following reliefs in the said writ petition:   

“PRAYER     

Wherefore, this Hon‟ble Court may be pleased to      a. Issue a writ of Quo Warranto directing the 6th Respondent  

to vacate the office of the Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat,  Bellary.   

b. set aside the proceedings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No.  SUM./KAM/Pra HaGu/chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring  the 6th Respondent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat,  

Bellary vide Annexure-H.   c. consequently quash the caste certificate issued to the  

6th Respondent vide order dated 26-04-2016 in  application No. 01/16-17 issued by the 5th  Respondent vide Annexure-G.   

d. pass such other or further orders or directions as this  Hon‟ble Court may deem fit, in the interest of justice”.     

(emphasis supplied)    

4. This writ petition was contested by the appellant inter  

alia on the ground that the same was not maintainable in view  

of the bar contained in Article 243-O of the Constitution of  

India. Further, the writ petitioners were only voters and  

therefore, had no locus to challenge the election of the

6    

appellant as Adhyaksha, which was an indirect election.  Rule  

7 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Rules explicitly envisages  

that only a member of the Panchayat may challenge the  

validity of the election of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha. It  

was also pointed out that the writ petition filed by the said  

respondents was a politically motivated petition and filed at  

the behest of unsuccessful candidates who could not prevent  

the appellant from getting elected as Adhyaksha. As regards  

the allegations in the writ petition that the appellant had made  

false declarations and filed incorrect affidavits, the appellant  

contended that the Income and Caste Certificate was issued in  

favour of the appellant by the competent authority after  

completing all the formalities and procedure. So long as the  

said certificate was valid and in force, issuance of writ of quo  

warranto was misplaced. For, there is legal presumption about  

the validity of the said certificate in terms of Rules 3-C of the  

Rules of 1992 framed under the 1990 Act. The said Rule  

makes it amply clear that the certificate would remain valid  

until it is cancelled by the jurisdictional Caste Verification  

Committee. The appellant also pointed out that the allegation

7    

made in the writ petition, regarding the false or incorrect  

income disclosure made by the appellant, was wrong and ill-

founded. Such allegation was based on far-fetched logic and  

untenable assumptions. The affidavit dated 06.02.2016  

submitted along with the nomination form filed for contesting  

elections from 13-Badanahatti Constituency was in reference  

to the factual position stated therein. Similarly, the affidavit  

filed by the appellant dated 26.04.2016 was also true, faithful  

and accurate as it disclosed facts in reference to the  

qualification required for contesting the election of Adhyaksha  

at the relevant time, in respect of post reserved for “B”  

Category (Women) Backward Caste. In other words, both the  

affidavits and the information disclosed therein were truthful,  

accurate and contextual, as noted in the respective affidavit.  

The appellant also asserted that the fact that the Income and  

Caste Certificate was issued within five days from the date of  

application for the said certificate or on the same date the  

affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 was filed before the Tahshildar,  

could not give rise to a presupposition, inference or  

assumption that the same was issued without necessary and

8    

proper enquiry.  On the other hand, there is legal presumption  

that the same was valid, having been issued by the  

jurisdictional Tahshildar competent in that regard. The  

circumstances, of the time of issue of E-stamps at about 5:27  

P.M. or the date of affidavit being 26.04.2016, cannot be a just  

basis to assume that the certificate was fraudulent,  in the  

face of the statutory provision making it explicit that it would  

be valid until cancelled by the Caste Verification Committee.  

Thus, the circumstances relied upon by the writ petitioners  

were neither relevant nor sufficient to draw any inference on  

fact, much less legal inference, so as to conclude that the  

certificate was fraudulently issued. The fact that the appellant  

belongs to “Kapu Caste”, which is notified as B Category  

Backward Class; and the declaration regarding income made  

by the appellant, are issues which are intrinsically mixed with  

the issuance of the Income and Caste Certificate. It is not open  

to question the validity of the said certificate much less to  

entertain the prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto on  

the assumption that the said certificate was fraudulent  

because of some fortuitous circumstances. It was pointed out

9    

by the appellant that the writ of quo warranto is not an  

ordinary power to be exercised by the High Court and moreso,  

in the matter involving disputed questions of fact.  The High  

Court may be justified in issuing such a writ only if it is  

indisputable that the elected public representative was  

ineligible or disqualified to contest the election or had incurred  

disqualification at a later point of time. In either case, such a  

person cannot justify holding on to the public post such as  

that of Adhyaksha. That situation will arise only if the Caste  

Verification Committee was to invalidate and cancel the  

Income and Caste Certificate issued in favour of the appellant  

and not otherwise. On these contentions, the appellant prayed  

for dismissal of the writ petition.   

 5. Preliminary objection regarding bar of jurisdiction in  

terms of Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and locus of  

the writ petitioners raised by the appellant commended to the  

learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition vide  

judgment and order dated 21.10.2016.  

10    

6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the  

writ petitioners (respondent Nos.6 to 9 herein) carried the  

matter in Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016. The Division Bench  

reversed the judgment of the learned Single Judge and allowed  

the writ appeal vide judgment and order dated 05.06.2016. It  

remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge for fresh  

decision.  

 7. The appellant therefore, approached this Court by way of  

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.17059 of 2017 (converted to  

Civil Appeal No.10587 of 2017) wherein the preliminary  

objection regarding the bar under Article 243-O of the  

Constitution of India and locus of the writ petitioners, as also  

the contention that the only remedy to challenge the election  

of the appellant would be an election petition, was reiterated.  

The two-Judge Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal  

preferred by the appellant on the finding that the voter of the  

Panchayat cannot be rendered remediless and if he is  

aggrieved by the election of the Adhyaksha of the Panchayat, it  

is open to him to seek the remedy of judicial review under

11    

Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of the India. In such  

proceedings, it is open to the High Court to undertake judicial  

review of the subject matter. In paragraph 13 of its judgment,  

this Court observed thus:   

 “13. It is thus clear that power of judicial review under  Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is an essential feature  

of the Constitution which can neither be tinkered with nor  eroded.  Even the Constitution cannot be amended to erode  the basic structure of the Constitution.  Therefore, it cannot  

be said that the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 6 to 9  under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable.   However, it is left to the discretion of the court exercising the  

power under Articles 226/227 to entertain the writ petition.”      

Again in paragraph 15, the Court observed thus:     

“15. As noticed above, though respondent Nos. 6 to 9 are the  

voters are not the members of the Zilla Panchayat.  They are  aggrieved by the election of the appellant to the office of the  

Adhyaksha.  They cannot challenge the election of the  appellant to the office of Adhyaksha by filing an election  petition as they are not the members of the Zilla Panchayat  

in question.  In our view, a voter of the Zilla Panchayat who  is not a member cannot be denied an opportunity to  

challenge the election to the office of Adhyaksha under  Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.  Therefore, we hold  that the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 6 to 9 before  

the High Court is maintainable.”    

