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      REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 242 OF 2012

B.D. Khunte …Appellant

Versus

Union of India & Ors. …Respondents

WITH  

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2328 OF 2014            (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8457 of 2014

             Crl. M.P. No.15455 of 2014)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

Criminal Appeal No.242 of 2012:

1. High Court of  Delhi  has,  while  dismissing writ  petition  

No.4652 of 2010 filed by the appellant, affirmed the orders  

passed by the Armed Forces  Tribunal,  New Delhi  and that  

passed  by  the  Summary  General  Court Martial holding the

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appellant guilty for an offence punishable under Section 69  

of the Army Act read with Section 302 of the Ranbir Penal  

Code and sentencing him to undergo imprisonment for life  

besides dismissal from service.   

2. Enrolled on 30th July, 2004, the appellant was posted at  

Razdan  in  Baramulla  Sector  of  the  State  Jammu  and  

Kashmir.  Deceased  Sub  Randhir  Singh  was  serving  as  a  

Senior  JCO/Post  Commander  at  the  very  same  place  of  

posting. The prosecution case is that on 28th June, 2006 at  

about  9.30  p.m.  the  appellant  while  on  guard  duty  shot  

Subedar (AIG) Randhir Singh dead with a 5.56 Insas Rifle  

issued to him. FIR No.137 of 2006 about the incident was  

lodged  by  the  Brigade  Commander  concerned  with  the  

jurisdictional police Station at Bandipur who after completing  

its investigation of the incident filed a charge sheet against  

the  appellant  before  the  Jurisdictional  Magistrate  for  

commitment  of  the  case  to  the  Court  of  Sessions  at  

Baramulla for trial.

3. The Court of Sessions at Baramulla in turn transferred  

the case to the Army Authorities for being dealt with under  

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the Army Act on an application filed before it by the GOC 15  

Corps.  A Summary General  Court  Martial  was accordingly  

convened  for  the  trial  of  the  appellant  who  found  the  

appellant guilty for the commission of offences punishable  

under Section 69 of the Army Act and Section 302 of the  

Ranbir  Penal  Code  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  

imprisonment for life and dismissal from service. Statutory  

remedies  under  the  Army  Act,  1950  having  proved  

ineffective, the appellant filed OA No.5 of 2009 before the  

Armed Forces Tribunal,  Principal  Bench, New Delhi,  which  

was heard and dismissed by the Tribunal by its order dated  

27th August,  2009.  The  appellant  then  filed  Writ  Petition  

No.4652 of 2010 before the High Court of Delhi which too  

failed and was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High  

Court by its order dated 5th July, 2011. The present appeal  

assails the correctness of the judgment passed by the High  

Court  and  that  passed  by  the  Armed  Forces  Appellate  

Tribunal. It also challenges the conviction of the appellant  

for the offence of murder and the sentence awarded to him  

by the Summary General Court Martial.   

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4. Mr. Sisodia, senior counsel appearing for the appellant,  

raised  a  short  point  before  us.  He  contended  that  the  

appellant was, in the facts and circumstances of the case,  

entitled to the benefit of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the  

IPC. He argued that according to appellant’s version he was  

on 28th June, 2006 resting in his bunk after lunch when the  

deceased Sub Randhir Singh came to the appellant’s cot in  

an inebriated state, slapped him mildly twice and asked the  

appellant to follow him. Thinking that he was being called for  

some kind of duty, the appellant followed the deceased to  

the store room where the deceased bolted the door from  

inside  and  asked  the  appellant  to  remove  his  pant  

suggesting thereby that the deceased intended to sodomise  

the appellant.  When the appellant  declined,  the deceased  

punched him and kicked him repeatedly and asked him to  

put up his hand and hold the side beams of the top berth of  

the double bunk in the store room. The appellant’s further  

case is that the deceased thereafter made unwelcome and  

improper  advances  like  kissing  his  body,  cheeks  and  

stomach. While this was going on, two other personnel viz.  

