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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6974 of 2013

Basawaraj & Anr.                                                      …Appellants

Versus

The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer                          …Respondent

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6975 of 2013

Basawaraj & Ors.                                                       …Appellants

Versus

The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer                          …Respondent

J U D G M E N T   

Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  common  

impugned judgment and order dated 10.6.2011 passed by the High  

Court  of  Karnataka at  Gulbarga in  MFA Nos.10765 and 10766 of

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2007 by which the appeals of the appellants under Section 54 of the  

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’) have  

been dismissed on the ground of limitation.  

2. For the purpose of convenience, the facts of C.A. No. 6974 of  

2013 are taken, which are as under:

A. The land of the appellants in Survey No.417/2 admeasuring 4  

acres and Survey No.418 admeasuring 23 acres, 1 guntha; and 5 acres,  

23 gunthas of  phut kharab situated in the revenue estate of  village  

Mahagaon, Tehsil and Distt. Gulbarga was acquired in pursuance of  

notification dated 23.4.1994 under Section 4(1) of the Act.  

B. After completing the formalities as required under the Act, an  

award under Section 11 of the Act was made on 23.10.1997 fixing the  

market  value  of  the  land  at  the  rate  of  Rs.11,500/-  per  acre  and  

Rs.100/- per acre in respect of phut kharab land.

C. The appellants preferred references under Section 18(1) of the  

Act for enhancement of compensation and the reference court vide  

award  dated  28.2.2002  fixed  the  market  value  of  the  land  from  

Rs.31,500/- to Rs.70,000/- per acre depending upon the quality and  

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geographical situation of the land.  For phut kharab land, assessment  

was made at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per acre.

D. Aggrieved, the appellants filed appeals under Section 54 of the  

Act  before  the  High  Court  on  16.8.2007  with  applications  for  

condonation  of  delay.   The  applications  for  condonation  of  delay  

stood rejected as the High Court did not find any sufficient cause to  

condone the delay.  

Hence, these appeals.

3. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing  

on  behalf  of  the  appellants,  has  submitted  that  the  High  Court  

committed an error in not condoning the delay as there was sufficient  

cause for not approaching the High Court within time.  One of the  

appellants  was  suffering from ailments  and it  was in  itself  a  good  

ground for condonation of delay.  The High Court ought to have kept  

in view that in a large number of identical matters, huge delays had  

been  condoned  on  the  condition  that  the  claimant  would  not  be  

entitled for interest of the delay period, thus, the High Court itself has  

given  discriminatory and contradictory verdicts which itself is a good  

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ground for  interference  by  this  Court.   The  appeals  deserve  to  be  

allowed.  

4. Per contra, Shri Naveen R. Nath, learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeal contending that the  

delay can be condoned keeping in mind the provisions contained in  

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the  

‘Act 1963’).   The order of condonation of delay is to be based on  

sound legal parameters laid down by this Court.  No condition can be  

imposed while condoning the delay.  The question whether a claimant  

should  be awarded interest  or  not  would arise  at  the time of  final  

hearing  of  the  appeal  and  such  condition  cannot  be  imposed  for  

admitting a time barred appeal. If the High Court has committed such  

a grave error in other cases, that cannot be a ground for interference  

by  this  Court  as  it  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  doctrine  of  

equality  does  not  apply  for  perpetuating  an  illegal  and  erroneous  

order.  The appeals before the High Court were hopelessly time barred  

as  the  same  had  been  preferred  after  about  5-1/2  years  and  no  

satisfactory  explanation  could  be  furnished  in  the  applications  for  

condonation of delay for not approaching the court in time.  Thus, the  

appeals lack merit and are liable to be dismissed.  

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5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

6. Admittedly, there was a delay of 5-1/2 years in filing the said  

appeals under Section 54 of the Act before the High Court. The only  

explanation offered for approaching the court at such a belated stage  

has been that one of the appellants had taken ill.   

7. Shri Patil, learned senior counsel, has taken us through a large  

number  of  judgments  of  the  High  Court  wherein  delay  had  been  

condoned without considering the most relevant factor i.e. “sufficient  

cause”  only on the condition that  applicants  would be deprived of  

interest  for  the delay period.   These kinds of  judgments cannot  be  

approved.   The  High  Court  while  passing  such  unwarranted  and  

uncalled  for  orders,  failed  to  appreciate  that  it  was  deciding  the  

appeals under the Act and not a writ petition where this kind of order  

in exceptional  circumstances perhaps could be justified.  

