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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7728  OF 2012

Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan … Appellant

Versus

The State of Maharashtra & Ors. … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.:

1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment  

and  order  dated  22.9.2009,  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Bombay  

(Aurangabad  Bench)  in  Writ  Petition  No.3129  of  2009,  filed  by  

respondent no.5, challenging the caste certificate of the appellant.

2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this appeal are as  

follows:  

A. The  competent  authority  in  the  present  case,  issued  a  caste  

certificate dated 19.10.1989, after following due procedure, in favour  

of  the  appellant  stating  that  he  does  in  fact,  belong to  Bhil  Tadvi

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(Scheduled Tribes).  On the basis of the said certificate, the appellant  

was  appointed  as  Senior  Clerk  in  the  Municipal  Corporation  of  

Aurangabad  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the,  ‘Corporation’)  on  

6.2.1990,  against  the  vacancy  reserved  for  persons  under  the  

Scheduled  Tribes  category.   The  Corporation  referred  the  caste  

certificate of the appellant for the purpose of verification, to the Caste  

Certificate  Scrutiny  Committee  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the,  

“Scrutiny Committee”).  The Vigilance Cell attached to the Scrutiny  

Committee,  upon  conducting  vigilance  enquiry,  vide  order  dated  

29.12.1998, found that the appellant did, in fact, belong to Bhil Tadvi  

(Scheduled Tribes) and thus,  the said certificate was verified.  The  

Scrutiny Committee,  on the basis  of  the said report  and also other  

documents  filed  by  the  appellant  in  support  of  his  case,  issued  a  

validity certificate, dated 23.5.2000 to the appellant belonging to Bhil  

Tadvi  (Scheduled  Tribes).  After  the  lapse  of  a  period  of  9  years,  

respondent no.5 filed complaint dated 9.1.2009, through an advocate  

before the Scrutiny Committee, for the purpose of recalling the said  

validity  certificate,  on  the  ground  that  the  appellant  had  obtained  

employment  by  way  of  misrepresentation,  and  that  he  does  not  

actually  belong  to  the  Scheduled  Tribes  category.   In  fact,  the  

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appellant professed the religion of Islam and therefore, could not be a  

Scheduled Tribe.

B. The Scrutiny Committee rejected the said application vide order  

dated 13.3.2009, observing that it had no power to recall or to review  

a  caste  validity  certificate,  as  there  is  no  statutory  provision  that  

provides for the same.   

C. Aggrieved,  respondent  no.5  challenged  the  order  dated  

13.3.2009, by filing Writ Petition No.3129 of 2009 before the High  

Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench), praying for quashing of the  

order dated 13.3.2009, and directing the Scrutiny Committee to hold  

de novo enquiry, with respect to the appellant’s caste certificate. The  

appellant contested the said petition, denying all the allegations made  

by respondent  no.5.   Vide its  impugned judgment  and order  dated  

22.9.2009, the High Court disposed of the said writ petition without  

going into the merits of the case. However, while doing so, the High  

Court set aside the order dated 13.3.2009, and remitted the matter to  

the Scrutiny Committee, directing it to hear all the parties concerned  

in accordance with law, as regards the allegations made by respondent  

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no.5 in the complaint.  It further directed the Committee to decide the  

said matter within a period of 6 months.   

Hence, this present appeal.

3. Before proceeding further, it may also be pertinent to refer to  

certain subsequent developments.  

During the pendency of this appeal, this Court vide order dated  

20.11.2009,  granted  a  stay  with  respect  to  the  operation  of  the  

aforementioned impugned judgment.  Vide order dated 6.1.2012, the  

said  interim  order  was  modified,  to  the  extent  that  the  Scrutiny  

Committee  would  re-examine  the  case  on  merit,  without  being  

influenced by earlier proceedings before it,  and by giving adequate  

opportunity  to  the  parties  to  lead  evidence  in  support  of  their  

respective cases after which, the Scrutiny Committee would submit its  

report to this Court within a period of 3 months.  

4. Shri  A.V.  Savant,  learned  Senior  counsel,  appearing  for  the  

appellant has submitted that respondent no.5 does not belong to any  

reserved  category,  infact,  he  belongs  to  the  General  category,  and  

hence, he has no right or  locus standi,  to challenge the appellant’s  

certificate. Thus, the High Court committed an error by directing the  

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Scrutiny  Committee  to  entertain  the  complaint  filed  by respondent  

no.5.  It has further been submitted that, despite the directions given  

by this  Court,  the Scrutiny Committee failed to  ensure compliance  

with the principles of natural justice, as the appellant was denied the  

opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and no order was passed with  

respect to his application for recalling such witnesses for the purpose  

of  cross-examination,  which  has  no  doubt,  resulted  in  the  grave  

miscarriage of justice.  The affidavit filed by the Scrutiny Committee  

did not clarify, or make any specific statement with respect to whether  

or  not  the  appellant  was  permitted  to  cross-examine  witnesses.  It  

further, did not clarify whether the application dated 28.2.2012, filed  

by  the  appellant  to  re-call  witnesses  for  the  purpose  of  cross-

examination, has been disposed of.  Moreover, the procedure adopted  

by  the  Scrutiny  Committee  is  in  contravention  of  the  statutory  

requirements,  as  have  been  specified   under  the  Maharashtra  

Scheduled  Castes,  Scheduled  Tribes,  De-Notified  Tribes,  (Vimukta  

Jatis),  Nomadic  Tribes,  Other  Backward  Category  (Regulation  of  

Issuance  and  Verification  of)  Caste  Certificate  Act,  2000  

(Maharashtra Act No. XXIII of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as the,  

`Act  2001’),  and the Rules,  2003 which are  framed under  the Act  

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2001  and  therefore,  all  proceedings  hereby  stand  vitiated.   The  

appellant placed reliance upon several documents which are all very  

old and therefore,  their  authenticity should not  have been doubted.  