Hadgal Vilas and Anil Gadge knocked at the door of the store  

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room. The deceased opened the store room door and asked  

them to go away and shut the door again only to continue  

the  appellant’s  torture  for  half  an  hour.  The  appellant  

somehow managed to free himself and return to his barrack,  

shaken and crying inconsolably. He is alleged to have shared  

his  grief  and  sorrow  about  the  whole  episode  with  his  

colleagues and immediate superior officers. No formal report  

was, however, lodged by the appellant before the superior  

officers,  although according to the appellant,  the superior  

officers pacified and advised the appellant to remain calm  

and keep his cool. The appellant’s further case is that he and  

his  colleagues  planned  to  gather  near  the  water  heating  

point in the evening and beat up the deceased. With that  

resolve he performed his administrative tasks during the day  

till  it  was time for him to go for  night picket  guard duty  

commencing at 2000 hrs. along with Hadgal Villas carrying  

his service weapon duly loaded as the place where he was  

posted was an operational area. The appellant’s version is  

that  after taking early dinner he reached his place of night  

guard  duty.  While  on  duty  he  saw someone  approaching  

him.  As per the prevailing drill and procedure the appellant  

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claims to have challenged the approaching person, but the  

person  paid  no  heed  to  the  warning  and  continued  to  

approach till  the appellant  could recognise him to be Sub  

Randhir Singh. Seeing the deceased and still seething with  

anger  he opened fire  upon him from his  service weapon.  

Sub Randhir Singh was hit and dropped dead on the spot.  

The  appellant  was  immediately  taken  into  custody  

handcuffed and tied to the cot in the barrack.  Investigation  

by the local police into the incident commenced leading to  

his trial by the Summary General Court Martial in which he  

was found guilty for the murder of Sub Randhir Singh and  

sentenced as mentioned earlier.

5. The above factual backdrop, argued Mr. Sisodia, was to  

bring the appellant’s case within Exception 1 to Section 300  

of  the Indian Penal  Code.  It  was contended that  the day  

time incident in the store room had so deeply shaken the  

appellant that he was gravely and suddenly provoked when  

the appellant saw the deceased approaching the picket in  

the evening. Mr. Sisodia argued that although there was a  

time  gap  of  several  hours  between  the  attempted  

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commission of an unnatural offence upon the appellant and  

the time when he was gunned down by the appellant, yet  

keeping in view the nature of the incident and the effect the  

same had upon the appellant the interval was not of much  

consequence  in  the  matter  of  restoring  the  appellant’s  

equilibrium.  The  appellant  was,  according  to  the  learned  

Counsel, so deeply disturbed and provoked into a state of  

complete loss of self-control that he had taken the extreme  

step of putting the deceased to death no sooner the latter  

came  before  him while  the  appellant  was  on  guard  duty  

armed with his service weapon. Mr. Sisodia contended that  

the question: whether an incident was sufficient to result in  

a provocation  so grave and sudden as would deprive  the  

person so provoked of the power of self-control will have to  

be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case.  He  

urged that the appellant being a young jawan serving in the  

Indian Army when beaten up to make him succumb to a  

possible  sexual  assault  was  bound  to  provoke  any  

reasonable  person  in  his  position  especially  when  the  

provocation came from a superior who instead of protecting  

him had tried to take undue advantage of his position. The  

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provocation resulting from the day time store room incident  

had  continued  despite  the  intervening  time  gap  as  the  

appellant had been all the while seething with anger. His act  

of  firing  at  the  deceased  no  sooner  he  saw  him  must,  

therefore, be taken in the context of the attendant facts and  

circumstances. It was urged that an incident of this nature  

taking  place  in  the  Army  is  usually  underplayed  by  the  

authorities by either denying the same totally or presenting  

a different picture which is neither true nor realistic.  

6. On behalf of the respondents, it was per contra argued  

by Mr.  Attri  that while  the question of  grave and sudden  

provocation  will  have  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  each  

individual case, the facts of the case at hand did not support  

the appellant’s plea for invocation of Exception 1 to Section  

300 of IPC. He urged that the test laid down by the decisions  

of this Court to determine whether the deceased had given  

any  provocation  to  the  accused,  whether  the  provocation  

was sudden and whether the same was sufficiently grave so  

as  to  deprive  the  offender  of  his  self-control  were  not  

satisfied in the case at hand. It was contended that even if  

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the  appellant’s  version  about  the  day  time  incident  was  

accepted, a long interval between the alleged provocation by  

the deceased and the murderous assault  by the appellant  

clearly  denuded  the  provocation  of  its  gravity  and  

spontaneity. A provocation like the one allegedly given by  

the deceased at 1 p.m. would have sufficiently cooled down  

after  long  hours  especially  when  even  according  to  the  

appellant he had attended to other duties in the intervening  

period. The fact that the appellant and his colleagues had  

decided that they will in the evening give a beating to the  

deceased when they assembled at the water heating point  

also showed that the provocation was far from being sudden  

and grave enough for the appellant to shoot the deceased  

down when he saw him in the evening.

