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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITIOIN [C] NO.20525/2011

Avtar Singh … Petitioner

Vs.

Union of India & Ors. … Respondents

[With SLP [C] Nos.4757/2014 and 24320/2014]

J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.  

1. The cases have been referred to for resolving the conflict of opinion in the

various decisions of Division Benches of this Court as noticed by this Court in

Jainendra Singh v. State of U.P. through Principal Secretary, Home & Ors. (2012)

8 SCC 748. The Court has considered the cleavage of opinion in various decisions

on the question of suppression of information or submitting false information in

the  verification  form as  to  the  question  of  having  been  criminally  prosecuted,

arrested or as to pendency of a criminal case. A Division Bench of this Court has

expressed  the  opinion  on  merits  while  referring  the  matter  as  to  the  various

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principles  to  be  borne  in  mind  before  granting  relief  to  an  aggrieved  party.

Following is the relevant observation made by a Division Bench of this Court :

“29. As noted by us, all the above decisions were rendered by a Division  Bench  of  this  Court  consisting  of  two  Judges  and having  bestowed  our  serious  consideration  to  the  issue,  we consider that while dealing with such an issue, the Court will have  to  bear  in  mind  the  various  cardinal  principles  before granting any relief to the aggrieved party, namely: 29.1. Fraudulently  obtained  orders  of  appointment  could  be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer or could be recalled by the employer  and in such cases merely because the respondent employee has continued in service for a number  of  years,  on  the  basis  of  such  fraudulently  obtained employment,  cannot  get  any  equity  in  his  favour  or  any estoppel against the employer. 29.2. Verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important  criteria  to  test  whether  the  selected  candidate  is suitable  to  the  post  under  the  State  and  on  account  of  his antecedents the appointing authority if finds it not desirable to appoint  a  person  to  a  disciplined  force  can  it  be  said  to  be unwarranted. 29.3. When appointment was procured by a person on the basis of forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation and fraud on the employer and, therefore, it would create no equity in  his  favour  or  any  estoppel  against  the  employer  while resorting to termination without holding any inquiry. 29.4. A  candidate  having  suppressed  material  information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in  service  and  the  employer,  having  regard  to  the  nature  of employment  as  well  as  other  aspects,  has  the  discretion  to terminate his services. 29.5. The  purpose  of  calling  for  information  regarding involvement in any criminal case or detention or conviction is for the purpose of verification of the character/antecedents at the  time  of  recruitment  and  suppression  of  such  material information  will  have  a  clear  bearing  on  the  character  and

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antecedents  of  the  candidate  in  relation  to  his  continuity  in service. 29.6. The  person  who  suppressed  the  material  information and/or  gives  false  information  cannot  claim  any  right  for appointment or continuity in service. 29.7. The standard expected of a person intended to serve in uniformed  service  is  quite  distinct  from  other  services  and, therefore, any deliberate statement or omission regarding a vital information can be seriously viewed and the ultimate decision of the appointing authority cannot be faulted. 29.8. An employee on probation can be discharged from service or may be refused employment on the ground of suppression of material information or making false statement relating to his involvement in the criminal case, conviction or detention, even if  ultimately  he was acquitted of  the  said  case,  inasmuch as such a situation would make a person undesirable or unsuitable for the post. 29.9. An  employee  in  the  uniformed  service  presupposes  a higher level of integrity as such a person is expected to uphold the law and on the contrary such a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be tolerated. 29.10. The  authorities  entrusted  with  the  responsibility  of appointing constables, are under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is suitable for the post of a constable and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the  criminal  case,  he  cannot  be  held  to  be  suitable  for appointment to the post of constable.

30. When we consider the above principles laid down in the majority of the decisions, the question that looms large before us  is  when  considering  such  claim  by  the  candidates  who deliberately suppressed information at the time of recruitment, can there be different yardsticks applied in the matter of grant of relief.

31. Though there  are  very many decisions  in  support  of  the various points culled out in the above paragraphs, inasmuch as we have noted certain other decisions taking different view of coordinate  Benches,  we  feel  it  appropriate  to  refer  the

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abovementioned issues to a larger Bench of this Court for an authoritative pronouncement so that there will be no conflict of views  and  which  will  enable  the  courts  to  apply  the  law uniformly while dealing with such issues.”

2. This Court while referring the matter had expressed the opinion that in case

an appointment order has been secured fraudulently, the appointment is voidable at

the option of the employer and the employee cannot get any equity in his favour

and no estoppel is created against the employer only by the fact that the employee

has continued in service for a number of years. It has been further observed that if

appointment is secured on forged documents, it would amount to misrepresentation

and fraud. The employer has a right to terminate the services on suppression of

important  information  or  giving  false  information,  having  regard  to  nature  of

employment. Verification of character and antecedents is important if the employer

has found an incumbent to be undesirable for appointment to a disciplined force. It

cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Court thus further opined that suppression of

material information necessary for verification of character/antecedents will have a

clear  bearing  on  character  and  antecedents  of  a  candidate  in  relation  to  his

continuity in service and such a person cannot claim a right for appointment or

continuity  in  service.  The  Bench  was  of  the  view  that  in  uniformed  service,

suppression or false information can be viewed seriously as it requires higher level

of integrity and the employer is supposed to find out before an appointment is

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made that criminal case has come to an end and pendency of a case would serve as

a bar for appointment and in such cases of suppression whether different yardsticks

can be applied as noted in the various decisions of this Court.   The question which

has been referred to arises frequently and there are catena of decisions taking one

view or the other on the facts of the case. It would be appropriate to refer to the

various decisions rendered by this Court; some of them have been referred to in the

impugned order.  

3. It cannot be disputed that the whole idea of verification of character and

antecedents is that the person suitable for the post in question is appointed. It is one

of the important criteria which is necessary to be fulfilled before appointment is

made.  An incumbent should not  have antecedents  of  such a  nature which may

adjudge him unsuitable for the post. Mere involvement in some petty kind of case

would not render a person unsuitable for the job. Way back in the year 1983, in

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramashanker Raghuvanshi & Anr. (1983) 2 SCC 145,

where a teacher was employed in a municipal school which was taken over by the

Government  and who was absorbed in  Government  service  in  1972 subject  to

verification of antecedents and medical fitness. The termination order was passed

on the basis of a report made by the Superintendent of Police to the effect that the

respondent was not a fit person to be entertained in Government service, as he had

taken  part  in  ‘RSS  and  Jan  Sangh  activities’.  There  was  no  allegation  of

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involvement in subversive activities. It was held that such activities were not likely

to  affect  the  integrity  of  individual’s  service.  To hold  otherwise  would  be  to

introduce ‘McCarthyism’ into India which is not healthy to the philosophy of our

Constitution. It was observed by this Court that most students and most youngmen

who take part in political activities and if they do get involved in some form of

agitation or the other, is it to be to their ever lasting discredit ? Sometimes they feel

strongly on injustice and resist. They are sometimes pushed into the forefront by

elderly  persons  who  lead  and  mislead  them.  Should  all  these  young  men  be

debarred from public employment ? Is Government service such a heaven that only

angels should seek entry into it ? This Court has laid down that the whole business

of  seeking  Police  report  about  the  political  belief  and  association  of  the  past

political activities of a candidate for public employment is repugnant to the basic

rights guaranteed by the Constitution. This Court has considered in Ramashanker

Raghuvanshi’s case (supra) the decision in  Garner v. Board of Public Works 341

US 716 thus :

“5.  In  another  loyalty  oath  case,  Garner  v. Board of  Public Works 341 US 716, Douglas, J. had this to say :

  Here the past conduct for which punishment is exacted is  single  –  advocacy  within  the  past  five  years  of  the overthrow of the Government by force and violence. In the other cases the acts for which Cummings and Garland stood condemned  covered  a  wider  range  and  involved  some conduct  which  might  be  vague  and  uncertain.  But  those differences, seized on here in hostility to the constitutional

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provisions,  are  wholly  irrelevant.  Deprivation  of  a  man’s means of livelihood by reason of past conduct, not subject to this penalty when committed, is punishment whether he is a professional  man,  a  day  laborer  who  works  for  private industry,  or  a  Government  employee.  The  deprivation  is nonetheless  unconstitutional  whether  it  be  for  one  single past act or a series of past acts …

Petitioners  were  disqualified  from  office  not  for  what they are today, not because of any program they currently espouse (cf.  Gerende v. Board of Supervisors 341 US 56), not because of standards related to fitness for the office, cf Dent v. West Virginia 129 US 114; Hawker v. New York 170 US 189, but for what they once advocated …

6. In the same case, Frankfurter, J. observed :

The needs of security do not require such curbs on what may well be innocuous feelings and associations. Such curbs are indeed self-defeating. They are not merely unjustifiable restraints on individuals. They are not merely productive of an  atmosphere  or  repression  uncongenial  to  the  spiritual vitality of a democratic society. The inhibitions which they engender  are  hostile  to  the  best  conditions  for  securing  a high-minded and high-spirited public service.

x x x x x

   10. We are not for a moment suggesting that even after entry into  government  service,  a  person  may  engage  himself  in political activities. All that we say is that he cannot be turned back at the very threshold on the ground of his past political activities. Once he becomes a government servant, he becomes subject  to  the  various  rules  regulating  his  conduct  and  his activities  must  naturally  be  subject  to  all  rules  made  in conformity with the Constitution.”

At the same time, this Court has also observed that after entry into Government

service,  a  person  has  to  abide  by  the  service  rules  in  conformity  with  the

Constitution.

