09 May 2011
Supreme Court
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BHAGWAN DASS Vs STATE (NCT) OF DELHI

Bench: MARKANDEY KATJU,GYAN SUDHA MISRA, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001117-001117 / 2011
Diary number: 638 / 2011
Advocates: GAURAV AGRAWAL Vs ANIL KATIYAR


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1117  OF 2011 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.1208 OF 2011

Bhagwan Dass   ..      Appellant

-versus-

State (NCT) of Delhi   ..          Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Markandey Katju, J.

     “Hai maujazan ek kulzum-e-khoon kaash yahi ho     Aataa hai abhi dekhiye kya kya mere aage”

  --  Mirza Ghalib

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1. This is yet another case of gruesome honour killing, this time  

by the accused-appellant of his own daughter.

2. Leave granted.

3. Heard  learned  counsels  for  the  parties  and  perused  the  

record.

4. The prosecution case is that the appellant was very annoyed  

with his daughter, who had left her husband Raju and was living  

in  an  incestuous  relationship  with  her  uncle,  Sriniwas.   This  

infuriated  the  appellant  as  he  thought  this  conduct  of  his  

daughter  Seema  had  dishonoured  his  family,  and  hence  he  

strangulated her with an electric wire.  The trial court convicted  

the appellant and this judgment was upheld by the High Court.  

Hence this appeal.

5. This is a case of circumstantial evidence, but it is settled law  

that  a  person  can  be  convicted  on  circumstantial  evidence

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provided  the  links  in  the  chain  of  circumstances  connects  the  

accused  with  the  crime  beyond  reasonable  doubt  vide  Vijay  

Kumar Arora  vs.  State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 2 SCC 353  

(para 16.5),  Aftab Ahmad Ansari  vs.  State of Uttaranchal,  

(2010) 2 SCC 583 (vide paragraphs 13 and 14), etc.  In this case,  

we are satisfied that the prosecution has been able to prove its  

case beyond reasonable doubt by establishing all the links in the  

chain of circumstances.

6. In cases of circumstantial evidence motive is very important,  

unlike cases of direct evidence where it is not so important vide  

Wakkar and Anr.  vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 3 SCC  

306 (para 14).  In the present case, the prosecution case was  

that the motive of the appellant in murdering his daughter was  

that she was living in adultery with one Sriniwas, who was the  

son of  the  maternal  aunt  of  the appellant.   The appellant  felt  

humiliated by this, and to avenge the family honour he murdered  

his own daughter.

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7. We have carefully gone through the judgment of  the trial  

court as well as the High Court and we are of the opinion that the  

said judgments are correct.

8. The circumstances which connect the accused to the crime  

are:

i) The motive of the crime which has already been mentioned  

above.  In our country unfortunately ‘honour killing’ has become  

common  place,  as  has  been  referred  to  in  our  judgment  in  

Arumugam Servai  vs.  State of Tamil Nadu Criminal Appeal  

No.958  of  2011  (@SLP(Crl)  No.8084  of  2009)  pronounced  on  

19.4.2011.

Many people feel that they are dishonoured by the behaviour  

of the young man/woman, who is related to them or belonging to  

their  caste  because  he/she  is  marrying  against  their  wish  or  

having an affair with someone, and hence they take the law into  

their  own  hands  and  kill  or  physically  assault  such  person  or  

commit some other atrocities on them.  We have held in  Lata

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Singh  vs.  State of U.P. & Anr. (2006) 5 SCC 475, that this is  

wholly illegal.  If someone is not happy with the behaviour of his  

daughter or other person, who is his relation or of his caste, the  

maximum he can do is to cut off social relations with her/him, but  

he cannot take the law into his own hands by committing violence  

or giving threats of violence.   

ii) As  per  the  post  mortem  report  which  was  conducted  at  

11.45 am on 16.5.2006 the likely time of death of Seema was 32  

hours prior to the post mortem.  Giving a margin of two hours,  

plus  or  minus,  it  would  be  safe  to  conclude  that  Seema died  

sometime between 2.00 am to 6.00 am on 15.5.2006.  However,  

the appellant, in whose house Seema was staying, did not inform  

the police or anybody else for a long time.  It was only some  

unknown person who telephonically informed the police at 2.00  

pm  on  15.5.2006  that  the  appellant  had  murdered  his  own  

daughter.   This omission by the appellant in not informing the  

police about the death of his daughter for about 10 hours was a

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totally unnatural conduct on his part.            

iii) The appellant had admitted that the deceased Seema had  

stayed in his house on the night of 14.5.2006/15.5.2006.  The  

appellant’s mother was too old to commit the crime, and there is  

not even a suggestion by the defence that his brother may have  

committed it.  Hence we can safely rule out the possibility that  

someone else, other than the appellant, committed the crime.

