REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.   1509       OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.29417 of 2016)

BALKRISHNA DATTATRAYA GALANDE    …Appellant

VERSUS

BALKRISHNA RAMBHAROSE GUPTA      …Respondents AND ANOTHER                 

J U D G M E N T

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of the judgment dated 23.06.2016

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Mumbai dismissing

the  Writ  Petition  No.6873  of  2016  thereby  affirming  the

judgment  of  the  First  Appellate  Court  decreeing  the  first

respondent’s suit for permanent injunction.  

3. The  first  Respondent-plaintiff  claiming  to  be  a  tenant

filed  a  suit  in  the  year  2004  for  permanent  injunction

restraining the appellant-landlord from disturbing his peaceful

possession in the suit premises.  Case of the first respondent-

plaintiff  was  that  he  was  running  eating  house,  a  pan  shop

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and  was  also  doing  fabrication  work  in  the  suit  premises

which  has  been  constructed  in  tin  sheet,  wooden  logs  and

rafters.    According  to  the  first  respondent-plaintiff,  he  was

inducted in the suit premises as a tenant in the year 1977 on

monthly  rent  of  Rs.55/-.  Appellant-defendant  has  earlier

instituted  a  suit  against  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  in  RCS

No.1004/1988 and the said suit was dismissed as withdrawn.

The  first  respondent-plaintiff  averred  that  he  repeatedly

called  upon  the  appellant-defendant  to  carry  out  the

necessary  repairs  in  the  suit  premises;  however,  the

appellant-defendant refused to carry out the repairs. The first

respondent-plaintiff  further  alleged  that  after  obtaining

permission  from the  Corporation  for  effecting  the  necessary

repairs,  when  he  was  about  to  start  the  repair  works,  on

19.08.2004, the appellant-defendant came along with his men

and obstructed the first respondent-plaintiff from carrying out

the  repairs.  Hence,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  was

constrained to file the suit for permanent injunction.  

4. The  appellant-defendant  filed  a  written  statement

contending  that  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  was  in

occupation of only one room until the year 1991. According to

the  appellant-defendant,  earlier  he  instituted  a  suit  in  RCS

No.1004/1988 against the first respondent-plaintiff and during

the pendency of that suit, parties arrived at a settlement and

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in pursuance of that settlement, the first respondent-plaintiff

had handed over  the possession of  the suit  premises to the

appellant-defendant.  Accordingly,  the  appellant-defendant

filed  Purshis  Ex.-41  on  23.04.1991  seeking  permission  to

withdraw  the  suit  and  the  said  suit  was  disposed  of  on

26.04.1991.  According  to  the  appellant,  the  relationship

between  the  parties  as  landlord-tenant  ceased to  exist.  The

appellant  further  averred  that  he  had  executed  a

Development  Agreement  with  the  second  respondent  and

when  he  was  about  to  start  the  development  of  the  suit

premises,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  had filed the  suit  for

permanent  injunction  and  therefore,  prayed  for  dismissal  of

the suit.  

5. Based upon the pleadings and evidence, relevant issues

were framed before the trial court. Upon consideration of oral

and documentary evidence, the trial  court  dismissed the suit

holding that the first respondent-plaintiff has not produced any

licence or electricity connection to show that he was running

the hotel, pan shop and doing fabrication work showing that he

has been carrying on the business from the suit premises. The

trial  court  held  that  the  plea  of  the  first  respondent-plaintiff

that  he  has  been  in  occupation  of  the  suit  premises  is  not

acceptable.  Referring  to  the  settlement  arrived  at,  in  RCS

No.1004/1988,  the trial  court  pointed out that after disposal

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of  RCS  No.1004/1988,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  had  not

paid the rent  and that the first  respondent-plaintiff  failed to

establish that he was the tenant in the suit premises and on

those findings, the trial court dismissed the suit.  

