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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007

BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants

Versus

THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively,  

for convenience) were tried by the Principal Sessions Court,  

Coimbatore in  Sessions Case No.141 of  2000 for  offences  

punishable under Section 498A and Section 302 read with  

Section 34 of the IPC.  A1-Babu was convicted under Section  

498A  of  the  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in  

default,  to  undergo  further  rigorous  imprisonment  for  two  

months.  A1-Babu was also convicted for offence punishable

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under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and sentenced to suffer  

rigorous imprisonment for  seven years for  the same.  A2-

Pappathi was convicted for offence punishable under Section  

498A  of  the  IPC  and  sentenced  to  undergo  rigorous  

imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in  

default,  to  undergo  further  rigorous  imprisonment  for  two  

months.  A2-Pappathi  was  also  convicted  for  offence  

punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of  

the IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for  

seven years for the same.  On appeal, the Madras High Court  

confirmed the conviction and sentence.  Hence, this appeal,  

by special leave.   

2. Gist of the prosecution case needs to be stated.  

A1-Babu  was  married  to  deceased-Indirani  (“the  

deceased”) on 11/4/1994.  The couple resided in the house  

of A2-Pappathi, who is the younger sister of A1-Babu.  At the  

time of marriage, 25 gold sovereigns were demanded by A1-

Babu and his family, but the parents of the deceased could  

only give 20 gold sovereigns.  After six months of marriage,

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they  demanded  dowry  for  which  Panchayat  meeting  was  

held  by  the  elders  in  the  house  of  the  deceased.   The  

members of the panchayat went to the house of the accused  

and requested them not to threaten the deceased.  After one  

year, the deceased gave birth to a male child.  The accused  

demanded  10  gold  sovereigns  and  cash  of  Rs.10,000/-.  

Parents of the deceased could give only 3 gold sovereigns.  

Thereafter,  the couple was blessed with a daughter.   This  

time also,  the accused demanded 10 gold sovereigns and  

cash of Rs.10,000/- to purchase manure, but the parents of  

the  deceased  could  not  fulfill  this  demand  due  to  their  

financial  difficulties.   A1-Babu   and  A2-Pappathi  started  

harassing  the  deceased.   On  15/11/1998  the  deceased  

informed PW-2 Nataraj, her brother about the dowry demand  

made by her husband and the cruelty meted out to her.  The  

prosecution story further goes on to say that on 16/11/1998,  

PW-3 Ponnusamy, the grandfather of the deceased, visited  

the house of the accused.  When he reached near the house  

of the accused, he heard the voice of the accused asking the  

deceased as to why sum of Rs.10,000/- was not brought by

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her.  PW-3 Ponnusamy peeped through the window and saw  

A1-Babu, who had caught hold of the deceased, dashing the  

back of her head against a pillar.  At that time, A2-Pappathi  

intervened and said that the deceased should not die like  

this.  She asked him to pour poison in her mouth.  Upon this,  

A1-Babu brought  poison  and gave it  to  A2-Pappathi.   A1-

Babu caught hold of the deceased and A2-Pappathi poured  

the poison in the mouth of the deceased.  PW-3 Ponnusamy  

went inside the house and questioned them.  The accused  

started pacifying him and told him that they would save her  

life.  They asked him to remain in the house and they took  

the deceased in a van to Udumalpet Government Hospital.  

PW-4  Dr.  Shanmugham  examined  the  deceased  and  

declared her dead.  He sent a report to the Udumalpet Police  

Station, pursuant to which PW-11 SI Lakshmanan came to  

the  hospital  and  recorded  the  statement  of  PW-1  

Subramaniya, the father of the deceased, which is treated as  

FIR.  On the basis of the FIR, investigation was started.  After  

completion of investigation, the accused came to be charged  

as  aforesaid.   In  support  of  its  case,  the  prosecution

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examined 14 witnesses.  Out of them, PW-1 Subramaniya,  

PW-2 Nataraj  and PW-5 Dr.  Rajabalan,  who conducted the  

post-mortem of the deceased are crucial to the prosecution.  

The  accused  denied  the  prosecution  case  and  contended  

that they were falsely implicated.  Learned Sessions Judge  

convicted the accused as aforesaid.  