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4. A 3-Judge Bench of this Court in T. S. Vasudavan Nair v. Director of Vikram

Sarabhai Space Centre & Ors. (1988) Supp SCC 795 had considered a case where

the employee had suppressed the fact that during emergency he had been convicted

in a case registered under the Defence of India Rules for having shouted slogans on

one occasion. This Court has laid down that cancelling the offer of appointment

due to such non-disclosure was illegal and the employer was directed to appoint

him  as  a  Lower  Division  Clerk.  Thus  this  Court  has  taken  the  view  that

non-disclosure of aforesaid case was not a material suppression on the basis of

which employment could have been denied and the person adjudged unsuitable for

being appointed as an LDC. This Court has laid down thus :

“2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. In the special facts and circumstances of this case we feel that the appellant should  not  have  been  denied  the  employment  on  the  sole ground that he had not disclosed that during emergency he had been convicted under  the Defence of  India  Rules for  having shouted slogans on one occasion. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and also the order dated August 1, 1983 cancelling the offer of appointment. The respondents shall issue  the  order  of  appointment  to  the  appellant  within  three months appointing him as a Lower Division Clerk, if he is not otherwise disqualified, with effect from the date on which he assumes  duty.  It  is  open  to  the  respondents  to  employ  the appellant at any place of their choice. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.”

5. In Union of India & Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran (1995) Supp 4 SCC 100, it was

held that if some persons have procured employment in Railway on the basis of

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bogus and forged casual labourer service cards, they were rightly held guilty of

misrepresentation and fraud. Mere long continuance of such employment could not

create any equity in their favour or estoppel against the employer. The question

was left open whether after obtaining employment on the basis of bogus and forged

casual  labourer  service  cards  was  covered  under  Rule  31(1)(i)  and  (iii)  of  the

Railway  Services  (Conduct)  Rules,  1966.  It  was  held  that  the  employment

procured by fraud is voidable at the option of the employer and employee cannot

plead estoppel. This Court has laid down thus :

“6.  It  is  not  necessary  for  us  to  express  any opinion on the applicability of Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) on the facts of the present cases  for  the  simple  reason  that  in  our  view  the  railway employees  concerned,  respondents  herein,  have  admittedly snatched  employment  in  railway  service,  maybe  of  a  casual nature, by relying upon forged or bogus casual labourer service cards. The unauthenticity of the service cards on the basis of which they got employment is clearly established on record of the departmental enquiry held against the employees concerned. Consequently, it has to be held that the respondents were guilty of  misrepresentation  and  fraud  perpetrated  on  the appellant-employer while getting employed in railway service and had snatched such employment which would not have been made available to them if they were not armed with such bogus and  forged  labourer  service  cards.  Learned  counsel  for  the respondents  submitted  that  for  getting  service  in  railway  as casual  labourers,  it  was  strictly  not  necessary  for  the respondents to rely upon such casual service cards. If that was so  there  was  no  occasion  for  them  to  produce  such  bogus certificates/service  cards  for  getting  employed  in  railway service. Therefore, it is too late in the day for the respondents to submit that production of such bogus or forged service cards had not played its role in getting employed in railway service. It

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was clearly a case of fraud on the appellant-employer. If once such  fraud  is  detected,  the  appointment  orders  themselves which were found to be tainted and vitiated by fraud and acts of cheating on the part of employees, were liable to be recalled and  were  at  least  voidable  at  the  option  of  the  employer concerned. This is precisely what has happened in the present case.  Once  the  fraud  of  the  respondents  in  getting  such employment  was  detected,  the  respondents  were  proceeded against in departmental enquiries and were called upon to have their say and thereafter have been removed from service. Such orders of  removal  would amount  to  recalling of  fraudulently obtained erroneous appointment orders which were avoided by the employer-appellant after following the due procedure of law and complying with the principles of natural justice. Therefore, even independently of Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of the Rules, such fraudulently obtained appointment orders could be legitimately treated as voidable at the option of the employer and could be recalled by the employer and in such cases merely because the respondent-employees have continued in service for a number of years on the basis of such fraudulently obtained employment orders cannot create any equity in their favour or any estoppel against the employer. In this connection we may usefully refer to  a  decision  of  this  Court  in  Distt.  Collector  & Chairman, Vizianagaram Social Welfare Residential School Society v.  M. Tripura Sundari Devi (1990) 3 SCC 655.. In that case Sawant, J.  speaking  for  this  Court  held  that  when  an  advertisement mentions a particular qualification and an appointment is made in disregard of the same, it is not a matter only between the appointing  authority  and  the  concerned  appointee.  The aggrieved  are  all  those  who  had  similar  or  even  better qualifications than the appointee or appointees but who had not applied  for  the  post  because  they  did  not  possess  the qualifications mentioned in the advertisement. It amounts to a fraud on public to appoint persons with inferior qualifications in such  circumstances  unless  it  is  clearly  stated  that  the qualifications are relaxable. No court should be a party to the perpetuation of the fraudulent practice. It is of course true as noted by the Tribunal that the facts of the case in the aforesaid decision were different from the facts of the present case. And it is  also  true  that  in  that  case  pending the  service  which was

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continued pursuant to the order of the Tribunal the candidate concerned  acquired  the  requisite  qualification  and  hence  his appointment was not disturbed by this Court. But that is neither here nor there.  As laid down in the aforesaid decision,  if  by committing  fraud  any  employment  is  obtained,  such  a fraudulent practice cannot be permitted to be countenanced by a court of law. Consequently, it must be held that the Tribunal had committed a patent error of law in directing reinstatement of the respondent-workmen  with  all  consequential  benefits.  The removal orders could not have been faulted by the Tribunal as they were the result of a sharp and fraudulent practice on the part of the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents, however,  submitted  that  these  illiterate  respondents  were employed  as  casual  labourers  years  back  in  1983  and subsequently  they  have  been  given  temporary  status  and, therefore, after passage of such a long time they should not be thrown out  of  employment.  It  is  difficult  to  agree  with  this contention.  By  mere  passage  of  time  a  fraudulent  practice would  not  get  any  sanctity. The  appellant  authorities  having come to know about the fraud of the respondents in obtaining employment  as  casual  labourers,  started  departmental proceedings  years  back  in  1987  and  these  proceedings  have dragged on for a number of years. Earlier, removal orders of the respondents  were  set  aside  by  the  Central  Administrative Tribunal,  Madras Bench and proceedings were remanded and after remand, fresh removal orders were passed by the appellant which  have  been  set  aside  by  the  Central  Administrative Tribunal, Ernakulam Bench and which are the subject-matter of the present proceedings. Therefore, it  cannot be said that the appellants  are  estopped  from  recalling  such  fraudulently obtained  employment  orders  of  the  respondents  subject  of course  to  following  due  procedure  of  law  and  in  due compliance  with  the  principles  of  natural  justice,  on  which aspect  there is no dispute  between the parties.  If  any lenient view is taken on the facts of the present case in favour of the respondents,  then  it  would  amount  to  putting  premium  on dishonesty and sharp practice which on the facts of the present cases cannot be permitted.”

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It is apparent from the aforesaid discussion that the case of  M. Bhaskaran

(supra) did not relate at all to the suppression of material facts or submitting false

information but pertained to obtaining employment on the basis of forged or bogus

casual  labourer  service  cards.  The  decision  in  M.  Bhaskaran (supra)  is  quite

distinguishable. It has a different field to operate. Though the principles laid down

therein may be attracted to  some extent  in  a  given case in a  particular  factual

scenario  but  are  not  of  general  application  in  the  cases  in  which the  question

involved is with which we are presently dealing with.

6. The next decision mentioned by the Division Bench in the order of reference

is  in  Delhi Administration through its  Chief  Secretary & Ors.  v. Sushil  Kumar

(1996) 11 SCC 605 in which appointment was denied to an incumbent who was

duly selected for the post of Constable in Police service subject to verification of

character and antecedents. On verification of his antecedents it was found that he

was involved in a  criminal  case under  sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC.  The

incumbent was appointed in Delhi Police service in the year 1990. On character

verification,  his  name  was  rejected.  The  tribunal  allowed  the  application  and

directed the appointment since employee had been acquitted in the said criminal

case. It was held by this Court that mere acquittal in the criminal case was not

enough once it was found that it was not desirable to appoint such a person as a

Constable in the disciplined force. This Court opined that the view taken by the

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employer in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted, though

he was discharged or acquitted. Antecedents of the incumbents could not be said to

be proper. The Court has held thus :

“3. This appeal by special leave arises from the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi made on 6-9-1995 in  OA No.  1756  of  1991.  The  admitted  position  is  that  the respondent  appeared for  recruitment  as  a  Constable  in  Delhi Police  Services  in  the  year  1989-90  with  Roll  No.  65790. Though  he  was  found  physically  fit  through  endurance  test, written test  and interview and was selected provisionally, his selection  was  subject  to  verification  of  character  and antecedents by the local police. On verification, it was found that his antecedents were such that his appointment to the post of Constable was not found desirable.  Accordingly, his name was  rejected.  Aggrieved  by  proceedings  dated  18-12-1990 culminating in cancellation of his provisional selection, he filed OA in the Central Administrative Tribunal. The Tribunal in the impugned  order  allowed  the  application  on  the  ground  that since the respondent had been discharged and/or acquitted of the offence punishable under Section 304 IPC, under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC and under Section 324 IPC, he cannot be denied the right of appointment to the post under the State. The question is whether the view taken by the Tribunal is correct in law? It is seen that verification of the character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to test whether the selected candidate is suitable to a post under the State. Though he  was  found  physically  fit,  passed  the  written  test  and interview  and  was  provisionally  selected,  on  account  of  his antecedent  record,  the  appointing  authority  found  it  not desirable to appoint a person of such record as a Constable to the  disciplined  force.  The  view  taken  by  the  appointing authority in the background of the case cannot be said to be unwarranted. The Tribunal, therefore, was wholly unjustified in giving the direction for reconsideration of his case. Though he was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same

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has nothing to do with the question. What would be relevant is the conduct or character of the candidate to be appointed to a service  and  not  the  actual  result  thereof.  If  the  actual  result happened to be in a particular way, the law will take care of the consequences. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents  of  the  candidate.  Appointing authority, therefore, has rightly focussed this aspect and found it  not desirable to appoint him to the service.”

