REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.766 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4531/2006)

Asmathunnisa   … Appellant

Versus

State of A.P. represented by the  Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., Hyderabad & Another              … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

Dalveer Bhandari, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The  appellant  is  the  Headmistress  in  the  Little  Star  

School located at Gayatri  Hills,  Yousufguda, Hyderabad has  

preferred  this  appeal  against  the  impugned  judgment  and  

order  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  of  Andhra  

Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Petition No.2127 of 2006.

3. It may be pertinent to mention that her husband Mohd.  

Samiuddin  and  the  appellant  are  being  prosecuted  for  an  

offence under section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the  

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short  

‘the 1989 Act’).

4. The appellant filed a petition before the Andhra Pradesh  

High  Court  under  section  482  of  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure  for  quashing  the  proceedings  in  Crime  No.50  of  

2006,  Police  Station  Jubilee  Hills,  Hyderabad.   The  High  

Court, by the impugned judgment, has declined to quash the  

proceedings.   

5. The  brief  facts  which  are  necessary  to  dispose  of  this  

appeal are recapitulated as under:

A  complaint  was  filed  against  the  appellant  and  her  

husband  Mohd.  Samiuddin  on  09.02.2006  before  the  Sub-

Inspector  of  Police,  Jubilee  Hills  Police  Station,  Hyderabad,  

which reads as under:

“I am to inform you that just besides my house a  building  bearing  No.8-2-293/82/B/60,  in  1+3  storied building, a school is being run from 1 to 10th  class.   I  have  informed  the  management  of  the  school with regard to sound pollution.  I have also  

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submitted  representation to  the  DEO,  Hyderabad.  Since the authorities have not taken any action in  this regard, I approached the Hon’ble High Court of  A.P., and obtained an interim order on 03.10.1995.  While  the  DEO  trying  to  implement  the  interim  orders, the Little Star School management, Gayathri  Hills, has created more sound pollution.  When we  were not able to stay at our houses due to sound  pollution, we invited the press people and expressed  our grievances on 08.02.2006.  The same news was  published in the Newspapers on 09.02.2006.  After  reading  the  news,  the  School  management,  Smt.  Asmatunnisa  and  her  husband  namely  Md.  Samiuddin came to my house at 9.00 a.m., when I  was  not  there.  Md.  Samiuddin  abused  in  filthy  language by naming caste  and asked my wife,  R.  Sridevi, without even looking that she is a lady, that  where  did  she  sent  me  and  also  said  that  “AA  LAMBADODU”,  “let  him come home today we will  settle the matter with him.”  Smt. Asmatunnisa also  abused my wife.   Smt.  Anuradha,  who is  staying  opposite to my house was the eye witness for the  incident.”

The  significant  part  of  this  complaint  is  that  the  offending  

words  were  admittedly  spoken  by  Mohd.  Samiuddin,  the  

husband of  the appellant.   He abused Sridevi’s  husband in  

filthy  language  by  naming  caste  and  said  that  “AA  

LAMBADODU”,  “let him come home today we will  settle the  

matter with him.”  At that time, admittedly Sridevi’s husband  

was not present.

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6. The appellant has also been implicated because she had  

accompanied her husband to the house of the complainant.  

Admittedly,  the  appellant  did  not  utter  offending words.   It  

would  be  relevant  to  set  out  relevant  provisions  of  law  as  

under:

7. Section 3 sub-section (1) sub-section (x) of the 1989 Act  

is reproduced as under:

“3. Punishments  for  offences  of  atrocities.  –  (1)  Whoever, not being a member of a Scheuled Caste  or a Scheduled Tribe,-

xxx            xxx   xxx

intentionally  insults  or  intimidates  with  intent  to  humiliate  a  member  of  a  Scheduled  Caste  or  a  Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;”

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that:

A. According  to  the  complaint,  no  offence  under  the  

aforesaid  section  can  be  made  out  against  the  appellant  

because the ingredients of the offence are not made out.  In  

the  complaint  so  called  offending  words  were  not  even  

attributed to the appellant.   It  is  alleged that the appellant  

merely  accompanied  her  husband  and  the  offending  words  

were spoken by the husband of the appellant, therefore, the  

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appellant in this appeal by no stretch of imagination can be  

held guilty of the offence under the section 3(1)(x) of the 1989  

Act.

