ASSISTANT COMMERCIAL TAXES OFFICER Vs M/S MAKKAD PLASTIC AGENCIES
Bench: MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,ANIL R. DAVE, , ,
Case number: C.A. No.-002692-002692 / 2011
Diary number: 34628 / 2010
Advocates: MILIND KUMAR Vs
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2692 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 33853 of 2010]
Assistant Commercial Taxes Officer …. Appellant
Versus
M/s Makkad Plastic Agencies …. Respondent
JUDGMENT
Dr. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 03.05.2010 passed by the Rajasthan
High Court, Jodhpur Bench, in S.B. Civil [Sales-
Tax] Revision No. 74 of 2010, whereby the High
Court dismissed the said Revision Petition
preferred by the appellant herein and upheld the
order dated 22.01.2009 passed by the Rajasthan
Taxation Board, Ajmer, wherein the Taxation
Board interfered and modified its earlier order
dated 13.05.2008.
3. The assessment of the assessee-respondent for
the Assessment Year 2001-02 was completed by the
Assessing Officer under Section 29(7) of the
Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 [for short “the
Act of 1994”] holding that the tax on “thermo
ware” and “vacuum ware”, which were the articles
sold by the assessee-respondent during the
relevant assessment year, should be levied Sales
Tax at 10 per cent instead of 8 per cent,
treating them as separate articles from plastic
goods/products. Consequently, the liability of
difference of tax at 2 per cent along with
surcharge, interest and penalty was also levied.
4. The aforesaid order of the Assessing Officer was
challenged by the assessee-respondent before the
Deputy Commissioner [Appeals], Commercial Tax
Department, Bikaner under Section 84 of the Act
of 1994, which was allowed by the Appellate
Authority by order dated 29.03.2005 by setting
aside the demand for difference of tax imposed
at 2 per cent as also the penalty and interest.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated
29.03.2005 of the Deputy Commissioner [Appeals],
Bikaner the appellant herein preferred an appeal
before the Rajasthan Taxation Board, Ajmer,
which was heard and disposed of by the Taxation
Board by allowing the same vide its order dated
13.05.2008. The Taxation Board considered
various documents placed on record including
invoices and, thereafter, on appreciation
thereof, it was held that “plastic goods” and
“thermo ware” are two different articles as was
indicated from the invoice itself. It was also
held that the conclusion arrived at by the Tax
Assessing Officer is well-considered and
reasonable, whereas the order passed by the
Deputy Commissioner [Appeals], Bikaner is
contrary to facts and law. Having held thus, the
Taxation Board allowed the appeal and order
dated 29.03.2005 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner [Appeals], Bikaner was set aside
and order passed by the Tax Assessing Officer
was restored.
6. The assessee-respondent thereafter filed a
rectification/amendment application purportedly
under Section 37 of the Act of 1994, which was
decided by the Rajasthan Taxation Board, Ajmer
by passing an order dated 22.01.2009. By the
aforesaid order the Taxation Board modified its
earlier order to the extent of holding that as
the assessee-respondent had declared all his
sales in the books of accounts, in that
situation, in order to levy penalty, department
has to also prove additionally, that there was a
mala fide intention on the part of the assessee-
respondent for tax evasion, which is not
revealed in the present case. It was further
held that as the mala fide intention of the
assessee-respondent for tax evasion has not been
proved and since no such evidence is available
on record from which it could be established
that the assessee-respondent had the mala fide
intention behind recovering the tax at the rate
of 8 per cent, the order of levying penalty is
not justiciable. After recording the aforesaid
findings, the Taxation Board passed an order
dated 22.01.2009 to the extent of amending its
previous order dated 13.05.2008 and set aside
the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner
[Appeals], Bikaner dated 29.03.2005 on the issue
of tax evasion only, however, maintained the
finding on the issue of penalty.
7. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by
the Taxation Board a Revision Petition was
preferred by the appellant before the High Court
of Rajasthan, Jodhpur Bench under Section 86 of
the Act of 1994. The High Court, however, held
that no question of law arises out of the order
passed by the Taxation Board for consideration
and, consequently, the Revision Petition was
dismissed. The present appeal, as stated
hereinbefore, is directed against the aforesaid
two orders passed by the High Court as also by
the Taxation Board.