It  is  apparent  that  the  background  of  the  case  was  considered  by  the

employer in the case of Sushil Kumar (supra) and this Court has emphasized in the

aforesaid background that the decision of the employer was not unwarranted as the

incumbent was rightly not found desirable for appointment to the service. It was

not a case of suppression in the verification form. The decision does not deal with

the effect of suppression but the case has turned on the background of the facts of

the case in which the incumbent was involved as is apparent from the discussion

made by this Court in para 3 quoted above. Thus, it is apparent that the background

facts of the case have to be taken into consideration by the employer or court while

dealing with such matters.

7. Another  decision  of  this  Court  which  has  been  noted  in  the  order  is

Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Anr. v. Dhaval Singh (1999) 1 SCC 246. It was a

case pertaining to the verification or antecedents form in August, 1995 in which

pendency of criminal case was not mentioned but it was disclosed on 15.11.1995.

An  application  was  submitted  mentioning  that  he  had  inadvertently  failed  to

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mention in the appropriate column regarding the pendency of the criminal case and

the latter may be treated as an information despite such disclosure before passing

an order of cancellation of candidature, was not taken into consideration by the

concerned employer. This Court has held that cancellation of the candidature of

Dhaval Singh was not appropriate. It was without proper application of mind and

without taking into consideration all relevant material. The tribunal has therefore

rightly set it aside. This Court has laid down thus :

“5. That there was an omission on the part of the respondent to give information against the relevant column in the Application Form about the pendency of the criminal case, is not in dispute. The  respondent,  however,  voluntarily  conveyed  it  on 15-11-1995 to the appellant that he had inadvertently failed to mention in the appropriate column regarding the pendency of the criminal case against him and that his letter may be treated as  “information”.  Despite  receipt  of  this  communication,  the candidature of the respondent was cancelled. A perusal of the order  of  the  Deputy  Commissioner  of  Police  cancelling  the candidature  on  20-11-1995  shows  that  the  information conveyed by the respondent on 15-11-1995 was not taken note of.  It  was  obligatory  on  the  part  of  the  appellant  to  have considered that application and apply its mind to the stand of the respondent that he had made an inadvertent mistake before passing the order. That, however, was not done. It is not as if information  was  given  by  the  respondent  regarding  the inadvertent  mistake  committed  by  him  after  he  had  been acquitted by the trial court — it was much before that. It is also obvious that the information was conveyed voluntarily. In vain, have  we  searched  through  the  order  of  the  Deputy Commissioner  of  Police  and  the  other  record  for  any observation  relating  to  the  information  conveyed  by  the respondent on 15-11-1995 and whether that application could not be treated as curing the defect which had occurred in the

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Form.  We are  not  told  as  to  how  that  communication  was disposed of either. Did the competent authority ever have a look at it,  before passing the order of cancellation of candidature? The  cancellation  of  the  candidature  under  the  circumstances was without any proper application of mind and without taking into consideration all relevant material. The Tribunal, therefore, rightly set it aside. We uphold the order of the Tribunal, though for slightly different reasons, as mentioned above.”

8. In  Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt.

Industrial Tribunal & Anr. (1999) 2 SCC 247, the respondent employee secured the

appointment  on  a  clerical  post  concealing  information  of  criminal  prosecution

under section 307 IPC. Subsequent to his appointment, he was convicted by the

criminal court. After one year of the conviction, Bank issued a show cause notice

against  the  proposed  termination  of  his  service  and  for  pendency  of  criminal

prosecution. After about one and a half years, second show-cause notice was issued

and after 1 year 8 months, the order of termination of services was passed. In the

appeal the employee was acquitted. This Court did not interfere under Article 136

of the Constitution in the decision of the tribunal. In the facts of the case, directing

reinstatement  as  punishment  was found by the Labour Court  to be an extreme

punishment and not warranted due to acquittal in the criminal case. At the same

time, it was made clear that the decision was rendered on the peculiar facts of the

case and will not be treated as a precedent in future. This Court has discussed the

matter thus :

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“8. The facts which are well established on record and which have weighed with us for coming to the aforesaid conclusion may now be noted. It is true that the respondent made a wrong statement while replying to Query 27 of the application form that he had not been prosecuted at any time. It is equally true that the Labour Court itself found that giving a false statement should not  be deemed to be such a  grave misconduct  which may be visited with extreme punishment of termination from service.  However,  it  has  also  to  be  noted  that  the appellant-Management while issuing show-cause notice for the first time on 26-2-1980 has in terms noted in the said notice that not  only  the  criminal  proceedings  were  pending  but  had ultimately ended in conviction of the respondent. The appellant itself thought it fit to await the decision of the criminal case before taking any precipitate action against the respondent for his  misconduct.  Thus,  according  to  the  respondent,  this suppression  was  not  so  grave  as  to  immediately  require  the appellant  to  remove  the  respondent  from  service.  On  the contrary, in its wisdom, the appellant thought it fit to await the decision of the criminal proceedings. This may be presumably so because the charge against the respondent was that he was alleged to have involved himself in an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code. It was not an offence involving cheating or misappropriation which would have a direct impact on the decision of the appointing Bank whether to employ such a  person  at  all.  We may  not  delve  further  into  the  liberal approach of the appellant itself when it did not think it fit to immediately take action against the respondent but wait till the decision  of  the  criminal  case.  Be  that  as  it  may,  once  the Sessions Court convicted the respondent, the appellant issued the impugned notice dated 26-2-1980. It can therefore be safely presumed  that  if  the  Sessions  Court  itself  had  acquitted  the respondent, the appellant would not have decided to terminate his services on this ground. So far as the notice dated 26-2-1980 is concerned, in the reply to the said show-cause notice filed by the respondent, he had mentioned that an appeal was pending in the High Court against the said conviction. In that view of the matter, once the High Court ultimately acquitted the respondent for any reason, with which strictly we are not concerned, the net result that follows is that by the time the Labour Court decided

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the  matter,  the  respondent  was  already  acquitted  and  hence there remained no real occasion for the appellant to pursue the termination order. Consequently, that was a sufficient  ground for not visiting the respondent with the extreme punishment of termination  of  service.  But  even  that  apart,  though  the conviction was rendered by the Sessions Court on 20-2-1979, the  show-cause  notice  for  the  first  time  was  issued  by  the appellant after one year, i.e., on 26-2-1980 and thereafter, the termination order was passed on 18-4-1983. That itself by the passage  of  time,  created  a  situation  wherein  the  original suppression of involvement of the respondent in the prosecution for an offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code did not remain so pernicious a misconduct on his part as to visit him with the grave punishment of termination from service on these peculiar facts of the case and especially when the Labour Court  also  did not  award any back wages  to  the  respondent from 1983 till the respondent’s reinstatement by its order dated 29-9-1995 and one month thereafter and when the High Court also did not  think it  fit  to interfere under Article  226 of  the Constitution of India on the peculiar facts of this case. In our opinion, the interest of justice will be served by maintaining the order passed by the Labour Court and as confirmed by the High Court subject to a slight modification that the respondent may be  treated  to  be  a  fresh  recruit  from the  date  when  he  was exonerated by the High Court, i.e., from 13-1-1988 which can be treated as 1-1-1988 for the sake of convenience. It is ordered accordingly. From 1-1-1988, the respondent will be treated to have been reinstated into the services of the Bank on the basis that he will be treated as a fresh recruit from that date and will be entitled to be placed at the bottom of the revised scale of pay for Clerks and will also be entitled to other allowances which were available in the cadre of Clerks in the Bank’s service. The respondent  will  be  entitled  to  back  wages  with  effect  from 1-11-1995, i.e., from the date when the Labour Court awarded the  reinstatement  of  the  respondent.  It  also  directed  that  the appellant-Bank will work out appropriate back wages payable to the respondent from 1-11-1995 in the time-scale of Clerks as available from 1-1-1988, treating his services to be continuous from that date and accordingly, working out of his salary and emoluments on a notional basis with the usual increments from

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1-1-1988 and the actual  arrears of pay and other permissible emoluments from 1-11-1995 till reinstatement of the respondent by the appellant. All such arrears will be paid to the respondent within a period of four weeks from 1-3-1999. The respondent who  is  present  before  us  takes  notice  of  this  order  and  his counsel on his instructions states that the respondent will report for  duty  pursuant  to  the  present  order  before  the  Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda, Northern Zone, Meerut on 1-3-1999. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  agrees  to  the  said  course being adopted. The appeal will stand dismissed subject to the aforesaid  modifications.  IA  No.  2  for  passing  order  under Section  17-B  of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act,  1947  will  not survive in view of the present order. We make it clear that this order  of  ours  is  rendered  on  the  peculiar  facts  and circumstances of the case as mentioned earlier and will not be treated as a precedent in future. There would be no order as to costs.”