B. According to the section,  any word which intentionally  

insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a  

Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe is an offence under the  

1989 Act.  In the instant case, the husband of Sridevi was not  

present when the offending words, if any, were spoken by the  

husband of the appellant.  In absence of real aggrieved person  

present at that point of time, no offence under the said section  

can be made out against the appellant.

C.  It is not established that the words were spoken by a  

person  who  was  not  a  member  of  Scheduled  Caste  or  

Scheduled Tribe.

D. The entire incident is alleged to have taken place at the  

residence of Sridevi and not in any place within public view.  

E.   None of the ingredients of this offence are present in the  

instant  case.   Even  if  the  contents  of  the  complaint  in  its  

entirety are taken as correct and true even then no offence is  

made out against the appellant.  

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9. In this connection, learned counsel for the appellant has  

placed reliance on a judgment of the Kerala High Court in E.  

Krishnan Nayanar v. Dr. M.A. Kuttappan & Others 1997  

Crl. L.J. 2036.  The relevant paragraphs of this judgment are  

paras 12, 13 and 18.  The said paragraphs read as under:

“12. A reading of Section 3 shows that two kinds of  insults against the member of Scheduled Castes or  Scheduled  Tribes  are  made punishable   –  one  as  defined  under  sub-section  (ii)  and  the  other  as  defined under sub-section (x) of the said section.  A  combined  reading  of  the  two  sub-sections  shows  that  under  section  (ii)  insult  can  be  caused  to  a  member  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  or  Scheduled  Tribes by dumping excreta, waste matter, carcasses  or any other obnoxious substance in his premises  or  neighbourhood,  and  to  cause  such  insult,  the  dumping  of  excreta  etc.  need  not  necessarily  be  done  in  the  presence  of  the  person  insulted  and  whereas under sub-section (x) insult can be caused  to the person insulted only if he is present in view of  the  expression  “in  any  place  within  public  view”.  The words “within public view”, in my opinion, are  referable only to the person insulted and not to the  person who insulted him as the said expression is  conspicuously absent in sub-section (ii) of Section 3  of Act 3/1989.  By avoiding to use the expression  “within  public  view”  in  sub-section  (ii),  the  Legislature, I feel, has created two different kinds of  offences  an  insult  caused  to  a  member  of  the  Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes, even in his  absence, by dumping excreta etc.  in his premises  or neighbourhood and an insult by words caused to  a  member  of  the  Scheduled  Castes  or  Scheduled  Tribes “within public view” which means at the time  of  the  alleged insult  the  person insulted  must  be  present  as  the  expression  “within  public  view”  indicates  or  otherwise  the  Legislature  would  have  

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avoided  the  use  of  the  said  expression  which  it  avoided in sub-section (ii) or would have used the  expression “in any public place”.

13. Insult  contemplated  under  sub-section  (ii)  is  different from the insult  contemplated under sub- section  (x)  as  in  the  former  a  member  of  the  Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes gets insulted  by the physical act and whereas is the latter he gets  insulted in public view by the words uttered by the  wrongdoer  for  which  he  must  be  present  at  the  place.

xxx            xxx   xxx

18. As stated by me earlier the words used in sub- section  (x)  are  not  “in  public  place”,  but  “within  public view” which means the public must view the  person being insulted for which he must be present  and no offence  on the  allegations  under  the  said  section  gets  attracted.  In  my  view,  the  entire  allegations contained in the complaint even if taken  to be true do not make out any offence against the  petitioner”.  

10. The aforesaid  paragraphs  clearly  mean that  the  words  

used are “in any place but within public view”, which means  

that the public must view the person being insulted for which  

he must be present and no offence on the allegations under  

the said section gets attracted if the person is not present.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that, in  

any event, the words were not attributed to the appellant.  She  

merely accompanied her husband to that place even according  

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to  the  allegation  in  the  complaint  and  she  did  not  utter  

offending  words.   According  to  appellant,  in  the  facts  and  

circumstances of this case, Section 3(1)(x) of the 1989 Act is  

not attracted.   

12. Learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has also  drawn our  

attention  to  a  judgment  of  this  Court  Gorige  Pentaiah  v.  

State of Andhra Pradesh & Others (2008) 12 SCC 531.  The  

relevant paragraph of this judgment is as under:

“6. .. According to the basic ingredients of Section  3(1)(x)  of  the  Act,  the  complainant  ought  to  have  alleged  that  the  appellant-accused  was  not  a  member  of  the  Scheduled  Caste  or  a  Scheduled  Tribe  and  he  (Respondent  3)  was  intentionally  insulted or intimidated by the accused with intent  to humiliate in a place within public  view. In the  entire complaint, nowhere it is mentioned that the  appellant-accused  was  not  a  member  of  the  Scheduled  Caste  or  a  Scheduled  Tribe  and  he  intentionally insulted or intimidated with intent to  humiliate  Respondent  3  in  a  place  within  public  view. When the basic ingredients of the offence are  missing  in the  complaint,  then permitting  such a  complaint to continue and to compel the appellant  to face the rigmarole of the criminal trial would be  totally  unjustified  leading  to  abuse  of  process  of  law.

13. This  Court,  in  a  number  of  cases,  has  laid  down the  

scope and ambit of the High Court’s power under section 482  

of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure.   Inherent  power  under  

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section  482  Cr.P.C.  though  wide  have  to  be  exercised  

sparingly,  carefully  and  with  great  caution  and  only  when  

such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in  

this  section  itself.   Authority  of  the  court  exists  for  the  

advancement of justice.  If any abuse of the process leading to  

injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court  

would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent  

powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute.  

14. The law has been crystallized more than half a century  

ago in the case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC  

866 wherein this Court  has summarized some categories of  

cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to  

quash the proceedings. This  Court  summarized  the  

following three broad categories where the High Court would  

be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482:

(i) where  it  manifestly  appears  that  there  is  a  legal bar against the institution or continuance  of the proceedings;

(ii) where the allegations in the first  information  report or complaint taken at their  face value  and accepted in their entirety do not constitute  the offence alleged;

(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but  there  is  no  legal  evidence  adduced  or  the  

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evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to  prove the charge.”

15. In  Smt.  Nagawwa v.  Veeranna  Shivalingappa  

Konjalgi  and Others (1976)  3  SCC 736,  according  to  the  

court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set  

aside :

“(1)  where the allegations made in the complaint or  the  statements  of  the  witnesses  recorded  in  support of the same taken at their face value  make  out  absolutely  no  case  against  the  accused or the complaint does not disclose the  essential  ingredients  of  an  offence  which  is  alleged against the accused;

(2) where  the allegations made in the complaint  are patently absurd and inherently improbable  so  that  no prudent  person can ever  reach a  conclusion that there is sufficient ground for  proceeding against the accused;

(3) where  the  discretion  exercised  by  the  Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and  arbitrary  having  been  based  either  on  no  evidence  or  on  materials  which  are  wholly  irrelevant or inadmissible; and

(4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental  legal  defects,  such  as,  want  of  sanction,  or  absence  of  a  complaint  by  legally  competent  authority and the like”.

16. This court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy &  

Others (1977) 2 SCC 699, observed that the wholesome power  

under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a  

proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the  

proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of  

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the  court  or  that  the  ends  of  justice  requires  that  the  

proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been  

invested  with  inherent  powers,  both  in  civil  and  criminal  

matters,  to  achieve  a  salutary  public  purpose.  A  Court  

proceeding  ought  not  to  be  permitted  to  degenerate  into  a  

weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court  

observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere  

law though justice  must  be  administered  according to  laws  

made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large  

number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts.

17. In Janta Dal v.  H.S. Chowdhary and Others (1992) 4  

SCC 305 the court observed as under:

“131.  Section  482  which  corresponds  to  Section 561-A of the old Code and to Section 151 of  the  Civil  Procedure  Code  proceeds  on  the  same  principle and deals with the inherent power of the  High  Court.  The  rule  of  inherent  powers  has  its  source  in  the  maxim  “Quadolex  aliquid  alicui   concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon  potest”  which  means  that  when  the  law  gives  anything  to  anyone,  it  gives  also  all  those  things  without which the thing itself could not exist.