8. It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  Article  14  of  the  

Constitution is not  meant to perpetuate illegality or  fraud,  even by  

extending  the  wrong  decisions  made  in  other  cases.   The  said  

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provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive  

aspect.   Thus,  if  some  other  similarly  situated  persons  have  been  

granted some relief/ benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order  

does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well.  

If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated.  

Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore,  

cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner.  If an  

illegality  and  irregularity  has  been  committed  in  favour  of  an  

individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed  

by a Judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher  

or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or  

illegality  or  for  passing  a  similarly  wrong  order.   A  wrong  

order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any  

other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision.  Even  

otherwise,  Article  14  cannot  be  stretched  too  far  for  otherwise  it  

would make functioning of administration impossible.

(Vide: Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr.,  

AIR 1995 SC 705, M/s. Anand Button Ltd. v. State of Haryana &  

Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR  

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2006 SC 898; and  Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab,  AIR 2010 SC  

1937).

 9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be  

blamed  for  his  absence.  The  meaning  of  the  word  "sufficient"  is  

"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the  

purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more  

than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices  

to  accomplish  the  purpose  intended in  the facts  and circumstances  

existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable  

standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means  

that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was  

a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances  

of  a  case  or  it  cannot  be  alleged  that  the  party  has  "not  acted  

diligently"  or  "remained  inactive".  However,  the  facts  and  

circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the  

Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever  

the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The  

applicant  must  satisfy  the  Court  that  he  was  prevented  by  any  

“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory  

explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application  

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for  condonation  of  delay.  The  court  has  to  examine  whether  the  

mistake  is  bona  fide  or  was  merely  a  device  to  cover  an  ulterior  

purpose. (See:  Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v.  

Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors.,  AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin v.  

A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal v.Veena @ Bharti AIR  

2011  SC  1150;  and  Maniben  Devraj  Shah  v.  Municipal  

Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629.)

10.  In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this  

Court  explained  the  difference  between  a  “good  cause”  and  a  

“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good  

cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be  

that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree  

of proof that that of “sufficient cause”.  

11.  The  expression  “sufficient  cause”  should  be  given  a  liberal  

interpretation to ensure that substantial  justice is done,  but only  so  

long  as  negligence,  inaction  or  lack  of  bona  fides  cannot  be  

imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has  

been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no  

straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide:  Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR  

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2002 SC 100;  and  Ram Nath Sao  @ Ram Nath Sahu  & Ors.  v.  

Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201.)

12.  It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  law  of  limitation  may  

harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its  

rigour when the statute so prescribes.   The Court has no power to  

extend  the  period  of  limitation  on  equitable  grounds.  “A  result  

flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no  

power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress  

resulting  from  its  operation.”  The  statutory  provision  may  cause  

hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no  

choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim  

“dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,  

stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,  

“inconvenience  is  not”  a  decisive  factor  to  be  considered  while  

interpreting a statute.   

13.  The Statute  of  Limitation is  founded on public  policy,  its  aim  

being  to  secure  peace  in  the  community,  to  suppress  fraud  and  

perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression.  It  seeks to  

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bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably  

and have from lapse of time become stale.  

According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 24, p. 181:

"330. Policy of Limitation Acts.  The courts have   expressed  at  least  three  differing  reasons   supporting the existence of statutes of limitations   namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of   cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant   might have lost  the evidence to disprove a stale   claim, and (3)  that  persons with good causes  of   actions  should  pursue  them  with  reasonable   diligence".

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and  

uncertainty,  and  therefore,  limitation  prevents  disturbance  or  

deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by  

long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction,  

negligence' or laches.  

(See:  Popat and Kotecha Property v.  State Bank of India Staff  

Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh &  

Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537;  and  Pundlik  Jalam Patil  v.  Executive  

Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).

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14.    In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC  

1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation  

amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by  

the Constitution Bench in  A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992  

SC 1701.

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where  

a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant  

has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which  

means  an  adequate  and  enough  reason  which  prevented  him  to  

approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be  

negligent,  or  for  want  of  bonafide  on  his  part  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of the case,  or found to have not acted diligently or  

remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the  

delay.  No court  could be justified in condoning such an inordinate  

delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be  

decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard  

to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to  

prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay  

without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts  

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to  passing  an  order  in  violation  of  the  statutory  provisions  and  it  

tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.

16. In view of above,  no interference is required with impugned  

judgment and order of the High Court.  The appeals lack merit and  

are, accordingly, dismissed.  

….………………..........J.  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

…...................................J.                             (S.A. BOBDE)  

NEWDELHI;

August 22, 2013

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