The Court has taken note of the fact that it was not an offence involving

cheating or misappropriation which would have direct impact on the decision of

the  appointing  Bank.  By  the  time  the  Labour  Court  decided  the  matter  the

employee was acquitted by the High Court. The passage of time created a situation

wherein  the  original  suppression  or  involvement  of  the  respondent  in  the

prosecution for an offence under section 307 IPC did not remain so pernicious or

misconduct to visit him punishment of termination. In the peculiar facts this Court

has not interfered but at the same time laid down that the decision would not be

treated as a precedent in future.

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9. In Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Ors. v. Ram Ratan Yadav (2003) 3 SCC

437, a question arose as to suppression of material information relating to character

and  antecedents.  In  clause  4  of  the  offer  of  appointment  offered  to  Physical

Education Teacher, it was mentioned that suppression of any information will be

considered a major offence for which the punishment may extend to dismissal from

service.  Suppression of  information was held to be material  as  a criminal  case

under sections 323, 341, 294, 506-B read with section 34 IPC was pending on the

date when the respondent filled the attestation form. This Court has observed that

suppression of material information or making a false statement has a clear bearing

on the character and antecedents in relation to his continuance in service. It was

also held that mere fact that the case was withdrawn by the State Government was

not much material. This Court has discussed the matter thus :

“10. The  memorandum dated  7-4-1999/8-4-1999  terminating the services of the respondent refers to columns 12 and 13 of the  attestation  form,  the  criminal  case  registered  against  the respondent on the basis of the report given to the appellants by IG,  Police,  suppression  of  material  information  by  the respondent while submitting attestation form and violating the clause stipulated under para 9 of the offer of appointment issued to  him,  OM  dated  1-7-1971  of  the  Cabinet  Secretary, Department  of  Personnel,  New Delhi,  in  which  it  is  clearly mentioned that furnishing of false information or suppression of factual  information  in  the  attestation  form  would  be disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for employment under the Government and that as per clause 4 of the offer of appointment, the respondent was on probation for a

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period  of  two  years  and  that  his  services  were  liable  to  be terminated by one month’s notice. 11. It  is  not  in  dispute  that  a  criminal  case  registered  under Sections 323, 341, 294, 506-B read with Section 34 IPC was pending on the date when the respondent filled the attestation form. Hence, the information given by the respondent as against columns 12 and 13 as “No” is plainly suppression of material information  and  it  is  also  a  false  statement.  Admittedly, the respondent is holder of BA, BEd and MEd degrees. Assuming even  his  medium  of  instruction  was  Hindi  throughout,  no prudent man can accept that he did not study English language at all at any stage of his education. It is also not the case of the respondent  that  he  did  not  study  English  at  all.  If  he  could understand columns 1-11 correctly in the same attestation form, it is difficult to accept his version that he could not correctly understand the contents of columns 12 and 13. Even otherwise, if he could not correctly understand certain English words, in the ordinary course he could have certainly taken the help of somebody. This being the position,  the Tribunal  was right  in rejecting the contention of the respondent and the High Court committed  a  manifest  error  in  accepting  the  contention  that because the medium of instruction of the respondent was Hindi, he could not understand the contents of columns 12 and 13. It is not  the  case  that  columns  12  and  13  are  left  blank.  The respondent could not have said “No” as against columns 12 and 13 without understanding the contents. Subsequent withdrawal of criminal case registered against the respondent or the nature of offences, in our opinion, were not material. The requirement of filling columns 12 and 13 of the attestation form was for the purpose  of  verification  of  character  and  antecedents  of  the respondent as on the date of filling and attestation of the form. Suppression  of  material  information  and  making  a  false statement has a clear bearing on the character and antecedents of the respondent in relation to his continuance in service.      12. The object of requiring information in columns 12 and 13  of  the  attestation  form and  certification  thereafter  by  the candidate  was  to  ascertain  and  verify  the  character  and antecedents  to  judge his  suitability  to  continue  in  service.  A candidate having suppressed material information and/or giving false information cannot claim right to continue in service. The

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employer having regard to the nature of the employment and all other aspects had the discretion to terminate his services, which is made expressly clear in para 9 of the offer of appointment. The purpose of seeking information as per columns 12 and 13 was not to find out either the nature or gravity of the offence or the result of a criminal case ultimately. The information in the said columns was sought with a view to judge the character and antecedents of the respondent to continue in service or not. The High Court, in our view, has failed to see this aspect of the matter. It went wrong in saying that the criminal case had been subsequently  withdrawn  and  that  the  offences,  in  which  the respondent was alleged to have been involved, were also not of serious nature. In the present case the respondent was to serve as a  Physical  Education Teacher in Kendriya Vidyalaya.  The character, conduct and antecedents of a teacher will have some impact on the minds of the students of impressionable age. The appellants having considered all the aspects passed the order of dismissal of the respondent from service. The Tribunal after due consideration rightly recorded a finding of fact in upholding the order of  dismissal  passed by the appellants.  The High Court was clearly in error in upsetting the order of the Tribunal. The High Court was again not right in taking note of the withdrawal of the case by the State Government and that the case was not of a serious nature to set aside the order of the Tribunal on that ground  as  well.  The  respondent  accepted  the  offer  of appointment  subject  to  the  terms  and  conditions  mentioned therein  with  his  eyes  wide  open.  Para  9  of  the  said memorandum  extracted  above  in  clear  terms  kept  the respondent  informed that  the suppression of  any information may lead to dismissal from service. In the attestation form, the respondent has certified that the information given by him is correct and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief; if he could not understand the contents of columns 12 and 13, he could not certify so. Having certified that the information given by him is correct and complete, his version cannot be accepted. The order of termination of services clearly shows that there has been due consideration of various aspects. In this view, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that as per para 9 of the memorandum, the termination of service was not automatic, cannot be accepted.”

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It  is  clear  from  the  decision  in  Ram  Ratan  Yadav (supra)  that  besides

considering the effect of suppression, this Court has observed  that having regard to

the nature of employment and various aspects, the employer has the discretion to

terminate his services as provided in the order of appointment. It was also held that

the involvement in the criminal case would have some impact on the minds of

students of impressionable age. This Court has further observed that the order of

termination  of  service  shows that  there  had been  due  consideration  of  various

aspects by the concerned authority while passing the order of termination. It  is

clear from the decision in Ram Ratan (supra) also that there is a discretion with the

employer to terminate the services. Character, conduct and antecedents do have

some impact on the nature of employment and there has to be due consideration of

various aspects. Thus, it follows that merely because there is a power to terminate

services or cancellation of offer of appointment, it does not follow that the person

should  be  removed  outrightly.  Various  aspects  have  to  be  considered  and  the

discretion so used should not be arbitrary or fanciful. It has to be guided on certain

principles for which purpose  verification is sought.

10. In Secretary, Department of Home Secy., A.P. & Ors. v. B. Chinnam Naidu

(2005) 2 SCC 746, the case pertained to suppression of material information and/or

giving  false  information  in  the  attestation  form.  In  the  attestation  form  the

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respondent had not mentioned about his arrest and pendency of a case against him.

The tribunal  held that  the employee had suppressed material  information while

filling up the attestation form and upheld the order of termination. The High Court

set aside the order of the tribunal holding that the employer was not justified in

denying  appointment  to  the  respondent.  This  Court  has  noted  that  as  per  the

relevant  column of  the  attestation  form the  candidate  was  required  to  indicate

whether  he  had  ever  been  convicted  by  a  court  of  law or  detained  under  any

State/Central preventive detention laws. He was not required to indicate whether

he had been arrested in any case or any case was pending against him. In view of

the relevant column in the form it could not be said that the respondent had made

false declaration or had suppressed material information. As such this Court held

that the action of the employer in not permitting the respondent to join the training

due to suppression of truth in the attestation form, was not sustainable. This Court

observed  that  the  requirement  in  the  present  case  was  “conviction”  and  not

“prosecution”. This Court has held thus :

“8. In order to appreciate the rival submissions it is necessary to take note of column 12 of the attestation form and column 3 of the declaration. The relevant portions are quoted below: “Column 12.—Have you ever been convicted by a court of law or detained under any State/Central preventive detention laws for any offence whether such conviction sustained in court of appeal or set aside by the appellate court if appealed against.”

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“Column  3.—I  am  fully  aware  that  furnishing  of  false information  or  suppression  of  any  actual  information  in  the attestation  form would  be  a  disqualification  and  is  likely  to render me unfit for employment under the Government.

9. A bare  perusal  of  the  extracted  portions  shows  that  the candidate is required to indicate as to whether he has ever been convicted by a court of law or detained under any State/Central preventive  detention  laws  for  any  offences  whether  such conviction is  sustained or  set  aside by the appellate court,  if appealed against. The candidate is not required to indicate as to whether he had been arrested in any case or as to whether any case was pending. Conviction by a court or detention under any State/Central preventive detention laws is different from arrest in  any  case  or  pendency  of  a  case.  By  answering  that  the respondent had not been convicted or detained under preventive detention  laws it  cannot  be  said  that  he  had suppressed  any material  fact  or  had  furnished  any  false  information  or suppressed  any  information  in  the  attestation  form  to  incur disqualification.  The  State  Government  and  the  Tribunal appeared to  have proceeded on the basis  that  the respondent ought to have indicated the fact of arrest or pendency of the case, though column 12 of the attestation form did not require such information being furnished. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that such a requirement has to be read into an  attestation  form.  We  find  no  reason  to  accept  such contention. There was no specific requirement to mention as to whether any case is pending or whether the applicant had been arrested. In view of the specific language so far as column 12 is concerned  the  respondent  cannot  be  found  guilty  of  any suppression.”

