16 July 2012
Supreme Court
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AZIM AHMAD KAZMI Vs STATE OF U.P.

Bench: G.S. SINGHVI,SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA
Case number: C.A. No.-002006-002006 / 2003
Diary number: 10326 / 2002
Advocates: Vs ANIL KUMAR JHA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL      APPEAL      NO.      2006      OF     2003    

AZIM AHMAD KAZMI AND ORS.         … APPELLANTS

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. & ANR.     … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL      APPEAL      NO.      2007      OF     2003    

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

SUDHANSU      JYOTI      MUKHOPADHAYA,J.    

1. These  appeals  have  been  preferred  against  the  

judgment dated 7.12.2001 passed by the Division Bench  

of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad whereby  

the  writ  petition  preferred  by  lessee  –  Azim  Ahmad  

Kazmi  and  Ors.  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  “the  

appellants”) was dismissed with certain observations.

2. A  lease­deed  of  the  demised  premises  was  

executed  by  the  respondent­State  in  favour  of  the  

appellants on 19th March, 1996 followed by a renewal  

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of  lease  dated  17th  July,  1998.   The  State  

Government  vide  order  dated  15th  December,  2000  

cancelled the lease deed and proceeded to resume the  

demised  premises  which  was  informed  to  the  

appellants  by  the  District  Magistrate,  Allahabad  on  

11th  January,  2001.   The  objection  preferred  by  the  

appellants  was  rejected  on  24th  August,  2001.   The  

appellants  preferred  a  writ  petition  against  the  

order  dated  15th  December,  2000  passed  by  the  State  

Government,  the  notice  dated  11th  January,  2001  and  

the  order  dated  24th  August,  2001  passed  by  the  

District  Magistrate,  Allahabad  which  was  dismissed  

but  with  the  observation  that  the  State  Government  

is  not  entitled  to  take  forcible  possession  though  

it  may  take  possession  of  the  demised  premises  in  

accordance  with   the  procedure  established  by  law.  

The  appellants  are  aggrieved  against  the  dismissal  

of  the  writ  petition  whereby  the  order  of  

cancellation of lease deed was affirmed, whereas the  

State  Government  is  aggrieved  against  the  last  

portion  of  the  order  whereunder  it  was  mentioned  

that  the  State  Government  is  not  entitled  to  take  

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forcible possession though it may take possession in  

accordance with the procedure established by law.

3. The  dispute  relates  to  Plot  No.  59,  Civil  

Station, Allahabad having an area of 1 acre and 4272  

sq.  yards  (9112  sq.  yards  or  7618  sq.  meters).  

Initially, a lease of aforesaid plot was granted in  

favour of one Thomas Crowby for a period of 50 years  

on 11th January, 1868 by the then Secretary of State  

for  India  in  Council  and  it  was  signed  by  the  

Commissioner of Allahabad Division.    A fresh lease  

was executed in favour of his successor for another  

period of 50 years on 12.4.1923 which was to operate  

from  1.1.1918.   With  the  permission  of  the  

Collector,  Allahabad,  the  successors  of  the  lessee  

transferred their lease hold rights in favour of one  

Purshottam  Das  in   the  year  1945.   According  to  

appellants  on  31st  October,  1958,   the  legal  

representative  of   said  Purshottam  Das  transferred  

the lease­hold rights in favour of  appellant no. 7­

Smt.  Shakira  Khatoon  Kazmi,   appellant  no.  6­  Smt.  

Sabira  Khatoon  Kazmi  and  their  mother­Smt.  Maimoona  

Khatoon  Kazmi.     The  appellant  no.  1­ Azim Ahmad  

Kazmi,  appellant  no.  5­  Omar  Ahmad  Kazmi,  

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appellant  no.  2­  Shamim  Ahmad  Kazmi,  appellant  

no. 3­ Alim Ahmad Kazmi and appellant no. 4­ Maaz  

Ahmad  Kazmi  are  heirs  of  late  Smt.  Maimoona  

Khatoon Kazmi.  The lease, which had been granted on  

12th  April,  1923  expired  on  31st  December,  1967  but  

the  same  was  not  renewed  for  a  long  period.  

