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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.248 of 2007

Bhadragiri Venkata Ravi                                …Appellant

Versus

Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P., Hyderabad         …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated  

13.9.2006, passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad  

in Criminal Appeal No.863 of 2004, by way of which the High Court  

reversed the judgment and order of the Sessions Judge, Vijianagaram  

dated 19.10.2001, passed in Sessions Case No.40 of 2001, by way of  

which and whereunder the appellant  stood acquitted of the charges

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under Section 302 read with Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code  

1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).

2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are that:

A. The  appellant  had  developed  intimacy  with  Ratna  Kumari  

(deceased) and got an inter caste marriage, registered on 26.10.1991  

under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.  Their married life was not very  

happy, therefore, Divorce Petition being O.P. No.37/92 was filed and  

the same was rejected by the Family Court on the ground that one  

year had not elapsed after their marriage.   

B. Thus,  a fresh Divorce Petition, i.e.,  O.P. No.65 of 1992 was  

filed on 31.12.1992. Their marriage was dissolved and the appellant  

and deceased stood separated.   There was no child out  of the said  

wedlock.

C. The deceased was a well qualified woman as she has obtained  

M.Com., LL.B. qualification. In order to earn her livelihood, she had  

been giving tuitions to the students in a rented premises i.e. House  

no.754, Phoolbagh Colony, Vijianagaram.  The appellant, as alleged,  

in spite of their divorce, was having visiting terms with the deceased.

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D. On  15.4.2000,  Ratna  Kumari  was  admitted  in  the  Govt.  

Headquarter  Hospital,  Vijianagaram at  1.30  p.m.  with  44% burns.  

Her statement/complaint was recorded by the head constable of police  

wherein she had stated that a stove full of kerosene oil fell upon her  

and thus, she suffered burn injuries.  On the basis of the same an FIR  

was registered.

E. On the same day, her dying declaration was recorded by the  

Executive  Magistrate  after  getting  certificate  of  fitness  from  the  

Doctor, wherein a similar statement had been recorded.  She remained  

admitted in the hospital.  

On 28.4.2000, her another dying declaration was recorded by  

the  Executive  Magistrate  wherein she  alleged that  on 14.4.2000 at  

about  1.30  p.m.  while  the  deceased  was  cooking food  and  all  the  

students had gone home, the appellant poured kerosene on her body  

and threw the burning stove on her, due to which she received severe  

burn injuries.  The deceased raised hue and cry which attracted some  

of the neighbours.

F. Ratna Kumari (deceased) expired on 3.6.2000 in the hospital  

and on getting the information, the police altered the FIR into Section  

302  and  498A  IPC.   The  doctor  conducted  the  post  mortem  and  

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opined  that  the  cause  of  death  was  septicemia  shock  due  to  ante-

mortem burns.

G. After necessary investigation, the police filed charge sheet on  

2.12.2000 against  the  appellant  and his  parents  for  offences  under  

Sections 302 and 498A IPC.  After committal of the proceedings, the  

trial commenced on 6.8.2001.  After conclusion of the trial, the Trial  

Court  vide  judgment  and  order  dated  19.10.2001  acquitted  all  the  

accused  observing  that  prosecution  could  not  prove  any  case  

whatsoever against either of them as there was no iota of evidence to  

show the involvement of either of them.

H. Aggrieved, the State preferred Criminal Appeal No.863 of 2004  

before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad.  The court  

dismissed the appeal against the parents of the appellant at the stage of  

admission itself. The appeal was admitted only qua the appellant. The  

appeal of the State has been allowed by the High Court vide judgment  

and order dated 13.9.2006, convicting the appellant under Section 302  

IPC and awarding the sentence to undergo life imprisonment and to  

pay fine of Rs.5,000/-, in default, to undergo further S.I. for a period  

of one year. Appellant was acquitted of all other charges.  

Hence, this appeal.