11. This Court in R. Radhakrishnan v. Director General of Police & Ors. (2008)

1 SCC 660 considered a case where the appellant intended to obtain appointment

in police force. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in

Hindi and also in English. The application was filed for appointment to the post of

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a Fireman on 5.1.2000. He was involved in the criminal case which occurred on

15.4.2000 under section 294(b) IPC. He was released on bail and was acquitted of

the said charge on 25.9.2000. However his services were dispensed with on the

ground of suppression of pendency of the criminal case. This Court upheld the

order and had held thus :

“10. Indisputably, the appellant intended to obtain appointment in  a  uniformed  service.  The  standard  expected  of  a  person intended to serve in such a service is different from the one of a person who intended to serve in other services. Application for appointment and the verification roll were both in Hindi as also in English. He, therefore, knew and understood the implication of his statement or omission to disclose a vital information. The fact  that  in  the  event  such  a  disclosure  had  been made,  the authority could have verified his character as also suitability of the appointment is not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that the persons who had not made such disclosures and were, thus, similarly situated had not been appointed.”

In  R. Radhakrishnan (supra) this Court had taken note of the decision in

Sushil  Kumar (supra)  in  which the  background facts  of  the  case  in  which the

employee was involved were considered, and the antecedents were not found good.

12. In Union of India & Ors. v. Bipad Bhanjan Gayen (2008) 11 SCC 314, the

facts  indicate  that  the  respondent  was  selected  for  training  as  a  Constable  in

Railway Protection Force, and pending verification of Form 12, he was sent for

training. It was found on verification that he had been involved in FIR 20/1993 for

an offence punishable under section 376 IPC and another case under section 417

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was  pending  in  the  court.  On  10.7.1995  his  services  were  terminated  with

immediate effect because of his involvement in the police case and suppression of

factual information in the attestation form by the candidate. It was an admitted fact

that two prosecutions were pending on the date when he filled in the form. The

employee was under probation at the time of termination of his service. This Court

has held thus :  

“8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through  the  record.  Rule  57  of  the  Rules  provides  for  a probation  period  of  2  years  from  the  date  of  appointment subject  to  extension.  Rule  67  provides  that  a  direct  recruit selected for appointment as an enrolled member of the Force is liable to be discharged at any stage if the Chief Security Officer, for reasons to be recorded in writing, deems it fit to do so in the interest of the Force till such time as the recruit is not formally appointed  to  the  Force.  A reading  of  these  two rules  would reveal  that till  a  recruit  is  formally enrolled to the Force his appointment is extremely tenuous. 9. It  is  the admitted case that  the respondent  was still  under probation at the time his services had been terminated. It is also apparent  from the record that the respondent had been given appointment  on  probation  subject  to  verification  of  the  facts given  in  the  attestation  form.  To our  mind,  therefore,  if  an enquiry revealed that the facts given were wrong, the appellant was at liberty to dispense with the services of the respondent as the question of any stigma and penal consequences at this stage would not arise. 10. It bears repetition that what has led to the termination of service  of  the  respondent  is  not  his  involvement  in  the  two cases  which  were  then  pending,  and  in  which  he  had  been discharged  subsequently,  but  the  fact  that  he  had  withheld relevant information while filling in the attestation form. We are further of the opinion that an employment as a police officer pre-supposes  a  higher  level  of  integrity  as  such  a  person  is

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expected to uphold the law, and on the contrary, such a service born in deceit and subterfuge cannot be tolerated.”     

The fact remains that this Court in Bipad Bhanjan Gayen (supra), the case in

which the offence involved was with respect to commission of rape under section

376 and cheating under section 417. The case involved moral turpitude, as such

suppression was material as that would have clear impact on the antecedents and

suitability of an incumbent for being appointed in the service. Thus the suppression

was material and was such that the employer could have safely taken the view to

terminate the services. Such an incumbent cannot be said to have any equity to

seek  employment  till  he  is  given  a  clean  chit  by  the  courts  of  law  and  his

antecedents are otherwise found to be good besides the acquittal.  

13. In A.P. Public Service Commission v. Koneti Venkateswarulu & Ors. (2005)

7 SCC 177 there was suppression of the information regarding the employment

and the explanation offered that he inadvertently filled the form was not accepted.

14. In Kamal Nayan Mishra v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2010) 2 SCC

169, this Court has considered the question of dismissal of a confirmed employee

without any inquiry or opportunity to show cause on the basis that he had furnished

incorrect/false information in his personal attestation form. This Court held that

such  misdemeanor  would  be  treated  as  a  misconduct  and  punishment  can  be

imposed only after subjecting the employee to appropriate disciplinary proceedings

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as  per  the  relevant  service  rules.  Besides,  the  attestation  was  required  to  be

furnished after 14 years of the service, and even after detection of the suppression,

the  authorities  waited  for  7  long  years  which  indicated  that  the  Department

assumed that such misconduct did not call for any disciplinary or punitive action.

Thus the belated decision which was taken to terminate his service  sans enquiry

was  adjudged  to  be  illegal  and  violative  of  protection  conferred  under  Article

311(2) of the Constitution.  This Court in  Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra) has held

that the decision in Ram Ratan (supra) was with respect to a probationer. It was not

laid down in the said decision that services of a confirmed employee holding a

civil post under the State, could be terminated for furnishing false information in

the attestation form, without giving him an opportunity to meet the charges against

him, as such the termination was void. This Court held thus :

“9. On  the  contentions  urged,  two  questions  arise  for consideration: (i) Whether the ratio decidendi of the decision in  Ram Ratan Yadav (2003)  3 SCC 437 apply to this case? Does it hold that the State Government could dismiss or remove the holder of a civil post, without any enquiry or opportunity to show cause, once it is found that he has given incorrect/false information in the personal attestation form? (ii) Whether the termination of the appellant is valid?”

x x x x x

“18. There are also several  other  features in this case which distinguish it from Ram Ratan Yadav (2003) 3 SCC 437.  First is  that  Ram Ratan  Yadav  (supra)  related  to  an  employee  of

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Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, who did not have the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, whereas in this case we  are  concerned  with  a  government  servant  protected  by Article 311. Second is that the attestation form in this case, was required to  be furnished by the  employee,  not  when he  was appointed, but after fourteen years of service. The third is that while action was promptly taken against the probationer in Ram Ratan Yadav, within the period of probation, in this case even after  knowing  that  the  appellant  had  furnished  wrong information, the respondents did not take any action for seven long years, which indicated that the Department proceeded for a long time on the assumption that the wrong information did not call for any disciplinary or punitive action. The belated decision to terminate him, seven years later was unjustified and violative of Article 311. 19. If  the  appellant  had  been  issued  a  charge-sheet  or  a show-cause notice he would have had an opportunity to explain the  reason  for  answering  the  queries  in  Column  12  in  the manner  he  did.  He  could  have  explained  that  he  did  not understand the queries properly and that he was instructed to furnish the information as on the date of appointment. In fact his  contention that  he was required to  answer  the  queries  in Column 12 with reference to the date of his appointment, finds support  from  the  termination  order,  which  says  that  the appellant  was  terminated  for  giving  wrong  information  and concealment of facts in the attestation from at the time of initial recruitment. This clearly implies that he was expected to reply the  queries  in  Column  12  with  reference  to  his  initial appointment,  even though Clauses 12(b) and (c) of  the form stated that the information should be as on the date of signing of the attestation form. The explanations given by the appellant, would have certainly made a difference to the finding on guilt and the punishment to be imposed. But he could not give the said explanations as there was no show-cause notice or enquiry. The termination order is  also unsustainable,  as  the statement therein  that  the  appellant  had  given  wrong  information  and concealed  the  facts  at  the  time  of  initial  recruitment,  is erroneous. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to  the  instructions  to  the  employees  in  the  preamble  to  the

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attestation  form  and  the  undertaking  contained  in  the verification  certificate  by  the  employee  at  the  end  of  the attestation  form,  which  puts  him  on  notice  that  any  false information could result in termination of his service without enquiry. It is contended that as the attestation form stated that an employee could be terminated without notice, if he furnishes false information, the employee is estopped from objecting to termination  without  notice.  The  said  contention  may  merit acceptance in the case of a probationer, but not in the case of a confirmed government servant. 21. No term in the attestation form, nor any consent given by a government servant, can take away the constitutional safeguard provided  to  a  government  servant  under  Article  311  of  the Constitution.

x x x x x

23. We also  find  from  an  examination  of  the  terms  of  the attestation form that termination without notice or inquiry was contemplated only in the context of furnishing false information in  and around  the  time  of  the  appointment.  Note  (1)  of  the preamble warns that: “the  furnishing  of  false  information  or  suppression  of  any factual  information  in  the  attestation  form  would  be  a disqualification and is likely to render the candidate unfit for employment”. Similarly, the certificate at the end of the attestation form states that: “I am not aware of any circumstances which might impair my fitness for employment under the Government. I agree that if the  above  information  is  found  false  or  incomplete  in  any material respect,  the appointing authority will have a right to terminate my services without giving notice or showing cause.” Be that as it may.

x x x x x 25. We have already pointed out that there are clear indications that the appellant was bona fide under the impression that he was required to give the particulars sought in Column 12 of the

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form with reference to the date of his appointment. Further, the entire matter relates to an attestation form given in 1994 and the appellant has already been out of service for more than seven years on account of the illegal termination from service without an inquiry on 7-3-2002. We are therefore of the view that the interests of justice would be served if the appellant is reinstated with  continuity  of  service  and  other  consequential  benefits, dispensing with any further disciplinary action. The appellant will  not be entitled to any salary for the period 7-3-2002 till today.”

In Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra), this Court has considered various aspects

while  holding  termination  order  for  Kamal  Nayan  Mishra on  the  ground  of

suppression  of  information  was  bad  in  law.  The  employer  has  to  take  into

consideration various aspects and a blanket order of termination of services cannot

be passed on the basis of mere enabling clause in the verification form to do so.

15. In  Daya Shankar Yadav v. Union of India & Ors. (2010) 14 SCC 103 on

consideration of  various aspects as to ambiguities  in the verification form, this

Court  observed  that  the  purpose  of  seeking the  information is  to  ascertain  the

character and antecedents of the candidate so as to assess the suitability for the

post. Therefore the candidate will have to answer the questions truthfully and fully

and any misrepresentation or suppression or false statement therein, by itself would

demonstrate a conduct or character unbefitting for a uniformed police force. This

Court has observed various consequences which may arise due to character and

antecedents verification thus :

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“14. Rule 14 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955 relevant in this case relates to verification. Clauses (a) and (b) of the said Rule are extracted below :        “14.  Verification.—(a) As soon as a man is enrolled, his character, antecedents, connections and age shall be verified in accordance  with  the  procedure  prescribed  by  the  Central Government from time to time. The verification roll  shall  be sent to the District Magistrate or Deputy Commissioner of the District of which the recruit is a resident. (b)  The  verification  roll  shall  be  in  CRP Form 25 and after verification shall be attached to the character and service roll of the member of the force concerned.” The purpose of seeking the said information is to ascertain the character and antecedents of the candidate so as to assess his suitability for  the post.  Therefore,  the candidate  will  have to answer the questions in these columns truthfully and fully and any misrepresentation or suppression or false statement therein, by itself would demonstrate a conduct or character unbefitting for a uniformed security service.

15. When an employee or a prospective employee declares in a verification form, answers to the queries relating to character and antecedents, the verification thereof can therefore lead to any of the following consequences: (a)  If  the  declarant  has  answered  the  questions  in  the affirmative  and  furnished  the  details  of  any  criminal  case (wherein he was convicted  or  acquitted by giving benefit  of doubt for want of evidence), the employer may refuse to offer him  employment  (or  if  already  employed  on  probation, discharge him from service), if he is found to be unfit having regard to the nature and gravity of the offence/crime in which he was involved. (b) On the other hand, if the employer finds that the criminal case disclosed by the declarant related to offences which were technical,  or of a nature that would not affect the declarant’s fitness  for  employment,  or  where  the  declarant  had  been honourably acquitted and exonerated, the employer may ignore the fact  that  the declarant  had been prosecuted in a criminal

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case  and  proceed  to  appoint  him  or  continue  him  in employment. (c)  Where  the  declarant  has  answered  the  questions  in  the negative and on verification it is found that the answers were false,  the  employer  may  refuse  to  employ  the  declarant  (or discharge him, if already employed), even if the declarant had been  cleared  of  the  charges  or  is  acquitted.  This  is  because when  there  is  suppression  or  non-disclosure  of  material information  bearing  on  his  character,  that  itself  becomes  a reason for not employing the declarant. (d)  Where the  attestation  form or  verification  form does  not contain proper or  adequate  queries  requiring the declarant  to disclose his involvement in any criminal proceedings, or where the candidate was unaware of initiation of criminal proceedings when he gave the declarations in the verification roll/attestation form, then the  candidate  cannot  be found fault  with,  for  not furnishing  the  relevant  information.  But  if  the  employer  by other means (say police verification or complaints, etc.) learns about the involvement of the declarant, the employer can have recourse to courses (a) or (b) above. 16. Thus  an  employee  on probation  can be  discharged from service or a prospective employee may be refused employment: (i) on the ground of unsatisfactory antecedents and character, disclosed  from  his  conviction  in  a  criminal  case,  or  his involvement in a criminal offence (even if he was acquitted on technical  grounds  or  by  giving  benefit  of  doubt)  or  other conduct  (like  copying  in  examination)  or  rustication  or suspension  or  debarment  from  college,  etc.;  and  (ii)  on  the ground of suppression of material information or making false statement  in  reply  to  queries  relating  to  prosecution  or conviction  for  a  criminal  offence  (even if  he  was  ultimately acquitted in the criminal case). This ground is distinct from the ground of  previous  antecedents  and character,  as  it  shows a current dubious conduct and absence of character at the time of making the declaration, thereby making him unsuitable for the post.”   

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16. This Court has also held that query in verification form has to be very clear,

specific and unambiguous. This Court has observed thus :

“21. If the object of the query is to ascertain the antecedents and  character  of  the  candidate  to  consider  his  fitness  and suitability for employment, and if the consequence of a wrong answer can be rejection of his application for appointment, or termination from service if already appointed, the least that is expected of the employer is to ensure that the query was clear, specific  and  unambiguous.  Obviously,  the  employer  cannot dismiss/discharge/terminate an employee, for misunderstanding a vague and complex question, and giving a wrong answer. We do hope that CRPF and other uniformed services will use clear and  simple  questions  and  avoid  any  variations  between  the English and Hindi versions. They may also take note of the fact that  the ambiguity and vague questions will  lead to hardship and  mistakes  and  make  the  questions  simple,  clear  and straightforward. Be that as it may.”

However, on facts this Court held that the employee was not misled and

made a false statement. As such CRPF was justified in dispensing with his services

for not being truthful in giving material information.

17. In State of West Bengal & Ors. v. SK. Nazrul Islam (2011) 10 SCC 184, there

was concealment of fact regarding antecedents in the verification form. Though

Nazrul Islam was selected and found medically fit, he concealed the fact that he

was involved in a criminal case. A chargesheet was filed and he had been granted

bail. The employer did not appoint him as a Constable. The High Court directed

that  the  employer  could  not  withhold  the  offer  of  appointment  and  they  were

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directed to issue appointment letter to the employee, subject to final decision in the

pending criminal case. This Court held that due to pendency of the criminal case

under  sections  148/323/380/427/506  IPC,  the  High  Court  had  committed  an

illegality in issuing a direction to appoint. The employee could not have been held

suitable for appointment to the post. This Court has laid down thus :

“5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and we fail  to  appreciate  how when  a  criminal  case  under  Sections 148/323/380/448/427/506  IPC,  against  the  respondent  was pending  in  the  Court  of  the  Additional  Chief  Judicial Magistrate, Uluberia, Howrah, any mandamus could have been issued  by  the  High  Court  to  the  authorities  to  appoint  the respondent as a constable. Surely, the authorities entrusted with the responsibility of appointing constables were under duty to verify the antecedents of a candidate to find out whether he is suitable for the post of constable and so long as the candidate has not been acquitted in the criminal case of the charges under Sections 148/323/380/448/427/506 IPC, he cannot possibly be held to be suitable for appointment to the post of constable.”

18. In Commissioner of Police & Ors. v. Sandeep Kumar (2011) 4 SCC 644, this

Court  considered  a  case  where  Sandeep  Kumar’s  candidature  for  the  post  of

Constable was cancelled on the ground that he had concealed his involvement in

the criminal case under section 325/34 IPC when he was about 20 years. In para 9,

this Court took note of the character “Jean Valjean” in Victor Hugo’s novel ‘Les

Miserables’ in which for committing a minor offence of stealing a loaf of bread for

his hungry family,  Jean Valjean was branded as a thief for whole life. This Court

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also referred to the decision in Morris v. Crown Office (1970) 2 QB 114. Relevant

portion is extracted hereunder  :

“8. We respectfully agree with the Delhi High Court that the cancellation of his candidature was illegal, but we wish to give our own opinion in the matter. When the incident happened the respondent must have been about 20 years of age. At that age young  people  often  commit  indiscretions,  and  such indiscretions can often be condoned.  After  all,  youth will  be youth. They are not expected to behave in as mature a manner as  older  people.  Hence,  our  approach  should  be  to  condone minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for the rest of their lives. 9. In  this  connection,  we  may  refer  to  the  character  “Jean Valjean” in Victor Hugo’s novel  Les Miserables, in which for committing a minor offence of stealing a loaf of bread for his hungry family Jean Valjean was branded as a thief for his whole life. The modern approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him as a criminal all his life. 10. We may  also  here  refer  to  the  case  of  Welsh  students mentioned by Lord Denning in his book Due Process of Law. It appears  that  some  students  of  Wales  were  very  enthusiastic about the Welsh language and they were upset because the radio programmes were being broadcast in the English language and not in Welsh. They came up to London and invaded the High Court.  They  were  found  guilty  of  contempt  of  court  and sentenced to prison for three months by the High Court Judge. They filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. Allowing the appeal, Lord Denning observed:

“I come now to Mr Watkin Powell’s third point. He says that  the  sentences  were  excessive.  I  do  not  think they were excessive, at the time they were given and in the circumstances  then  existing.  Here  was  a  deliberate interference with the course of  justice in a case which was no concern of theirs. It was necessary for the Judge to show—and to show to all students everywhere—that this  kind  of  thing  cannot  be  tolerated.  Let  students demonstrate, if they please, for the causes in which they

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believe. Let them make their protests as they will.  But they must do it by lawful means and not by unlawful. If they strike at  the course of  justice  in this  land—and I speak  both  for  England  and  Wales—they  strike  at  the roots of society itself,  and they bring down that which protects them. It is only by the maintenance of law and order that they are privileged to be students and to study and live in peace. So let them support the law and not strike it down. But now what is to be done? The law has been vindicated by the sentences which the Judge passed on Wednesday of last week. He has shown that law and order must be maintained, and will be maintained. But on this appeal, things are changed. These students here no longer defy the  law. They  have  appealed  to  this  Court  and shown respect for it. They have already served a week in prison. I  do not  think it  necessary to  keep them inside it  any longer. These  young people  are  no  ordinary  criminals. There is no violence, dishonesty or vice in them. On the contrary, there was much that we should applaud. They wish to do all they can to preserve the Welsh language. Well may they be proud of it. It is the language of the bards—of the poets and the singers—more melodious by far than our rough English tongue. On high authority, it should be equal in Wales with English. They have done wrong—very wrong—in going to the extreme they did. But, that having been shown, I think we can, and should, show mercy on them. We should permit them to go back to their  studies,  to their  parents and continue the good course  which  they  have  so  wrongly  disturbed.”  (Vide Morris v. Crown Office (1970) 2 QB 114 at p. 125C-H.