6. In  appeal  the  First  Appellate  Court  allowed  the  appeal

filed by the first respondent-plaintiff  by holding that there is

nothing on record to show that after withdrawal of the earlier

suit  i.e.  RCS No.1004/1988,  the first  respondent-plaintiff  has

vacated the suit premises in the year 1991. After referring to

the evidence of the first respondent-plaintiff (PW-1) and other

evidence,  the  First  Appellate  Court  held  that  the  first

respondent-plaintiff  had  established  his  possession  over  the

suit  property  and  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  drawing

presumption  of  possession  based on withdrawal  Purshis  Ex.-

41  filed  in  RCS  No.1004/1988.  Challenging  the  judgment  of

the  First  Appellate  Court,  the  appellant-defendant  filed  the

Writ  Petition  No.6873  of  2016  before  the  High  Court  under

Article  227  of  the  Constitution  of  India  which  came  to  be

dismissed by the impugned judgment.

7. We have heard  the learned counsel  appearing for  both

the  parties  and  perused  the  impugned  judgment  and

materials  on record.   When the first  respondent-plaintiff  has

neither proved his actual possession nor shown to have paid

the  rent  from  the  year  1991,  in  the  suit  filed  by  the  first 4

respondent-plaintiff  under  Section  38  of  the  Specific  Relief

Act,  whether  the  High  Court  and  the  First  Appellate  Court

were right in granting permanent  injunction in favour  of  the

first respondent-plaintiff, is the point falling for consideration

in this appeal.

8. Both the First Appellate Court and the High Court mainly

relied upon Purshis Ex.-41 dated 23.08.1991 based on which

the court  permitted the appellant-defendant  to  withdraw his

earlier suit RCS No.1004/1988 on the ground that there were

technical  defects  in  the  said  suit.   Placing  reliance  upon

Purshis  Ex.-41,  both  the  High  Court  and  the  First  Appellate

Court  have  held  that  there  was  no  settlement  between  the

parties and there is no other evidence to show that the first

respondent-plaintiff  has  voluntarily  surrendered  the

possession  of  the  suit  premises  and  that  the  appellant-

defendant has taken possession by following due process of

law.   Contention  of  the  appellant-defendant  that  after  the

settlement  in  the  earlier  suit  RCS  No.1004/1988,  the  first

respondent-plaintiff  vacated the premises,  was not  accepted

by the  courts  below on the ground that  Purshis  Ex.-41 does

not  indicate  that  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  vacated  and

handed over possession of the suit premises to the appellant-

defendant.   The  conclusion  of  the  First  Appellate  Court  as

affirmed by the High Court presuming possession of the first

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respondent-plaintiff  based  on  the  Purshis  Ex.-41  is  not  a

correct approach.

9. In a suit filed under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act,

permanent injunction can be granted only to a person who is

in actual possession of the property.  The burden of proof lies

upon  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  to  prove  that  he  was  in

actual and physical possession of the property on the date of

suit.   The  First  Appellate  Court  drew  inference  of  the

possession of the first respondent-plaintiff from Purshis Ex.-41

and from the circumstances that he has obtained permission

from  the  Corporation  for  carrying  out  the  repairs.  The

Commissioner’s  report  dated 02.11.1988 which  was  referred

to in extenso in the order passed in interlocutory application

(Ex.-5)  dated  17.10.2005  rejecting  the  first  respondent’s

prayer  for  temporary  injunction  shows the  poor  condition  of

the suit premises prior to filing of the suit RCS No.430/2004.

The Commissioner’s report indicates that even after replacing

the roof by new tin sheet, the premises was not fit to carry on

business.  In the order passed in the interlocutory application

(Ex.-5) dated 17.10.2005, the trial court referred to the report

of the Commission which reads as under:-

“…..The flooring was completely damaged.  Big Shahabadi tiles  were  kept  without  using  cement  or  morter  for joining/pointing.  It  was just  of shift  flooring, wooden stall was also closed at the time of commission work.  According to plaintiff the premises was taken for conducting business

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i.e.  eating  house.   Considering  the  condition  of  the premises  on  the  date  of  commission  work,  it  was impossible to carry such business in it.  It is not case of the plaintiff that he carried repairs after commission work….”

As  observed  by  the  trial  court,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff

has  not  brought  on  record  any  document  to  show  that  the

court  has  passed  any  order  permitting  him  to  carry  repairs

after the date of inspection by the Commissioner and having

regard to the condition of the building, it  was impossible for

the  first  respondent-plaintiff  to  carry  business  in  the  suit

premises.   