The earlier report submitted by the Vigilance Cell dated 29.12.1998,  

clearly  stated  that  the  traits  and  characteristics  of  the  appellant’s  

family, matched with those of Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribes).  The  

action  of  respondent  no.5  is  therefore,  completely  malifide  and  is  

intended, solely to harass the appellant, and the High Court committed  

grave error  in not  deciding the issue related to the  locus standi of  

respondent no.5 in relation to him filing a complaint in the first place,  

as the said issue was specifically raised by the appellant.  Therefore,  

the present appeal deserves to be allowed.

5. Per contra, Shri Shankar Chillarge, learned counsel appearing  

for  the  Scrutiny  Committee,  has  made  elaborate  submissions,  in  

support of the impugned judgment and subsequent proceedings.  Mr.  

Udaya  Kumar  Sagar  and  Ms.  Bina  Madhavan,  learned  counsel  

appearing  for  respondent  no.5,  have  also  supported  the  impugned  

judgment  of  the  High  Court  and  has  further  submitted  that  even  

though  respondent  no.5,  does  not  belong  to  the  Scheduled  Tribes  

category,  he  most  certainly  could  file  a  complaint  against  the  

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appellant,  at  such  a  belated  stage,  as  the  appellant  had  obtained  

employment  in  1989,  by  way  of  mis-representation  and  fraud.  

Respondent  no.5,  being  a  public  spirited  person  has  espoused  the  

cause of the real persons who have been deprived of their right to be  

considered for the said post occupied by the appellant.  Respondent  

No. 5 has also filed affidavits of relevant persons before the Scrutiny  

Committee, to prove his allegations. Thus, the present appeal lacks  

merit and is liable to be dismissed.  

6. We  have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned  

counsel for the parties and perused the record.  

Person aggrieved :

7. It  is  a  settled  legal  proposition  that  a  stranger  cannot  be  

permitted  to  meddle  in  any  proceeding,  unless  he  satisfies  the  

Authority/Court,  that  he  falls  within  the  category  of  aggrieved  

persons.

Only a person who has suffered,  or  suffers from  legal  

injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ  

petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either  

for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is  

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a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory  

duty  on  the  part  of  the  Authorities.   Therefore,  there  must  be  a  

judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of  

which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce  

the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ  

jurisdiction  at  the  behest  of  a  person,  provided  that  such  person  

satisfies  the  Court  that  he  has  a  legal  right  to  insist  on  such  

performance. The existence of such right  is a condition precedent for  

invoking  the  writ  jurisdiction  of  the  courts.  It  is  implicit  in  the  

exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for  

must be one to  enforce a legal right. Infact, the  existence of such  

right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by  

the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be  

the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such  

right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same.  (Vide :  

State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12; Saghir  

Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728;  Calcutta Gas  

Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR  

1962 SC 1044;  Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR  

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1996 SC 2736; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare  

Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784).  

8. A “legal right”, means an entitlement arising out of legal  

rules.  Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred  

upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, “person aggrieved”  

does  not  include a  person who suffers  from a psychological  or  an  

imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be  

one,  whose  right  or  interest  has  been  adversely  affected  or  

jeopardised.  (Vide:  Shanti  Kumar R. Chanji  v.  Home Insurance  

Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719; and  State of Rajasthan &  

Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361).  

9. In  Anand  Sharadchandra  Oka  v.  University  of  

Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC 1289, a similar view was taken by this Court,  

observing  that,  if  a  person  claiming  relief  is  not  eligible  as  per  

requirement,  then  he  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  person  aggrieved  

regarding the election or the selection of other persons.  

10. In A. Subhash Babu v. State of A. P. , AIR 2011 SC 3031, this  

Court held:  

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“The expression ‘aggrieved person’ denotes an   elastic  and  an  elusive  concept.  It  cannot  be   confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and  comprehensive  definition.  Its  scope  and   meaning depends on diverse,  variable  factors   such as the content and intent of the statute of   which  contravention  is  alleged,  the  specific   circumstances  of  the  case,  the  nature  and   extent of complainant's interest and the nature   and  the  extent  of  the  prejudice  or  injury   suffered by the complainant.”  

11. This  Court,  even  as  regards  the  filing  of  a  habeas  corpus  

petition,  has  explained  that  the  expression,  ‘next  friend’  means  a  

person who is not a total stranger. Such a petition cannot be filed by  

one who is a complete stranger to the person who is in alleged illegal  

custody. (Vide:  Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India  

& Ors., AIR 1951 SC 41; Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration,  

AIR 1980 SC 1579; Mrs. Neelima Priyadarshini v. State of Bihar,  

AIR 1987 SC 2021; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India,  AIR  

1993 SC 280; Karamjeet Singh v. Union of India,  AIR 1993 SC  

284; and Kishore Samrite v. State of U.P. & Ors., JT (2012) 10 SC  

393).   

12. This Court has consistently cautioned the courts against  

entertaining public interest litigation filed by unscrupulous persons, as  

such meddlers do not hesitate to abuse the process of the court.  The  

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right of effective access to justice, which has emerged with the new  

social rights regime, must be used to serve basic human rights, which  

purport to guarantee legal rights and, therefore, a workable remedy  

within  the  framework  of  the  judicial  system  must  be  provided.  