8. From the aforesaid narration of facts it is
crystal clear that the earlier order dated
13.05.2008 passed by the Taxation Board was
interfered with and modified by the Taxation
Board itself under its order dated 22.01.2009.
The said order dated 22.01.2009 is practically
challenged in the present case on the ground
that the said order was passed by the Taxation
Board in excess of its jurisdiction. The said
order dated 22.01.2009 was passed on the basis
of an Amendment Application filed by the
assessee-respondent under Section 37 of the Act
of 1994. In the said order dated 22.01.2009, the
Taxation Board proceeded on the ground that the
said application was in the nature of Amendment
Application praying for amendment of its
judgment and order dated 13.05.2008.
9. Contention raised on behalf of the appellant is
that the Taxation Board committed a
jurisdictional error in amending and reviewing
its earlier order dated 13.05.2008 while
exercising the power of rectification of a
mistake apparent on the face of the record.
10.It may be stated herein that despite service of
notice, none appears for the assessee-respondent
and, therefore, we proceed to dispose of this
appeal on the basis of the submissions made by
the counsel appearing for the appellant and also
on the perusal of the records placed before us.
11.In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention,
we are required to extract the relevant part of
Section 37 of the Act of 1994, which was the
power exercised by the Taxation Board for
passing the order dated 22.01.2009: -
“Section 37: Rectification of a Mistake –
(1) With a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, any officer appointed or any authority constituted under the Act may rectify suo motu or otherwise any order passed by him.
Explanation: A mistake apparent from the record shall include an order which was valid when it was made and is subsequently rendered invalid by an amendment of the law having retrospective operation or by a judgment of the Supreme Court, the Rajasthan High Court or the Rajasthan Tax Board.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………………………………………………………………….”
12.The Taxation Board by its order dated 13.05.2008
was disposing of an appeal filed against the
order dated 29.03.2005 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner [Appeals]. By the aforesaid order
dated 13.05.2008 the Taxation Board upheld and
accepted the contention of the appellant herein
that “thermo ware” is not similar to “plastic
product” and that rather they are two different
products/articles, which in fact is also proved
and established from the documents on record. It
was, therefore, held that the conclusion arrived
at by the Assessing Officer is well-considered
and reasonable. It was also held that, although,
in the appellate judgment, given by the Deputy
Commissioner [Appeals], reference was made to
the use of “plastic granules” and “powder” as
raw material for manufacturing “thermo ware” for
treating “thermo ware” as covered under the
category of plastic goods/products, but neither
any evidence nor any reasonable and justifiable
ground was given in the said order for doing the
same. After recording the aforesaid findings,
the Taxation Board set aside the judgment of the
Deputy Commissioner [Appeals] and restored the
order of the Tax Assessing Officer, who had by
his order, held that the assessee-respondent is
liable to pay tax at the rate of 10 per cent, as
the product “thermo ware” and “vacuum ware”,
which are the articles sold by the assessee-
respondent, are assessable to tax at the rate of
10 per cent instead of 8 per cent to be levied
on plastic wares.
13. The aforesaid well-reasoned order came to be
interfered with by the Taxation Board itself
while exercising the purported powers under
Section 37 of the Act of 1994, which empowers
the Board only to rectify a mistake apparent on
the face of the record. The issue, therefore, is
whether, while exercising such power vested
under Section 37 of the Act of 1994, the
Taxation Board could re-appreciate the evidence
on record and review its earlier order by
holding that there was no mens rea on the part
of the assessee-respondent and, therefore, no
penalty is leviable on them. The aforesaid
exercise of power by the Taxation Board in the
present case by interfering with its earlier
order was submitted to be a jurisdictional error
and also purportedly to be an exercise of power
in excess to what is provided in the statute.
14.The scope and ambit of the power which could be
exercised under Section 37 of the Act of 1994 is
circumscribed and restricted within the ambit of
the power vested by the said Section. Such a
power is neither a power of review nor is akin
to the power of revision but is only a power to
rectify a mistake apparent on the face of the
record. Rectification implies the correction of
an error or a removal of defects or
imperfections. It implies an error, mistake or
defect which after rectification is made right.
