REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.30404­30442/2017

Baljeet Singh (Dead) through Lrs. …Petitioners and others etc. etc.

versus

State of U.P. and others …Respondents

WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.30455­30460/2017

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NOS.23522­23530/2018

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

Delay of 193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the

special leave petitions is condoned.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the common

impugned judgment and order dated  2.4.1996  passed  by the

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High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in First Appeal No.

919/1993 and other allied first appeals, the respective original

claimants – land owners have preferred the present special leave

petitions.

3. At  the outset, it is required to be noted that there  is  an

inordinate delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days respectively

(approximately 21 years) in preferring the special leave petitions

before this Court challenging the impugned common judgment

and order passed by the High Court. There is a further delay of

193, 224 and 142 days respectively in refiling the special leave

petitions.

3.1. The application/applications for condonation of delay is/are

vehemently opposed by the respondents herein.   Therefore, this

Court is first required to consider and decide the

application/applications submitted by the petitioners/applicants

praying to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days

respectively in preferring the special leave petitions.

4. Shri Rishi Malhotra, learned Advocate appearing on behalf

of the respective petitioners has vehemently submitted that the

lands of the respective petitioners have been compulsorily

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acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, and

therefore, they are entitled to the fair compensation for the lands

acquired.  It is submitted that the dispute is with respect to the

lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta which are only 4

kms. away from village Kasna.   It is submitted that the location

wise the lands of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta were better located

and were abutting the national highway, i.e, Noida – Dadri Road.

It is submitted that village Kasna is 4 kms. behind village

Gulsitapur.  It is submitted that for the lands acquired of village

Kasna,  Section 4 notification was  issued on 1.3.1989 and the

compensation was awarded @ Rs.65/­ per  square yard,  which

has been confirmed by this Court vide order dated 05.12.2016.  It

is submitted that therefore the respective petitioners are entitled

to the fair compensation for the lands acquired of village

Gulsitapur and  Tilpta at par  with the land owners of village

Kasna, i.e.,  at  Rs.65/­  per  square  yard.   It is  submitted  that

therefore the agriculturists/farmers are entitled to the fair

compensation for the lands acquired.  It is submitted that for the

lands compulsorily acquired, the delay should not defeat the

valuable rights of the petitioners to get fair compensation.   It is

submitted that the petitioners may not be awarded the interest

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and other statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act for

the period of delay.

4.1 Making the above submissions and relying upon the

decisions of this Court in the cases of Market Committee, Hodal v.

Krishan Murari reported in (1996) 1 SCC 311; Dhiraj Singh v. State

of Haryana reported in (2014) 14 SCC 127; and K. Subbarayudu

v. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in (2017) 12

SCC 840, it is  prayed to  condone  the  delay  and consider the

special leave petitions on merits.

5. All these applications are vehemently opposed by the

learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent no.3 – Uttar

Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) and

on behalf of respondent no.4 – Greater Noida Industrial

Development Authority.   Counter affidavits are filed on behalf of

respondent nos. 3 and 4 opposing the present applications for

condonation of delay.

5.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondents that there is an inordinate delay of

approximately 21 years in preferring the special leave petitions.

It is submitted  that  at  no  point  of time earlier the respective

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petitioners made any grievance with respect to inadequacy of the

compensation as awarded by the High Court.   

5.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondents that as such no sufficient cause has

been shown explaining the huge delay of approximately 21 years.

It is submitted that merely because in view of the subsequent

decision in the case of lands acquired of another village, relying

upon which the petitioners have preferred the present petitions,

huge delay of approximately 21 years may not be condoned.

5.3 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for

the respondents that even otherwise the reliance placed upon the

decisions of the  High Court  and this  Court is  with respect to

entirely different village, i.e., village Kasna and that too in respect

of the land which was acquired after about four years of

acquisition of the petitioners’ land.  It is submitted that therefore

the lands acquired of village Kasna are not comparable at all with

respect to the lands acquired of village Gulsitapur and Tilpta.