Whenever any public interest is invoked, the court must examine the  

case to ensure that there is in fact, genuine public interest involved.  

The court  must  maintain strict  vigilance  to  ensure that  there  is  no  

abuse  of  the  process  of  court  and  that,  “ordinarily  meddlesome  

bystanders are not granted a Visa”.  Many societal pollutants create  

new problems of non-redressed grievances, and the court should make  

an  earnest  endeavour  to  take  up those  cases,  where  the  subjective  

purpose  of  the  lis  justifies  the  need  for  it.   (Vide:  P.S.R.  

Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam & Anr.,  AIR 1980 SC 856; Dalip  

Singh  v.  State  of  U.P.  &  Ors., (2010)  2  SCC  114;  State  of  

Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors., (2010) 3 SCC 402;  

and Amar Singh v. Union of India & Ors., (2011) 7 SCC 69)

13. Even as regards the filing of a Public Interest Litigation,  

this  Court  has  consistently  held  that  such  a  course  of  action  is  not  

permissible  so  far  as  service  matters  are  concerned.  (Vide:  Dr.  

Duryodhan Sahu & Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra & Ors., AIR  

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1999 SC 114;  Dattaraj Natthuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra,  

AIR 2005 SC 540; and Neetu v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 2007 SC  

758)

14. In Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal & Ors., (2002) 1  

SCC 33, this Court considered a similar issue and observed as under:–

“There  is  no  dispute  regarding  the  legal   proposition that the rights under Article 226 of   the Constitution of India can be enforced only   by  an  aggrieved  person  except  in  the  case   where the writ prayed for is for habeas corpus   or  quo  warranto.  Another  exception  in  the   general  rule is the filing of a writ  petition in   public interest. The existence of the legal right   of the petitioner which is alleged to have been   violated  is  the  foundation  for  invoking  the   jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court  under  the   aforesaid  article.  The  orthodox  rule  of   interpretation regarding the locus standi of a   person  to reach the  Court  has  undergone  a   sea  change with  the  development  of   constitutional  law  in  our  country  and  the   constitutional  Courts  have  been  adopting  a   liberal approach in dealing with the cases or   dislodging  the  claim  of  a  litigant  merely  on   hyper-technical grounds.--------In other words,   if  the  person  is  found  to  be  not  merely  a  stranger  having  no  right whatsoever  to  any   post  or property,  he cannot be non-suited on   the ground of his not having the locus standi.”   (Emphasis added)

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15. In view of the above, the law on the said point can be summarised  

to the effect that a person who raises a grievance, must show how he has  

suffered legal injury. Generally, a stranger having no right whatsoever to  

any post or property, cannot be permitted to intervene in the affairs of  

others.  

       Locus standi of respondent no.5 :

16. As  respondent  no.5  does  not  belong  to  the  Scheduled  Tribes  

category, the garb adopted by him, of serving the cause of Scheduled  

Tribes candidates who might have been deprived of their legitimate right  

to be considered for the post, must be considered by this Court in order  

to determine whether respondent no. 5, is in fact, in a legitimate position  

to lay  any claim before any forum, whatsoever.  

17. This  Court   in  Ravi  Yashwant  Bhoir  v.  District  Collector,  

Raigad & Ors., (2012) 4 SCC 407,  held as under:  

“Shri Chintaman  Raghunath  Gharat,  ex- President  was  the  complainant,  thus,  at  the   most, he could lead evidence as a witness. He   could  not  claim  the  status  of  an  adversarial   litigant. The complainant cannot be the party to   the  lis.  A  legal  right  is  an  averment  of   entitlement arising out of  law. In fact,  it  is  a   benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of   law.  Thus,  a  person  who  suffers  from  legal   

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injury can only challenge the act or omission.   There may be some harm or loss that may not   be wrongful  in  the eye  of  the law because  it   may  not  result  in  injury  to  a  legal  right  or   legally  protected  interest  of  the  complainant   but juridically harm of this description is called   damnum sine injuria.    The complainant has to establish that he has   been deprived of or denied of a legal right and   he has sustained injury to any legally protected   interest.  In  case  he  has  no  legal  peg  for  a   justiciable  claim  to  hang  on,  he  cannot  be   heard  as  a  party  in  a  lis.  A  fanciful  or   sentimental grievance may not be sufficient to   confer  a  locus  standi  to  sue  upon  the   individual.  There  must  be  injuria  or  a  legal   grievance which can be appreciated and not a   stat  pro ratione voluntas reasons i.e.  a claim  devoid of reasons.    Under the garb of being a necessary party, a   person cannot be permitted to make a case as   that of general public interest. A person having   a  remote  interest  cannot  be  permitted  to   become a party in the lis,  as the person who   wants  to  become  a  party  in  a  case,  has  to   establish that he has a proprietary right which   has been or is threatened to be violated, for the   reason that  a legal injury creates  a remedial   right in the injured person. A person cannot be   heard  as  a  party  unless  he  answers  the   description of aggrieved party.”

18. A  similar  view  has  been  re-iterated  by  this  Court  in  K.  

Manjusree v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., (2008) 3 SCC 512,  

wherein it was held that, the applicant before the High Court could not  

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challenge the appointment of a person as she was in no way aggrieved,  

for she herself could not have been selected by adopting either method.  

Morever, the appointment cannot be challenged at a belated stage  and,  

hence, the petition should have been rejected by the High Court, on the  

grounds of delay and non-maintainability, alone.    