7. We must at  the threshold point  out that there is  no  

challenge to the finding that it was the appellant who had  

shot the deceased using the weapon and the ammunition  

issued to him. The reason is obvious. Depositions of PWs 4,  

5, 7, 8-12 and 16-18 clearly support the prosecution case  

that it was the appellant who had shot the deceased-Randhir  

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Singh  and  that  he  was  moments  after  the  incident  seen  

standing near the former’s dead body with the service rifle in  

his hand. The evidence also proves that the appellant was  

caught by two Jawans on the spot and brought inside the OR  

Lines and tied to the bed using ropes. PW-19 has further  

deposed that  after  the appellant  was tied  to the bed the  

witness slapped the appellant and asked him as to why he  

shot  the deceased to which the appellant  replied “SAHAB  

NEY  MERE  KO  DUPHAAR  KO  MARA  THA,  ISLIYE  MAINE  

SAHIB  KO MAAR DIYA”  (Sahab  had  beaten  me  at  noon,  

therefore, I have killed Sahab).  The use of the rifle issued  

to the appellant and the fact that 18 empties recovered from  

the  spot  had  been  fired  from  the  said  weapon  is  also  

established  from the  evidence  of  PW-18.  That  18  bullets  

fired by the appellant had pierced the body of the deceased  

is  also  not  in  dispute.   Any  argument  to  discredit  this  

overwhelming evidence  or  dispute  the involvement  of  the  

appellant in the shooting incident would have been specious  

and futile to say the least. That is perhaps the reason why  

no  attempt  was  made  by  Mr.  Sisodia  to  argue  that  the  

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incident did not involve the appellant or that he was falsely  

implicated.    

8. The  only  question,  as  seen  earlier,  is  whether  the  

incident that took place around 1400 hrs. in the store room  

could mitigate the offence committed by the appellant. The  

answer  to  that  question  would  in  turn  depend  upon  the  

nature  of  the  incident  and  whether  the  same  would  

constitute grave and sudden provocation for the appellant to  

have shot the deceased long after the store room incident  

had taken place.  

9. That an incident took place at 1400 hrs. in the store  

room  cannot  be  denied.  Depositions  of  PWs.  11  and  13  

support the appellant's case that some incident had indeed  

taken place which had disturbed the appellant for he was  

found crying over the same. When asked as to why he was  

upset and crying, the appellant had, according to the said  

two witnesses, told them that the deceased had beaten him.  

To the same effect is the deposition of PW-19, according to  

whom, the appellant was in the company of the deceased in  

a room at around 1400 hrs. where the appellant was crying.  

Later that day when the appellant met the witness near the  

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water heating point and was asked as to why he was crying  

the appellant is said to have replied “SAHAB NEY MERE KO  

BAHUT MARA AUR PANT KHOLNEY KO BATAYA AUR MERE  

MANA KARNE PAR MUJHE PHIR PITA” (Sahab beat me up  

and asked me to open my pant and on my refusal to do so  

beat me again).    

10. Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  appellant's  version  gets  

sufficient  support  from  the  prosecution  witnesses  

themselves that an incident did take place at 1400 hrs. in  

the  store  room  in  which  the  appellant  was  beaten  and  

humiliated.  There  is,  however,  no  evidence  nor  is  it  the  

appellant's case that the deceased had actually sodomised  

him.  Even  PW-19  deposed  that  the  appellant  had  not  

complained of having been sodomised by the deceased. The  

High Court has also taking note of this aspect held that while  

the  physical  assault  on  the  appellant  had  humiliated  the  

appellant,  but  there  was  nothing  to  show  that  he  was  

actually  sodomised.  Whether  or  not  the  deceased  had  

sodomised  the  appellant  is  not  material.  The  question  is  

whether an incident had taken place.  If so, did the same  

constitute grave and sudden provocation?  What is proved  

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by the evidence on record is that the deceased had, by his  

conduct, humiliated the appellant to an extent that he felt  

deeply disturbed and was seen crying by his colleagues in  

whom he had confided  by telling  them the  cause  for  his  

distress.   