10. As rightly  pointed out  by the trial  court  on the date of

inspection  by  Commissioner,  the  premises  was  not  fit  for

conducting the hotel business.  The trial court rightly rejected

the  contention  of  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  that  he  has

carried out repairs after the inspection by the Commissioner

observing  that  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  has  failed  to

produce documents such as the order of the court permitting

him to carry repairs, receipts of material purchase and labour

charges  paid  etc.   From  the  photographs  filed  by  the  first

respondent-plaintiff, the trial court rightly concluded that the

condition  of  the  said  premises  was  not  at  all  fit  for  any

purpose.  

11. The  first  respondent-plaintiff  has  filed  the  suit  under

Section  38  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act  seeking  permanent

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injunction on the ground that he is in actual possession of the

suit  property.   Grant  of  permanent  injunction  results  in

restraining  the  defendant’s  legitimate  right  to  use  the

property  as  his  own  property.   Under  Section  38  of  the

Specific  Relief  Act,  an  injunction  restraining  the  defendant

from disturbing possession  may not  be  granted in  favour  of

the plaintiff unless he proves that he was in actual possession

of  the  suit  property  on  the  date  of  filing  of  the  suit.  The

earlier suit RCS No.1004/1988 was filed in the year 1988 and

it  proceeded  till  1991.   In  the  present  case,  the  first

respondent-plaintiff has to prove his actual possession on the

date of filing of suit. The First Appellate Court concluded that

the appellant-defendant had failed to prove that the plaintiff

has vacated the premises in 1991 after withdrawal of earlier

suit RCS No.1004/1988. Contention of the appellant is that a

settlement was arrived at  between the parties and pursuant

to that settlement,  the plaintiff  has vacated the premises in

1991.   This  has  not  been  rebutted  by  the  first  respondent-

plaintiff by adducing substantive evidence.  The possession of

the plaintiff cannot be based upon the inferences; drawn from

circumstances. The plaintiff has to prove actual possession for

grant of permanent injunction.

12. According  to  the  first  respondent-plaintiff,  he  was

conducting  business  of  hotel  and  Pan  shop  in  the  suit

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premises  and also  carrying  on fabrication  work.   As  pointed

out  by  the  trial  court,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  admitted

that  for  running  the  business  of  hotel  and  Pan  shop,  two

licences  are  required.  In  his  evidence,  the  first  respondent-

plaintiff  admitted that he was not holding any licence issued

by  the  Pune  Municipal  Corporation  for  carrying  on  business.

The trial court also pointed out that the first respondent has

admitted  that  three-phase  electricity  connection  is  required

for  carrying  out  the  business  of  fabrication  which  he  was

allegedly  carrying  on  in  the  suit  premises.  But  in  his  cross-

examination,  the first  respondent  admitted that  he does not

have  such  three-phase  electricity  connection  at  the  suit

premises.  In  the  absence  of  requisite  electricity  connection,

the  contention  of  the  first  respondent  that  he  has  been

carrying  on  the  business  of  fabrication  at  the  suit  premises

does not appear to be probable. In the absence of licence and

the  requisite  electricity  connection,  the  trial  court  rightly

rejected  the  plea  of  the  first  respondent  that  he  has  been

carrying on business of hotel,  Pan shop and fabrication work

at the suit premises.

13. Contention  of  the  appellant-defendant  that  after  1991,

the first respondent-plaintiff was not in possession of the suit

property  is  corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  Sandeep Wagh.

In his evidence, Sandeep Wagh stated that he knows the first

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respondent-plaintiff and appellant-defendant and that the first

respondent-plaintiff  had met with an accident and thereafter

he  was  not  carrying  on  any  business  at  the  suit  premises.

Based upon the evidence of appellant-defendant and Sandeep

Wagh,  the  trial  court  has  arrived  at  conclusion  that  in  all

probability,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  must  have  vacated

the  suit  premises  in  the  year  1991.  In  our  considered  view,

the First Appellate Court ought not to have interfered with the

findings  of  fact  recorded  by  the  trial  court  on  the  basis  of

Purshis Ex.-41.

14. The  conclusion  of  the  trial  court  that  the  first

respondent-plaintiff  vacated the suit  property  since the year

1991  is  fortified  by  yet  another  circumstance  viz.,  non-

payment of rent by the respondent-plaintiff.  Admittedly, ever

since  withdrawal  of  earlier  suit  RCS  No.1004/1988,  the  first

respondent-plaintiff has not paid any rent from the year 1991.