After this decision, the preliminary objections regarding the  

maintainability of writ petition stood concluded. An attempt  

was made by the appellant to question the correctness of the  

view expressed by this Court in the aforesaid decision.

12    

Concededly, even if the arguments of the appellant may  

appear to be attractive, it cannot be entertained in relation to  

the decision inter partes.  

  8. Be that as it may, in light of the view expressed by this  

Court, the parties were relegated before the learned Single  

Judge of the High Court. Before the remanded writ petition  

was taken up for hearing by the learned Single Judge, the  

appellant filed a writ petition bearing Writ Petition No.108700  

of 2017 (LB-RES) before the High Court of Karnataka,  

Dharwad Bench, challenging the note appended to the  

notification  dated 13.01.1995. That notification had been  

issued by the State Government in exercise of powers  

conferred under Section 2(2) of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj  

Act, 1993, for classifying and notifying the classes of citizens  

as Backward Class, for the purpose of reservation of seats and  

office of Chairperson in Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and  

Gram Panchayat. The note predicates that no person falling  

under category “B” would be entitled to the benefit of  

reservation in the seats and office of Adhyaksha and Upa-

13    

Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Taluk Panchayat and Gram  

Panchayat if,  inter alia,  he/she or either of his/her  

parents/guardians was an income tax assessee/wealth tax  

assessee (Clause ii). This stipulation has been  assailed by the  

appellant as being in the teeth of the exposition of this Court  

in K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Others Vs. Union of India  

and Another1 and Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. Union of  

India2. The High Court being prima facie convinced with the  

said contention granted interim stay to the said stipulation  

(Clause ii) in the notification dated 13.01.1995.  

 9. Reverting to the remanded writ petition from which the  

present appeal arises as aforesaid, the same was to be heard  

by the learned Single Judge on merits of the controversy for  

grant of reliefs prayed in the writ petition including for  

issuance of a writ of quo warranto. The learned Single Judge,  

after examining the rival contentions and after taking note of  

the original documents forming part of the original file  

                                                           1 (2010) 7 SCC 202  2 (1992) Supp (3) SCC 210  

14    

produced by the Government advocate, opined vide judgment  

and order dated 21.09.2017 as under:   

“11. Learned AGA appearing for respondents 1,3 to 5 filed  following documents pertaining to issuance of caste and  

income certificate to respondent No. 6-Smt. Bharati Reddy  w/o Sri Thimmareddy for perusal of this Court.     

1. Application dated 22.04.2016 for issue of caste and  income certificate (Xerox copy).  

2. Notice dated 23.04.2016 issued by the Revenue  

Inspector.   3. Report of the Revenue Inspector dated 26.04.2016  

bearing No. Sam.Kam.Jaa and Aa Zi.  Pam.Chu/01/16-17 dated 26.04.2016.  

4. Mahazar  

5. Statement  6. Affidavit of the applicant sworn before the Advocate  

Notary  7. Applicant‟s identity card (Xeroxcopy)   8. Applicant‟s voter identity card (Xerox copy)    

9. Transfer Certificate (certified copy)  10. Study Certificate (certified copy)  11.  Original Caste and Income Certificate bearing No.  

Sam.Kam.01/06-07 dated 26.04.2016.   12. Form No. 24 regarding applicant‟s land holding.   

 12. On perusal of the documents it is seen that on  22.04.2016 the respondent No. 6 has filed application for  

issue of caste and income certificate; on 23.04.2016 the  jurisdictional Revenue Inspector has issued notice to  

respondent No. 6 pointing out the discrepancies with regard  to issuance of caste and income certificate; on 26.04.2016  the Revenue Inspector has submitted a report recommending  

to issue caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward Caste  II(B); revenue inspector had conducted mahazar along with  the Village Accountant and opined that there is no objection  

for issue of caste certificate to the petitioner in Backward  Caste II(B); statement of Smt. C. Bharathi w/o V.C. Thimma  

Reddy before the Revenue Inspector; affidavit of Smt. C.  Bharathi w/o  V.C. Thimma Reddy sworn before the  Advocate Notary, Ballari Tq. Rev. Area on 26.04.2016; Xerox  

copy of the original voters‟ list of the year 2015; Xerox copy  of the voter‟s identity card; certified copy of the transfer

15    

certificate; certified copy of the study certificate and also the  original certificate issued by the Special Tahasildar,  

Kurugodu, declaring the caste of the respondent No. 6 as  Kapu which comes under Backward Category „B‟ on  

26.04.2016 so also the original of Form No. 24 regarding  holding of land by the respondent No. 6.     

13. The entire process of issuance of caste certificate is  concluded in five days, i.e., application was filed on  

22.04.2016 and the caste certificate was issued on  26.04.2016, which cannot be said to be illegal, as contended  

by the learned counsel for respondent No.6. However, on  perusal of the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 6  before the Notary it is seen that the e-stamp paper is  

purchased at 5.27 PM on 26.04.2016 and after purchase  affidavit was sworn before the Notary and on that day  

itself the caste certificate is issued.  It is also seen that  the date 26.04.2016 is over-written.  This creates a  serious doubt about the process of issuance of caste  

certificate by the respondent No.5.     

14. The respondent No. 5 being a responsible officer of  the Revenue Department has issued the caste certificate  

in a mortal hurry.  The respondent No. 6 who purchased  the E-stamp paper on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 PM and on the  same day she files the affidavit on the E-Stamp paper before  

the Advocate Notary and the same is submitted before the  Special Tahsildar and the Tahsildar after verification has  

issued caste certificate to the respondent No.6, being the  contested candidate for the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla  Panchayat, Ballari. The same is found in the documents  

produced by the learned AGA.  From this process it can be  said that the respondent No. 5 being a responsible officer  

has not taken care and diligence in issuing the caste  certificate and had adopted a casual working nature.   Whether this casual attitude of the  respondent No.5 can  

be said as illegality or negligence is to be considered in a  separate proceedings”.  

(emphasis supplied)  

Again, while dealing with the factual matrix of the case, the  

learned Single Judge, in the same judgment, analysed the  

issue as follows:  

16    

“35. In this writ petition the core issue relates to the holding of  the office of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari, by the  

respondent No.6 and also seeking quashing of Annexure-H the  notification declaring the respondent No. 6 as Adhyaksha of  Zilla Panchayat Ballary.  Therefore, the concept of creamy  

layer as stated supra, does not come in the way of disposal of  this writ petition which is filed for issue of writ of quo  warranto against the respondent No. 6 to vacate the office of  

the Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballary and also to quash  Annexure-H.  In view of the same, the contention of the  

respondent No.6 does not hold substance.    36. In the instant petition it is relevant to state that the  

procedure of writ of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and  authority on the Court to control executive action in the  

matter of making an appointment of a person to the public  office against the relevant statutory provisions.  In the instant  case, the petitioners are the voters/electorates and so also the  

whistle blowers. It is also relevant to state that, the writ of  Quo Warranto protects from illegal deprivation of public  office to which they may have a right and also it relates to  

protect the public from usurping of public office by a  person who is not entitled to hold the public office as a  

result of connivance of executive or that its active help,   wherein the respondent No. 5 being the responsible  Tahasildar, Kurugodu, issued caste certificate to  

respondent No. 6, on the basis of which she was able to  contest and elect for the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla  