19. In Balbir Kaur & Anr. v. Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education  

Services Selection Board, Allahabad & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 1, it has  

been held that a violation of the equality clauses, enshrined in Articles  

14 and 16 of the Constitution, or discrimination in any form, can be  

alleged,   provided  that,  the  writ  petitioner  demonstrates  a  certain  

appreciable disadvantage qua other similarly situated persons.  

20. While  dealing  with  the  similar  issue,  this  Court  in  Raju  

Ramsingh Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhiavapurkar & Ors., (2008)  

9 SCC 54  held:

“We must now deal with the question of locus   standi.  A  special  leave  petition  ordinarily   would not have been entertained at the instance   of  the  appellant.  Validity  of  appointment  or   otherwise  on  the  basis  of  a  caste  certificate   granted by a committee is ordinarily a matter   between the employer and the employee. This   Court, however, when a question is raised, can   take  cognizance  of  a  matter  of  such  grave   importance  suo  motu.  It  may  not  treat  the   

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special  leave  petition  as  a  public  interest   litigation, but, as a public law litigation. It is,   in a proceeding of that nature, permissible for   the  court  to  make  a  detailed  enquiry  with   regard  to  the  broader  aspects  of  the  matter   although it  was initiated at  the instance of  a   person  having  a  private  interest.  A  deeper   scrutiny can be made so as to enable the court   to  find  out  as  to  whether  a  party  to  a  lis  is   guilty  of  commission  of  fraud  on  the   Constitution. If such an enquiry subserves the   greater public interest and has a far-reaching   effect on the society, in our opinion, this Court   will  not  shirk  its  responsibilities  from  doing   so.”

(See also: Manohar Joshi v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2012) 3  

SCC 619)

21. In Vinoy Kumar v. State of U.P., AIR 2001 SC 1739, this Court  

held:

“Even in cases filed in public interest, the court   can exercise the writ jurisdiction at the instance   of a third party only when it is shown that the   legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is   threatened and such person or determined class   of person is by reason of poverty, helplessness or  disability  or  socially  or  economically   disadvantaged position, unable to approach the   court for relief.”  

22. Thus,  from  the  above  it  is  evident  that  under  ordinary  

circumstances, a third person, having no concern with the case at hand,  

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cannot  claim  to  have  any  locus-standi to  raise  any  grievance  

whatsoever.  However, in the exceptional circumstances as referred to  

above, if the actual persons aggrieved, because of ignorance, illiteracy,  

inarticulation or poverty, are unable to approach the court, and a person,  

who has no personal agenda, or object, in relation to which, he can grind  

his own axe, approaches the court, then the court may examine the issue  

and in exceptional circumstances, even if  his bonafides are doubted, but  

the  issue  raised  by  him,  in  the  opinion  of  the  court,  requires  

consideration,  the court may proceed suo-motu, in such respect.  

Cross-examination is one part of the principles of natural justice:

23. A Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  State of  M.P.  v.  

Chintaman Sadashiva Vaishampayan, AIR 1961 SC 1623, held that  

the  rules  of  natural  justice,  require  that  a  party  must  be  given  the  

opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon which he relies, and  

further that, the evidence of the opposite party should be taken in his  

presence,  and  that  he  should  be  given  the  opportunity  of  cross-

examining the witnesses examined by that party. Not providing the said  

opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, would violate the principles of  

natural justice. (See also: Union of India v.T.R. Varma, AIR 1957 SC  

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882;  Meenglas Tea Estate v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1719;  M/s.  

Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 708;  

New India Assurance Company Ltd . v . Nusli Neville Wadia and  

Anr., AIR 2008 SC 876; Rachpal Singh & Ors. v. Gurmit Singh &  

Ors.,  AIR 2009 SC 2448; Biecco Lawrie & Anr. v. State of West  

Bengal & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 142; and State of Uttar Pradesh v.  

Saroj Kumar Sinha, AIR 2010  SC 3131).   

24.  In  Lakshman Exports Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise,  

(2005) 10 SCC 634, this Court, while dealing with a case under the  

Central Excise Act, 1944, considered a similar issue i.e. permission with  

respect  to  the  cross-examination  of  a  witness.  In  the  said  case,  the  

assessee  had  specifically  asked  to  be  allowed  to  cross-examine  the  

representatives  of  the  firms  concern,  to  establish  that  the  goods  in  

question had been accounted for in their books of accounts, and that  

excise duty had been paid. The Court held that such a request could not  

be  turned down,  as  the denial  of  the right  to  cross-examine,  would  

amount to a denial of the right to be heard i.e. audi alteram partem.  

25. In New India  Assurance  Company  Ltd.,  v.  Nusli  Neville  

Wadia & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 876; this Court considered a case under  

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the Public Premises ( Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971  

and  held as follows :-

“If some facts are to be proved by the landlord,   indisputably  the  occupant  should  get  an  opportunity to cross-examine. The witness who   intends to prove the said fact  has the  right to  cross-examine the  witness.  This  may  not  be   provided by under the statute, but it being a part   of the principle of natural justice should be held   to be indefeasible right.”        (Emphasis added)

In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the  

right of cross-examination is an integral part of the principles of natural  

justice.

26. In K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India & Ors., AIR 1984 SC  

273,  this  Court  held  that,  in  order  to  sustain  a  complaint  of  the  

violation of the principles of natural justice on the ground of absence  

of opportunity of cross-examination, it must be established that some  

prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the procedure followed.  