3. We  have  heard  Mr.  Ratnakar  Dash,  senior  advocate,  

appearing  for  the  appellants  and  Mr.  M.  Yogesh  Khanna,  

counsel  appearing  for  the  respondent-State.  Mr.  Ratnakar  

Dash submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove its  

case beyond reasonable doubt.  He submitted that learned  

Sessions Judge ought to have appreciated that the evidence  

on  record  clearly  establishes  that  the  deceased  had  

committed suicide.  The Forensic Science Laboratory Report  

(Ex-P6) is a pointer to this.  It is also clear that the deceased  

had  consumed  poison  first  and  had  suffered  head  injury  

because of the fall sustained by her due to consumption of  

poison.  Counsel pointed out that the suicide note (Ex-P1)  

supports  the  case  of  the  accused  that  the  deceased

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committed suicide.  Counsel submitted that the evidence of  

PW-3 Ponnusamy has rightly been rejected by the trial court  

and the High Court and that has made the prosecution case  

suspect.  Counsel submitted that it is the accused, who took  

the deceased to the hospital.  The conduct of the accused  

belies the prosecution case.  According to the counsel, since  

the  prosecution  has  failed  to  prove  its  case  beyond  

reasonable doubt, the conviction of the accused deserves to  

be  set  aside.   Counsel  submitted  that  in  any  case  the  

involvement of A2-Pappathi, the sister, who is a widow, is not  

proved at all.   Besides, she could not have been convicted  

under Section 302 read with Section 109 of the IPC in the  

absence of a charge being framed under Section 109 of the  

IPC.   In support of this submission, counsel relied on the  

judgment of this Court in Wakil Yadav & Anr.  v.  State of  

Bihar  1  .   Shri  M.  Yogesh  Khanna,  learned  counsel  for  the  

State submitted that the impugned judgment deserves no  

interference.  

1 (2000) 10 SCC 500

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4. We shall first deal with charge under Section 498A of  

the IPC.  In our opinion, the trial court as well as the High  

Court have rightly held that charge under Section 498A of  

the  IPC  is  proved.   PW-1  Subramaniya,  the  father  of  the  

deceased has stated how the deceased was ill-treated in her  

matrimonial house.  It appears from his evidence that the  

accused constantly harassed the deceased and asked her to  

bring  gold  sovereigns  and  money  from  her  parents.   On  

account of his strained financial condition, he could not fulfill  

those demands. He stated that at the time of marriage, a  

demand of 25 gold sovereigns and a sum of Rs.50,000/- was  

made.  He could only give 20 gold sovereigns.  He stated  

that  A1-Babu and the deceased lived in  the house of  A2-

Pappathi.  He has described how A1-Babu used to threaten  

and beat the deceased stating that what she had brought  

was  less  as  compared to  his  wealth  and  that  she  should  

bring  more  from her  parents.   On  several  occasions,  the  

deceased had communicated this to him. He used to give  

some money to the deceased as and when she came to his  

house.   Because  of  the  persistence  of  the  accused,  a

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meeting of the Panchayat was held.  The members of the  

Panchayat went to the house of the accused and told them  

not  to  threaten  the  deceased.   However,  she  was  again  

beaten up.  When the first baby was born, A2-Pappathi came  

to  their  house  and  demanded a  gold  chain  for  the  baby.  

They accordingly gifted a gold chain and anklet to the newly  

born.   When  the  second  child  was  born,  PW-2  Nataraj,  

brother of the deceased went to the house of the accused  

and informed them.  After 2 to 3 days, the accused came to  

the hospital and again demanded gold jewellery.  He then  

made a  gold  chain  and anklet  for  the baby and took the  

deceased to the house of the accused.  According to him,  

A1-Babu shouted at him and asked him as to why he had  

brought her.  The deceased stayed there for  a  month and  

came back to his house.  They consoled her and told her that  

they would pay the money as and when they can arrange for  

it.  Thereafter, the deceased went to her matrimonial house  

with  the  child.   When  PW-2  Nataraj  went  to  see  the  

deceased, she told him that A1-Babu had demanded a sum  

of Rs.10,000/- to buy fertilizers. She expressed a fear that he

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would  kill  her  if  she  failed  to  fulfill  the  demand.   PW-1  

Subramaniya  then  went  to  the  matrimonial  house  of  the  

deceased and told her that he will arrange for the money at  

any cost and she should bear with the situation for a while.  