Panchayat, Ballari.  The respondent No.6 was contested and  elected for post of Zilla Panchayat Member from 13- Badanahatti Constituency which was reserved for General  

Category (Woman).  In her affidavit (Annexure-E dated  06.2.2016) itself she has stated that she is an income tax  assessee and has even furnished PAN (permanent account  

number).  However, the said fact is suppressed in the  subsequent affidavit vide Annexure-F dated 26.04.2016  

submitted before the Tahasildar, Kurugodu (respondent  No. 5) along with her application for obtaining Backward  Class B Community certificate.  

  xxx   xxx   xxx   xxx    

38… However, the respondent No.5 is under suspension  pending enquiry with regard to the procedure adopted by

17    

him in issuing the caste certificate to the respondent  No.6.   

39. The respondent No.6 who is elected by a democratic  process, she belonged to Kapu caste, which caste falls under  

Backward Class-B category, which is indicated in the  Government Notification dated 13.01.1995 of the Government  of Karnataka. However, now the issue is pending before the  

Caste Verification Committee and that issue cannot be  decided under the jurisdiction of this court under Article  226 of the Constitution of India.  

 40…. whereas in the instant writ petition the Income Tax  

Returns filed by the respondent No. 6 pertains to the year  2013-14.  But she sworn in the affidavit that she is not an  assessee for the year 2015-16. It reflects the conduct of  

the respondent No.6.”  (emphasis supplied)  

Finally, the learned Single Judge concluded as under:    

“42. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that, the E-stamp paper  was purchased at 5.57 pm on 26.04.2016 and the caste cum  

income certificate was issued on the same day, which fact  reveals that the certificate was issued in a mortal hurry.   

Accordingly, this writ petition is filed for issue of writ of Quo  Warranto in respect of quashing the proceedings vide  Annexure-H dated 29.04.2016 and also to direct the  

respondent No. 6 to vacate the office of Adhyaksha of Zilla  Panchyat, Ballari.     

43. Respondent No. 6 being a responsible member of Zilla  

Panchayat, Ballari as she was the successful candidate elected  from 13 Badanahatti constituency which was reserved for  General Category (Woman) as per the notification dated  

28.03.2016 published in Karnataka Gazatee.  The post of  Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat was reserved for Backward  

Category B Woman. The respondent No.6 belonged to Kapu  community which belongs to Category B Community.  However, the declaration regarding her family income  

reveals that it is more than Rs.3,50,000/- p.a. that too  only from the rental income.  This shows that the  respondent No. 6 files an affidavit to secure the caste and  

income certificate from the respondent No.5, who issued  the certificate in a mortal hurry. This creates serious  

doubt about the genuinity  or otherwise of the process of

18    

issuing the caste certificate.  However, the issue is now  pending before the Caste Verification Committee, which is  

a fact finding committee and would be decided in its own  course.  Hence, the question of fact as regarding the caste  

of respondent No. 6 in this writ petition does not arise for  consideration.   In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, since the  

respondent No. 6 has not declared her correct and proper  family income only with an intention to hold the post of  Adhyaksha which is a public office, must be prevented from  

holding the office.”   (emphasis supplied)  

 On the said finding and after recording its opinion, the learned  

Single Judge passed the following order:   

“ORDER  

Writ Petition is allowed in part.  Accordingly, the  proceddings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No.  

SUM./KAM/PraHaGu/ chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring  the 6th respondent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari,  vide Annexure-H is hereby quashed.  Consequently, writ of  

quo warranto is issued directing the 6th respondent to vacate  the office of Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat, Ballari.  Rest of  the prayers do not arise for consideration and  

accordingly they are rejected.     The records submitted by the learned A.G.A. before  

this court on 07.09.2017 are directed to be returned by  substituting them with Xerox copies.    The observations made in this Writ Petition is  

restricted for disposal of this case and shall not have any  bearing regarding the pending litigation before the Caste  

Verification Committee.  The Caste Verification  Committee shall independently hold an enquiry and  

dispose of the case in accordance with law”.      

(emphasis supplied)      

10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant filed  

Writ Appeal No.5872 of 2017. The writ petitioners (respondent

19    

Nos.6 to 9 herein) also filed a cross appeal being Writ Appeal  

No.100657 of 2017. Both the appeals were heard and decided  

together by the Division Bench of the High Court of  

Karnataka, Dharwad Bench vide judgment and order dated  

04.12.2017. The Division Bench broadly reiterated the view  

expressed by the learned Single Judge and affirmed the  

conclusion of the learned Single Judge both on factual and  

legal matters. While analysing the factual matrix, the Division  

Bench observed as follows:  

35… “As narrated in the preceding paragraph Nos. 12 and  13, supra, the appellant filed an application before the  

jurisdictional Tahsildar for issue of Caste cum Income  Certificate on 22.04.2016 in the prescribed format as per the  Notification dated 13.01.1995. On considering the same, the  

jurisdictional Revenue Inspector has issued notice to the  appellant calling upon her to rectify the defects pointed out,  

pursuant to which, the appellant filed an affidavit  on  India, Non-Judicial, Government of Karnataka, e-stamp  paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. declaring that  

the appellant and her husband are neither income tax  assesses nor sales tax assesses. Annexure-G to the Writ  Petition No. 106417/2016 is the application filed by the  

appellant in the prescribed format in terms of the  notification dated 13.1.1995, whereby in Clause - 11, it  

is stated that the applicant or their  father/mother/guardian are not the assessee of income  tax/wealth tax. This is the moot point which requires to  

be considered to decide whether the appellant has  

played any fraud on the constitution.”    

(emphasis supplied)  

20    

11. Again in paragraph 36, the Division Bench noted as  

follows:  

“36. It is not in dispute that any affidavit filed before the  authorities has sanctity in the eye of law and the same, if  

found to be false statement and misrepresentation, it is a  case of perjury punishable under criminal law. Based on the  statement declared by the appellant, the jurisdictional  

Tahasildar has issued verification certificate certifying that  the appellant belongs to backward Class-B Category in terms  of the notification dated 13.1.1995. It is not in dispute that  

the statements were made by the appellant on the E-stamp  paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. and the  

jurisdictional Tahasildar has issued the certificate on the  very same day i.e. 26.04.2016, based on the application  bearing No. 01/16-17, dated 25.04.2016. Fraud played by  

the appellant is manifest from the certificate issued by  the jurisdictional Tahasildar. Based on these facts, the  

Government of Karnataka has now suspended the  jurisdictional Tahasildar for providing false certificate.  On 06.02.2016, the appellant swearing to an affidavit  

that she is an income-tax assessee, furnishing the PAN  card details, subsequently giving statements before the  Revenue Inspector that she is not a PAN card holder and  

not an income tax assessee prima facie proves the  fraudulent act of the appellant. In addition to that filing a  

false affidavit in order to usurp a public office is highly  deplorable. In such circumstances, if the appellant is  continued to chair and hold the office of Adhyaksha, her  

action would be fraud on the constitution….”    