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3. Shri  H.S.  Phoolka,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellant has submitted that admittedly after the marriage the parties  

had  separated  themselves  and  therefore,  there  was  no  question  of  

living as husband and wife even after 8 years of their divorce.  Just  

immediately  after  the  incident  when  Ratna  Kumari,  deceased  was  

taken to the hospital, she lodged a complaint/FIR which was recorded  

by the Head Constable though after her death the same was treated as  

her dying declaration.  On the same day, her dying declaration was  

also  recorded  by  the  Executive  Magistrate  and  both  these  dying  

declarations  clearly  speak  non-involvement  of  the  appellant  or  

anybody else.  It is a clear case of accident. The deceased was tutored  

by her mother and hence in third dying declaration, the appellant and  

his  parents  were  enroped,  in  the  offence.  The  declaration  dated  

28.4.2000 is self contradictory.  The appeal deserves to be allowed.  

4. Per contra,  Shri Nachiketa Joshi, learned counsel appearing for  

the  State  has  submitted  that  the  High  Court  has  appreciated  the  

evidence and the dying declarations of Ratna (deceased) recorded on  

15.4.2000  and  on  28.4.2000,  and  the  latter  clearly  involved  the  

appellant and his parents. The High Court has taken a lenient view  

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and  did  not  admit  the  appeal  against  the  parents  of  the  appellant.  

While deciding the appeal, the High Court has met all the parameters  

laid down by this Court for interfering against the order of acquittal.  

Hence, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

5. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

The  FIR/dying  declaration  recorded  on  15.4.2000  reads  as  

under:-    

“I belong to Phoolbagh Colony, Vijianagaram. I married  10  years  back  with  Ramana of  Kamma  while  I  was  studying at Tirupathi. After one year living together, we  got divorced through Vijianagaram District.  I am living  alone and  gave  tuitions  to  children  and  studying  law.  I  forgone my relation with my own people.  There  are  nobody of  my own.  Yesterday on 14.04.2000 night  at  about  8  hours  time  the  current  was  cut  off.  I  lit  my  kerosene  stove  and  prepared  tea.  In  the  darkness  my  polyster saree worned by me got fire and my entire body,  chest,  hands,  face,  legs,  foot  and  some  portion  of  the  stomach were burnt.     I phoned to my known friend  i.e. Bhadragin Lalita of Pradeep Nagar. She came and  took  me  to  the  Pradeep  Nagar.  By  then  I  purchased  ointment and applied it. Not cured. Today i.e. 15.04.2000  morning by 10 hours I came to  Government Hospital,  Vijianagaram with the help of my friend Bhadragin  Lalitha. Nobody is aware due to air and rain while I was  burning. I poured water and put of. Then I felt nothing.  Doctor gave medicines.”  (Emphasis added)

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The Doctor has put an endorsement on the declaration that she  

was fit to make the declaration and signed the same. The declaration  

bears signature of the maker (deceased) and the person recording the  

same.

6. The  dying  declaration  recorded  by  the  Executive  Magistrate  

dated 15.4.2000 reads as under:  

“Yesterday  night  at  about  8  hours  when  I  was  litting the kerosene stove to prepare tea, huge winds are  coming in the meanwhile my saree was burnt and flames  came  out.  Likewise  my  body  was  burnt.  I  have  no  children. I got divorced with my husband through Court  ten years back. I alone present when this happened. There  are no disputes in between myself and my husband. My  husband never came to my house after divorce. There  are no disputes between myself and neighbours. Though I  raised cries none of neighbours came as huge winds are  flowing. Hence it might not be heard. My friend Lalitha  took me to the Hospital. As myself has poured water  vessel on me available in the kitchen. The flames were  put of. I have no relationship with my parent-in-law's  house.  This is  happened unexpectedly.  No body did  this.” (Emphasis added)

This declaration also contains the endorsement by the Doctor in  

respect of the fit condition of the maker. It bears the signature of the  

deceased and the Executive Magistrate.  

