27 August 2013
Supreme Court
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BALDEV KRISHAN Vs SATYA NARAIN

Bench: T.S. THAKUR,VIKRAMAJIT SEN
Case number: C.A. No.-007163-007163 / 2013
Diary number: 20272 / 2011
Advocates: PRATIBHA JAIN Vs AISHWARYA BHATI


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  7163         OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.21936 of 2011]

Baldev Krishan …..Appellant

Versus

Satya Narain …..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1. Leave granted.  We have heard learned counsel for the parties in  

great detail, at the end of which a settlement was arrived at between them,  

the terms of which we shall spell out later.

2. The Appeal assails the order of the learned Single Judge of the High  

Court of Rajasthan in Second Appeal No.216 of 2010 dated 11.3.2011  

which in turn related to the legal propriety of the decree of eviction passed  

by  the  First  Appellate  Court  being  the  District  Judge,  Churu.   The  

landlord/Appellant  had  filed  a  Suit  for  the  eviction  of  the  

tenant/Respondent  on  sundry  grounds  out  of  which  we  are  presently  

concerned  only  with  that  under  Section  13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan  

Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950,   which envisages the

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

eviction of a tenant on the predication of the landlord, “that the premises  

are required reasonably and bonafide by the landlord (i) for the use or  

occupation of himself or his family, …..”.

3. We have perused the Plaint, the salient averments of which are that  

“in  order  to  solve  his  financial  problem the  plaintiff  wants  to  start  a  

business of  Paapad, Badi and spices in the disputed shop to be looked  

after by his wife.  The wife of the plaintiff also wants to do the same and  

the plaintiff after his retirement himself wants to pursue and continue this  

industry  and  business  and  keep  up  his  source  of  income.   In  these  

situations since the plaintiff and his wife and children will also require  

place for  their  residence for  which he wants  to  vacate  and utilise  two  

rooms, store and varandah as are built on the first floor which is presently  

with Jaiprakash on rent.  The plaintiff and his wife also need rooms built at  

the second floor of the house for the business and industry of  Paapad,  

Badi etc., and for their residential purposes and for other needs.  In this  

way,  the  plaintiff  has  legitimate,  reasonable  and  bonafide  need  of  the  

disputed shop and room which is at second floor for himself and his family  

members.......”.   After a perusal of these averments, it seems to us that it  

cannot be concluded that the eviction suit pleaded the bonafide need of  

only the subsequently deceased wife, either for commercial or residential  

requirement; the claimed need was of the plaintiff  and his family.

4. The Trial Court,  by its order dated 4.9.2003, decreed the Suit in  

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

favour of the Appellant-landlord which, as already indicated above, was  

upheld  in  appeal  by  the  District  Judge,  Churu,  by  judgment  dated  

8.11.2010.  However, in that duration, the Appellant-landlord's wife had  

passed away in 2007.  In the impugned judgment, the High Court repelled  

the contention of the landlord that concurrent finding of fact ought not to  

be upset by the High Court in the Second Appeal.  After doing so, the High  

Court  did  not  view the  claim of  bonafide  requirement  of  the  tenanted  

premises favourably.  This has resulted in the filing of the present appeal  

before us.

5. The discussion of the law should properly start with the three-Judge  

Bench decision in  Pasupuleti  Venkateswarlu v.  The Motor  & General  

Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770.  Our research reveals that the question in hand  

has not received the attention of any larger Bench and hence if the ratio  

decidendi of Pasupuleti is to be varied, it per force has to be done by a  

larger Bench.  In these circumstances,  Pasupuleti  holds the field on the  

question of the consideration to be given to events which have occurred  

subsequent to the institution of a suit and the disposal of any statutory  

appeal.   Pasupuleti requires the Court to “take cautious cognisance of  

events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding  

provided  the  rules  of  fairness  to  both sides  are  scrupulously obeyed.”  

After laying down these propositions the decision was to the effect that the  

recovery of another accommodation by the landlord during the pendency  

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

of the case, had material bearing on the right to evict since that right would  

be defeated by the statutory provisions itself.  Pasupuleti did not have the  

occasion to consider Phool Rani v.  Naubat Rai Ahluwalia (1973) 1 SCC  

688;  counsel  were  clearly  remiss  in  not  bringing  this  decision  to  the  

Court’s  notice.   Close  upon  the  heels  of  this  decision  is  Shantilal  

Thakordas  v.  Chimanlal  Maganlal  Telwala  (1976)  4  SCC  417  also  

rendered by a three-Judge Bench.   Phool Rani was cited and overruled in  

Shantilal  and, therefore, the former ought not to be cited or considered  

any further.  The tenor of Shantilal is in consonance with and not contrary  

to Pasupuleti, as it necessarily must be.  What has been held is that if the  

requirement of the Plaintiff as well as his heirs is in issue before the Court,  

the passing away of the Plaintiff will not defeat the  lis.   Another three-

Judge Bench in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 has  

followed  Pasupuleti,  again as  it  was  precendentially  bound to.   The  

plurality was of the view that a decree or order does not become final till  

the appeal filed against it is finally disposed of.  In his dissenting note,  

Pathak.J emphasised upon the fact that it was only in the course of the  

Second Appeal that the tenant endeavoured to draw the attention of the  

court  to the demise of the landlord.   Accordingly, Pathak,J  was  of the  

opinion that since there were concurrent findings of fact rendered by the  

Trial Court as well as the first Appellate Court, the demise of the Plaintiff-

landlord  in  the  course  of  the  Second  Appeal  would  not  have  any  

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

detrimental legal consequences to his claim.  We may add here, by way of  

emphasis,  that  a  Second Appeal  would  not  entail  the  determination of  

questions of fact but must conform to the discipline of only considering  

question of law of substantial importance.  Shakuntala Bai v. Narayan  

Das (2004) 5 SCC 772 is a decision of a two-Judge Bench and, therefore,  

need  not  detain  us  in  view of  the  ratio  decidendi of  larger  Benches.  