11. What is critical for a case to fall under Exception 1 to  

Section 300 IPC is that the provocation must not only be  

grave  but  sudden  as  well.  It  is  only  where  the  following  

ingredients of Exception 1 are satisfied that an accused can  

claim  mitigation  of  the  offence  committed  by  him  from  

murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder:

(1) The  deceased  must  have  given  provocation  to  the  accused.

(2) The provocation so given must have been grave.

(3) The  provocation  given  by  the  deceased  must  have  been sudden.

(4) The  offender  by  reason  of  such  grave  and  sudden  provocation must have been deprived of his power of  self-control; and

(5) The offender  must  have killed the deceased or  any  other  person  by  mistake  or  accident  during  the  continuance of the deprivation of the power of self- control.

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12. Applying the above tests to the case at hand there is  

no  gainsaying  that  an  able  bodied  youthful  Jawan  when  

physically  assaulted by his  superior  may be in a state  of  

provocation.   The  gravity  of  such  a  provocation  may  be  

heightened if the physical beating was meant to force him to  

submit  to  unnatural  carnal  intercourse  to  satisfy  the  

superior's  lust.  The  store  room  incident  involving  the  

appellant and the deceased is alleged to have taken place  

when the deceased had bolted the door of the store room to  

keep  out  any  intruder  from  seeing  what  was  happening  

inside. By any standard the act of a superior to humiliate  

and force his subordinate in a closed room to succumb to  

the  lustful  design  of  the  former  was  a  potent  recipe  for  

anyone  placed  in  the  appellant’s  position  to  revolt  and  

retaliate  against  the  treatment  being  given  to  him.  What  

may have happened inside the store room if the appellant  

had indeed revolted and retaliated against the unbecoming  

conduct  of  the  deceased  is  a  matter  of  conjecture.  The  

appellant  or  any  one  in  his  position  may  have  retaliated  

violently to the grave peril of his tormentor.   The fact of the  

matter,  however,  is  that  the  appellant  appears  to  have  

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borne  the  assault  without  any  retaliation  against  the  

deceased-superior  and somehow managed to escape from  

the  room.  The  critical  moment  when  the  appellant  could  

perhaps loose  his  cool  and equilibrium to take retaliatory  

action  against  the  deceased  was  thus  allowed  to  pass  

uneventfully,  grave  and  sudden  provocation  for  any  such  

action notwithstanding.

13. All  that  the  evidence  proves  is  that  after  the  said  

incident the appellant was seen crying and depressed and  

when asked by his colleagues he is said to have narrated his  

tale of humiliation at the hands of the deceased.  There is no  

evidence to prove that after the incident aforementioned the  

appellant had continued to suffer a prolonged spell of grave  

provocation.  By their  nature  such provocation  even  when  

sudden and grave cool off with passage of time often lapsing  

into  what  would  become  a  motive  for  taking  revenge  

whenever  an  opportunity  arises.  That  appears  to  have  

happened in the present case also for the appellant's version  

is  that  he and his  colleagues  had planned to  avenge the  

humiliation by beating up the deceased in the evening when  

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they all assemble near the water heating point. That apart,  

the appellant attended to his normal duty during the day  

time  and  after  the  evening  dinner,  went  to  perform  his  

guard  duty  at  2100  hrs.  All  these  circumstances  do  not  

betray  any  signs  of  grave  leave  alone  grave  and sudden  

provocation to have continued haunting the appellant and  

disturbing  his  mental  equilibrium or  depriving  him of  self  

control  that is an essential  attribute of  grave and sudden  

provocation to qualify as a mitigating factor under Exception  

1 to Section 300 IPC.  

14. It was contended by Mr. Sisodia that although between  

the incident that happened at noon and the shooting of the  

deceased at 2130 hrs. were separated by nearly seven hours  

interval,  the  nature  of  the  provocation  continued  to  be  

grave within the meaning of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC.  