A party, who does not want to controvert the veracity of the evidence  

on record, or of the testimony gathered behind his back, cannot expect  

to succeed in any subsequent grievance raised by him, stating that no  

opportunity of cross-examination was provided to him, specially when  

the same was not requested, and there was no dispute regarding the  

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veracity of the statement. (See also: Union of India v. P.K. Roy, AIR  

1968 SC 850; and  Channabasappa Basappa Happali  v.  State of  

Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32).

27. In Transmission Corpn. of A.P. Ltd. v. Sri Rama Krishna  

Rice Mill,  AIR 2006 SC 1445, this Court held:   

“In  order  to  establish  that  the  cross- examination is necessary, the consumer has to   make out a case for the same. Merely stating   that the statement of an officer is being utilised   for the purpose of  adjudication would not  be   sufficient in all cases. If an application is made   requesting for grant of an opportunity to cross- examine  any  official,  the  same  has  to  be   considered  by the adjudicating authority  who   shall have to either grant the request or pass a   reasoned  order  if  he  chooses  to  reject  the   application. In that event an adjudication being   concluded,  it  shall  be  certainly  open  to  the   consumer  to  establish  before  the  Appellate   Authority as to how he has been prejudiced by   the  refusal  to  grant  an  opportunity  to  cross- examine any official”.

28. The meaning of  providing a  reasonable  opportunity  to  show  

cause against an action proposed to be taken by the government, is  

that the government servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity to  

defend himself against the charges, on the basis of which an inquiry is  

held. The government servant should be given an opportunity to deny  

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his guilt and establish his innocence. He can do so only when he is  

told what the charges against him are.  He can therefore, do so by  

cross-examining the witnesses produced against him. The object of  

supplying statements is that, the government servant will be able to  

refer  to  the  previous  statements  of  the  witnesses  proposed  to  be  

examined against him. Unless the said statements are provided to the  

government servant, he will not be able to conduct an effective and  

useful cross-examination.

29. In Rajiv Arora v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1100,  

this Court held:

“Effective cross-examination could  have  been  done as regards the correctness or otherwise of   the report, if the contents of them were proved.   The principles analogous to the provisions of   the  Indian  Evidence  Act  as  also   the principles of natural justice demand  that   the  maker  of  the  report  should  be  examined,   save and except  in cases where  the facts are   admitted  or  the  witnesses  are  not  available   for cross-examination or similar situation. The   High  Court  in  its  impugned  judgment   proceeded to consider the issue on a technical   plea, namely, no prejudice has been caused to   the appellant by such non-examination. If  the   basic principles of law have not been complied   with  or  there  has  been  a  gross  violation  of   the principles of natural justice, the High Court   should  have  exercised  its  jurisdiction  of   judicial review.”

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30. The aforesaid discussion makes it evident that, not only should  

the opportunity of cross-examination be made available, but it should be  

one of effective cross-examination, so as to meet the requirement of the  

principles of natural justice. In the absence of such an opportunity, it  

cannot be  held that the matter has been decided in accordance with law,  

as cross-examination is an integral part and parcel of the principles of  

natural justice.  

31. Affidavit - whether evidence within the meaning of Section 3  

of the  Evidence Act, 1872:

It is a settled legal proposition that an affidavit is not evidence  

within the meaning of Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act,  1872  

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Evidence Act’).  

Affidavits are therefore, not included within the purview of the  

definition  of  "evidence"  as  has  been  given  in  Section  3  of  the  

Evidence Act, and the same can be used as "evidence" only if, for  

sufficient reasons, the Court passes an order under Order XIX of the  

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘CPC’).  

Thus, the filing of an affidavit of one’s own statement, in one’s own  

favour, cannot be regarded as sufficient  evidence for any Court or  

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Tribunal, on the basis of which it can come to a conclusion as regards  

a particular fact-situation. (Vide: Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan &  

Ors., AIR  1988  SC  1381;  and  Range Forest  Officer   v.  S.T.  

Hadimani, AIR 2002 SC 1147).  

32. While examining a case under the provisions of the Industrial  

Disputes Act, 1947, this Court, in M/s Bareilly Electricity Supply Co.  

Ltd.  v.  The Workmen & Ors., AIR 1972 SC 330,  considered the  

application of Order XIX, Rules 1 and 2 CPC,  and observed as under:-

"But the  application  of  principles  of  natural   justice does not imply that what is not evidence,   can be acted upon. On the other hand, what it   means is that no material can be relied upon to   establish a contested fact which are not spoken to  by the persons who are competent to speak about   them and are subject to cross-examination by the  party against whom they are sought to be used.   When a document is produced in a Court or a   Tribunal, the question that naturally arises is: is   it a genuine document, what are its contents and   are the statements contained therein true...... If a   letter or other document is produced to establish   some fact which is relevant to the inquiry, the   writer  must  be  produced  or  his  affidavit  in   respect thereof be filed and opportunity afforded   to the opposite party who challenges this fact.   This is both in accordance with the principles of   natural  justice  as  also  according  to  the   procedure  under  O.  19  of  the  Code  and  the   Evidence  Act,  both  of  which  incorporate  the   general principles."

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33. In Needle Industries (India) Ltd. & Ors. v. N.I.N.I.H. Ltd. &  

Ors., AIR 1981 SC 1298, this Court considered a case under the Indian  

Companies Act,  and observed that,  “it is generally unsatisfactory to  

record a finding involving grave consequences with respect to a person,  

on  the basis  of  affidavits  and documents  alone,  without  asking that  

person to submit to cross-examination”. However, the conduct of the  

parties may be an important factor, with regard to determining whether  

they showed their willingness to get the said issue determined on the  

basis of affidavits, correspondence and other documents, on the basis of  

which proper and necessary inferences can safely and legitimately be  

drawn.  