5.4 It is further submitted that so far as the impugned common

judgment and order dated 2.4.1996 is concerned, as such, the

same has  attained finality.   It is submitted that  not  only the

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petitioners accepted the compensation but after the said

judgment was delivered by the High Court no special leave

petition has been filed by the present petitioners all these years.

It is submitted that therefore they have acquiesced  with the

impugned common judgment and order of the High Court.

5.5 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondents that any attempt by the present

petitioners to reopen the judgment shall lead to a cascading effect

where every one  whose land has been acquired by the said

notification with respect to the land acquired at village

Gulsitapur and Tilpta would start demanding enhanced

compensation @ Rs.65/­ per square yard.   It is submitted that

similarly the other land owners whose land has been acquired

though at  different villages  between the  years  1985­1989, too

start demanding the same rate of compensation.

5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondents that after the acquisition, the land is

developed, infrastructure and amenities are laid. They are

maintained. The developed land has been allotted decades ago.  It

is submitted that the rate of allotment is based on the cost of

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acquisition and the amounts spent on development, laying out

the infrastructure.  It is submitted that if the cost of acquisition

is increased, then how this cost would now be recovered from the

allottees after decades of allotment.  It is submitted therefore that

to entertain the present petitions now after a period of

approximately 21 years and to increase the amount of

compensation would have a cascading effect.

5.7 It is further submitted that it is disputed and denied that

the land in village Gulsitapur is superior to the land in village

Kasna. It is submitted that the correct fact is that village Kasna is

located on the  main road, which connects Greater Noida to

Sikanderabad,  District  Bulandshar, unlike the land of village

Gulsitapur which is in the interiors.

5.8 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this

Court by the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the

petitioners, referred to hereinabove,   is concerned, it is

vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the respondents that none of the aforesaid decisions of

this Court shall be applicable to the facts of the case on hand.  It

is submitted that in the present case there is an inordinate delay

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of approximately 21 years.   It is submitted that in the present

case the petitioners have failed to make out a sufficient cause to

condone the huge delay of approximately 21 years in preferring

the special leave petitions. It is submitted that in the relied upon

cases this Court was satisfied on the sufficient cause for delay.  It

is submitted that in the relied upon cases the parity was claimed

with respect to the land acquired under the very notification and

it  was pointed out that  due  to poverty  and  financial  difficulty

some of the land owners  whose land was acquired under the

same notification could not prefer the appeals earlier and they

preferred the appeals subsequently and claimed parity of

compensation at par  with the lands acquired  under the very

notification.   It is submitted that in the present case the

petitioners are claiming the parity in compensation with respect

to the land acquired of another village and that too the land in

the  said village was acquired after  a period of four years and

location wise etc. the lands are different.  It is submitted that

therefore on facts the same shall not be applicable to the facts of

the case on hand.

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5.9 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the

present applications for condonation of delay and consequently

dismiss the special leave petitions as barred by limitation.

6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the

respective parties at length.

6.1 At the outset, it is required to be noted that as such there is

an inordinate delay of approximately 21 years in preferring the

special leave petitions before this Court challenging the

impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court

which has been passed in the year 1996.   It  is required to be

noted that the notification under Section 4 of the Land

Acquisition Act with respect to the land situated in village

Gulsitapur and Tilpta was issued in the year 1985; possession

was taken over in the month of January, 1987; the Land

Acquisition Officer declared the award in the year 1988 awarding

compensation at the  rate  of  Rs.8­10 per  square yard.  At the

instance of the petitioners  herein ­ the original land owners,

reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was made

to the reference Court.  By judgment and award dated 22.3.1993,

the reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs.30/­ per

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square yard.   However, on appeals and considering the material

on record, by the impugned common judgment and order, the

High Court reduced the amount of compensation to Rs. 22­20

per square yard.  That thereafter, after a period of approximately

21 years, now the petitioners have preferred the present petitions

claiming compensation at par with the compensation awarded for

the land owners of another village Kasna.   It  is required to be

noted that so far as the land acquisition of village  Kasna is

concerned, notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition

Act was issued in the year 1989, i.e., after a gap of four years and

it appears that in between certain developments have also taken

place.