Subsequently,  a  fresh  lease  deed  was  executed  on  

behalf  of  Governor  of  Uttar  Pradesh  in  favour  of  

some  of  the  appellants  and  their  ancestors  on  19th  

March,  1996  for  a  period  of  30  years  which  was  to  

operate  with  effect  from  1.1.1996.   This  deed  

contained  a  clause  that  the  lease  deed  may  be  

renewed  for  two  successive  terms  of  30  years   each  

but  the  total  period  shall  not  exceed   90  years  

including the original term.      The period of this  

deed expired on 31st December, 1997 and on 17th July,  

1998  which  was  renewed  for  a  further  period  of  30  

years  w.e.f.  1st  January,  1998.   Subsequently  the  

State  Government  passed  an  order  on  15th  December,  

2000 for cancelling the lease deed and resuming the  

possession of the plot in question.    The District  

Magistrate,  Allahabad,  thereafter  gave  a  notice  

dated 11th January, 2001 to the appellants intimating  

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them  that  the  State  Government  had  passed  an  order  

dated  15th  December,  2000  cancelling  the  lease  and  

resuming  possession  of  the  plot  in  question  as  the  

same was required for a pubic purpose.   The notice  

further  mentioned  that  the  appellants  should  remove  

the  structure  standing  on  the  plot  failing  which  

possession  will  be  taken  in  accordance  with  clause  

3(c)  of  the  lease  deed.   The  appellants  filed  an  

objection  against  the  notice  before  the  District  

Magistrate  on  2.2.2001.   They  further  claimed  to  

have  sent  an  objection  to  the  Chief  Minister  of  

Uttar Pradesh on 31.1.2001 praying for revocation of  

the order of the State Government dated 15.12.2000.  

The District Magistrate considered the objection and  

rejected  the  same  by  an  order  dated  24.8.2001.  A  

copy  of  the  aforesaid  order  along  with  cheques  

representing  the  compensation  for  the  building  

standing over the plot (cheques for total amount of  

Rs.10 lakhs) were served upon the appellants.   The  

respondent­State  tried  to  dispossess  the  lease  on  

1.9.2001 and their stand was that the possession of  

open land was taken.   It was at that stage when the  

writ petition was filed and a stay order was passed  

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by  High  Court  on  2nd  September,  2001  staying  the  

dispossession of the appellants.   The writ petition  

was subsequently dismissed on merit.  

4. Learned  counsel  appearing  for  the  lessees  

submitted that the State Government initially made a  

proposal  for  acquiring  disputed  plot  for  the  same  

purpose  in  accordance  with  the  Provisions  of  Land  

Acquisition  Act,  1894.  The  District  Magistrate,  

Allahabad, wrote a letter to the State Government on  

29th October, 1998 that looking to the area of  plot,  

the  estimated  amount  of  compensation,  including  30%  

solatium,  12%  additional  amount  and  interest,  etc.  

could come to rupees two crores and sixty two lakhs.  

The  said  proposal  was  not  accepted  by  the  State  

Government and was rejected by order dated 17th July,  

2000.   The State Government took possession of few  

other  Nazul  Lands  in  Allahabad  under  the  Land  

Acquisition  Act,  1894  wherein  a  good  amount  of  

compensation  was  paid  to  the  lessees.   It  was  

contended  that  if  the  State  Government  had  taken  a  

recourse  of  the  Provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  

Act,  1894  for  acquiring  the  plot  in  question,  the  

lessees  would  have  got  sufficient  compensation  and  

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not  by  opting  the  said  mode  the  lessees  have  been  

discriminated  against  and  consequently,   the  

impugned  order  of  the  State  Government  dated  15th  

December, 2000 is liable to be set aside.     In the  

past,  the  State  Government  had  not  taken  any  

recourse  to  resume  the  land  in  the  manner.   The  

State  Government  had  taken  over  the  possession  of  

the  land  much  prior  to  the  completion  of  period  of  

lease.   The order passed by the State Government on  

15th December, 2000 for cancellation of   lease   and  

a  resumption  of  possession  is  illegal  and  not  in  

accordance with the Government Grants Act, 1895.    

5. It  was  next  submitted  that  the  public  purpose,  

if  any,  existed  prior  to  17th  July,  1998  when  the  

lease  was  renewed  and  by  renewal  of  the  lease  the  

State Government is stopped from pleading that there  

is  a  public  purpose.   By  renewal  of  lease,  the  

lessee  legitimately  expected  that  they  will  remain  

in  occupation  for  30  years  from  1st  January.  1998,  

the date from which the lease was renewed.

6. Learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

respondent­State  submitted  that  the  existence  of  

public  purpose  is  not  a  new  development.   It  was  

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submitted that by letter dated 29th August, 1998, the  

District  Magistrate  informed  the  Special  Secretary  

to  the  State  Government,  he  had  given  the  estimate  

for  acquiring  the  property  under  the  Provisions  of  

the  Land  Acquisition  Act,  1894.     In  the  said  

letter,  the  reference  of  earlier  letters  including  

letter  dated  2nd  December,  1997  has  been  referred.  

Those letters shows that even before the renewal of  

the lease deed in favour of the lessees, taking over  

the  possession  of  property  for  extension  of  the  

Allahabad  High  Court  and  office  of  the  Advocate­

General, U.P. was seriously considered; it is wrong  

to  suggest  that  the  requirement  of  the  land  for  

public  purpose  was  not  in  existence  when  the  lease  

was renewed.

7. It  was  contended  on  behalf  of  the  respondent­

State that the lease has been cancelled and an order  

to  resumption  of  possession  has  been  passed  as  the  

plot  in  question  is  required  for  extension  of  the  

Allahabad  High  Court  as  also  for  extension  of  the  

office  of  Advocate  General,  U.P.     The  plot  is  

situated just in front of the gate of the High Court  

on the Kanpur Road and, therefore, most suitable and  

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ideal  place  for  the  aforesaid  purpose.   Several  

courts­room  and  chambers  for  the  judges  have  been  

constructed  in  the  past  but  there  has  been  no  

addition of office space with the result that there  

is  hardly  any  place  to  keep  the  records.   Even  

pending files are being kept by having a make shift  

and temporary arrangement by enclosing the verandas.  

Similarly,  there  is  an  acute  shortage  of  space  in  

the  office  of  Advocate­General.   There  is  no  place  

at  all  where  the  State  counsel  may  sit  and  do  the  

drafting work or for keeping the files. The grounds  

for passing of the order,  namely,  extension of the  

High  Court  and  extension  of  office  of  Advocate­

General is undoubtedly a public purpose and the same  

has  rightly  not  been  challenged  by  the  learned  

counsel for  the lessees.

8. It  was  further  contended  that  the  State  

Government having conferred power under Clause 3 (C)  

of  the  lease  deed,  as  the  plot  in  question  was  

required  for  public  purpose,  it  was  open  to  the  

State  Government  to  take  possession  of  the  land  in  

question on expiry of the one month notice.

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9. The  questions  which  requires  consideration  are  

(i)   whether  the  order  passed  by  the  State  

Government on 15th December, 2000 for cancellation of  

lease and resumption of possession is legally valid  

and (i) whether the State Government can dispossess  

the lessee in accordance with the Government Grants  

Act,  1895  without  resorting  to  other  procedure  

established by any other law.

10. There  is  clear  recital  in  the  lease  deed  

executed  in  favour  of  the  appellants  by  the  

Government of U.P. on 19th March, 1996 that the same  

is being done under the Government Grants Act, 1895.  

Clause 3 (C) of the deed reads as follows:

“3(C) That  if  the  demised  premises  are at any time required by the lessor  for  his  or  for  any  public  purpose  he  shall  have  the  right  to  give  one  month’s clear notice in writing to the  lessees  to  remove  any  building  standing  at  the  time  of  the   demised  premises  and  within  two  months  of  the  receipt  of  the  notice  to  take  possession  thereof  on  the   expiry  of  that  period  subject  however  to  the  condition  that  if  the  lessor  is  willing  to  purchase  the  building  on  the  demised  premises,   the  lessees  shall  be  paid  for  such  building  such  amount  as  may  be   determined  by  the  Secretary to Government of U.P. in the  Nagar Awas Department.”

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11. Sections 2 and 3 of the Government Grants Act,  

1895, have been amended by U.P. Act 13 of 1960 with  

a  retrospective  effect  and  the  substituted  Sections  

reads as follows:

“2.  (1)  Transfer  of  Property  Act,  1882,  not  to  apply  to  Government  Grants.  –  Nothing  contained  in  the  Transfer of Property Act, 1882,   shall  apply  or  be  deemed  ever  to  have  applied to any grant or other transfer  of  land  or  of  any  interest  therein,  heretofore  made  or  thereafter  to  be  made,  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  Government  to  or  in  favour  of  any  person  whomsoever;  and  every  such  grant  and  transfer  shall  be  construed  and take effect as if the said Act had  not been passed.