In  our  opinion,  we  should  display  the  same  wisdom  as displayed by Lord Denning. 11. As  already  observed  above,  youth  often  commits indiscretions, which are often condoned. 12. It is true that in the application form the respondent did not mention that he was involved in a criminal case under Sections 325/34 IPC. Probably he did not mention this out of fear that if he did so he would automatically be disqualified. At any event,

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it was not such a serious offence like murder, dacoity or rape, and hence a more lenient view should be taken in the matter.”

This Court has observed that suppression related to a case when the age of

Sandeep Kumar was about 20 years. He was young and at such age people often

commit indiscretions and such indiscretions may often be condoned. The modern

approach should be to reform a person instead of branding him a criminal all his

life. In  Morris v. Crown Office (supra), the observations made were that young

people are no ordinary criminals. There is no violence, dishonesty or vice in them.

They were trying to preserve the Welsh language. Though they have done wrong

but must we show mercy on them and they were permitted to go back to their

studies, to their parents and continue the good course.  

19. In  Ram Kumar  v. State  of  Utttar  Pradesh  & Ors.  (2011)  14  SCC 709,

appointment was denied to Ram Kumar due to failure to disclose in the verification

form about  a  criminal  case  under  sections  324/323/504  IPC  in  which  he  was

subsequently acquitted. This Court examined the sustainability of the order and

laid down that in terms of the instructions in Government Order dated 28.4.1958 it

was the duty of the appointing authority to satisfy himself whether the appellant

was suitable for appointment to the post of a Constable, with reference to nature of

suppression  and  nature  of  the  criminal  case.  Instead  thereof,  the  appointing

authority mechanically held that his selection was irregular and illegal because the

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appellant  had furnished an  affidavit  stating  the facts  incorrectly  at  the time of

recruitment. This Court also took note of the facts of the case that he was acquitted

subsequently and since the sole witness had deposed that victim was injured when

he fell and hit a brick platform and that he was not beaten by the accused by any

sharp   weapon.  In  view  of  the  aforesaid  it  was  held  by  this  Court  that  the

appointing  authority  could  not  have  found  appellant  unsuitable  to  the  post  of

Constable.  Hence,  the  appeal  was  allowed  and  appointment  of  employee  was

directed.  However,  backwages  were  denied  for  the  period  he  remained  out  of

service. Relevant portion of the decision is extracted below :

“9. We  have  carefully  read  the  Government  Order  dated 28-4-1958  on  the  subject  “Verification  of  the  character  and antecedents  of  government  servants  before  their  first appointment” and it is stated in the government order that the Governor  has  been  pleased  to  lay  down  the  following instructions in supersession of all the previous orders:

“The  rule  regarding  character  of  candidate  for appointment under the State Government shall continue to be as follows:

The  character  of  a  candidate  for  direct  appointment must be such as to render him suitable in all respects for employment in the service or post to which he is to be appointed. It would be the duty of the appointing authority to satisfy itself on this point.”

10. It will be clear from the aforesaid instructions issued by the Governor that the object of the verification of the character and antecedents  of  government  servants  before  their  first appointment  is  to  ensure  that  the  character  of  a  government servant for a direct recruitment is such as to render him suitable in all respects for employment in the service or post to which he

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is  to  be appointed and it  would be a  duty of  the appointing authority to satisfy itself on this point. 11. In the facts of the present case, we find that though Criminal Case  No.  275 of  2001  under  Sections  324/323/504  IPC had been registered against the appellant at Jaswant Nagar Police Station,  District  Etawah,  admittedly  the  appellant  had  been acquitted  by  order  dated  18-7-2002  by  the  Additional  Chief Judicial Magistrate, Etawah. 12. On a reading of the order dated 18-7-2002 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate it would show that the sole witness examined  before  the  court,  PW 1,  Mr  Akhilesh  Kumar,  had deposed  before  the  court  that  on  2-12-2000  at  4.00  p.m. children  were  quarrelling  and  at  that  time  the  appellant, Shailendra  and  Ajay  Kumar  amongst  other  neighbours  had reached there and someone from the crowd hurled abuses and in the scuffle Akhilesh Kumar got injured when he fell and his head hit  a  brick platform and that  he was not  beaten by the accused persons by any sharp weapon. In the absence of any other  witness  against  the  appellant,  the  Additional  Chief Judicial Magistrate acquitted the appellant of the charges under Sections  323/34/504  IPC.  On  these  facts,  it  was  not  at  all possible  for  the  appointing authority  to  take  a  view that  the appellant  was  not  suitable  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  a police constable. 13. The order dated 18-7-2002 of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate had been sent along with the report dated 15-1-2007 of Jaswant Nagar Police Station to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, but it appears from the order dated 8-8-2007 of the Senior Superintendent of Police, Ghaziabad, that he has not  gone  into  the  question  as  to  whether  the  appellant  was suitable for appointment to service or to the post of constable in which he was appointed and he has only held that the selection of the appellant  was illegal  and irregular  because he did not furnish in his affidavit in the pro forma of verification roll that a criminal case has been registered against him. 14. As has been stated in the instructions in the Government Order  dated  28-4-1958,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Senior Superintendent  of  Police,  Ghaziabad,  as  the  appointing authority,  to  satisfy  himself  on  the  point  as  to  whether  the

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appellant  was  suitable  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  a constable,  with  reference  to  the  nature  of  suppression  and nature of the criminal case. Instead of considering whether the appellant  was  suitable  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  male constable, the appointing authority has mechanically held that his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit stating the facts incorrectly at the time of recruitment.”

20. When  we  take  stock  of  aforesaid  decisions  of  this  Court  in  nutshell  it

emerges  that  in  Ramashanker  Raghuvanshi (supra),  this  Court  has  opined  that

activities  in  Jan  Sangh  and  RSS  could  not  be  made  a  ground  to  deprive

employment.  In democratic set up ‘McCarthyism’ is not healthy.  Some leniency

to young people cannot be ruled out.  In  T.  S.  Vasudavan  Nair (supra),  a  three

Judges’  Co-ordinate  Bench  of  this  Court  held  that  due  to  non-disclosure  of

conviction in a case of violation of Defence of India Rules by shouting slogans, the

cancellation  of  appointment  was  illegal.   In  Dhaval  Singh (supra),  though

pendency of case was suppressed when verification form was filed, however, the

information about it was furnished before cancellation of appointment order on the

ground of suppression was passed.  This Court set aside the order on the ground of

non-consideration  of  effect  of  disclosure  made  before  order  of  cancellation  of

appointment was passed.  In  Sandeep Kumar (supra), this Court in the backdrop

fact of the case that offence suppressed was committed under section 325/34 IPC at

the time when incumbent was 20 years of age.  This Court held that young people

to  be  dealt  with  leniency.   They  should  not  be  deprived  of  appointment  as

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suppression  did  not  relate  to  involvement  in  a  serious  case.    In  Ram Kumar

(supra), this Court considered a case when pending criminal case under sections

324, 323, 504 IPC in which subsequently acquittal had been recorded, no overt act

was  attributed  by  sole  witness  to  incumbent  and  moreover  Government

instructions dated 28.4.1958 requiring authority to consider suitability as such was

not  complied  with,  denying  back  wages  to  incumbent,  his  appointment  was

ordered.  In  Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda (supra),  this Court declined to

interfere under Art.136 in view of subsequent acquittal in a case under section 307

IPC.  The decision of Labour Court was not interfered with. Passage of time was

taken into consideration.  However, this Court clarified that decision will not be

treated as precedent.   In  Kamal Nayan Mishra (supra),  action was taken when

employee  was  not  on  probation.   He  had  been  confirmed  in  service  and  was

holding civil post, attestation was filled after 14 years of service and then after 7

years of that, action was taken.  It was held that confirmed employee could not

have  been  removed  in  view  of  protection  under  Art.311(2)  without  enquiry.

Removal was held to be void.  In M. Bhaskaran (supra), it was held that when the

employment  was  taken  on  bogus  and  forged  casual  labourer  service  card  no

estoppel was created against employer by appointment and such appointment was

voidable.  In  Sushil Kumar (supra), on consideration of background facts of the

pending case which was suppressed under sections 304, 324/34 and 324 IPC, it

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was  held  not  desirable  to  appoint  incumbent  notwithstanding  his  subsequent

acquittal.  In Ram Ratan Yadav (supra), this Court held that suppression of pending

criminal  case under sections 323, 341,  294,  506B/34 IPC on the date of  filing

attestation form coupled with impact of it on students, nature of employment, the

discretion exercised to terminate the services was upheld.  In  R. Radhakrishnan

(supra)  in  which  pendency  of  criminal  case  under  section  294(b)  IPC  was

suppressed relying on Sushil Kumar (supra), it was held that removal was legal.   

