22 November 2011
Supreme Court
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B.T. PURUSHOTHAMA RAI Vs K.G. UTHAYA .

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: SLP(C) No.-022377-022377 / 2004
Diary number: 21207 / 2004
Advocates: ROMY CHACKO Vs


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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL) NO. 22377/2004

B.T. PURUSHOTHAMA RAI   ….  PETITIONER

Versus

K.G. UTHAYA & ORS.            .… RESPONDENTS WITH

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL) NO. 24892/2004

LT.COL.K.G.UTHAYA   ….  PETITIONER Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.       .… RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

SLP (C) No. 22377/2004

Application for substitution is allowed.

2. This is  a Special  Leave Petition for setting aside the judgment dated  

29.6.2004  of  the  Division  Bench  of  the  Karnataka  High  Court,  Bangalore  

whereby  the  writ  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellant  (petitioner  herein)  was  

dismissed and the order passed by  the learned Single Judge was affirmed.

3. The petitioner was the third respondent in Writ Petition No. 28821 of  

1998 preferred by the first respondent herein.  The Writ  Petition was preferred  

by  the  first  respondent  after  about  21  years  to  set  aside  the  order  dated  

25.10.1975 and 10.8.1977 passed by the Land Tribunal, Somwarpet, in so far  

as it granted occupancy rights in  regard to  Sy. Nos. 166 (8A. 60 cents)  and  

164 (2A. 80 cents) of  Attur Nallar Village, Suntikoppa Talum, Somwarpet.  

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The  writ  petition  was  allowed  in  part,  quashing  the  order  dated  10.8.1977  

passed by the Land Tribunal,  Somwarpet in so far as  Sy.  No.166 (8A. 60  

cents).

4. Sy.  No.   166  of  Athur  Nallur  village  measuring  8  acres  60  cents  

originally belonged to one Subbaiah, grand father of first respondent and 12th  

respondent. The said Subbaiah had two sons, namely, K.S. Ganapathi and K.S.  

Appachu.   The  first  respondent  is  the  son  of  K.S.  Ganapathi  and  the  12th  

respondent – K.A. Kuttayya, is the son of K.S. Appachu.  According to first  

respondent -writ petitioner, the said Subbaiah executed a gift deed in respect of  

said Sy. No. 166 and some other survey numbers in favour of his son K.S.  

Ganapathi.   However, as K.S. Appachu, the other brother did not accept the  

validity of the said gift deed,  there were negotiations between the two brothers  

K.S. Ganapathi and K.S. Appachu, and by way of a settlement, an agreement of  

sale  was  executed  by  K.S.  Appachu  in  favour  of   K.S.  Ganapathi  on  

12.12.1968 with regard to half portion of  the wet lands (Sy. No. 166 and other  

lands) and half that of Bane lands and the land surrounding the plaintiff’s house  

(as described in  Schedule A, B and C respectively). On the death of  K.S.  

Ganapathi,  his  widow  K.  Devaki  and  his  two  sons  -   (first  respondent  –  

K.G.Uthaya  and  his  brother  K.G.  Chengappa)  filed  a  suit  vide  O.S.  No.  

17/1976  before the Civil Judge, Coorg, Mercara agaist K.S. Appachu and his  

son,  (the  12th respondent  herein)   for   specific  performance  of   the  said  

agreement of sale.   The suit was decreed after contest by judgment and decree  

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dated 16.7.1977 directing the defendants in the  suit, to  execute the  sale deed  

with  respect to  the suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs,  including the  

petitioner  herein,   in  terms  of  the  sale  agreement.    During  the  course  of  

judgment,  the court took note of the fact that  a tenancy claim was pending  

with  regard to the ‘A’ Schedule lands.  The decree stated thus regarding the  

Schedule –A properties; which included Sy. No. 166:

“If it is found that the defendants are not in possession of ‘A’   schedule  land  at  the  time  of  delivery  of  possession,   then  plaintiffs  are   entitled  to  get  constructive  or  symbolic   possession  or  rights  to  get  compensation  amount  from the   Government under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act,   without prejudice to the right of the plaintiffs to disprove the  question of tenancy before the  Land Tribunal or elsewhere   according to law.”

5. In the meantime, the petitioner’s father – Thyampanna Rai, claiming to  

be the tenant of  K.S. Appachu, filed an application under Section 48A of the  

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, in Form No. 7,  praying for the grant of  

occupancy rights regarding eight items of land i.e.  wet  lands  bearing Sy. No.  