(2) U.P.  Tenancy  Act,  1939  and  Agra  Tenancy  Act,  1926  not  to  affect  certain leases made by or on behalf of  the Government. ­ Nothing contained in  the  U.P.  Tenancy  Act,  1939,   or  the  Agra  Tenancy  Act,  1926,   shall  affect  or  be  deemed  to  have   ever  affected  any  rights,  created,  conferred  or  granted,  whether  before  or  after  the  date  of  the  passing  of  the  Government  Grants (U.P. Amendment), Act, 1960, by  leases  of  land  by,  or  on  behalf  of,  the  Government  in  favour  of  any  person,  and  every  such  creation,  conferment  or;  grant  shall  be  construed  and  take  effect,  notwithstanding  anything  to  the  contrary contained in the U.P. Tenancy  Act,  1939  or  the  Agra  Tenancy  Act,  1926.

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(3) Certain  leases  made  by  or  on  behalf  of  the  Government  to  take  effect  according  to  their  tenor.  ­  All  provisions,  restrictions,  conditions  and  limitations  contained  in  any  such  creation,  conferment  or  grant  referred  to  in  Section  2,  shall  be  valid  and  take  effect  according  to  their  tenor;  any  decree  or  direction  of a Court of law or any rule of law,  statute  or  enactments  of  the  Legislature,  to  the  contrary  notwithstanding:

Provided  that  nothing  in  this  Section  shall  prevent,  or  be  deemed  ever  to  have  prevented  the  effect  of  any  enactment  relating  to  the  acquisition  of  property,  land  reforms  or  the  imposition  of  ceiling  on  agricultural lands.”

12. This Court in the case of  The State of U.P. vs.  

Zahoor Ahmad and Another,  reported in   AIR 1973 SC  

2520 held as follows:­

“ Section  3  of  the  Government  Grants  Act  declares  the  unfettered  discretion  of  the  Government  to  impose  such  conditions  and  limitations  as  it  thinks  fit,  no  matter  what  the  general  law  of  the  land  be.   The  meaning  of  Section  2  and  3  of  the  Government  Grants  Act  is that the scope of that Act is not  limited  to  affecting  the  provisions  of  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act  only.   The Government has unfettered  discretion to impose any conditions,  limitations,  or  restrictions  in  its  grants,  and  the  right,  privileges  and obligations of the grantee would  be  regulated according to the terms  

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of  the  grant,  notwithstanding   any  provisions  of  any  statutory  or  common law.”

13. Clause  3(C)  of  the  lease  deed  clearly  confers  

power  upon  the  lessor,  State  of  U.P.  that  if  the  

plot in question is required by the State Government  

for  its  own  purpose  or  for  any  public  purpose,  it  

shall  have  the  right  to  give  one  month’s  notice  in  

writing  to  the  lessees  to  remove  any  building  

standing on the plot and to take possession thereof  

on  the  expiry  of  the  two  months’  from  the  date  of  

service of notice.   There is a further condition in  

the clause that if the lessor is willing to purchase  

the building standing on the plot, the lessee shall  

be  paid  such  amount  as  may  be  determined  by  the  

Secretary  to  Government  of  U.P.  in  the   Nagar  Awas  

Department.

14. The deed of renewal executed at 17th July, 1998  

is a very short one and recites that the renewal is  

being  done  on  the  same  terms  and  conditions  

including the clause for re­entry as is continued in  

the  original  lease  deed  dated  19th  March,  1996  and  

the terms and conditions of the aforesaid deed would  

be binding upon the parties.  The clause of re­entry  

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was  not  introduced  for  the  first  time  in  the  deed  

executed in 1996 but also contained   as one of the  

clause  in  lease  deed  dated  12th  April,  1923  wherein  

it  was  stipulated  that  if  the  Government  shall  at  

any time require to re­enter on the demised plot it  

can do so, on paying the cost of the building that  

may be on the site and that the lessee shall have no  

further  claim  of  any  sort  against  the  Government.  