According to him, this talk took place just one week before  

the incident in  question.   He has been cross-examined at  

some length.  In the cross-examination, he has not deviated  

from the story narrated by him in the examination-in-chief.  

This  witness  comes  across  as  a  very  honest  and  reliable  

witness.   It  may  be  stated  here  that  he  is  a  coolie.  

Obviously,  therefore, he could not have fulfilled the extra-

ordinary  demands  of  money  and  jewellery  made  by  the  

accused. His evidence is consistent with the FIR lodged by  

him.  There are no material omissions or contradictions in his  

evidence.  We, therefore, find no difficulty in placing reliance  

on  his  evidence.   PW-2  Nataraj  has  corroborated  the  

evidence of PW-1 Subramaniya in all respects.  

5. It appears that while the inquest of the dead-body was  

being conducted Ex-P2, a letter tied in the skirt (petticoat) of

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the deceased was recovered by PW-6 Ganesan, the Revenue  

Divisional Officer, who conducted the inquest.  The accused  

have  placed  heavy  reliance  on  this  letter  which  they  

describe as a suicide note.  It is contended that this note and  

the  poison  found  in  the  stomach  and  intestine  of  the  

deceased suggest that the deceased had committed suicide.  

We have carefully gone through the letter (Ex-P2).  In our  

opinion, Ex-P2 completely supports the prosecution case that  

the deceased was harassed and ill-treated by the accused  

for money and jewellery.  This letter bears out the version of  

the prosecution story given by PW-1 Subramaniya and PW-2  

Nataraj.  However, in this letter, the deceased has nowhere  

expressed any desire to commit suicide.  It is, therefore, not  

possible to treat this letter as a suicide note.  In view of the  

above,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  concurring  with  the  trial  

court  and  the  High  Court  that  A1-Babu  and  A2-Pappathi  

treated the deceased with cruelty and are guilty of offence  

punishable  under  Section  498A  of  the  IPC  and  their  

conviction on that count is perfectly justified.

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6. We must now turn to the conviction of the appellants  

under Section 304 Part I of the IPC.  We are of the confirmed  

opinion that this charge is made out only against A1-Babu  

and not against A2-Pappathi.  A2-Pappathi’s involvement in  

this  offence  could  be  held  to  be  proved  only  if  PW-3  

Ponnusamy’s evidence is believed.   PW-3 Ponnusamy has  

been disbelieved by the trial court as well as the High Court  

and,  in  our  opinion,  rightly  so.   This  witness claimed that  

when  he  visited  the  house  of  the  accused,  he  heard  the  

accused  asking  the  deceased  as  to  why  the  sum  of  

Rs.10,000/-  was not  brought  by her.   He claimed that  he  

peeped through the window and saw A1-Babu catching hold  

of  the  deceased  and  dashing  her  head  against  a  pillar.  

According to him, at that time, A2-Pappathi intervened and  

asked  A1-Babu  to  pour  poison  in  her  mouth.   A1-Babu  

accordingly  brought  poison.   According  to  this  witness,  

further, A1-Babu gave poison to A2-Pappathi, who poured it  

in the mouth of the deceased.  It is at that time that he went  

inside  the  house  and  questioned  them.   Thereupon,  they  

took the deceased to the hospital telling him that they would

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save her life. This entire story is inherently improbable and  

totally  unbelievable.   If  this witness has seen A2-Pappathi  

pouring poison in the mouth of the deceased, he should have  

screamed  and  called  people.   He  should  have  tried  to  

prevent A2-Pappathi from pouring poison in the mouth of the  

deceased.   He  should  have  rushed  to  the  police  station  

rather than waiting in the house.  The exaggerated evidence  

of this witness must, therefore, be kept out of consideration.  

If this witness is disbelieved, A2-Pappathi cannot be said to  

be involved in offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of  

the IPC.  In our opinion, her conviction for the said offence  

must be set aside.  