34. In Ramesh Kumar v.  Kesho  Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700,  this  

Court considered the scope of application of the provisions of O. XIX,  

Rr. 1 and 2 CPC  in a Rent Control matter, observing as under:-

"The Court may also treat any affidavit filed in   support of the pleadings itself as one under the   said provisions and call upon the opposite side to  traverse  it.  The  Court,  if  it  finds  that  having   regard  to  the  nature  of  the  allegations,  it  is   necessary to record oral evidence tested by oral   cross-examination,  may  have  recourse  to  that   procedure."  

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35. In Standard Chartered  Bank  v.  Andhra  Bank  Financial  

Services Ltd. & Ors., (2006) 6 SCC 94, this Court while dealing with a  

case under the provisions of Companies Act, 1956, while considering  

complex issues regarding the Markets, Exchanges and Securities, and  

the procedure to be followed by special Tribunals, held as under :

“While it may be true that the Special Court has   been given a certain amount of latitude in the   matter  of  procedure,  it  surely  cannot fly away   from established legal principles while deciding   the cases before it.  As to what inference arises   from a document, is always a matter of evidence   unless  the  document  is  self-explanatory…….In  the absence of any such explanation, it was not   open to the Special Court to come up with its   own explanations and decide the fate of the suit   on  the  basis  of  its  inference  based  on  such   assumed explanations.”  

36. Therefore, affidavits in the light of the aforesaid discussion are  

not considered to be evidence, within the meaning of Section 3 of the  

Evidence Act. However, in a case where the deponent is available for  

cross-examination, and opportunity is given to the other side to cross-

examine him, the same can be relied upon.  Such view, stands fully  

affirmed particularly, in view of the amended provisions of Order XVIII,  

Rules 4 & 5 CPC. In certain other  circumstances,  in order to avoid  

technicalities of procedure, the legislature, or a court/tribunal, can even  

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lay down a procedure to meet the requirement of compliance with the  

principles of natural justice, and thus, the case will be examined in the  

light  of  those  statutory  rules  etc.  as  framed  by  the  aforementioned  

authorities.   

37. The instant case is required to be examined in the light of the  

aforesaid legal propositions. This Court examined this matter in detail in  

Km. Madhuri  Patil  v.  Addl.  Commissioner,  Tribal  Development,  

(1994) 6 SCC 241, and upon realising that spurious tribes and persons  

not belonging to the Scheduled Tribes category, were snatching away  

the reservation benefits that have been made available to genuine tribals,  

and that they were being wrongly deprived of their rights on the basis of  

false  caste  certificates,  and  that  further,  at  a  subsequent  stage  such  

unscrupulous  persons,  after  getting  admission/employment,  were  

adopting  dilatory tactics, the court issued a large number of directions to  

investigate such cases of false claims. The directions inter-alia included:  

(1) Each Directorate should constitute a vigilance cell consisting of  

Senior Deputy Superintendent of Police in over all charge and such  

number  of  Police  Inspectors  to  investigate  into  the  social  status  

claims.  

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(2) The  Director  concerned,  on  receipt  of  the  report  from  the  

vigilance  officer  if  he found the claim for  social  status  to  be “not  

genuine’’ or “doubtful’’ or spurious or falsely or wrongly claimed, the  

Director concerned should issue show cause notice supplying a copy  

of the report of the vigilance officer to the candidate by a registered  

post with acknowledgement due or through the head of the concerned  

educational  institution  in  which  the  candidate  is  studying  or  

employed...........  After  giving  such  opportunity  either  in  person  or  

through counsel, the Committee may make such inquiry as it deems  

expedient and consider the claims vis-a-vis the objections raised by  

the candidate or opponent and pass an appropriate order with brief  

reasons in support thereof.

(3) In case the report is in favour of the candidate and found to be  

genuine and true, no further action need be taken except where the  

report or the particulars given are procured or found to be false or  

fraudulently obtained and in the latter event the same procedure as is  

envisaged in para 6 be followed.

(4) The inquiry should be completed as expeditiously as possible  

preferably  by  day-to-day  proceedings  within  such  period  not  

exceeding two months. If after inquiry, the caste Scrutiny Committee  

finds  the  claim to  be  false  or  spurious,  they should  pass  an  order  

cancelling  the  certificate  issued  and confiscate  the  same.  It  should  

communicate within one month from the date of the conclusion of the  

proceedings  the  result  of  enquiry  to  the  parent/guardian  and  the  

applicant.

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(5) In case, the certificate obtained or social status claimed is found  

to be false, the parent/guardian/the candidate should be prosecuted for  

making  false  claim.  If  the  prosecution  ends  in  a  conviction  and  

sentence of the accused, it could be regarded as an offence involving  

moral turpitude, disqualification for elective posts or offices under the  

State or the Union or elections to any local body, legislature or the  

Parliament.

(6) As soon as the finding is recorded by the Scrutiny Committee  

holding that the certificate obtained was false, on its cancellation and  

confiscation  simultaneously,  it  should  be  communicated  to  the  

concerned  educational  institution  or  the  appointing  authority  by  

registered post with acknowledgement due with a request to cancel the  

admission or the appointment. The principal etc. of the educational  

institution  responsible  for  making  the  admission  or  the  appointing  

authority,  should  cancel  the  admission/appointment  without  any  

further  notice  to  the  candidate  and debar  the  candidate  for  further  

study or continue in office in a post.