(emphasis supplied)    

The other relevant extract of the impugned judgment of the  

Division Bench in paragraph 44, reads thus:  

“44. The issue relating to the caste, whether the  appellant belongs to Kapu caste or not is a disputed  question of fact. It is true that there is no absolute bar  under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India to  

consider annulment of caste certificate de hors alternative  statutory remedy available provided the disputed question of

21    

facts are not involved and the circumstances warrant  invoking of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. The  

judgments relied upon by the respondents on this point do  not assist the respondents since the matter is already  

pending before the Caste Verification Committee, considering  this prayer at this stage would be, entertaining the parallel  proceedings which is not tenable. The determination of  

caste requires a full-fledged enquiry, as such the learned  single judge directing the caste verification committee,  to proceed with the matter cannot be found fault with.  

Confirming the order of the learned single Judge, we direct  the Caste Verification Committee to proceed with the matter  

in accordance with law without being influenced by any of  the observations made above. All rights and contentions of  the parties are left open. Caste Verification Committee shall  

decide the matter in an expedite manner.  

In the result, both the appeals stand dismissed.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

12. We have heard Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned Senior  

Counsel appearing for the appellant and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan &  

Mr. S.M. Chander Shekhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing  

for the respondents.   

 13. It is indisputable that the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla  

Panchayat is a public office in relation to which a writ of quo  

warranto can be issued, if the post is occupied by a person  

who is not eligible to be so appointed or incurs disqualification  

to continue to occupy the post.  Indeed, when a statutory  

remedy is provided for removal of disqualified person from the

22    

public office who is allegedly usurper of public office, the writ  

court would be ordinarily slow in interfering, much less,  

issuing a writ of quo warranto. The Constitution Bench of this  

Court in the case of The University of Mysore and Another  

Vs. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another3 has observed thus.   

“6. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate that the  

attention of the High Court was drawn to the technical  

nature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by  

the respondent in the present proceedings, and the  

conditions which had to be satisfied before a writ could  

issue in such proceedings.  

7. As Halsbury has observed :  

„An information in the nature of a quo warranto  

took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto  

which lay against a person who claimed or  

usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire  

by what authority he supported his claim, in order  

that the right to the office or franchise might be  

determined.‟  

8. Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a  judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an  independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is  called upon to show by what right he holds the said office,  franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly  determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the  office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by  judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto  

gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from  making appointment to public office against law and to protect  a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a  

                                                           3 (1964) 4 SCR 575

23    

right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from  usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue  either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of its  apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can  effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to  satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public  office and is held by a usurper without legal authority,  

and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to  whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has  

been made in accordance with law or not.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

14. The moot question in the present case is: whether the  

High Court, in the facts of the present case, was justified in  

invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction to issue a writ of quo  

warranto? Let us advert to the assertion made in the writ  

petition in support of such a relief claimed by the respondent  

Nos.6 to 9. The relevant paragraphs have been extracted in  

paragraph 3 of this judgment, being paragraphs 6 and 7 of the  

writ petition. The case of the writ petitioners was that the  

appellant, in order to grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla  

Panchayat, submitted a bogus and false certificate indicating  

that she belongs to the backward community-B category,  

which was surreptitiously obtained from respondent No.5. In  

support of this plea, the crux of the allegation is that a false,  

incorrect and misleading declaration was given by the

24    

appellant in respect of her financial status and income.  In  

that, in the first affidavit dated 6th February, 2016 she had  

declared that she was receiving rent of Rs. One lakh forty  

thousand per annum and her husband was receiving rent of  

Rs. Four lakh eighty thousand per annum.  Whereas in the  

second affidavit dated 26th April, 2016 filed in support of the  

application for grant of Income and Caste Certificate, she has  

stated that the annual income of her family was only Rs. Three  

lakh fifty thousand; and that she and her husband were not  

paying income tax and commercial tax. According to the writ  

petitioners, this declaration was false to the knowledge of the  

appellant. Further, the caste certificate was issued on the  

same day of the application without any proper inquiry as  

required under the law. On these assertions, the matter  

proceeded before the High Court. We will advert to the  

explanation offered by the appellant a little later.  

  15. First, we must notice the other material which had come  

on record during the hearing of the writ petition and which  

weighed with the High Court. During the hearing, the original

25    

official file relating to the grant of caste certificate to the  

appellant was produced by the Government Advocate, as noted  

in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge  

and extracted in paragraph 9 above.  On analyzing the  

documents contained in the original file, it is noticed that the  

certificate was not granted to the appellant on the same day of  

the application as alleged but it took almost five days‟ time for  

processing the application and for its issuance. In that, first, a  

notice was issued by the Revenue Inspector, then, a report of  

the Revenue Inspector was obtained, Mahazar was prepared,  

statement was recorded, and then affidavit of the appellant  

came to be filed along with other documents, as has been  

noted in the original file.   

 16. The concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single  

Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court is that the  

process of issuance of the certificate to the appellant by the  

jurisdictional Authority was done in a mortal hurry. This  

inference has been drawn by the High Court in light of the  

facts revealed from the original official file - that the appellant

26    

purchased stamp paper for preparing affidavit at 5.27 p.m. on  

26th April, 2016 and used the same for notarization and also  

submitted it to the respondent No.5, who then issued the  

caste certificate on the same day i.e. 26th April, 2016.  The  

Court has also noted that there was some overwriting in  

relation to the date. After adverting to these circumstances,  

the High Court opined that there was something seriously  

wrong about the process adopted by the respondent No.5 for  

issuance of caste certificate, which was obviously done to  

favour the appellant who could then contest the election. The  

High Court also noted that the respondent No.5 who had  

issued the stated certificate was later on suspended, pending  

departmental enquiry against him in reference to the selfsame  

certificate issued to the appellant.  Additionally, the High  

Court has found that there was discrepancy in the two  

affidavits filed by the appellant, which is in the nature of  

suppression and non-disclosure of material financial  

information. Finally, the High Court concluded that since the  

issue regarding the validity of Income and Caste Certificate  

was pending before the Caste Verification Committee, which

27    

was a fact finding Committee, the Committee would decide the  

same on its own merits. Notably, the High Court did not quash  

the caste certificate as being void but left it open to the Caste  

Verification Committee to proceed in accordance with law.  