7. There is  yet one other strong reason why we cannot  

confirm the conviction of A2-Pappathi for offence punishable  

under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC.  

Though  she  has  been  convicted  as  aforesaid,  she  was  

charged for offence punishable under Section 302 read with  

Section 34 of the IPC.  There was no charge under Section  

109  of  the  IPC.   Section  109  of  the  IPC  by  itself  is  an

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independent  offence  though  punishable  in  the  context  of  

other  offences.  A2-Pappathi  has  faced  trial  for  offence  

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC  

i.e.  for  murdering  the  deceased  by  sharing  common  

intention with A1-Babu.  She cannot therefore be convicted  

for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC  

with the aid of Section 109 of the IPC in the absence of a  

charge under Section 109 of the IPC.  In this connection, we  

may  usefully  refer  to  Wakil  Yadav where  the  appellant  

therein had faced trial for being a member of an unlawful  

assembly which achieved the common object of killing the  

deceased.   No  charge was  framed for  offence punishable  

under  Section  302  read  with  Section  109  of  the  IPC.  

However, the appellant was convicted for offence punishable  

under  Section  302  read  with  Section  109  of  the  IPC  and  

sentenced to  life  imprisonment.   This  Court  held  that  the  

appellant therein having faced trial for being a member of an  

unlawful  assembly  which  achieved  the  common  object  of  

killing  the  deceased,  could  in  no  event  be  substitutedly  

convicted for offence under Section 302 of the IPC with the

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aid of Section 109 of the IPC.  This Court observed that there  

was not only a legal flaw but also a great prejudice to the  

appellant  therein  in  projecting  his  defence.     Drawing  a  

parallel from this decision, we hold that A2-Pappathi could  

not  have  been  convicted  for  offence  punishable  under  

Section 304 Part I of the IPC read with Section 109 of the IPC  

and  sentenced  for  the  same.   On  this  count  also,  A2-

Pappathi’s conviction and sentence under Section 304 Part I  

read with Section 109 of the IPC will have to be set aside.  

8. Now  the  question  is  whether  if  PW-3  Ponnusamy  is  

disbelieved,  the entire  prosecution story becomes suspect  

and deserves to be disbelieved.  In our opinion, even if PW-3  

Ponnusamy’s evidence is obliterated,  the prosecution case  

can be held proved on the basis of other evidence on record.  

Witnesses do exaggerate.  They have a tendency to improve  

upon the prosecution case.  If one of the witnesses is found  

to be prone to  exaggeration and,  hence,  not  reliable,  the  

other evidence on record, if it is cogent and reliable, can be  

relied  upon.   The  entire  prosecution  evidence  does  not

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necessarily become tainted thereby.  In this connection we  

may usefully refer to the observations of this Court in Sucha  

Singh & Anr.  v.  State of Punjab2, which read thus:

“The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has   no application in India and the witnesses cannot   be branded as liars.  This maxim has not received   general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the   status  of  a  rule  of  law.   It  is  merely  a  rule  of   caution.   All  that  it  amounts  to  is  that  in  such   cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that   it  must  be  disregarded.   The  doctrine  merely   involves the question of weight of evidence which   a court may apply in a given set of circumstances,   but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule   of evidence”.   The doctrine is  a dangerous one,   especially  in  India  for  if  a  whole  body  of  the  testimony were to be rejected, because a witness   was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect,   it  is  to be feared that administration of criminal   justice would come to a dead stop.  Witnesses just   cannot  help  in  giving  embroidery  to  a  story,   however true in the main.  Therefore, it has to be   appraised  in  each  case  as  to  what  extent  the   evidence  is  worthy  of  acceptance,  and  merely   because in some respects the court considers the   same to be insufficient for  replacing reliance on   the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily   follow  as  a  matter  of  law  that  it  must  be   disregarded in all respects as well.  The evidence   has to be sifted with care.  Falsity of a particular   material witness or a material particular would not   ruin it from the beginning to end.  The aforesaid   dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one   hardly  comes  across  a  witness  whose  evidence   

2 (2003) 7 SCC 643

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does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate   exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.”   