Significantly, it was not brought to the notice of the Court that Phool Rani  

had  already  been  overruled  by  two  larger  Benches.   However,  the  

distinguishing feature in this case was that consequent upon the death of  

the  original  landlord-plaintiff  his  legal  heirs  had  been  allowed  to  be  

impleaded and the case progressed from that stage, not in the appellate  

court but before the Trial Court.  It has been duly noted at the final hearing  

of  the  eviction  Suit  by  the  Trial  Court,  all  the  Plaintiff’s  sons  had  

specifically set up their own bonafide needs.   

6. We have briefly considered the previous precedents since disparate  

decisions inexorably lead to a vexed and a split exposition of the law.  Our  

objective  is  to  insulate  the  subordinate  courts  from choosing  between  

decisions of the Apex Court by presenting only one opinion of the law.  

7. We must  immediately refer  to  the  decision of  this  Court,  in the  

nature of a re-statement of the law, in Sheshambal v. Chelur Corporation  

(2010) 3 SCC 470 in which my learned and esteemed brother Thakur J.  

had  perspicuously  yet  concisely  considered  the  plethora  of  precedents  

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

pertaining to the legal consequences of the demise of the landlord whose  

bonafide  need  was  the  substance  of  the  eviction  action,  during  the  

pendency of an appeal.  After analysing several previous decisions, it has  

been held that events which transpired subsequent to filing of the eviction  

petition could and must  be kept  in perspective if they would have the  

effect  of  dislodging  the  very  plinth  or  substratum  of  the  claim.   In  

Sheshambal, the bonafide need that had been pleaded pertained only to  

the landlord and his wife.  It will be relevant to record that the claim had  

been concurrently rejected by the courts below, before whom the landlord-

husband had passed away.  The widow, whose bonafide need had also  

been set up, unfortunately, also passed away during the pendency of the  

appeal in this Court.  In those circumstances, it was held that the bonafide  

need, even assuming that it existed at the time of filing of the eviction  

action,  had thereafter  lapsed  altogether  on the  death of  the  petitioning  

protagonists.  It seems to us that it is arguable that the position may change  

had there been a favourable verdict during their lifetime.  Premium should  

not  be  placed  on  the  filing  of  appeals  merely  to  defeat  a  favourable  

decision on the unfair speculation that the endemic delay in disposal of  

appeals  may result  in  defeating  a  decree  because  of  the  death  of  the  

landlord.   It  had  been  clarified  in  Sheshambal that  “if  the  deceased  

landlord had any dependent member of the family, we may have even in  

the absence of a pleading assumed that the requirement pleaded extended  

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C.A. @ S.L.P(C)No 21936/11 …. (contd.)

also to the dependent member of their family.  That unfortunately for the  

Appellant is neither the case set up nor the position on facts”.  The second  

aspect of the decision which needs to be recounted is that the rent had  

been increased by the High Court to Rs.10,000/- per month with effect  

from 1.11.2003 and thereafter by this Court to Rs.25,000/- per month with  

effect from 1.1.2009.

8. Returning  to  the  pleadings  before  us,  we  are  not  seized  of  an  

eviction action in which the bonafide need of only the deceased wife of the  

Appellant had been pleaded.  It is for this reason that we have extracted  

above the relevant parts of the Plaint.  Therefore, it required our careful  

cogitation as to whether the landlord could still claim bonafide need for  

himself as well as his dependents.   

9. In these circumstances, mindful of the uncertainty of which manner  

we  may  decide,  the  parties  through  their  counsel  have  arrived  at  a  

settlement before us.  It has been agreed that the rent shall stand increased  

to Rs.1500/- per month and that the Respondent-tenant shall be permitted  

to continue to occupy the tenanted premises for a further period of three  

years.   The Appeal is accordingly allowed.  The judgment of the High  

Court  is  set  aside.   However,  the  Respondent-tenant  shall  hand  over  

peaceful and vacant possession to the landlord or his legal heirs in the  

event  of  his  demise  on  or  before  31st August  2016  provided  the  

Respondent pays all the arrears of rent till date (if any); and with effect  

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from  September  2013  pays  a  sum  of  Rs.1500/-  per  month  towards  

damages for use and occupation.  The usual undertaking to abide by these  

terms must be filed within four weeks from today failing which he shall be  

liable to be evicted/ejected forthwith.

10. Parties shall bear their respective costs.

.................................................J. [T.S. THAKUR]

New Delhi .................................................J. August 27, 2013. [VIKRAMAJIT SEN]

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