7. Having considered the averments made in the

application/applications for condonation of delay, we are of the

opinion that as such the petitioners  have  miserably failed to

make out a case to condone the huge delay of approximately 21

years.  No sufficient cause has been shown to condone the huge

delay of approximately 21 years.   It is required to be noted that

as such in the application itself it is submitted by the petitioners

that there is an inordinate delay in approaching this Court.  The

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only explanation in approaching this Court after about 21 years

is given in paragraph 3 of the application, which reads as under:

“That the primary reason in not approaching this Hon’ble Court in time was the fact that it was only in December, 2016, the claimants pertaining to village Kasana got the enhanced compensation from this Hon’ble Court to the tune of Rs.65/­ per sq. yard.  The petitioners herein came to know about the said  fact in the month of  January, 2017 causing not only lots of heartburn but spelling miseries over them.   It took not only lots of courage in mustering support from number of affected families but also it took time for the petitioners to collectively file the instant special leave petition claiming not only the enhanced compensation but  also  parity  with  regard  to the compensation awarded to their co­villagers at village Kasana.”

7.1 That thereafter the petitioners have stated that though there

is a reasonable case  made out by the petitioners to get the

enhanced compensation to the tune of Rs.65/­ per square yard,

but fairly enough in order to balance the equity, this Court may

not grant interest from the date of the judgment of the High Court

i.e., 2.4.1996 till the filing of the special leave petitions before this

Court.   Except the explanation in paragraph 3, reproduced

hereinabove, there is no other explanation whatsoever explaining

the huge delay of approximately 21 years.  Neither any poverty is

pleaded nor  any  financial  difficulty is  pleaded.  Nothing is  on

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record that after the impugned common judgment and order is

passed by the High Court, the petitioners made any

grievance/objection with respect to inadequacy of the

compensation determined by the High Court.  On the contrary, all

the petitioners have accepted the compensation as per the

judgment and award passed by the reference Court determining

the compensation  at the rate of  Rs.30/­  per square yard.   It

appears that with respect to some of the land owners even the

execution petitions are pending with respect to recovery of the

differential amount of compensation, determined by the reference

Court and the High Court as by the impugned common judgment

and order  the High Court  has reduced the compensation  from

Rs.30­/ per sq. yard to Rs.22/­ per sq. yard.  Be that as it may,

the fact remains that after the impugned common judgment and

order is passed by the High Court, no grievance at all is made by

the petitioners with respect to inadequacy of the compensation

determined by the High Court.  Thus,  it  can be said that  for a

period of approximately 21 years no grievance was made by the

petitioners.   Therefore, considering the terms of doctrine of

acquiescence, the petitioners lose their right to complain.   This

principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that

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in such a case the party who did not make any objection

acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and

therefore has no right to complain against that alleged wrong.

8. The matter requires examination from another aspect, viz.,

laches and delay.   It is a very recognised principle of

jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non­

existent.   Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by

any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases, courts

have coined the doctrine of laches and delay as well as doctrine of

acquiescence  and non­suited  the litigants  who approached the

court  belatedly  without  any  justifiable  explanation  for  bringing

the action after unreasonable delay.   In those cases, where the

period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be

brought before the court,  if the action is not brought within that

prescribed period, the aggrieved party loses   remedy and cannot

enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over,

however,  subject to the prayer  for  condonation of  delay and  if

there is a justifiable explanation for bringing the action after the

prescribed period of limitation is over and sufficient cause is

shown, the court may condone the delay.   Therefore, in a case

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where the period of limitation is prescribed and the action is not

brought within the period of limitation and subsequently

proceedings are initiated after the period of limitation along with

the prayer for condonation of delay, in that case, the applicant

has to make out a sufficient cause and justify the cause for delay

with a proper explanation.  It is not that in each and every case

despite the sufficient cause  is not shown and the delay  is  not

properly explained, the court may condone the delay.   To make

out a case for condonation of delay, the applicant has to make

out a sufficient cause/reason which prevented him in initiating

the proceedings within the period of limitation.  Otherwise, he will

be accused of gross negligence.   If the aggrieved party does not

initiate the  proceedings  within  the  period of limitation without

any sufficient cause, he can be denied the relief on the ground of

unexplained laches and delay and on the presumption that such

person has waived his right or acquiesced with the order.  These

principles are based on the principles relatable to sound public

policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time

then such right is non­existent.