In  Bipad  Bhanjan Gayen (supra),  there  was  suppression  of  two pending

cases on the date of filing verification form under sections 376 IPC and 417 IPC

relating to rape and cheating.  It was observed that since antecedents were not good

incumbent could not claim equity for appointment.  In  Daya  Shankar  Yadav

(supra), this Court has laid down course of action to be taken in such cases, and

that suppression by itself can be a ground to remove person from service or cancel

an appointment, notwithstanding acquittal  in the criminal  case.    In  SK Nazrul

Islam (supra),  due to suppression of pending case on the date of filing of form

under  sections  148,  323,  380,  427,  596  IPC  incumbent  was  adjudged  to  be

unsuitable for appointment.   

This Court has also opined that before a person is held guilty of suppression

of a fact it has to be considered whether verification form is precise and is not

vague, and what it required to disclose.  In Daya Shankar (supra) it was held that

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in  case  verification  form  is  vague  no  fault  can  be  found  on  the  ground  of

suppression.   However,  facts  which  have  come  to  knowledge  it  has  to  be

determined by employer whether antecedents of incumbent are good for service, to

hold someone guilty of suppression, query in the form has to be specific. Similarly,

in B. Chinnam Naidu (supra) when column in verification form required to disclose

detention or conviction, it did not require to disclose a pending criminal case or

fact of arrest, removal on the ground of material suppression of pending case and

arrest was set aside as that was not required to be disclosed.

21. The verification of antecedents is necessary to find out fitness of incumbent,

in  the  process  if  a  declarant  is  found  to  be  of  good  moral  character  on  due

verification of antecedents, merely by suppression of involvement in trivial offence

which was not  pending on date  of  filling attestation form, whether  he may be

deprived of employment?  There may be case of involving moral turpitude/serious

offence  in  which employee has  been acquitted  but  due  to  technical  reasons  or

giving benefit of doubt.  There may be situation when person has been convicted of

an  offence  before  filling  verification  form or  case  is  pending  and  information

regarding it has been suppressed, whether employer should wait till outcome of

pending criminal case to take a decision or in case when action has been initiated

there is already conclusion of criminal case resulting in conviction/acquittal as the

case may be.  The situation may arise for consideration of various aspects in a case

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where  disclosure  has  been  made  truthfully  of  required  information,  then  also

authority is required to consider and verify fitness for appointment.  Similarly in

case of suppression also, if in the process of verification of information, certain

information comes to  notice  then also  employer  is  required  to  take  a  decision

considering various aspects before holding incumbent as unfit.  If on verification of

antecedents a person is found fit at the same time authority has to consider effect of

suppression of a fact that he was tried for trivial offence which does not render him

unfit, what importance to be attached to such non-disclosure. Can there be single

yardstick to deal with all kind of cases?    

22. The employer is given ‘discretion’ to terminate or otherwise to condone the

omission.  Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a decision when at

the time of filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/acquitted,

in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts and attending circumstances,

including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration

while adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question. In case the

employer come to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts

would  have  been  disclosed  would  not  have  affected  adversely  fitness  of  an

incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However,

while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of

post and duties to be rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be

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very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a

person unsuitable for the post. However same standard cannot be applied to each

and every post.   In  concluded criminal  cases,  it  has to  be seen what  has been

suppressed  is  material  fact  and  would  have  rendered  an  incumbent  unfit  for

appointment.  An employer would be justified in not appointing or if appointed to

terminate  services  of  such  incumbent  on  due  consideration  of  various  aspects.

Even if disclosure has been made truthfully the employer has the right to consider

fitness and while doing so effect of conviction and background facts of case, nature

of offence etc. have to be considered.  Even if acquittal has been made, employer

may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or giving benefit

of  doubt  on technical  reasons and decline  to  appoint  a  person who is  unfit  or

dubious  character.    In  case  employer  comes  to  conclusion  that  conviction  or

ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the fitness for employment

incumbent may be appointed or continued in service.

23. Coming  to  the  question  whether  an  employee  on  probation  can  be

discharged/refused appointment though he has been acquitted of the charge/s, if his

case was not pending when form was filled, in such matters, employer is bound to

consider  grounds  of  acquittal  and  various  other  aspects,  overall  conduct  of

employee including the accusations which have been levelled.  If on verification,

the  antecedents  are  otherwise  also  not  found  good,  and  in  number  of  cases

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incumbent is involved then notwithstanding acquittals in a case/cases, it would be

open to the employer to form opinion as to fitness on the basis of material on

record. In case offence is petty in nature committed at young age, such as stealing a

bread,  shouting  of  slogans  or  is  such  which does  not  involve  moral  turpitude,

cheating, misappropriation etc. or otherwise not a serious or heinous offence and

accused  has  been  acquitted  in  such  a  case  when  verification  form  is  filled,

employer  may  ignore  lapse  of  suppression  or  submitting  false  information  in

appropriate cases on due consideration of various aspects.

24. No doubt about it that once verification form requires certain information to

be furnished, declarant is duty bound to furnish it correctly and any suppression of

material facts or submitting false information, may by itself lead to termination of

his services or cancellation of candidature in an appropriate case.  However, in a

criminal case incumbent has not been acquitted and case is pending trial, employer

may well be justified in not appointing such an incumbent or in terminating the

services as conviction ultimately may render him unsuitable for job and employer

is not supposed to wait till outcome of criminal case.  In such a case non disclosure

or submitting false information would assume significance and that by itself may

be ground for employer to cancel candidature or to terminate services.   

25. The  fraud  and  misrepresentation  vitiates  a  transaction  and  in  case

employment has been obtained on the basis of forged documents, as observed in

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M. Bhaskaran’s case (supra), it has also been observed in the reference order that if

an  appointment  was  procured  fraudulently,  the  incumbent  may  be  terminated

without  holding any inquiry, however  we add a  rider  that  in  case employee is

confirmed, holding a civil post and has protection of Article 311(2), due inquiry

has to be held before terminating the services.  The case of obtaining appointment

on the basis of forged documents has the effect on very eligibility of incumbent for

the job in question, however, verification of antecedents is different aspect as to his

fitness otherwise for the post in question.  The fraudulently obtained appointment

orders  are  voidable  at  the  option  of  employer,  however,  question  has  to  be

determined  in  the  light  of  the  discussion  made  in  this  order  on  impact  of

suppression or submission of false information.  

26. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the

important  criteria  to  assess  suitability  and  it  is  open  to  employer  to  adjudge

antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective

criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.

27. Suppression of ‘material’ information presupposes that what is suppressed

that ‘matters’ not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due

consideration of rules/instructions if any in exercise of powers in order to cancel

candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has

suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment

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or  continuity in  service  but  he  has  a  right  not  to  be  dealt  with arbitrarily  and

exercise  of  power  has  to  be  in  reasonable  manner  with  objectivity  having due

regard to facts of cases.

28. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher

post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed

service.  For  lower  posts  which  are  not  sensitive,  nature  of  duties,  impact  of

suppression  on  suitability  has  to  be  considered  by  concerned  authorities

considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due

consideration of various aspects.

29. The  ‘McCarthyism’  is  antithesis  to  constitutional  goal,  chance  of

reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases, interplay of

reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is

one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power for

cancelling candidature or discharging an employee from service.

30. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as

far as possible. In view of aforesaid discussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:

(1) Information  given  to  the  employer  by  a  candidate  as  to  conviction,

acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after

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entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or

false mention of required information.  (2) While  passing  order  of  termination  of  services  or  cancellation  of

candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of

special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information. (3) The  employer  shall  take  into  consideration  the  Government

orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking

the decision. (4) In  case  there  is  suppression or  false  information of  involvement  in  a

criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded

before  filling  of  the  application/verification  form  and  such  fact  later

comes  to  knowledge  of  employer,  any  of  the  following  recourse

appropriate to the case may be adopted : - (a) In  a  case  trivial  in  nature  in  which  conviction  had  been

recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty

offence  which  if  disclosed  would  not  have  rendered  an

incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its

discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information

by condoning the lapse. (b) Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial

in  nature,  employer  may  cancel  candidature   or  terminate

services of  the employee.  

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(c) If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral

turpitude  or  offence  of  heinous/serious  nature,  on  technical

ground and  it  is  not  a  case  of  clean  acquittal,  or  benefit  of

reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all

relevant  facts  available  as  to  antecedents,  and  may  take

appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

(5) In  a  case  where  the  employee  has  made  declaration  truthfully  of  a

concluded  criminal  case,  the  employer  still  has  the  right  to  consider

antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

(6) In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification

form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in

facts  and circumstances of  the case,  in its  discretion may appoint  the

candidate subject to decision of such case.

(7) In  a  case  of  deliberate  suppression  of  fact  with  respect  to  multiple

pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance

and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or

terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple

criminal cases were pending may not be proper.   

(8) If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time

of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing

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authority  would take  decision  after  considering the  seriousness  of  the

crime.

(9) In  case  the  employee  is  confirmed  in  service,  holding Departmental

enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal

or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information

in verification form.  

(10) For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification

form has to be specific,  not  vague.  Only such information which was

required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information

not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the

same can  be  considered  in  an  objective  manner  while  addressing  the

question of fitness.  However, in such cases action cannot be taken on

basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which

was not even asked for.

(11) Before  a  person  is  held  guilty  of  suppressio  veri or  suggestio  falsi,

knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.

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    We answer the reference accordingly. Let the matters be placed before an

appropriate Bench for consideration on merits.  

                                                                 ………………………..J. (Ranjan Gogoi)

………………………J. (Arun Mishra)

New Delhi; ………………………J. July 21, 2016. (Prafulla C. Pant)