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7. However,  in  the  third  dying  declaration  made  on  28.4.2000  

before the Magistrate, she has stated that she had been brought to the  

hospital by her husband Ravi, mother-in-law Lolitha, and father-in-

law  Gangaraju.  That  they  got  married  on  26.10.1991.   She  was  

preparing food on kerosene stove in the mid day between 1.30 to 2.00  

p.m. on 14.4.2000.  Her husband asked her whether she had paid the  

electricity bill.  She replied that she could not deposit as the office was  

closed.  Her husband sent one student, namely Matcha Basava Raju to  

the electricity office to see whether it was opened or closed.  He came  

back and answered that it was closed.  However, there was exchange  

of words between them.  He took up a kerosene tin lying there and  

poured the kerosene on her shoulders and immediately threw her on  

the burnt stove.  She got burn injuries.  Her husband took the water  

from the bath room and poured on her.  Srinu, a next door neighbour  

came there and also poured water on her.  The flames were put of.  No  

neighbour came except Srinu.  Her husband requested Srinu not to  

reveal anything about the incident to anybody.  Her husband arranged  

some  medicines  and  gave  injections  to  her.   He  gave  her  tablets  

frequently.  He had given six injections within a period of 3 days at  

home.   Her  parents-in-law came from Rajahmundry  on  15.4.2000.  

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They  also  requested  the  deceased  not  to  reveal  anyone  about  the  

incident.  On 16.4.2000, her husband and parents-in-law took her  

to a private hospital.  The doctor gave her glucose and one injection.  

On the same day at about 12 noon, she  was taken to Government  

hospital on cot by her husband and in-laws and thereafter, none  

of them could be found.  She had earlier made a statement before the  

police  as  narrated  by  her  husband  and  in-laws.   She  has  no  

consciousness  to  such  extent,  but  the  persons  were  visible.  

Previously,  the police or Magistrate had not taken any statement  

forcibly from her.   

8. The first two dying declarations were made in the Government  

Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram and the Magistrate had reached  

there  on  being  called  by  the  police.   There  is  no  inconsistency  

between the first two dying declarations and it is evident from the said  

dying declarations recorded on 15.4.2000 that both of them had been  

recorded in the Government Headquarter Hospital, Vijianagaram.   

The third dying declaration makes it evident that on 15.4.2000  

she had not been taken to the Government Hospital and her in-laws  

were not available on 14.4.2000. Her husband had been treating her at  

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home  and  had  also  given  her  injections  for  two-three  days.   Her  

parents-in-laws reached on 15.4.2000 from Rajahmundry and then she  

was admitted to the private hospital on 16.4.2000.  As she could not  

recover therein, then she was transferred to Government Headquarter  

Hospital, Vijianagaram on that day.

9. Satyavarapu  Anasuya  (PW.1),  mother  of  the  deceased   has  

deposed that Ratna (deceased) used to tell her that she was harassed  

by her husband to bring dowry, though she had given sufficient dowry  

at the time of marriage.  She came to know about the burn injuries of  

her daughter on 15.4.2000 and immediately went to the Government  

Hospital.  There she found the appellant and his parents.  On being  

asked, Ratna Kumari told her that she suffered the burn injuries by  

accident.  Ten days later, she told the witness that the appellant poured  

kerosene on her and pushed her on a burning stove, that is why she  

sustained  burn  injuries.   That  her  another  daughter  was  a  police  

constable and therefore, the appellant apprehended some action by the  

police against him and his parents.  She has further deposed that prior  

to  the  death  of  her  daughter,  the  appellant  had  developed  illicit  

relationship with another woman just after Sankranthi festival and she  

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had been informed about this by her daughter that appellant wanted to  

marry that woman.

10. Kondru  Srinivasrao  (PW.7),  a  second  year  student  and  

neighbour of the deceased used to come for tuition to the deceased.  

He deposed that he had heard shrieks coming from the house of Ratna  

and reached the place of occurrence.  He found Ratna in bath room  

and appellant was pouring water on her.  On her request, the witness  

also  brought  water  from the  well  and  given  to  the  appellant  who  

poured the water on her.  He has further deposed that he had not told  

about this incident to anybody.

11. Matcha Basavaraju (PW.8), a young student coming for tuition  

to  the  deceased  deposed  that  he  was  not  knowing  the  husband  of  

Ratna but he had seen the appellant going on his scooter in Phoolbagh  

colony.  He had never seen the appellant in the house of Ratna.