We  find  it  difficult  to  accept  that  submission.  Grave  

provocation  within  the  meaning  of  Exception  1  is  a  

provocation where judgment and reason take leave of the  

offender  and  violent  passion  takes  over.  Provocation  has  

been defined by Oxford Dictionary, as an action, insult, etc.  

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that is likely to provoke physical retaliation.  The term grave  

only  adds  an  element  of  virulent  intensity  to  what  is  

otherwise likely to provoke retaliation.  

15. In R. v. Duffy [1949] 1 All E.R. 932 provocation has  

been explained as under:-

“The whole doctrine relating to provocation depends   on the fact that it cause, or may causes, a sudden   and temporary loss of self-control, whereby malice,   which is the formation of an intention to kill  or to   inflict  grievous  bodily  harm,  is  negatived.   Consequently,  where  the  provocation  inspires  an   actual  intention to kill,  or to inflict grievous bodily   harm,  the  doctrine  that  provocation  may  reduce   murder to manslaughter seldom applies.”    

16. The argument that the incident that took place around  

noon on that day was a grave provocation that continued to  

provoke the appellant right through the day till 9.30 evening  

when the appellant shot the deceased, does not, therefore,  

appeal to us, not only because the appellant had settled for  

a lesser act of retaliation like beating of the deceased in the  

evening  by  him and his  colleagues  when they  assembled  

near the water heating point, but also because the appellant  

had performed his normal duties during the day time and  

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even  in  the  evening  except  that  he  and  some  of  his  

colleagues appear to have planned beating up the deceased.  

17. This  Court  was  in  K.M.  Nanavati  v.  State  of   

Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605 dealing with a somewhat  

similar question.  In that case the wife of the accused had  

confessed her  illicit  intimacy with  the deceased when the  

deceased was not present. The prosecution case as proved  

at the trial  was that after  the confession of the wife, the  

accused had driven her and the children to a cinema and left  

them there, gone to his ship to take a revolver loaded with  

six rounds and driven his car to the office of the deceased  

and then to his  flat,  gone to his  bed room and shot him  

dead.   This Court held that  between 1.30 p.m. when the  

deceased  left  his  house  and 4.20  p.m.  when the  murder  

took  place  there  was  a  gap  of  three  hours  which  was  

sufficient time for him to regain his self control even if he  

had not regained it earlier. The following passage from the  

decision  is  significant  when  it  deals  with  the  expression  

grave within the meaning of Exception 1 to Section 300 IPC:

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“86. Bearing these principles in mind, let us look at   the facts of this case. When Sylvia confessed to her   husband that she had illicit intimacy with Ahuja, the   latter was not present. We will assume that he had   momentarily lost his self-control. But, if his version   is true — for the purpose of this argument we shall   accept that what he has said is true — it shows that   he was only thinking of the future of his wife and   children and also of asking for an explanation from  Ahuja for his conduct. This attitude of the accused   clearly indicates that he had not only regained his   self-control, but, on the other hand, was planning for   the future. Then he drove his wife and children to a   cinema, left them there, went to his ship, took a re- volver on a false pretext, loaded it with six rounds,   did some official business there, and drove his car to   the office of Ahuja and then to his flat, went straight   to  the  bedroom of  Ahuja  and  shot  him dead.  Be- tween 1.30 p.m., when he left his house, and 4.20  p.m., when the murder took place, three hours had   elapsed, and therefore there was sufficient time for   him to regain his self-control, even if he had not re- gained  it  earlier.  On  the  other  hand,  his  conduct   clearly shows that the murder was a deliberate and   calculated one. Even if any conversation took place   between the accused and the deceased in the man- ner described by the accused — though we do not   believe that — it does not affect the question, for the   accused  entered  the  bedroom of  the  deceased  to   shoot him. The mere fact that before the shooting   the  accused  abused  the  deceased  and  the  abuse  provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceiv- ably be a provocation for the murder. We, therefore,   hold that the facts of the case do not attract the pro- visions of Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Indian   Penal Code.”