Seema had left her husband sometime back and was said to  

be living in an adulterous and incestuous relationship with her  

uncle (her father’s cousin), and this obviously made the appellant  

very hostile to her.

On receiving the telephonic  information at about 2.00 pm  

from some unknown person, the police reached the house of the  

accused and found the dead body of Seema on the floor in the  

back  side  room  of  the  house.   The  accused  and  his  family  

members  and some neighbours  were there  at  that  time.   The  

accused admitted that although Seema had been married about

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three years ago, she had left her husband and was living in her  

father’s house for about one month.  Thus there was both motive  

and opportunity for the appellant to commit the murder.

iv)  It has come in evidence that the accused appellant with his  

family members were making preparation for her last rites when  

the  police  arrived.   Had  the  police  not  arrived  they  would  

probably have gone ahead and cremated Seema even without a  

post mortem so as to destroy the evidence of strangulation.   

v) The mother of the accused, Smt. Dhillo Devi stated before  

the police that her son (the accused) had told her that he had  

killed Seema.  No doubt a statement to the police is ordinarily not  

admissible in evidence in view of Section 162(1) Cr.PC, but as  

mentioned in the proviso to Section 162(1) Cr.PC it can be used  

to contradict the testimony of a witness.  Smt. Dhillo Devi also  

appeared as a witness  before the trial  court,  and in her cross  

examination, she was confronted with her statement to the police  

to whom she had stated that her son (the accused) had told her

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that  he  had  killed  Seema.   On  being  so  confronted  with  her  

statement  to  the  police  she  denied  that  she  had  made  such  

statement.

We are of the opinion that the statement of Smt. Dhillo Devi  

to  the  police  can  be  taken  into  consideration  in  view  of  the  

proviso to Section 162(1) Cr.PC,  and her subsequent denial  in  

court is not believable because she obviously had afterthoughts  

and wanted to save her son (the accused) from punishment.  In  

fact in her statement to the police she had stated that the dead  

body of  Seema was removed from the bed and placed on the  

floor.  When she was confronted with this statement in the court  

she denied that she had made such statement before the police.  

We are of the opinion that her statement to the police can be  

taken into consideration in view of the proviso of Section 162(1)  

Cr.PC.

In our opinion the statement of the accused to his mother  

Smt. Dhillo Devi is an extra judicial confession.  In a very recent

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case  this  Court  in  Kulvinder  Singh  &  Anr.  vs.  State  of  

Haryana Criminal Appeal No.916 of 2005 decided on 11.4.2011  

referred  to  the  earlier  decision  of  this  Court  in  State  of  

Rajasthan  vs.  Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, where it was held  

(vide para 10) :

“An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and  made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the  court. The confession will have to be proved like any  other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession,  like any other evidence, depends upon the veracity of  the witness to whom it has been made. The value of  the evidence as to the confession depends on the relia- bility of the witness who gives the evidence. It is not  open to any court to start with a presumption that ex- tra-judicial  confession is  a  weak type of  evidence.  It  would depend on the nature of the circumstances, the  time when the confession was made and the credibility  of the witnesses who speak to such a confession. Such  a confession can be relied upon and conviction can be  founded thereon if  the evidence about the confession  comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be  unbiased,  not  even remotely inimical  to the accused,  and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which  may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of at- tributing an untruthful  statement to the accused,  the  words spoken to by the witness are clear, unambiguous  and unmistakably convey that the accused is the perpe- trator of the crime and nothing is omitted by the wit- ness which may militate against it. After subjecting the  evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touch- stone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be

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accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it pass- es the test of credibility.”