132.  The  criminal  courts  are  clothed  with  inherent  power  to  make  such  orders  as  may  be  necessary  for  the  ends  of  justice.  Such  power  though unrestricted and undefined should not  be  capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be  exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to  do  real  and  substantial  justice  for  the  

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administration of which alone the courts exist. The  powers possessed by the High Court under Section  482  of  the  Code  are  very  wide  and  the  very  plenitude of the power requires great caution in its  exercise.  Courts  must  be  careful  to  see  that  its  decision in exercise of this power is based on sound  principles.”

18. In Dr Raghubir Sharan v. State of Bihar (1964) 2 SCR  

336, this court observed as under

“... Every High Court as the highest court exercising  criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power  to make any order for the purpose of securing the  ends of justice .... Being an extraordinary power it  will,  however,  not  be  pressed  in  aid  except  for  remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court  of its powers ....”

19. In  the  said  case,  the  court  also  observed  that  the  

inherent powers can be exercised under this section by the  

High Court  (1)  to give effect to any order passed under the  

Code;  (2)  to  prevent  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court;  (3)  

otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

20. In Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC  

1254, Lord Ried at page 1296 expressed his view “there must  

always  be  a  residual  discretion  to  prevent  anything  which  

savours of abuse of process” with which view all the members  

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of the House of Lords agreed but differed as to whether this  

entitled a Court to stay a lawful prosecution.

21. In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal & Others  

reported  in  (1992)  Suppl.1  SCC  p.335,  this  court  had  an  

occasion to examine the scope of the inherent power of the  

High Court in interfering with the investigation of an offence  

by the police and laid down the following rule: [SCC pp. 364-

65, para 60: SCC (Cri) p. 456, para 60].

“The sum and substance of the above deliberation  results in a conclusion that the investigation of an  offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police  officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so  long as the power to investigate into the cognizable  offences  is  legitimately  exercised  in  strict  compliance  with  the  provisions  falling  under  Chapter  XII  of  the  Code  and  the  courts  are  not  justified  in  obliterating  the  track  of  investigation  when the investigating agencies are well within their  legal  bounds  as  aforementioned.  Indeed,  a  noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV  of  the  Code  is  that  a  Magistrate  is  kept  in  the  picture at all stages of the police investigation but  he  is  not  authorised  to  interfere  with  the  actual  investigation  or  to  direct  the  police  how  that  investigation  is  to  be  conducted.  But  if  a  police  officer  transgresses  the  circumscribed  limits  and  improperly  and illegally  exercises  his  investigatory  powers in breach of any statutory provision causing  serious  prejudice  to  the  personal  liberty  and also  property  of  a  citizen,  then  the  court  on  being  approached by the person aggrieved for the redress  of  any grievance,  has to  consider  the  nature  and  extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as  

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may be called for without leaving the citizens to the  mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a  dear value of our Constitution.”

22. In  Bhajan  Lal  (supra),  this  court  in  the  backdrop  of  

interpretation  of  various  relevant  provisions  of  the  Code  of  

Criminal Procedure under Chapter XIV and of the principles of  

law enunciated by this court in a series of decisions relating to  

the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 of  

the Constitution of India or the inherent powers under Section  

482 Cr.P.C., gave the following categories of cases by way of  

illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to  

prevent  abuse  of  the  process  of  the  court  or  otherwise  to  

secure the ends of justice. Thus, this court made it clear that  

it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined  

and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid  

formulae  and to  give  an exhaustive  list  to  myriad  kinds  of  

cases wherein such power should be exercised:

(1)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  first  information report or the complaint, even if they are  taken  at  their  face  value  and  accepted  in  their  entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or  make out a case against the accused.

(2)  Where  the  allegations  in  the  first  information  report  and  other  materials,  if  any,  accompanying  the  FIR  do  not  disclose  a  cognizable  offence,  

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justifying an investigation by police  officers under  Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of  a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of  the Code.

3)  Where  the  uncontroverted  allegations  made  in  the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in  support of the same do not disclose the commission  of  any  offence  and  make  out  a  case  against  the  accused.