15.In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax,
Bhopal v. Ralson Industries Ltd. reported in
(2007) 2 SCC 326 a similar situation arose for
the interpretation of this Court regarding the
scope and ambit of Section 154 of the Income Tax
Act vesting the power of rectification as
against the power vested under Section 263 of
the Income Tax Act, which is a power of
revision. While examining the scope of the power
of rectification under Section 154 as against
the power of revision vested under Section 263
of the Income Tax Act, it was held by this Court
as follows at Para 8: -
“8. The scope and ambit of a proceeding for rectification of an order under Section 154 and a proceeding for revision under Section 263 are distinct
and different. Order of rectification can be passed in certain contingencies. It does not confer a power of review. If an order of assessment is rectified by the Assessing Officer in terms of Section 154 of the Act, the same itself may be a subject matter of a proceeding under Section 263 of the Act. The power of revision under Section 263 is exercised by a higher authority. It is a special provision. The revisional jurisdiction is vested in the Commissioner. An order thereunder can be passed if it is found that the order of assessment is prejudicial to the Revenue. In such a proceeding, he may not only pass an appropriate order in exercise of the said jurisdiction but in order to enable him to do it, he may make such inquiry as he deems necessary in this behalf.”
In paragraph 12 of the said judgment it was also held
that when different jurisdictions are conferred upon
different authorities, to be exercised on different
conditions, both may not be held to be overlapping
with each other. While examining the scope and
limitations of jurisdiction under Section 154 of the
Income Tax Act, it was held that such a power of
rectification could only be exercised when there is
an error apparent on the face of the record and that
it does not confer any power of review. It was
further held that an order of assessment may or may
not be rectified and if an order of rectification is
passed by the Assessing Authority, the rectified
order shall be given effect to.
16.We may also at this stage appropriately refer to
yet another decision of this Court in
Commissioner of Trade Tax, U.P. v. Upper Doab
Sugar Mills Ltd. reported in (2000) 3 SCC 676,
in which the power and scope of rectification
was considered and pitted against the scope of
review. The aforesaid decision was in the
context of Section 39(2) of the U.P. Sales Tax
(Amendment) Act, 1995 which provides the power
of review. Section 22 of the said Act provides
for rectification of mistake. In the said
decision, it was held that when two specific and
independent powers have been conferred upon the
authorities, both powers can be exercised
alternatively, but, it cannot be said that while
exercising power of rectification, the authority
can simultaneously exercise the power of review.
17.Both the aforesaid two decisions which were
rendered while considering taxation laws are
squarely applicable to the facts of the present
case. It is also now an established proposition
of law that review is a creature of the statute
and such an order of review could be passed only
when an express power of review is provided in
the statute. In the absence of any statutory
provision for review, exercise of power of
review under the garb of
clarification/modification/correction is not
permissible. In coming to the said conclusion we
are fortified by the decision of this Court in
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath
Narichania and Others reported in (2010) 9 SCC
437.
18. Section 37 of the Act of 1994 provides for a
power to rectify any mistake apparent on the
record. Such power is vested on the authority to
rectify an obvious mistake which is apparent on
the face of the records and for which a re-
appreciation of the entire records is neither
possible nor called for. When the subsequent
order dated 22.01.2009 passed by the Taxation
Board is analysed and scrutinised it would be
clear/apparent that the Taxation Board while
passing that order exceeded its jurisdiction by
re-appreciating the evidence on record and
holding that there was no mala fide intention on
the part of assessee-respondent for tax evasion.
Such re-appreciation of the evidence to come to
a contrary finding was not available under
Section 37 of the Act of 1994 while exercising
the power of rectification of error apparent on
the face of the records.
19.Thus, the orders passed by the Taxation Board on
22.01.2009 as also the impugned order and
judgment passed by the High Court upholding the
said order of the Taxation Board are hereby set
aside and quashed and the original order passed
by the Assessing Officer is restored.
20.In terms of the aforesaid observations, the
present appeal is allowed but without costs.
............................J [ Dr. Mukundakam Sharma ]
.............................J
[ Anil R. Dave ] New Delhi, March 29, 2011.