The court further issued directions to all States to give effect to  

the  aforesaid  directions,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  constitutional  

objectives that were intended for the benefit and the advancement of  

persons genuinely belonging to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled  

Tribes category, are not defeated by such unscrupulous persons.  

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The Act 2000 and the Rules 2003 are based on the directions  

issued by this Court in  Km. Madhuri Patil (supra) as the same have  

been incorporated therein.  

38. The correctness  of  the  said  judgment  in  Km. Madhuri  Patil  

(supra), was doubted, and the matter was referred to and decided by a  

larger bench of this Court in  Daya Ram v. Sudhir Batham & Ors.,  

(2012) 1 SCC 333, wherein, while deciding the various issues involved,  

including the competence of this Court to legislate in this regard, it was  

held as under:  

“The scrutiny committee is not an adjudicating   authority  like  a  Court  or  Tribunal,  but  an   administrative  body  which  verifies  the  facts,   investigates  into  a  specific  claim  (of  caste   status) and ascertains whether the caste/tribal   status claimed is correct or not…...

Having regard to the scheme for verification   formulated by this Court in Madhuri Patil, the   scrutiny  committees  carry  out  verification  of   caste certificates issued without prior enquiry,   as for example the caste certificates issued by   Tehsildars or other officers of the departments   of  Revenue/Social  Welfare/Tribal  Welfare,   without  any  enquiry  or  on  the  basis  of  self-   affidavits  about  caste.  If there  were  to  be  a   legislation  governing  or  regulating  grant  of   caste certificates, and if caste certificates are   issued  after  due  and  proper  inquiry,  such   caste certificates will not call for verification   by  the  scrutiny  committees. Madhuri  Patil   

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provides for verification only to avoid false and   bogus claims…..”

                (Emphasis added)

39. Thus, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment in  Daya Ram  

(supra), that the purpose of issuing directions in Km. Madhuri Patil  

(supra), was only to examine those cases, where caste certificates had  

been issued without conducting any prior enquiry, on the basis of self-  

affidavits  regarding  one’s  caste  alone,  and  that  the  said  directions  

were not at all applicable, where a legislation governing or regulating  

the grant of caste certificates exists, and where caste certificates are  

issued  after  due  and  proper  enquiry.   Caste  certificates  issued  by  

holding proper enquiry, in accordance with duly prescribed procedure,  

would not require any further verification by the scrutiny committee.  

40.  In pursuance of the said order issued by the High Court, the  

Scrutiny Committee examined the case of the parties. However, with  

respect to this, the appellant raised the grievance that, the evidence of  

a  large  number  of  persons  had  been  recorded  by  the  Scrutiny  

Committee  behind  his  back,  and  that  he  had  not  been  given  an  

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses that were examined by the  

other side and therefore, he was unable to lead a proper defence.  The  

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appellant  filed  an  application  dated  28.2.2012,  for  the  purpose  of  

recalling  3  witnesses,  namely,  Sikandar  Gulab  Tadvi,  Bhagchand  

Ganpatsing Pardeshi and Bahadursing Mukhtarsing Patil, so that he  

may cross-examine them.  The appellant also filed another application  

on the same day, seeking a period of 30 days time, to file his reply as  

is required within the provisions of Rule 12(8) of the Rules 2003, and  

also another application for the purpose of calling of records from the  

office of the Tehsildar, to ascertain the genuineness of the certificate  

impugned.  None of the said applications have been decided till now.  

41.   In  view  thereof,  this  Court  vide  order  dated  11.5.2012,  

directed the learned counsel appearing for the Scrutiny Committee, to  

produce the original record of the matter and to file an affidavit with  

respect  to  whether  the  appellant  had been given an opportunity to  

cross-examine the witnesses that were examined by the other side, and  

also  with  respect  to  whether  the  other  applications  filed  by  the  

appellant, were decided upon.  

42. In  pursuance  of  the  said  order,  the  original  record  was  

produced. However, the learned counsel remained unable to point out  

from the original record, any proceeding or event, by way of which, it  

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could  be  ascertained  that  the  appellant  was  in  fact,  given  an  

opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses,  or to show that  all  the  

said  witnesses  were  examined  in  the  presence  of  the  appellant.  

Further, he was also unable to satisfy this Court, with respect to the  

circumstances under which, the applications filed by the appellant on  

28.2.2012, including the one to recall  witnesses and permit  him to  

cross-examine them,  have  been  kept  pending,  without  passing  any  

order in relation to either one of them.  

43. In  order  to  determine  the  genuineness  and  sincerity  of  

respondent no. 5, this Court on 29.10.2012 adjourned the matter until  

5.11.2012, directing respondent no. 5 to act as under:

“Meanwhile,  respondent  No.  5  may  file  the   affidavit  as on what date he appeared before   the  Scrutiny  Committee  and  what  was  the   material produced by him and as to whether on   that petitioner had a notice of his appearance   before the Scrutiny Committee and whether the   Committee has allowed the petitioner to cross   examine the respondent No. 5.”

In response to the said order, respondent no. 5 filed an affidavit  

in  Court  on  5.11.2012.   The  contents  of  the  affidavit  reveal  that  

respondent no.5 claims that his occupation is that of a social worker.  

The allegations against the appellant stating that he obtained the said  

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caste certificate fraudulently, have been repeated.   Respondent no. 5  

has not  mentioned in  the affidavit,  the date  on which he appeared  

before the Scrutiny Committee,  nor  has he responded to the query  

raised  with  respect  to  whether  he  had  produced  any  evidence  to  

support his allegations, or whether the appellant was allowed to cross-

examine any of the witnesses, or if in fact, he simply examined all of  

them himself.   