(4)  Where,  the  allegations  in  the  FIR  do  not  constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a  non-cognizable offence, on investigation is permitted  by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate  as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5)  Where  the  allegations  made  in  the  FIR  or  complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable  on the basis of which no prudent person can ever  reach  a  just  conclusion  that  there  is  sufficient  grounds for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in  any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned  Act  (under  which  a  criminal  proceedings  is  instituted) to the institution and continuance of the  proceedings  and/or  where  there  is  a  specific  provision  in  the  Code  or  the  concerned  Act,  providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the  aggrieved party.

(7)  Where  a  criminal  proceeding  is  manifestly  attended  with  mala  fide and/or  where  the  proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior  motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and  with a view to spite him due to private and personal  grudge.”

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23. This  court  in  Zandu Pharmaceutical  Works Ltd.  &  

Others v.  Mohd. Sharaful Haque & Another (2005) 1 SCC  

122 observed thus:-

"It  would  be  an abuse  of  process  of  the  court  to  allow any action which would result in injustice and  prevent  promotion  of  justice.  In  exercise  of  the  powers,  court  would  be  justified  to  quash  any  proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of  it  amounts  to  abuse  of  the  process  of  court  or  quashing  of  these  proceedings  would  otherwise  serve  the  ends  of  justice.  When  no  offence  is  disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine  the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to  be  quashed,  it  is  permissible  to  look  into  the  materials  to  assess  what  the  complainant  has  alleged and whether any offence is made out even if  the allegations are accepted in toto."

 24. A  three-Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Inder  Mohan  

Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007) 12 SCC 1 (wherein  

one of us, namely, Dalveer Bhandari, J. was the author of the  

judgment) has examined scope and ambit of Section 482 of the  

Criminal Procedure Code. The Court in the said case observed  

that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised  

for  the advancement of  justice.  If  any abuse of  the process  

leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then  

the court  would be  fully  justified in preventing injustice  by  

invoking inherent powers of the court.

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25. In  Devendra and Others v.  State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  

and  Another (2009)  7  SCC  495,  this  court  observed  as  

under:-

“There  is  no  dispute  with  regard  to  the  aforementioned propositions of  law. However,  it  is  now  well  settled  that  the  High  Court  ordinarily  would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of  the  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  if  the  allegations  made in the first information report,  even if  given  face value and taken to be correct in their entirety,  do not make out any offence. When the allegations  made in the first information report or the evidence  collected  during  investigation  do  not  satisfy  the  ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would  not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal  court for nothing.”

26. In  State  of  A.P. v.  Gourishetty  Mahesh and Others  

(2010) 11 SCC 226, this court observed that the power under  

section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is wide but has  

to be exercised with great care and caution.  The interference  

must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not  

be  exercised  to  stifle  the  legitimate  prosecution.  The  court  

further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint  

do not constitute the offence of  which cognizance has been  

taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the High Court to quash  

the same in exercise of its inherent power under section 482 of  

the Code.

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27. In a recent decision in M. Mohan v. The State 2011 (3)  

SCALE 78 this Court again had an occasion to consider the  

case of similar nature and this court held that if all the facts  

mentioned  in  the  complaint  are  accepted  as  correct  in  its  

entirety  and even then the complaint  does  not  disclose  the  

essential ingredients of an offence, in such a case the High  

Court  should  ensure  that  such  frivolous  prosecutions  are  

quashed under its inherent powers under section 482 of the  

Cr.P.C.  

28. When we apply the ratio of the settled principles of law to  

the  facts  of  this  case,  then,  in  our  considered opinion,  the  

High  Court  ought  to  have  exercised  its  jurisdiction  under  

section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and quashed  

the complaint qua the appellant only to prevent abuse of the  

process of law.  

29. Consequently,  we  set  aside  the  impugned  judgment  

passed by the High Court and quash the complaint qua the  

appellant in Crime No.50 of 2006, Police Station Jubilee Hills,  

Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh.  

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30. This appeal is accordingly allowed and disposed of.

….……………........................J.  (DALVEER BHANDARI)

…..…………….......................J.         (DEEPAK VERMA)

New Delhi; March 29, 2011

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