Be  it  noted,  that  the  appellant-defendant  had  also  not

initiated any proceedings claiming rent or arrears of rent from

the first  respondent-plaintiff.  After  filing of  the  suit  in  2004,

the  first  respondent-plaintiff  has  sent  a  cheque  dated

14.05.2005 for  Rs.10,395/-  towards  payment  of  rent  for  189

months  thereby  admitting  that  he  has  not  paid  the  rent  for

more than fifteen years. The trial court also observed that the

first respondent-plaintiff has suppressed the material fact that

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he has not paid the rent from 1991.  The trial court observed

that  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  has  not  come to  the  court

with clean hands and that he cannot sustain his claim for the

equitable relief of permanent injunction.   

15. The First  Appellate  Court  did  not  keep in view that  the

first respondent-plaintiff  has not shown that he has paid any

rent after 1991 and that without paying rent, he cannot have

any legitimate right to be in possession of the suit premises.

The party seeking injunction based on the averment that he is

in  possession  of  the  property  and seeking assistance  of  the

Court while praying for permanent injunction restraining other

party  who  is  alleged  to  be  disturbing  the  possession  of  the

plaintiff,  must  show  his  lawful  possession  of  the  property.

Having not paid rent for more than fifteen years, it cannot be

said  that  possession  of  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  can  be

said to lawful possession entitling him to grant of permanent

injunction.  

16. The appellant-defendant decided to develop his property

through  second  respondent-builder  and  in  that  regard,  a

public  notice  was  given  calling  for  objections  from persons,

whether  any person having any interest  in  the property.   At

that  time,  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  issued  notice  dated

13.04.2000 through his advocate claiming that he is a tenant

of  the  portion  of  the  land  measuring  1000 sq.  ft.  since  last 11

twenty two years.  In the earlier suit RCS No.1004/1988, the

tenanted  premises  was  described  as  only  one  room.   In  its

order  in  the  interlocutory  application  (Ex.-5)  dated

17.10.2005, the trial court has pointed out that the total area

of the premises described in all the schedule is 356 sq. ft.  It

is  not  known  how  the  first  respondent-plaintiff  issued  legal

notice claiming tenancy right over thousand square feet.  As

pointed  out  by  the  trial  court,  objection  of  the  first

respondent-plaintiff  was  rejected  by  the  Corporation  and

accordingly, layout of the proposed building on the said land

was sanctioned by the Corporation (Ex.-42/4).  This conduct of

the  first  respondent-plaintiff  also  disentitles  him  from

claiming  the  equitable  relief  of  permanent  injunction  and

these  aspects  were  not  properly  appreciated  by  the  First

Appellate Court.

17. As discussed earlier,  in a suit  filed under Section 38 of

the  Specific  Relief  Act,  possession  on  the  date  of  suit  is  a

must  for  grant  of  permanent  injunction.   When  the  first

respondent-plaintiff  has failed to prove that he was in actual

possession of the property on the date of the suit,  he is not

entitled for the decree for permanent injunction.  

18. Upon  appreciation  of  the  oral  and  documentary

evidence, the trial court rightly held that the first respondent-

plaintiff  failed  to  prove  his  actual  and  physical  possession

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over  the  suit  property  on  the  date  of  the  suit.   When  the

finding of the trial court was based on oral and documentary

evidence,  the First  Appellate Court  and the High Court  were

not  right  in  setting  aside the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  by

drawing inference of  possession from Purshis  Ex.-41.   In our

considered view, the First Appellate Court and the High Court

fell  in  error  by  presuming  that  the  first  respondent-plaintiff

was in possession by merely relying upon the prior suit  filed

by the appellant-defendant for possession and Purshis Ex.-41.

The impugned order of the High Court  affirming the findings

of the First Appellate Court is not sustainable and is liable to

be set aside.

19. In the result, the impugned judgment dated 23.06.2016

passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.6873/2016 is set

aside and this appeal is allowed.  The suit  RCS No.430/2004

filed by the first respondent is dismissed. No costs.

..……………………….J.                [R. BANUMATHI]  

                            …...………………………..J. [R. SUBHASH REDDY]

New Delhi; February 06, 2019    

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