                In the above decision it was also held that a conviction can  

be based on circumstantial evidence.

Similarly, in  B.A. Umesh  vs.  Registrar General,  High  

Court of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 85 the Court relied on the  

extra judicial confession of the accused.

   

No  doubt  Smt.  Dhillo  Devi  was  declared  hostile  by  the  

prosecution  as  she  resiled  from  her  earlier  statement  to  the  

police.  However, as observed in State  vs.  Ram Prasad Mishra  

& Anr. :

  “The  evidence  of  a  hostile  witness  would  not  be  totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or  the accused, but can be subjected to close scrutiny and  the portion of the evidence which is consistent with the  case of the prosecution or defence may be accepted.”    

Similarly in Sheikh Zakir  vs.  State of Bihar AIR 1983 SC  

911 this Court held :

“It  is  not  quite  strange that  some witnesses  do  turn hostile but that by itself would not prevent a court  from  finding  an  accused  guilty  if  there  is  otherwise  acceptable evidence in support of the conviction.”

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In  Himanshu alias Chintu  vs.  State (NCT of Delhi),  

(2011) 2 SCC 36 this Court held that the dependable part of the  

evidence of a hostile witness can be relied on.

Thus it is the duty of the Court to separate the grain from  

the chaff, and the maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no  

application in  India  vide  Nisar Alli  vs.   The State of  Uttar  

Pradesh AIR 1957 SC 366.  In the present case we are of the  

opinion that Smt. Dhillo Devi denied her earlier statement from  

the police because she wanted to save her son.  Hence we accept  

her statement to the police and reject  her statement in court.  

The defence has not shown that the police had any enmity with  

the accused, or had some other reason to falsely implicate him.

We are of the opinion that this was a clear case of murder  

and the entire circumstances point to the guilt of the accused.  

vi) The cause of death was opined by Dr. Pravindra Singh-PW1

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in his post mortem report as death “due to asphyxia as a result of  

ante-mortem strangulation by ligature.”  It is evident that this is  

a  case  of  murder,  and  not  suicide.   The  body  was  not  found  

hanging but lying on the ground.  

vii) The  accused  made  a  statement  to  the  SDM,  Shri  S.S.  

Parihar-PW8, immediately after the incident and has signed the  

same.  No doubt he claimed in his statement under Section 313  

Cr.PC that nothing was asked by the SDM but he did not clarify  

how his signature appeared on the statement, nor did he say that  

he  was  forced  to  sign  his  statement  nor  was  the  statement  

challenged  in  the  cross  examination  of  the  SDM.   The  SDM  

appeared as a witness before the trial court and he has proved  

the statement in his evidence.  There was no cross examination  

by the accused although opportunity was given.

In his statement under Section 313 Cr.PC the accused was  

asked :

“Q.8 It  is  in  evidence  against  you  that  you  were  interrogated and arrested vide memo Ex PW11/C and  your  personal  search  was  conducted  vide  memo  Ex

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PW11/D and you made disclosure statement EXPW7/A  and in pursuance thereto you pointed out the site plan  of  incident  and got  recovered an electric  wire  Ex P1  which  was  seized  by IO after  sealing  the  same vide  memo ExPW7/B.  What do you have to say?  

The reply he gave was as follows :

“Ans.  I was wrongly arrested and falsely implicated in  this case.  I never made any disclosure statement.  I  did not get any wire recovered nor I was ever taken  again to my house.”

We see no reason to disbelieve the SDM as there is nothing  

to show that he had any enmity against the accused or had any  

other reason for making a false statement in Court.   

viii) The accused had given a statement (Ex. PW7/A) to the SDM  

in  the  presence  of  PW11  Inspector  Nand  Kumar  which  led  to  

discovery of the electric wire by which the crime was committed.  

We  are  of  the  opinion  that  this  disclosure  was  admissible  as  

evidence under Section 27 of the Evidence Act vide Aftab Ahmad  

Ansari  vs.  State, (2010) 2 SCC 583 (para 40), Manu Sharma  

vs.  State,  (2010) 6 SCC 1 (paragraphs 234 to 238).   In his  

evidence  the  police  Inspector  Nand  Kumar  stated  that  at  the

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pointing  out  of  the  accused  the  electric  wire  with  which  the  

accused  is  alleged  to  have  strangulated  his  daughter  ws  

recovered from under a bed in a room.