 17. It is pertinent to mention that the Division Bench of the  

High Court, while deciding Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016,  

vide judgment dated 5th June, 2017, has recorded in Para 12  

of the judgment that there is no dispute as to the caste status  

of the appellant herein; that she belongs to “Kapu” Caste is  

not at all in dispute. Considering the above, the issue before  

the Caste Verification Committee would essentially be one  

relating to the income eligibility of the appellant. That may be  

a mixed question of fact and law. Presumably, therefore, the  

High Court stopped short of quashing the Income and Caste  

Certificate issued in favour of the appellant as being void.   

18. In this backdrop, the controversy will have to be analysed  

so as to determine whether the High Court was justified in  

issuing a writ of quo warranto in such a situation. Interfering  

in exercise of writ jurisdiction is limited to judicial review of

28    

the decision making process and not of the decision itself.  In  

this case, the final decision regarding the validity of Income  

and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant has been  

advisedly kept open, thereby the same, in law and in fact, is  

still valid and in force.  There is statutory presumption that  

such caste certificate shall be valid until it is cancelled by the  

Competent Authority.  However, the only logic that can be  

deduced from the contemplation done by the learned Single  

Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court, is that the  

process followed by the respondent No.5 for issuing the stated  

certificate to the appellant is replete with serious doubt and,  

therefore, is prima facie fraudulent.  

19. In other words, the existence of the caste certificate or for  

that matter the fact that it has been so issued by the  

respondent No.5, is not doubted or in dispute. It is not a case  

of appellant relying on a non-existing or officially non-issued  

caste certificate. Thus, enquiry will have to be made about the  

circumstances warranting issuance of stated certificate in a  

tearing hurry by the respondent No.5, allegedly to favour the

29    

appellant. The other aspect is about the discrepancies in the  

two affidavits submitted by the appellant and including the  

suppression and non-disclosure of her truthful financial  

information.  

20. Indubitably, both these aspects will be the subject matter  

of the enquiry before the Caste Verification Committee, being  

intrinsically mixed with the question of validity of the stated  

certificate.  Appellant had offered explanation on both these  

matters. Regarding the factum of mortal hurry allegedly  

displayed by the respondent No.5 in issuing the caste  

certificate, she contends that it was not issued on the same  

day as alleged but after due enquiry. That is evinced from the  

original official file produced before the Court. In that, the  

application was made on 22nd April, 2016 whence the process  

commenced and then concluded on 26th April, 2016. The  

process was required to be completed expeditiously as the  

certificate was required for contesting the impending election  

of Adhyaksha scheduled on 29th April, 2016.  This explanation  

certainly will have to be examined by the Caste Verification

30    

Committee, before invalidating the caste certificate on the  

ground that proper procedure was not followed. For the  

present, suffice it to observe that the mere fact that the  

certificate was issued in a short span of five days from the  

date of the application, per se, does not lead to an inference  

that the required procedure has not been followed.  

21. The fact as to whether necessary procedure has been  

complied with or not will be one aspect of the enquiry before  

the Caste Verification Committee, apart from the core aspect of  

whether in fact the appellant fulfills the income and financial  

criteria.  The mere fact that the caste certificate has been  

issued within a short span of five days albeit after following  

due procedure, can be no just basis to invalidate the certificate  

by the Caste Verification Committee. The said Committee will  

be obliged to record a clear finding of fact about the eligibility  

of the appellant in reference to her financial status and  

income, keeping in mind the purport of Clause (ii) of the Note  

to Notification dated 13th January, 1995.  While considering  

that matter, the Committee will have to make an enquiry as to

31    

whether the appellant or her parent(s)/guardian(s) “is” an  

income tax assessee /wealth tax assessee on the date of  

issuance of the certificate.  As regards this fact, Caste  

Verification Committee will have to examine the correctness  

and efficacy of the two affidavits in its proper perspective  

known to law. According to the appellant, there is no  

discrepancy in the disclosures made by her in the two  

declarations concerning her financial matters at the relevant  

time. The first affidavit dated 6th February, 2016, correctly  

discloses the fact that the appellant possessed PAN Card and  

was an income tax assessee, having paid income tax for the  

Financial Year 2013-14. The second affidavit dated 26th April,  

2016 is also accurate and discloses the correct financial  

position wherein it is stated that the annual income of her  

family is Rs. Three lakh fifty thousand from all the sources;  

and neither she nor her husband are income tax and  

commercial tax payers in reference to the Financial Year  

(2015-16), for which the affidavit was sworn on 26th April,  

2016. It is also contended by the appellant that Clause (ii) of  

the Note posits two aspects:- the first is that the incumbent or

32    

either of his/her parents/guardian should not be an income  

tax or wealth tax “assessee” at the relevant time. The  

expression used in this clause, “is” an income tax  

assessee/wealth tax assessee, pre supposes that it is in  

praesenti and for the relevant period. Secondly, the incumbent  

must necessarily fall within the expression “assessee” given in  

the concerned tax laws. That means only a person, by whom  

any tax or any other sum of money is payable under the Act  

for the concerned period and not otherwise. No material has  

been produced or is forthcoming that the appellant, or for that  

matter, her husband, had paid any tax or are liable to pay tax  

or a sum of money under the concerned tax legislation, for the  

relevant period i.e. Financial Year 2015-16. Absence of such  

evidence, the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the  

appellant cannot be invalidated. Furthermore, the income of  

her husband / spouse is not a relevant fact for issuance of the  

Income and Caste Certificate. For, Clause (ii) excludes benefit  

only if the incumbent or either of his/her parent/guardian is  

an income tax assessee or wealth tax assessee. This provision  

will have to be interpreted strictly, as in the case of provision

33    

for any other disqualification. The appellant also asserts that  

there is no discrepancy or for that matter suppression or non-

disclosure of financial information in the declarations  

submitted by her. In any case, that would be a disputed  

question of fact and per se concerning the issue of validity of  

Income and Caste Certificate.   

 22. According to the appellant, as long as the Income and  

Caste Certificate is valid and in force, which has only been  

doubted by the High Court having been issued by the  

respondent No.5 in a mortal hurry, the matter must rest at  

that. We find force in the submission of the appellant that all  

these issues will be the subject matter during the enquiry into  

the question of validity of the stated Income and Caste  

Certificate, which is pending before the Caste Verification  

Committee. Even the High Court was conscious of this  

position and perhaps, therefore, did not quash or set aside the  

Income and Caste Certificate as being void. A writ of quo  

warranto cannot be issued on the basis of assumptions,  

inferences or suspicion regarding the factum of fulfillment of

34    

eligibility criteria.  Being an extraordinary power, ordinarily  

such a writ ought to be issued only on the basis of  

indisputable facts leading to a singular conclusion that the  

incumbent was in fact or in law disqualified to occupy the  

public office or has incurred disqualification to continue to  

remain therein. Only whence such a person would fall within  

the description of an usurper of public office without legal  

authority.  On the other hand, for a person possessing an  

Income and Caste Certificate issued by the jurisdictional  

Authority and so long as it is valid and in force, in fact and in  

law, treating such a person as usurper of the public office and  

occupying it without legal authority, cannot be countenanced.  