12. Dr. Ch. Suryanarayana (PW.16) deposed that he had signed the  

dying declaration dated 28.4.2000. That  Ratna was having 44% of  

burns. The record of the hospital revealed that she had been admitted  

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in the hospital on 14.5.2000 and had been given regular treatment  

and blood many times between 14.5.2000 and 31.5.2000.  As per the  

hospital record she had been brought there by Lalita, a friend of Ratna  

(deceased).  She had given the name of her husband as Ramana and it  

has  further  been  mentioned  in  the  hospital  record  that  the  patient  

herself had stated that she suffered with burn injuries accidentally.

13. The Trial Court has found material inconsistencies in the case  

of the prosecution and did not see any reason whatsoever to rely upon  

the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000 as the contents  thereof  were  

admittedly false and could not be relied upon.  If the dying declaration  

has been recorded by the Executive Magistrate on 15.4.2000 in the  

Government hospital, the question of her being treated by her husband  

for 2-3 days and then her admission in a private hospital did not arise  

at  all.   Her  version  that  she  was  admitted  to  the  Government  

Headquarter hospital, Vijianagaram on 16.4.2000 could not be true.  

The contents of the dying declaration dated 28.4.2000 being full of  

contradiction do not inspire confidence.  

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14. Admittedly, there was a divorce between the parties.  Therefore,  

the question of demand of dowry or ill-treatment or harassment could  

not arise after 8 years of divorce decree by the court.   The mother of  

Ratna has deposed about the illicit relationship of the appellant and  

another woman and the appellant wanted to marry that woman.  In  

case the parties had separated by a divorce through court, we fail to  

understand how Ratna (deceased) or her parents were concerned about  

such a relationship.      

15. It is a settled legal proposition that in case there are apparent  

discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be unsafe to convict  

the accused. In such a fact-situation, the accused gets the benefit of  

doubt.  (Vide: Sanjay v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 9 SCC 148;  

and  Heeralal  v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh,  (2009)  12 SCC 671).

16. In case of plural/multiple dying declarations, the court has to  

scrutinise the evidence cautiously and must find out whether there is  

consistency particularly in material particulars therein. In case there  

are inter-se discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses given in  

support of one of the dying declarations, it would not be safe to rely  

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upon the same.  In fact it is not the plurality of the dying declarations  

but the reliability thereof that adds weigh to the prosecution case. If  

the dying declaration is found to be voluntary, reliable and made in a  

fit mental condition, it can be relied upon without any corroboration.  

But the statements should be consistent throughout.  

17. In case of inconsistencies, the court has to examine the nature  

of  the  same,  i.e.  whether  they  are  material  or  not  and  while  

scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, the court has to  

examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and  

circumstances.  In case of dying declaration, as the accused does not  

have right to cross-examine the maker and not able to elicit the truth  

as happens in the case of other witnesses, it would not be safe to rely  

if the dying declaration does not inspire full confidence of the court  

about its  correctness,  as  it  may be result  of  tutoring,  prompting or  

product of imagination. The court has to be satisfied that the maker  

was in a fit state of mind and had a clear opportunity to observe and  

identify the assailant (s).  

(Vide:  Smt. Kamla v. State of Punjab, AIR 1993 SC 374;  Kishan  

Lal v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 SC 3062; Lella Srinivasa Rao  

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v.  State  of  A.P.,  AIR  2004  SC  1720;  Amol  Singh  v.  State  of  

Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 5 SCC 468;  State of Andhra Pradesh v.  

P.  Khaja  Hussain, (2009)  15  SCC  120;  and  Sharda  v.  State  of  

Rajasthan, AIR 2010 SC 408).

18. This  court  has  time  and  again  laid  down  parameters  for  

interference  by  a  superior  court  against  the  order  of  acquittal.  In  

exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the  

judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can  

interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in  

mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the  

trial  Court’s  acquittal  bolsters  the  presumption  of  his  innocence.  

Interference  in  a  routine  manner  where  the  other  view is  possible  

should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

19. The  High  Court  did  not  consider  the  matter  in  correct  

perspective nor observed the parameters laid down by this court to  

interfere against the order of acquittal.

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20. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment  

and order of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order of  

the Sessions  Court  is  restored.   The appellant  is  on bail.   His  bail  

bonds stand discharged.

………………………………J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

………………………………J. (DIPAK MISRA)

New Delhi, May 29, 2013  

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