In  fact,  in  the  deed  executed  on  19th  March,  1996,  

the  right  of  re­entry  has  been  fettered  by  the  

condition “required by the lessor for his or for any  

public  purpose”.     As  the  State  Government  is  

resuming  the  leased  property  for  his  or  for  any  

public  purpose,  which  under  the  terms  of  the  grant  

it has absolute power to do, the order passed by it  

on  15th  December,  2000  is  perfectly  valid  and  does  

not suffer from any illegality.

15. The  Division  Bench  noticed  the  fact  that  in  

paragraph 7 of the   Supplementary counter affidavit  

filed in reply to the amendment application,   it is  

averred that the properties, reference of which has  

been made in para 23 of the writ petition   were in  

fact  acquired  at   the  instance  of  the   Allahabad  

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Development  Authority  for  building  of  residential  

and  commercial   complex  and  for  development  of  the  

area  and  the  proceeding  for  acquisition   had  

commenced  on  the  basis  of  the  proposals  received  

from  Allahabad  Development  Authority.     In  para  8  

of  the  Supplementary  counter  affidavit,  it  is  

averred that when Nazul plot No. 13, Civil Station,  

Allahabad,  which  is  situated  in  Civil  Lines  Area,  

was resumed by the State Government for the purpose  

of  construction  of  a  bus  station,   the  same  was  

done  in  exercise  of  power  vested  with  it  in  a  

similar clause of the lease deed and no proceedings  

under  the  Land  Acquisition  Act  had  been  initiated.  

The  resumption  by  the   State  Government  in   the  

said  case  was  challenged  before  the  Division  Bench  

of the Allahabad High Court which was dismissed   on  

16th  December,  1999  and  the  Special  Leave  Petition  

No.  4329  of  2000  preferred  against  the  judgment  of  

the  High  Court  was  summarily  dismissed  by  this  

Court  on  7th  September,  2001.   Therefore,  the  

contention  of  the  lessee  that  it  was  for  the  first  

time  in  their  case  that  a  lease  had  been  cancelled  

and  the   plot  has  been  resumed  by  the   State  

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Government  under  the  terms  of  the  deed  is,  

therefore,   not  correct  and  a  similar  course  of  

action has been taken in the past also.   Therefore,  

the violation of Article 14 cannot be alleged in the  

present case.

16. The  first  question  is  thereby  answered  in  

negative,  against  the  appellants  and  in  favour  of  

the respondents.

17. For  taking  possession,  the  State  Government  is  

required to follow the law, if any, prescribed.  

In  the  absence  of  any  specific  law,  the  State  

Government may take possession by filing a suit.  

Under  the  Provisions  of  the  Land  Acquisition  

Act,  1894,  if  the  State  Government  decides  to  

acquire  the  property  in  accordance  with  the  

provisions  of  the  said  Act,  no  separate  

proceedings  have  to  be  taken  for  getting  

possession of the land.   It may even invoke the  

urgency  provisions  contained  in  Section  17  of  

the  said  Act  and  the  Collector  may  take  

possession  of  the  land  immediately  after  the  

publication of the notice under Section 9.   In  

such  a  case,  the  person  in  possession  of  the  

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land  acquired  would  be  dispossessed  forthwith.  

However,  if  the  Government  proceeds  under  the  

terms  of  the  Government  Grants  Act,  1895  then  

what procedure is to be followed.   Section 3 of  

Government Grants Act, 1895, stipulates that the  

lease made by or on behalf of the Government to  

take  effect  according  to  their  tenor  –  All  

provisions,  restrictions,  conditions  and  

limitations  contained  in  any  such  creation,  

conferment  or  grant  referred  to  any  Section  2,  

shall  be  valid  and  take  effect  according  to  

their tenor; any decree or direction of a Court  

of Law or any rule of law, statute or enactments  

of the Legislature, to the contrary.