In our opinion, the High Court had plainly erred in engaging  

itself in an enquiry into a prohibited area which is already the  

subject matter of the proceedings pending before the Caste  

Verification Committee, without realizing that the observations  

made by it were inherently bound to influence the Committee  

from taking a just and proper decision in accordance with law  

irrespective of its observation to decide without being  

influenced by its decision.  

35    

 23. Strikingly, neither the learned Single Judge nor the  

Division Bench of the High Court thought it appropriate to  

quash and set aside the Income and Caste Certificate as being  

void. If the High Court was to allow that relief or other reliefs  

claimed by the writ petitioners in entirety after a full-fledged  

enquiry, the correctness of that approach could have been  

tested on a different scale. We must immediately clarify that  

we may not be understood to have said that such a course was  

open to the High Court. That issue does not arise in this  

appeal.   

 24. As aforementioned, the High Court stopped short of  

concluding that the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the  

appellant is void. It merely expressed a prima facie opinion that the  

process adopted by the respondent No.5 to issue the Income and  

Caste Certificate to the appellant created a serious doubt. At best,  

it observed that the appellant was instrumental in playing fraud  

upon the jurisdictional Authority and/or the said Authority  

colluded with the appellant, by surreptitiously issuing the Income  

and Caste Certificate to the appellant. But, finally, it has left the

36    

question regarding the validity of the certificate open to be decided  

by the Caste Verification Committee, in the pending proceedings,  

dealing with the factum of validity of the certificate issued to the  

appellant. Having said this, the High Court could not have issued  

a writ of quo warranto. That writ could be issued only if the Income  

and Caste Certificate was held to be void or after it was invalidated  

by the Competent Authority.    

 25. The distinction between a void and voidable order was  

considered in the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan Vs. State of  

Gujarat.4  The Court noted the dictum of Rubinstein that, when  

an act is not voidable but void, it is a nullity and can be  

disregarded and impeached in any proceedings, before any Court  

or Tribunal and whenever it is relied upon. In other words, it is  

made subject to „collateral attack‟. The Court observed that illegal  

act of authorities, if can be defied on self-determined voidness,  

startling consequences will follow. It, however, made an exception  

of cases where the order is passed by the jurisdictional authority  

without hearing the party affected, which entails injury to a  

                                                           4   (1974) 2 SCC 121

37    

Constitutionally guaranteed right to the affected party. It held that  

such orders may be treated as void and ineffectual to bind the  

parties from the beginning. That is not the case on hand. The  

underlying principle is that, in cases such as the one under  

consideration, the Income and Caste Certificate can only be  

invalidated after affording opportunity to the holder of the  

certificate. It will be useful to reproduce the legal position summed  

up by the Court in paragraph 18 as follows:   

“18. …………Decisions are legion where the conditions for  

the exercise of power have been contravened and the order  

treated as void. And when there is excess or error of  

jurisdiction the end product is a semblance, not an  

actual order, although where the error is within  

jurisdiction it is good, particularly when a finality clause  

exists. The order becomes „infallible in error‟, a peculiar legal  

phenomenon like the hybrid beast of voidable voidness for  

which, according to a learned author, Lord Denning is  

largely responsible. The legal chaos in this branch of  

jurisprudence should be avoided by evolving simpler  

concepts which work in practice in Indian conditions.  

Legislation, rather than judicial law-making will meet  

the needs more adequately. The only safe course, until  

simple and sure light is shed from a legislative source, is  

to treat as void and ineffectual to bind parties, from the  

beginning, any order made without hearing the party  

affected if the injury is to a constitutionally guaranteed  

right. In other cases, the order in violation of natural  

justice is void in the limited sense of being liable to be  

avoided by Court with retroactive force.”  

(emphasis supplied)

38    

As the subject certificate still holds the field and until it is  

invalidated by the Competent Authority, it is unfathomable as to  

how the appellant can be said to have occupied the public office  

without legal authority so as to invoke the extraordinary writ  

jurisdiction of issuing a writ of quo warranto.   

26. In K. Venkatachalam Vs. A. Swamickan5, the challenge  

was to the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly in  

Tamil Nadu by way of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution  

filed by the contesting candidate (respondent therein) for a  

declaration that the appellant was not qualified to be a Member of  

Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, since he was not enrolled as an  

elector in the electoral roll in the concerned constituency for the  

general elections in question. The Court analysed the factual  

matrix which pointed out that, admittedly, the incumbent was not  

an elector of the concerned constituency and that he blatantly and  

fraudulently impersonated himself as another elector in the  

constituency. Accepting that indisputable position, the Court  

proceeded to conclude that the appellant was not eligible to  

contest elections from the concerned constituency, not being a                                                              5 AIR 1999 SC 1723 = (1999) 4 SCC 526

39    

voter in that constituency. It thus held that the appellant therein  

lacked the basic qualification under Clause (c) of Article 173 of the  

Constitution of India read with Section 5 of the 1951 Act, which  

was quintessential to be elected from the constituency. On such  

finding, the Court entertained the writ petition under Article 226  

and declared the appellant to be occupying the public office  

without legal authority and issued a writ of quo warranto. In other  

words, the matter was decided on the basis of indisputable and  

established facts. This judgment will be of no avail to the writ  

petitioners in the present case, so long as the Income and Caste  

Certificate issued to the appellant is in force.  

 27. In Kurapati Maria Das Vs. Ambedkar Seva Samajan6 the  

Court distinguished the decision in K. Venkatachalam (supra)  

being on the facts of that case and reversed the judgment of the  

High Court under challenge, whereby a writ of quo warranto was  

issued against the appellant therein. The reason for doing so may  

have some bearing on the matter in issue as in that case, there  

was dispute about the caste status of the appellant. The Court  

                                                           6 (2009) 7 SCC 387

40    

opined that the issue regarding the caste status can be decided  

only by the Competent Authority under the relevant enactment  

and not by the High Court. The Court accepted the contention of  

the appellant that continuance of the post of Chairperson  

depended directly on his election, firstly, as a ward member and  

secondly as the Chairperson, which election was available only to  

the person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 32 of  

the reported decision, the Court while accepting the contention of  

the appellant noted that the question of caste and his election are  

so inextricably connected that they cannot be separated and  

therefore, when the writ petitioners challenged the continuation of  

the appellant on the ground of his not belonging to a particular  

caste what they actually challenged was the validity of the election  

of appellant though, apparently, the petition was for a writ of quo  

warranto.  

  28. We agree with this exposition. It applies on all fours to the  

case on hand. Inasmuch as, what the writ petitioners (respondents  

6 to 9) had questioned was the correctness of the declarations  

submitted by the appellant about her financial status and income

41    

which, according to them was beyond the prescribed limit and  

disentitled the appellant to get the Income cum Caste Certificate.  