It  has  been  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant  that  there  was  no  independent  witness  in  the  case.  

However, as held by this Court in State of Rajasthan  vs.  Teja  

Ram and Ors. AIR 1999 SC 1776 :

“The  over-insistence  on  witnesses  having  no  relation  with the victims often results in criminal justice going  awry. When any incident happens in a dwelling house,  the  most  natural  witnesses  would  be  the  inmates  of  that  house.  It  is  unpragmatic  to  ignore  such natural  witnesses and insist on outsiders who would not have  even seen anything. If the court has discerned from the  evidence  or  even from the investigation  records  that  some  other  independent  person  has  witnessed  any  event connecting the incident in question, then there is  a  justification  for  making  adverse  comments  against  non-examination of such a person as a prosecution wit- ness. Otherwise, merely on surmises the court should  not castigate the prosecution for not examining other  persons of  the locality  as  prosecution  witnesses.  The  prosecution can be expected to examine only those who  have witnessed the events and not those who have not  seen it though the neighbourhood may be replete with  other residents also.”

Similarly,  in  Trimukh  Maroti  Kirkan  vs.   State  of

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Maharashtra (2006)1 SCC 681 this Court observed:

“These crimes are generally committed in complete se- crecy inside the house and it becomes very difficult for  the prosecution  to lead evidence.  No member of  the  family, even if he is a witness of the crime, would come  forward to depose against another family member. The  neighbours,  whose  evidence  may  be  of  some  assis- tance,  are  generally  reluctant  to  depose  in  court  as  they want to keep aloof and do not want to antagonize  a  neighbourhood  family.  The  parents  or  other  family  members of  the bride being away from the scene of  commission of crime are not in a position to give direct  evidence which may inculpate the real accused except  regarding the demand of money or dowry and harass- ment caused to the bride. But, it does not mean that a  crime committed in secrecy or inside the house should  go unpunished.”

                                              (emphasis supplied)

In our opinion both the trial court and High Court have given  

very cogent reasons for convicting the appellant, and we see no  

reason to disagree with their  verdicts.   There is  overwhelming  

circumstantial evidence to show that the accused committed the  

crime as he felt that he was dishonoured by his daughter.

For the reason given above we find no force in this appeal  

and it is dismissed.

Before  parting  with  this  case  we would  like  to  state  that

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‘honour’ killings have become commonplace in many parts of the  

country,  particularly  in  Haryana,  western  U.P.,  and  Rajasthan.  

Often young couples who fall in love have to seek shelter in the  

police lines or protection homes, to avoid the wrath of kangaroo  

courts.  We have held in Lata Singh’s case (supra) that there is  

nothing ‘honourable’ in ‘honour’ killings, and they are nothing but  

barbaric  and  brutal  murders  by  bigoted,  persons  with  feudal  

minds.

In our opinion honour killings,  for  whatever reason,  come  

within  the  category  of  rarest  of  rare  cases  deserving  death  

punishment.   It  is  time  to  stamp  out  these  barbaric,  feudal  

practices which are a slur on our nation.    This is necessary as a  

deterrent for such outrageous, uncivilized behaviour.  All persons  

who are planning to perpetrate ‘honour’ killings should know that  

the gallows await them.  

Let  a  copy  of  this  judgment  be  sent  to  the  Registrar  

Generals/Registrars of all the High Courts who shall circulate the  

same  to  all  Judges  of  the  Courts.   The  Registrar

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General/Registrars of the High Courts will also circulate copies of  

the same to all the Sessions Judges/Additional Sessions Judges in  

the State/Union Territories.  Copies of the judgment shall also be  

sent  to  all  the  Chief  Secretaries/Home  Secretaries/Director  

Generals of Police of all States/Union Territories in the country.  

The  Home  Secretaries  and  Director  Generals  of  Police  will  

circulate  the  same  to  all  S.S.Ps/S.Ps  in  the  States/Union  

Territories for information.

        ……….…………………….J.      (Markandey Katju)`

             …………………………….J.      (Gyan Sudha Misra)

New Delhi; May  09 , 2011