171, 167, 170, 168 and 166 and  Jungle lands bearing Sy. No. 163, 164 and  

183.   In the  said proceedings,  the said Thyampanna  Rai  was represented by  

the  petitioner (his son)  as his power of attorney holder.  An affidavit dated  

24.10.1975 was filed by  Thyampanna Rai to the  following effect:

“I solemnly affirm that I have not cultivated the  5th item of  the  schedule  Land  described  below  at  any  point  of  time  bearing  Sy.  No.  166  of  8.60  acres  and  I  have  filed  the  declaration in respect of this land by mistake.  Further the 6th,  7th and 8th items of the schedule lands bearing Sy. Nos. 165 of  2.00  acres,   164  of  2.81  acres  and  183  of  6.98  acres  are  jungle land without any cultivation and I have not cultivated  these  lands  at  any  point  of  time  and  I  have  filed  my  

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declaration in respect of these lands also by mistake.  I have  cultivated only those lands viz. item Nos. 1,2,3 and 4 of the  schedule lands.  I am in possession of Jungle land item No. 7  in Sy. No. 164 of 2.81 acres.”

“I solemnly affirm that the declaration filed by me by  mistake in respect of lands bearing  survey Nos. 166 of 8.60  acres (item No.5) survey No. 163 of 2.00 acres (item No. 6)  and  survey No, 183 of 6.98 acres  (item No.8) be deleted  from the declaration form as I have not cultivated these  lands  at  any  point  of  time  and  further  these  lands  have  been  in  physical possession and enjoyment of Sri K.S. Appachu.”

6. The  petitioner  as  the  power  of  attorney  holder  was  examined  as  a  

witness before the Land Tribunal on behalf of his father and  confirmed that  

they  were  not   cultivating  lands  bearing  Sy.  No.  166,  163  and  183.  

Consequently,  the  Land Tribunal   by  order  dated  25.10.1975 accepted  the  

claim of  Thyampanna Rai  only   with regard to the remaining  five lands ( Sy.  

No. 171, 167, 170, 168 and 164)  for grant of occupancy rights.   The  affidavit  

filed by the petitioner’s father and the evidence of the  petitioner in the said  

proceeding made it clear that they were not  in possession of  Sy. No. 166 and  

it was in the possession of the owner.

7. During  the  pendency  of  the  said  suit  for  specific  performance,   the  

petitioner  filed  a  separate  petition  under  Article  48A  in  Form  7  dated  

23.12.1976 claiming occupancy rights in respect of  Sy. No. 166 (having area  

of 8A. 60 cents) and Sy. No. 181 (having  area of 4A. 28cents) alleging to be  

the  tenant  under  K.S.  Appachu   though  in  the  previous  proceeding  under  

Section  48A,   an  affidavit  was  filed  by  them  that   they  had  not  claimed  

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possession of Sy. No. 166 which was  in possession of the owner.  An affidavit  

filed in the earlier case, wherein  the petitioner himself stated that he was not  

the tenant and gave up the claim regarding Sy. No. 166, was  not  brought to  

the notice of the Tribunal and the Land  Tribunal by Order dated 10.8.1977  

directed the registration of the petitioner as an occupant of Sy. No. 166,  as  

extracted below:

“This is an application filed under Section 48A of   the  Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Act,  1961  (shortly   called  “Act”)   by  the  applicants  named  above  claiming tenancy rights over the suit land/lands.  The   said claim is against the respondent named above.

2. The notices as required under Section 1 and 2  were published and served upon the persons   interested in the suit and/lands.

Case called. Parties both present.  Applicants   I and II (K.B. Shivanna and K.B. Thimmappa) have   given affidavit before the Munisiff Magistrate stating   that they are cultivating the land of the Respondent   on  coolly  basis,  hence  their  petitions  may  be   rejected.  Accaordingly,  the applications of I and II   applicants are rejected.

As  regards  the  application  of  the  third   applicant  (B.T.  Purushothama  Rai),   respondent   admits this tenancy rights in respect of Sy. No. 166  to  an extent  of   8.60 acres.   Their  Statement  also   recorded.  Order pronounced registering the name  of the applicant (B.T. Purushotham Rai) as occupant   of the land of Sy. No. 166 to an extent of 8.60 acres   by the Tribunal Members.”

8. The  first  respondent  was  posted  as  an  Army Officer  when  all  these  

proceedings took place.  He took voluntary retirement in 1996.  He was later  

informed that his decree for specific performance in  respect of Sy. No. 166  

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was frustrated by  virtue of  collusive proceedings initiated by the petitioner  

and  K.S.  Appachu   before  the  Land  Tribunal  resulting  in  the  order  dated  

10.8.1977.    He  filed  O.S.  No.  84/1982  against  the  petitioner  seeking  a  

declaration that his right with regard to Sy. No. 166 was not affected by order  

of the Land  Tribunal dated 10.8.1977.   The suit was dismissed on 16.7.1982  

on the ground that the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction to grant relief.   The first  

respondent  challenged the said decree in  R.A. No. 7/1983 which was also  

dismissed on 7.8.1985.    Thereafter, the first respondent was advised to file  

one  more  suit  for  possession.  The  O.S.  No.  247/1989  filed  against  the  

petitioner, was dismissed on 4.1.1993 as being barred by  Section 132 and 133  

of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act.  The R.A. No. 110/1993 preferred by the  

first  respondent  against  the  said  order  was  also  dismissed on 7.3.1995 and  

affirmed by the Second  Appellate Court  vide order dated 20.9.1995 in R.S.A.  