The firm stand taken by the appellant is that there was no  

discrepancy between the two declarations muchless indicative of  

excess income of the appellant at the relevant time. In our opinion,  

there is no tittle of material forthcoming to show that in fact, the  

appellant or her parents/guardians had paid income tax or wealth  

tax during the relevant Financial Year 2015-16. That indeed could  

have disentitled the appellant from getting an Income and Caste  

Certificate. This submission of the appellant is founded on the  

setting in which Clause (ii) of the Note has been placed and is  

attracted only to an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessee as  

per the relevant taxation laws during the current period. An  

assessee is a person who pays taxes or is liable to pay tax or any  

other sum of money payable by him/her. The argument is that the  

fact that the appellant has been issued PAN number or has filed  

tax return and paid tax in the past will be of no consequence and  

does not impair or impinge upon the eligibility of the appellant to  

get an Income and Caste Certificate for the relevant period in any  

manner. As noted earlier, these are matters to be considered by

42    

the Caste Verification Committee and only if rejected, the caste  

certificate in question could be invalidated. Until a final decision is  

taken by the Caste Verification Committee, in law, it will have to  

be presumed that subject certificate is valid and in force in view of  

the statutory provision making it explicit to that effect.  

   29. In the case of Arun Singh alias Arun Kr. Singh Vs. State  

of Bihar and Others7, this Court over turned the decision of the  

High Court issuing a writ of quo warranto, on the ground that it  

was unclear from the orders passed by the Superintendence of  

Police or the District Magistrate, or for that matter, the State  

Election Commissioner, suggestive of the fact that the appellant  

therein was held to have committed any misconduct within the  

meaning of the Service Rules. In paragraph 13, the Court observed  

thus:  

“13.  ……..No cogent or sufficient reasons have been given  by the High Court for setting aside the well-considered order  of the State Election Commission. Furthermore, issuance of  

a writ of quo warranto is discretionary and such a writ  should be issued only upon a clear finding that the  

appointment to a public office was contrary to the  statute. For the said purpose it was obligatory on the part of  the High Court to arrive at a finding that the disqualifying  

clause contained in Section 139(1)(f) was squarely attracted  in the case of the appellant, in the light of the order of the  

                                                           7 (2006) 9 SCC 375

43    

State Election Commission. Evidently, the appellant was not  disqualified.”  

 30. In B.R. Kapur Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.8 the  

Constitution Bench was called upon to consider the situation  

where a person convicted for a criminal offence and whose  

conviction has not been suspended pending appeal, could be  

sworn in as the Chief Minister of a State and continue to function  

as such. The Court was called upon to answer the controversy on  

the basis of indisputable fact that the incumbent Chief Minister  

had already been convicted of a criminal offence and such  

conviction had not been suspended in the pending criminal  

appeal. After considering the purport of Article 164 and Article 173  

of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the appointment of  

the second respondent in the appeal as the Chief Minister was in  

clear violation of the constitutional provisions and thus a writ of  

quo warranto was inevitable. The substratum of the exposition was  

the factum of basic ineligibility of the person to be appointed or  

continue as Chief Minister. In a concurring judgment by Brijesh  

Kumar, J. (as His Lordship then was) the nature of writ of quo  

warranto has been explicated in the following words:                                                              8 (2001) 7 SCC 231  

44    

“79.  ……A writ of quo warranto is a writ which lies against  

the person, who according to the relator is not entitled to  

hold an office of public nature and is only a usurper of the  

office. It is the person, against whom the writ of quo  

warranto is directed, who is required to show, by what  

authority that person is entitled to hold the office. The  

challenge can be made on various grounds, including on the  

grounds that the possessor of the office does not fulfil the  

required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification,  

which debars the person to hold such office. So as to have  

an idea about the nature of action in the proceedings for writ  

of quo warranto and its original form, as it used to be, it  

would be beneficial to quote from Words and Phrases,  

Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A, p. 648. It reads as follows:  

“The original common law writ of quo warranto  

was a civil writ at the suit of the Crown, and not a  

criminal prosecution. It was in the nature of a writ  

of right by the King against one who usurped or  

claimed franchises or liabilities, to inquire by what  

right he claimed them. This writ, however, fell into  

disuse in England centuries ago, and its place was  

supplied by an information in the nature of a quo  

warranto, which in its origin was a criminal  

method of prosecution, as well as to punish the  

usurper by a fine for the usurpation of the  

franchise, as to oust him or seize it for the Crown.  

Long before our revolution, however, it lost its  

character as a criminal proceeding in everything  

except form, and was applied to the mere purposes  

of trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or  

ousting the wrongful possessor, the fine being  

nominal only; and such, without any special  

legislation to that effect, has always been its  

character in many of the States of the Union, and  

it is therefore a civil remedy only.”  

45    

80. In the same volume of Words and Phrases, Permanent  

Edn., at p. 647 we find as follows:  

“The writ of „quo warranto‟ is not a substitute for  

mandamus or injunction nor for an appeal or  

writ of error, and is not to be used to prevent an  

improper exercise of power lawfully possessed,  

and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer or  

corporation or persons purporting to act as such  

from usurping a power which they do not have.  

State ex inf. McKittrick v. Murphy9  

Information in the nature of „quo warranto‟ does  

not command performance of official functions  

by any officer to whom it may run, since it is not  

directed to officer as such, but to person holding  

office or exercising franchise, and not for purpose  

of dictating or prescribing official duties, but only  

to ascertain whether he is rightfully entitled to  

exercise functions claimed. State ex inf. Walsh v.  

Thatcher10.”  

(emphasis supplied)  

81. In Halsbury‟s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I,  

p. 368, para 265 it is found as follows:  

“265. In general.—An information in the nature of a  

quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo  

warranto which lay against a person who claimed or  

usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by  

what authority he supported his claim, in order that  

the right to the office or franchise might be  

determined.”  

                                                           9  148 SW 2d 527, 529, 530 : 347 Mo 484  10 102 SW 2d 937, 938 : 340 Mo 865  

46    

31. In the case of High Court of Gujarat and Anr. Vs. Gujarat  

Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors.11 (supra) in a concurring  

judgment S.B. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) noted that the  

High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this  

nature is required to determine at the outset as to whether a case  

has been made out for issuance of a writ of certiorari or a writ of  

quo warranto. However, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue  

a writ of quo warranto is a limited one. While issuing such a writ,  

the Court merely makes a public declaration but will not consider  

the respective impact of the candidates or other factors which may  

be relevant for issuance of a writ of certiorari. The Court went on  

to observe that a writ of quo warranto can only be issued when the  

appointment is contrary to the statutory rules as held in Mor  

Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. Vs. Financial Commr. &  

Secy. To Government of Haryana12.  The Court also took notice  

of the exposition in R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India13.  The Court  

noted that with a view to find out as to whether a case has been  

made out for issuance of quo warranto, the only question which  

                                                           11 (2003) 4 SCC 712  12 (2002) 6 SCC 269  13 (1993) 4 SCC 119

47    

was required to be considered was as to whether the incumbent  

fulfilled the qualifications laid down under the statutory provisions  

or not. This is the limited scope of inquiry. Applying the underlying  

principle, the Court ought not to enquire into the merits of the  

claim or the defence or explanation offered by the appellant  

regarding the manner of issuance of Income and Caste Certificate  

by the jurisdictional Authority or any matter related thereto which  

may be matter in issue for scrutiny concerning the validity of the  

Caste Certificate issued by the jurisdictional statutory authority  

constituted under the State Act of 1990 and the rules framed  

thereunder. That inquiry may require examination of all factual  

aspects threadbare including the legality of the stand taken by the  

appellant herein.  