9. We  can,  therefore,  analyze  the  other  evidence  and  

circumstances on record and see whether they support the  

conviction of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section  

304  Part  I  of  the  IPC.  In  this  connection,  the  medical  

evidence  is  of  great  importance.   PW-5  Dr.  Rajabalan  

conducted the post-mortem on 16/11/1998 at 5.00 p.m.  Ex-

P5 is the post-mortem certificate.  The external and internal  

injuries are described in the certificate as under:

“External  Injuries:-  Contusion  over  the  right   occipital area close to the midline 2 cm x 3 cm.   General  appearances do tally  with police report.   Eyelids closed. Frothy discharge from the mouth  and nostrils  present.   Tongue inside the mouth.   Jaws clenched.  Teath 8/7-8/7.  Hands empty.  No   fracture ribs.  Hart 200gm congested.  Chambers   empty.   Hyoid  bone  intact.   Lungs  left  400gm.   Right 450 gm congested.  Stomach contain 200 ml   of white coloured fluid with irritant smell.   Liver   1000 gm congested.   Spleen 10 gm congested.   Kidney  100  gm  each  contested.   Intestines   distended with gas.  Uterus normal.  Cavity empty.   Pelvis normal.  

On opening the head: Extravasation of blood   from the contused area on the right parietal area   and occipital area close to the midline.  Fracture  

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right  parietal  bone.   Membranes  torn  on  the  occipital and parietal area on the right side brain.   wt. of 1000 gms pale. 200 ml of fluid blood found   on the base of the skull”.  

10. PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan opined that the death was due to  

shock and hemorrhage due to the head injury sustained by  

the deceased which could have occurred 10 to 12 hours prior  

to  post-mortem.   As  noted  above,  on  opening  the  head,  

extravasation of blood from the contused area on the right  

parietal  area  and  occipital  area  close  to  the  midline  was  

found.  There was also a fracture on the right parietal bone.  

The membranes were torn on the occipital and parietal area  

on the right side brain and 20 ml. of blood was found on the  

base of the skull.  This head injury, according to PW-5 Dr.  

Rajabalan,  was  the  cause  of  death.   The  nature  of  head  

injury belies the defence case that the deceased suffered it  

due to a fall on account of consumption of poison.  In our  

opinion, such injury cannot be caused by a mere fall.  It can  

be  caused  only  if  some  external  force  is  applied.   This  

conclusion of ours is supported by the evidence of PW-5 Dr.  

Rajabalan, who stated that the injuries were caused before

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death  and  they  could  not  be  caused  due  to  fall  of  the  

deceased in a conscious state.   

11. It  is  also  pertinent  to  note  that  PW-5  Dr.  Rajabalan  

stated  that  the  injuries  sustained  by  the  deceased  could  

have been caused 10 to 12 hours prior to the post-mortem.  

We  have  already  stated  that  the  post-mortem  was  

conducted at 5.00 p.m.  Thus,  the death occurred around  

6.00  a.m.   The  death  occurred  in  the  house  where  the  

deceased resided with A1-Babu.  Presence of the accused at  

6.00  a.m.  in  the  house  is  natural.   Besides,  it  is  not  

contended by A1-Babu that he was not present in the house  

when the incident occurred.  To this fact situation, Section  

106  of  the  Evidence  Act  is  attracted.   As  to  how  the  

deceased received injuries to  her  head and how she died  

must  be  within  the  exclusive  personal  knowledge  of  A1-

Babu.  It was for him to explain how the death occurred.  He  

has not given any plausible explanation for the death of the  

deceased in such suspicious circumstances in the house in  

which  he  resided  with  her  and  when  he  was  admittedly

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present in the house at the material time.  This circumstance  

must be kept in mind while dealing with this case.  We are  

mindful  of  the  fact  that  this  would  not  relieve  the  

prosecution of its burden of proving its case.  But, it would  

apply  to  cases  where  the  prosecution  has  succeeded  in  

proving  facts  from  which  a  reasonable  inference  can  be  

drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless  

the  accused  by  virtue  of  his  special  knowledge regarding  

such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the  

court  to  draw  a  different  inference.   In  this  case,  in  our  

opinion, the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from  

which reasonable inference can be drawn that the death of  

the deceased was homicidal  and A1-Babu was responsible  

for it.  A1-Babu could have by virtue of his special knowledge  

regarding the said facts offered an explanation from which a  

different inference could have been drawn. Since he has not  

done so, this circumstance adds up to other circumstances  

which  substantiate  the  prosecution  case.   In  Tulshiram  

Sahadu Suryawanshi & Anr.  v.  State of Maharashtra3,  

3 (2012) 10 SCC 373

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while  dealing  with  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act,  this  