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9. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decisions of this

Court in the  cases  of  Market  Committee,  Hodal (supra);  Dhiraj

Singh  (supra);  and K.  Subbarayudu  (supra), relied upon by  the

learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners is

concerned, having gone through the said decisions, we are of the

opinion that none of the said decisions shall be applicable to the

facts of the case on hand and/or the said decisions shall be of

any assistance to the petitioners.  First of all, in the relied upon

cases, there was no such inordinate delay of approximately 21

years.   In the relied upon cases, this Court was satisfied on the

sufficient cause for delay.   In the relied upon cases, parity was

claimed with respect to the land acquired under the very

notification and it was pointed out that due to poverty and

financial difficulty some of the land owners whose land  was

acquired under the same notification could not prefer the appeals

earlier and thereafter they  preferred the  appeals subsequently

and claimed parity of compensation at par with the land acquired

under the same notification.  It is also required to be noted that

as such in none of the aforesaid decisions, this Court had dealt

with and/or considered the adverse impact/effect on the

State/acquiring body if after inordinate delay/laches the

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State/acquiring body is directed to pay the enhanced amount of

compensation.   In the present case, lands were acquired as far

back as  in  the year  1985 and the award by  the Special  Land

Acquisition Officer was declared in the year 1988.  The reference

Court enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs.30/­ per

square yard, which came to be reduced by the High Court by the

impugned common judgment and order in the year 1996.   It is

required to be noted that the lands were acquired for Industrial

development purposes.   That after the acquisition, the land has

been developed, infrastructure  and amenities  are laid  and  the

developed land has been allotted approximately before 30 years.

It is the specific case on behalf of the respondents that the rate of

allotment was based on the cost of acquisition and the amount

spent on development, laying out the infrastructure.  Therefore, if

the cost of acquisition is increased now and the State/acquiring

body is directed to pay enhanced compensation, in that case, it

would  be very  difficult to recover the  difference of amount of

compensation from the allottees after decades of allotment.   The

acquiring body will have to make additional budgetary provision

and as  observed hereinabove it  would be  very  difficult for the

acquiring body to recover the difference of compensation from the

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allottees after so many years.  All these aspects and the cascading

effect on the State/acquiring body if they are directed to pay the

additional  compensation after  number of  years,  have  not  been

considered by this Court in the aforesaid decisions relied upon by

the learned Advocate for the petitioners.   Even if the petitioners

are denied the interest and/or the other statutory benefits for the

delayed period as requested by the learned counsel for the

petitioners, in that case also, to direct the State/acquiring body to

pay the enhanced amount of compensation after number of years

(21  years)  would  be  unreasonable  and would  have  a financial

burden upon them and as observed hereinabove it would be very

difficult for the State/acquiring body to recover the same from the

allottees.   Under the circumstances, none of the aforesaid

decisions shall  be  applicable to the facts  of the  case on hand

and/or the same shall not be of any assistance to the petitioners.

10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we

refuse to condone the huge delay of 7534, 7542 and 7886 days

respectively in filing the special leave petitions.  Accordingly, the

applications for condonation of delay stand dismissed.

Consequently, all these special leave petitions are dismissed on

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the ground of limitation.   However, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………..J. [ARUN MISHRA]

……………………………………J. [S. ABDUL NAZEER]

NEW DELHI; ……………………………………J. AUGUST 08, 2019. [M.R. SHAH]

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