 32. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, Food  

Corporation of India and Others Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira  

and Others14, the question was in reference to the Caste  

Certificate which was invalidated after the verification done by the  

jurisdictional Scrutiny Committee. The observations in the said  

                                                           14 (2017) 8 SCC 670  

48    

decision may be of some import, if the Caste Verification  

Committee was to invalidate the Caste Certificate issued to the  

appellant after due verification. As a matter of fact, the enquiry  

before the Caste Verification Committee ought to proceed in terms  

of the procedure prescribed by the Act of 1990 and Rules framed  

thereunder and including the dictum of this Court in, amongst  

others Madhuri Patil Vs. Commr., Tribal Development15.   

33. In Rajesh Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Ors.16, the  

Court noted that a writ of quo warranto will lie when the  

appointment is made contrary to the statutory provisions as held  

in the case of Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. (supra)  

Further, relying on the decision in the cases of B. Srinivasa  

Reddy Vs. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage  

Board Employees Asson.17 and Hari Bansh Lal Vs. Sahodar  

Prasad Mahto18, wherein the legal position has been restated that  

the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of quo warranto is  

a limited one which can only be issued if the appointment is  

                                                           15 (1994) 6 SCC 241  16 (2013) 1 SCC 501  17 (2006) 11 SCC 731   18 (2010) 9 SCC 655

49    

contrary to the statutory rules and the Court has to satisfy itself  

that the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In that  

case, the Court after analysing the factual matrix found, as of fact,  

that there was non-compliance of sub-Section (5) of Section 85 of  

the Electricity Act, 2003, in the matter of appointment of the  

incumbent to the post of Chairperson of the Commission for which  

it became necessary to issue a writ of quo warranto. In the  

supplementing judgment by one of us Dipak Misra, J. (as His  

Lordship then was), the settled legal position expounded in B.R.  

Kapur (supra), University of Mysore (supra), High Court of  

Gujarat (supra), Centre for PIL Vs. Union of India19 has been  

recapitulated in paragraphs 29 to 33 of the reported decision.   

 34. We have adverted to some of those decisions in the earlier  

part of this judgment. Suffice, it to observe that unless the Court  

is satisfied that the incumbent was not eligible at all as per the  

statutory provisions for being appointed or elected to the public  

office or that he/she has incurred disqualification to continue in  

the said office, which satisfaction should be founded on the  

                                                           19 (2011) 4 SCC 1

50    

indisputable facts, the High Court ought not to entertain the  

prayer for issuance of a writ of quo warranto.  

35. In the case of K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) (supra) the  

Constitution Bench of this Court examined two questions as noted  

in paragraph 9 of the reported judgment, which read thus:  

“9. In light of the submissions that have been  

paraphrased in the subsequent paragraphs, the contentious  

issues in this case can be framed in the following manner:  

(i) Whether Article 243-D(6) and Article 243_T(6) are  

constitutionally valid since they enable reservations in  

favour of backward classes for the purpose of occupying  

seats and chairperson positions in panchayats and  

municipalities respectively?   

(ii) Whether Article 243-D(4) and Article 243-T(4) are  

constitutionally valid since they enable the reservation of  

chairperson positions in panchayats and municipalities  

respectively?”     

The Court opined that the objectives of democratic decentralisation  

are not only to bring governance closer to the people, but also to  

make it more participatory, inclusive and accountable to the  

weaker sections of society. The Court went on to observe that  

reservations in local self-government are intended to directly  

benefit the community as a whole, rather than just the elected

51    

representatives. It is for this very reason that there cannot be an  

exclusion of the “creamy layer” in the context of political  

representation. It also noted that while exclusion of the “creamy  

layer” may be feasible as well as desirable in the context of  

reservations for education and employment, the same principle  

cannot be extended to the context of local self-government.          

We may note that this decision may be of relevance to the  

appellant to pursue his remedy before the High Court in the writ  

petition No.108700 of 2017, questioning the validity of Clause (ii)  

of the notification dated 13.01.1995 providing for exclusion of  

“creamy layer” against the reserved category.    We may, however,  

without any hesitation record that the High Court had justly  

negatived the argument of the appellant which was founded on the  

interim relief granted by the High Court in the stated writ petition  

on the ground that the same cannot validate an action which was  

illegal so as to alter the eligibility criteria for contesting the election  

of Adhyaksha conducted on 26th April, 2016.                               

We do not intend to express any opinion either way on the pending  

issues in that proceedings, which  are not the subject           

52    

matter of this appeal.  The High Court is free to deal with that writ  

petition on its own merits in accordance with law.  

 36. This, however, will make no difference to the conclusion  

which we must reach in this case that the High Court could not  

have issued a writ of quo warranto until the Income and Caste  

Certificate issued in favour of the appellant, on the basis of which  

she participated in the election for the post of Adhyaksha and got  

elected, was to be declared void or invalidated by the Caste  

Scrutiny Committee. We do not wish to dilate on other incidental  

aspects/arguments as the same will not have any bearing on the  

conclusion noted above.  

37. In a matter of this nature, the High Court, having kept open  

the issue regarding the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate  

to be decided by the jurisdictional Caste Verification Committee  

and finding no legal basis to declare the certificate as void ab initio  

or choosing to do so, ought to have instead directed the Caste  

Verification Committee to expedite the enquiry and conclude the  

same in a time bound manner. The course adopted by the High

53    

Court has only prolonged the consideration of that issue by the  

competent authority and embroiled the parties in avoidable  

proceedings.  

 38. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the decisions  

of the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High  

Court which are impugned in the present appeal. We, however,  

dispose of the writ petition filed by the respondents 6 to 9 being  

Writ Petition No.106417 of 2016 only by directing the Caste  

Verification Committee to expedite the enquiry regarding the  

validity of the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant  

by respondent no.5 and conclude the same preferably within two  

months and also intimate its final decision to the appellant within  

the same time. Needless to observe that the Caste Scrutiny  

Committee will decide the matter on its own merit and without  

being influenced whatsoever by any observations made in the  

impugned judgments but in accordance with law. Besides, it shall  

deal with every contention raised before it by recording tangible  

reasons.   

54    

39. The appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms with no  

order as to costs.     

   .………………………….CJI.  

     (Dipak Misra)   

…………………………..….J.                (A.M. Khanwilkar)  

    …………………………..….J.               (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)  

New Delhi;  

March 6, 2018.