18. The  position  in  the  case  at  hand  is  no  different.  

Between 1400 hrs. when the appellant was given a grave  

provocation and 2130 hrs., the time when the appellant shot  

the  deceased  there  were  seven  hours  which  period  was  

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sufficient for the appellant to cool down. A person who is  

under a grave and sudden provocation can regain his cool  

and composure.  Grave provocation after all is a momentary  

loss of one’s capacity to differentiate between what is right  

and what is not. So long as that critical moment does not  

result  in  any  damage,  the  incident  lapses  into  realm  of  

memories to fuel his desire to take revenge and thus act a s  

a motivation for the commission of a crime in future.  But  

any such memory  of  a  past  event  does  not  qualify  as  a  

grave  and  sudden  provocation  for  mitigating  the  offence.  

The beating and humiliation which the accused had suffered  

may  have  acted  as  a  motive  for  revenge  against  the  

deceased who had caused such humiliation but that is not  

what falls in Exception 1 to Section 300 of the IPC which is  

identical to Exception 1 to Section 300 of the Ranbir Penal  

Code applicable to the State of Jammu & Kashmir where the  

offence in question was committed by the appellant.   We  

may,  in  this  regard,  extract  the  following  passage  from  

Mancini v. Director for Public Prosecutor [1941] 3 All   

E.R. 272 :

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“it is not all provocation that will reduce the crime of   murder  to manslaughter.  Provocation to  have that   result,  must  be  such  as  temporarily  deprive  the   person  provoked  of  the  power  of  self-control  as   result of which he commits the unlawful act which   caused death. The test to be applicable is that of the   effect of the provocation on a reasonable man, as   was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex   v.  Lesbini  so  that  an  unusually  excitable  or   pugnacious  individual  is  not  entitled  to  rely  on  provocation  which  would  not  have  led  ordinary   person to act as he did. In applying the test, it is of   particular  importance  to  (a)  consider  whether  a  sufficient interval has elapsed since the provocation  to allow a reasonable man time to cool, and (b) to   take  into  account  the  instrument  with  which  the  homicide was effected, for to retort, in the heat of   passion induced by provocation, by a simple blow, is   very  different  thing  from making  use  of  a  deadly   instrument  like  a  concealed  dagger.  In  short,  the   mode  of  resentment  must  bear  a  reasonable   relationship to the provocation if the offence is to be  reduced to manslaughter.”

19. The contention that the day time incident being such  

that  the  appellant  could  get  a  grave  provocation,  the  

moment  he  saw  the  deceased  coming  towards  the  place  

where he was on guard duty, also has not appealed to us.  It  

is not the case of the appellant that the deceased had come  

close to him or tried to act fresh with him so as to give to  

the appellant another provocation that could possibly justify  

his losing self-control and using his weapon. The appellant's  

version that he had called halt as all Jawans on guard duty  

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are trained to do in operational areas but when the person  

approaching him did not stop and when he recognised the  

person to be none other than the deceased shot him, clearly  

suggests  that  the  deceased  was  not  in  close  physical  

proximity  to  the appellant.  The appellant  may have been  

angry with the deceased for his act of misdemeanour.  But  

any such anger would only constitute a motive for taking  

revenge upon the deceased.  It could not be described as a  

grave  and  sudden  provocation  for  which  deceased  could  

have  been  shot  the  moment  he  came  in  front  of  the  

appellant.  The deceased, at any rate, could not be accused  

of having given any provocation to the appellant by moving  

towards the place where the appellant was on guard duty for  

the deceased was well within the sphere of his duty to keep  

an eye on those who were performing the guard duty. The  

very act of appearance of the deceased near the picket/post  

where  the  appellant  was  on  duty  could  not,  therefore,  

constitute a provocation within the meaning of Exception 1  

to Section 300 IPC.

20. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.  

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 Criminal Appeal No.2328 OF 2014 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 8457 of 2014 Crl M.P.  No.15455/2014)

Delay condoned

Leave granted.

In  view  of  our  order  of  even  date  passed  in  Criminal  

Appeal No.242 of 2012, this appeal, filed by the appellant-B.D.  

Khunte, also fails and is, hereby, dismissed.

………………………………….…..…J.          (T.S. THAKUR)

………………………………….…..…J.          (ADARSH KUMAR GOEL)

     …………………………..……………..J. New Delhi,   (R. BANUMATHI) October 30, 2014

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