18. In  the  case  of  The  State  of  U.P.  vs.  Zahoor  

Ahmad and Another(supra),   this Court held that the  

Section  3  of  the  Act  declares  the  unfettered  

discretion  of   the  Government  to  impose  such  

conditions  and  limitation  as  it  thinks   fit,  no  

matter  what  the  general  law  of  land  be.     From  

Clause 3(C) of the deed,  it is clear that the State  

of U.P.  while granting lease made it clear that  if  

the demised premises are at any time required by the  

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lessor for his or for  any public purpose,  he shall  

have the right to give one month’s   clear notice to  

the  lessee  to  remove  any  building  standing  at  the  

time of the demised  property and within two months’  

of  the  receipt  of  the  notice  to  take  possession  

thereof on the expiry of that period subject to the  

condition that the lessor is willing to purchase the  

property on the  demised premises,  the lessee shall  

be paid for such amount as may be determined by the  

Secretary  to  the  Government  of  U.P.  in  the   Nagar  

Awas Department.

19. In the case in hand,  the District Magistrate ,  

Allahabad High Court issued a notice on 11th January,  

2001  to  the  appellants   intimating  that  the  State  

Government  had  passed   order  on  15th  December,  2000  

cancelling lease deed and resuming possession of the  

disputed  property  as  the  same  was  required  for  

public  purpose.     The  appellants  sent  an  

application  but  instead  of  filing  objections  before  

the  State  Government  represented  before  the  Chief  

Minister  of  U.P.  on  31st  January,  2001  praying  for  

revocation  of  order  dated  15th  December,  2000.  

Objection  was  filed  before  the  District  Magistrate,  

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Allahabad  who  after  consideration  of  the  objection  

rejected  the  same  by  order  dated  24th  August,  2001  

enclosing  therein  a  cheque  for  rupees  ten  lakhs  

towards  compensation  for  the  building  standing  over  

the  plot.   The  appellants  refused  to  accept  the  

cheques.   The  respondents  thereafter  dispossessed  

the  appellants  from  the  part  of  the  land  on  1st  

September, 2001.

20. Under  Clause  3(C)  of  the  lease  deed,   the  

respondent­State  was  permitted  resumption  of  the  

land  which  required  for  its  own  use  or  for  public  

purpose  and  after  giving  one  month’s   clear  notice  

in  writing  is  entitled  to  remove  any  building  

standing  at  the  time  on   the  demised  premises  and  

within two months of   the receipt of the notice to  

take  possession  thereof  subject  to  the  condition  

that   if  the  lessor  is  willing  to   purchase  the  

building  of  the  demised  premises   required  to  pay  

the lessee the amount for such   building as may be  

determined by the Secretary to Government of U.P. in  

the  Awas  Department.   In  the  case  in  hand  such  

procedure  was  followed.  Therefore,  we  are  of  the  

view  that  there  is  no  other  procedure  or  law  

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required to be followed, as a special procedure for  

resumption  of  land  has  been  laid  down  under  the  

lease  deed.   As  a  special  procedure  for  resumption  

of land is prescribed under the lease deed, the High  

Court  was  not  correct  in  holding  that  the  State  

Government  cannot  dispossess  the  appellants  but  can  

take  possession  according  to  the  procedure  adopted  

by any other law.   The finding of the High Court to  

such extent is set aside but the rest portion of the  

judgment affirming the order of the State Government  

dated  15th  December,  2000,  the  notice  dated  11th  

January,  2001  and  an  order  passed  by  the  District  

Magistrate dated 24th August, 2001 is upheld.    The  

appeal  preferred  by  appellants  Azim  Ahmad  Kazmi  &  

Ors.   is dismissed and the appeal preferred by   the  

State  of  U.P.  and  Anr.  stands  disposed  of  with  

aforesaid  observations.     The  interim  order  of  

stay is vacated.  The State Government is allowed to  

take  possession  of  the  demised  premises  for  

extension  of  High  Court  building  etc.,  as  decided.  

However, the appellants  are given three months time  

to hand over the possession of the land and building  

to  the  State  and,  if  so  necessary,   the  State  

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Government will issue a fresh cheque for rupees ten  

lakhs  in  favour  of  the   appellants,  if  earlier  

cheque  has  expired  and  not  encashed.   If  the  

appellants  fail  to  handover  the  possession  of  

demised premises or create any third party interest  

in  such  case  the  State  Government  and  the  District  

Magistrate,  Allahabad  in  particular  will  take  

forcible possession of the demised premises.

……………………………………………….J.      ( G.S. SINGHVI )

……………………………………………….J.            ( SUDHANSU JYOTI  

MUKHOPADHAYA) NEW DELHI, JULY 16, 2012.

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