The relevant part of the abovementioned affidavit, has been re-

produced hereunder:   

“That  it  is  submitted  that  on  28.2.2012  the   Respondent No. 5 submitted copy of Affidavit of   Mr.  Supdu  Musa  Tadvi  and  by  way  of  an   application  prayed  for  personal  presence  of   Mr.  Supdu Musa Tadvi.   Scrutiny  Committee   finding contradictions in the two statement of   Mr.  Supdu Musa Tadvi,  issued  notice  to  him   requesting his personal presence on 17.3.2012.   However,  Mr.  Supdu  Musa  Tadri  never   appeared before the Committee.”  

44. The affidavit of Mr. Supdu Musa Tadri referred to hereinabove  

cannot be relied upon, as the said deponent  never appeared before the  

Scrutiny Committee. The conduct of respondent no. 5, who has been  

pursuing the said matter  from one court to another,  is  found to be  

reprehensible, and without any sense of responsibility whatsoever, as  

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he could not submit any satisfactory response to the directions issued  

by this Court on 29.10.2012.  In view of the above, we are highly  

doubtful  as  regards  his  bonafides.   He  has  therefore,  disentitled  

himself from appearing either before this Court, or any other court, or  

Committee, so far as the instant case is concerned.   

45. The Scrutiny Committee in ordinary circumstances examined  

the  matter  and  after  investigation  through  its  Vigilance  Cell  and  

considering all the documentary evidence on record and after being  

satisfied,  granted the caste verification certificate in 2000.  Section  

114 Ill.(e) of the Evidence Act provided for the court to pronounce  

that the decision taken by the Scrutiny Committee has been done in  

regular  course  and  the  caste  certificate  has  been  issued  after  due  

verification.  A very strong material/evidence is required to rebut the  

presumption.  In  fact,  respondent  no.  5  has  no  legal  peg  for  a  

justifiable claim to hang upon.   Once the respondent no. 5, for the  

reasons best known to him, had challenged caste certificate under the  

garb  of  acting  as  a  public  spirited  person  espousing  the  cause  of  

legitimate  persons  who  had  been  deprived  of  their  right  of  being  

considered for appointment, the respondent no. 5  must  have acted  

seriously and brought the material before the Scrutiny Committee to  

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show that the earlier decision was improbable or factually incorrect.  

Such a view stands fortified by a catena of decisions rendered by this  

Court  where  it  has  been  held  that  presumption  is  based  on  legal  

maxim  “Omnia  praesumuntur  rite  esse  acta” i.e.  all  acts  are  

presumed to have rightly and regularly been done.   

Such a presumption can be rebutted by adducing appropriate  

evidence. Mere statement made in the written statement/petition is not  

enough to rebut the presumption. The onus of rebuttal lies upon the  

person who alleges that the act had not been regularly performed or  

the procedure required under the law had not been followed.   (Vide:  

Gopal Narain v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 370; Narayan  

Govind Gavate & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977  

SC 183;  Karewwa & Ors.v.  Hussensab Khansaheb Wajantri  &  

Ors., AIR 2002 SC 504;  Engineering Kamgar Union v.  Electro  

Steels   Castings  Ltd.  &  Anr., (2004)  6  SCC  36;  Mohd.  

Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar,  (2010) 4 SCC 653;  Punjab State  

Electricity Board & Anr. v. Ashwani Kumar,  (2010) 7 SCC 569;  

M. Chandra v. M. Thangmuthu & Anr., AIR 2011 SC 146; and R.  

Ramachandran Nair v. Deputy Superintendent, Vigilance Police,  

(2011) 4 SCC 395)  

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46. In view of the above discussion and considering the seriousness  

of the allegations, as the Scrutiny Committee has already conducted  

an inquiry in relation to this matter,  and the only grievance of the  

appellant is that there has been non-compliance with the principles of  

natural justice, and the fact that the applications filed by him, were not  

decided upon, we direct that before the submission of any report by  

the Scrutiny Committee, his application for calling the witnesses for  

cross-examination must be disposed of, and appellant must be given a  

fair  opportunity  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses,  who  have  been  

examined  before  the  Committee.  We  further  direct  the  Scrutiny  

Committee  to  pass  appropriate  orders  in  accordance  with  the  law  

thereafter.   In  case,  the  Scrutiny  Committee  has  already  taken  a  

decision, the same being violative of the principles of natural justice,  

would stand vitiated.   

47. The appeal  is  disposed of  accordingly,  however,  considering  

the fact that respondent no. 5 has not been pursuing the matter in a  

bonafide  manner,  and has  not  raised  any public  interest,  rather  he  

abused  the  process  of  the  court  only  to  harass  the  appellant,  the  

respondent  no.  5  is  restrained  from intervening  in  the  matter  any  

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further, and also from remaining a party to it,  and he is also liable to  

pay costs to the tune of  Rs. one lakh, within a period  of 4 weeks to  

the  District  Collector,  Aurangabad.   The  District  Collector,  

Aurangabad,  would  deposit  the  said  amount  in  the  account  of  the  

Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.    In the event that, the cost  

imposed  is  not  deposited  by  respondent  no.  5  within  the  period  

stipulated, we request the District Collector, Aurangabad, to recover  

the same as arrears of land revenue and deposit the same, accordingly.  

A copy of the judgment be sent by the Registry of this Court to  

the District Collector, Aurangabad (Maharashtra) for compliance.   

……………………………………J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

……………………………………J. (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)  

New Delhi, November 8,  2012

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