Court observed as under:

“A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from  certain  other  proved  facts.   When  inferring  the  existence of a fact from other set of proved facts,   the  court  exercises  a  process  of  reasoning  and   reaches  a  logical  conclusion  as  to  the  most   probable  position.   The  above  position  is   strengthened  in  view  of  Section  114  of  the  Evidence  Act,  1872.   It  empowers  the  court  to   presume the existence of any fact which it thinks   likely  to  have  happened.   In  that  process,  the   courts shall have regard to the common course of   natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to   the facts of the case.  In these circumstances, the   principles  embodied  in  Section  106  of  the  Evidence  Act  can  also  be  utilized.   Section  106   however is not intended to relieve the prosecution  of  its  burden  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused   beyond reasonable doubt,  but  it  would  apply  to   cases  where  the  prosecution  has  succeeded  in   proving facts from which a reasonable inference   can be drawn regarding the existence of certain   other  facts,  unless  the  accused by  virtue  of  his   special  knowledge  regarding  such  facts,  has   offered an explanation which might drive the court   to draw a different inference.”  

The above observation is attracted to this case.

12. We must now go to the FSL report (Ex-P-6).  A perusal  

of the same discloses that the stomach and intestine of the

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deceased  were  found to  contain  the  poisonous  substance  

viz. Metasystox but the liver and kidney did not contain the  

said substance.  PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison  

had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have  

reached the liver and kidney.  He has added that if poison is  

administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state  

there is a possibility that it  would reach the stomach and  

intestine.  Considering the medical evidence, particularly the  

evidence of  PW-5 Dr.  Rajabalan  that  the  head injury  was  

anti-mortem  and  must  have  been  inflicted  prior  to  the  

consumption  of  poison  and  considering  the  other  

circumstances of the case, we concur with the High Court  

that A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased  

and  when  she  became  unconscious  in  order  to  create  

evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide,  

he administered poison to her.  It reached her stomach and  

intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she  

died.  When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison  

did not pass on to the liver and kidney.  The High Court has  

rightly  observed  that  this  is  the  reason  why  there  is  no

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evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased  

and no bruises were found on her lips.   

13. The  trial  court  has  convicted  A1-Babu  for  offence  

punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for  

offence  punishable  under  Section  302  of  the  IPC  on  the  

ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury.  

The High Court has concurred with the trial court.  We see no  

reason to interfere with the impugned order.  

14. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1-

Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section  

498A of the IPC.  We confirm the sentence imposed on A1-

Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC.  We find  

from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District  

and  Sessions  Judge,  Coimbatore  that  A2-Pappathi  has  

already undergone one year and four months sentence.  In  

the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence  

already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence  

for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC.  We confirm  

the  conviction  and  sentence  of  A1-Babu  for  offence

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punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC.  However, we  

quash  and  set  aside  the  conviction  and  sentence  of  A2-

Pappathi  for  offence  punishable  under  Section  304  Part  I  

read with Section 109 of  the IPC.   There is,  therefore,  no  

question  of  her  surrendering  to  the  Court.   As  per  order  

passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail.  Her bail  

bond shall stand discharged.  As per the order of this Court  

dated 8/10/2007,  A1-Babu is  also on bail.   Since we have  

confirmed  his  conviction  and  sentence,  we  direct  that  he  

should  surrender  before  the  Principal  Sessions  Judge,  

Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence.  His bail  

bond shall stand cancelled.  Needless to say that A1-Babu’s  

sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and  

304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.  

15. The appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.  

…..............................J. (A.K. Patnaik)

……………………………J.

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(Ranjana Prakash Desai) New Delhi July 02, 2013.