No. 740/1995.  The Special Leave Petition filed before this Court was also  

rejected.

9. After  spending  nearly  two  decades  initiating  the  wrong  proceedings  

based on wrong advice,  the first respondent approached the High Court by  

filing  a  writ  petition  (WP No.  28821/1998)  for   quashing  the  order  dated  

10.8.1977  passed by  the Land Tribunal in regard to Sy. No. 166.     He  

explained that the delay in preferring the petition after 21 years was due to his  

pursuing the wrong remedies  based on erroneous  advice;  and that ultimately  

he was advised that he should challenge the order of the Tribunal in a writ  

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petition instead of approaching the Civil Court.    This was opposed by the  

petitioner  but  the  learned  Single  Judge  being  satisfied,  vide  order  dated  

5.8.2003 accepted the explanation of delay, as he was of  the view that a virtual  

fraud  had  been  played  in  securing  the  order  dated  10.8.1977  of  the  Land  

Tribunal.   The  challenge  to  the  first  order  of  the  Land  Tribunal  dated  

25.10.1975 in regard to Sy. No. 171, 167, 170, 168 and 164  was  rejected by  

the learned Single Judge, but he partially   allowed the petition and quashed the  

order  of  Tribunal dated 10.8.1977 in so far as Sy. No. 166 is concerned.

10. Before the Division Bench, the afore stated facts were not disputed and  

the Division Bench being satisfied with the grounds accepted the view taken by  

the learned Single Judge in entertaining the writ petition after some delay.

11. We have  heard  the  learned  counsels  for  the  parties  and  perused  the  

record.   

12. The petitioner has challenged the orders of the High Court mainly on  

the ground that the writ petition was filed after 21 years of the impugned order  

whilst the first respondent had knowledge of the proceedings as can be seen  

from the judgement  passed in O.S.17 /1996, thereby there was no justification  

for condoning the delay.  

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13. On  the  question  of  Limitation  and  delay  this  Court  in  the  case  of  

N.Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy reported in (1998) 7  SCC 123  held  

that the  purpose of Limitation Act was not to destroy the rights.   It is founded  

on public policy fixing the life span for legal remedy for the general welfare.  

The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate between the parties and to  

advance substantial justice.   The object of providing legal remedy is to repair  

the damage caused as a result of legal injury.  If the explanation given does not  

smack mala fides or is not shown to have been put forth  as a part of a dilatory  

strategy,   the  Court  must  show utmost  consideration  to  the  suitor.   In  this  

context, this  Court observed as follows:

“  It  is  axiomatic  that  condonation  of  delay  is  a  matter  of  discretion  of the  Court.  Section 5 of the Limitation Act does  not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay  is  within  a  certain  limit.   Length  of  delay  is  no  matter,  acceptability  of  the   explanation  is  the  only  criterion.  Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable  due to a want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain  other cases,  delay of a very long range can be condoned as  the  explanation  thereof  is  satisfactory.   Once  the  Court  accepts  the   explanation  as  sufficient,   it  is  the  result  of  positive  exercise  of  discretion  and  normally  the  superior  Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional  jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly  untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different  matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In  such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the  cause  shown  for  the  delay  afresh  and  it  is  open  to  such  superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammelled  by the conclusion of the lower Court.”

14. In the present case, learned Single Judge noticed that the petitioner was  

bonafide  in  pursuing  the  matter  before  the  different  courts  which  have  no  

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jurisdiction and that the consent order dated 10.8.1977 was obtained from the  

Land  Tribunal  by  suppressing  facts  and  thereby  playing  fraud  upon  the  

Tribunal.   The  Division  Bench  also  approved  the  approach  of  the  learned  

Single  Judge,  who  considered  the  matter  in  the  proper  perspective.   Since  

condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the Court and the discretion so  

exercised is not perverse, interference with the order of the Division Bench is  

not called for.  We find no merit in this petition.  The Special Leave Petition is  

accordingly dismissed.

SLP (C) No. 24892/2004

Application for substitution is allowed.

In view of the order passed in SLP(C)No. 22377/2004 this petition is  

also dismissed.

……………………………………………….J.      ( G.S. SINGHVI )

……………………………………………….J.         ( SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA)

NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 22, 2011.

 

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