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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2109 OF 2008

ASLAM    APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                  RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2110 OF 2008

GALLI     APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH                   RESPONDENT

O R D E R

1. These appeals are directed against the judgment  

and  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Appeal Nos. 51 and 92  

of 1996, dated 06.07.2007. By the impugned judgment and  

order, the High Court has confirmed the judgment and order,  

dated 18.01.1996, passed by the Trial Court in S.T. No. 557  

of  1992  whereby  and  whereunder  the  Trial  Court  has  

convicted  the  appellants  for  offence  punishable  under  

Sections 376 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860  

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(“the  IPC”  for  short)  and  sentenced  them  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for a period of seven years.

2. The prosecution case in brief is as under: The  

prosecutrix, aged about 19 years was married and had an  

infant daughter at the time of the incident. On 16.01.1992,  

at 5:00 P.M., the accused persons, Aslam and Galli, upon  

finding the prosecutrix (PW-1) working alone in her field,  

had gagged her and committed rape on her in turns. After  

the accused persons had left, the prosecutrix returned home  

crying  and  immediately  narrated  the  incident  to  PW-2,  

Pradhan of the village. Since it was dark, PW-2 suggested  

to PW-1 to lodge the report in the police station next  

morning. On 17.01.1992, PW-1’s complaint was scribed by PW-

2 and FIR NO.2 of 1992 was registered against the accused  

persons.  

3. After due investigation, the accused persons were  

charged for the offence punishable under Section 376 read  

with Section 34 of the IPC and the case was committed to  

trial.

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4.   The Trial Court, after marshalling the facts and  

through  scrutiny  of  evidence  on  record  including  the  

testimony  of  PW-1,  has  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  

testimony  of  PW-1  inspires  confidence  and  accordingly  

rejected the case of defence, pleading acquittal on grounds  

of delay in filing of FIR, no injuries being caused to PW-1  

or the accused persons and PW-1 being a woman of loose  

morals, in its entirety.  The Trial Court has convicted the  

accused persons for the aforesaid offence relying upon the  

testimony of PW-1 corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and  

elimination of the possibility of any injuries having being  

caused since the place of incident was Barsin field.  

5. The accused persons, aggrieved by the aforesaid,  

had  preferred  appeals  before  the  High  Court.  The  High  

Court, after re-appreciation of entire evidence on record,  

has concurred with the findings and conclusions reached by  

the Trial Court and therefore, affirmed the judgment and  

order  passed  by  the  Trial  Court  convicting  the  accused  

persons for offence under Section 376 read with Section 34  

of the IPC.

6. It  is  the  correctness  or  otherwise  of  the  

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aforesaid judgment and order passed by the High Court which  

is called in question in these appeals.  

7. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for  

the parties. Shri J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel appearing  

for  the  appellants,  would  submit  that  the  absence  of  

injuries on the person of PW-1 and non-examination of the  

Doctor  who  conducted  medical  examination  of  PW-1  punch  

holes in the prosecution case inasmuch as casting a shadow  

of doubt in respect of commission of rape. He would submit  

that, in the aforesaid background, the sole testimony of  

PW-1 is not sufficient to sustain the conviction of the  

appellants.  In  aid  of  his  submission,  he  would  place  

reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Rai  

Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2012) 8 SCC 21 amongst  

others.  Per  contra,  Shri  C.D.  Singh,  learned  counsel  

appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh would justify the  

findings and conclusions reached by Courts below. He would  

submit  that  the  testimony  of  PW-1  is  trustworthy  and  

reliable  and  thus  eliminates  the  necessity  of  any  

corroboration by other evidence on record. He would further  

submit that neither the absence of corroborative testimony  

by the Doctor who conducted medical examination of PW-1 nor  

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the absence of injuries would render the judgment and order  

of conviction passed by the Courts below perverse, if the  

testimony  of  PW-1  inspires  confidence  and  reliable.  He  

would place reliance upon the decision of this Court in  

Vijay v. State of M.P., (2010) 8 SCC 191.  

8. With  the  able  assistance  of  both  the  learned  

counsel,  we  have  carefully  perused  and  analyzed  the  

evidence of the Prosecution Witnesses and, in particular,  

the evidence of PW-1. In our opinion, the evidence of the  

said witnesses is not only reliable but also trustworthy.  

9.  This Court has held that if, upon consideration  

of the prosecution case in its entirety, the testimony of  

the  prosecutrix  inspires  confidence  in  the  mind  of  the  

Court, the necessity of corroboration of her evidence may  

be excluded. This Court in  Rajinder v. State of Himachal  

Pradesh, (2009) 16 SCC 69 has observed as under:  

“18. This Court, in State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh,  (1996)  2  SCC  384 made  the  following  weighty  observations in respect of evidence of a victim of  sexual assault: (SCC pp. 395-96, para 8) “8. … The courts must, while evaluating evidence,  remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no  self-respecting woman would come forward in a court  just  to  make  a  humiliating  statement  against  her  honour such as is involved in the commission of rape  on  her.  In  cases  involving  sexual  molestation,  

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supposed  considerations  which  have  no  material  effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or  even  discrepancies  in  the  statement  of  the  prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are  such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw  out  an  otherwise  reliable  prosecution  case.  The  inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency  to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors  which the courts should not overlook. The testimony  of  the  victim  in  such  cases  is  vital  and  unless  there  are  compelling  reasons  which  necessitate  looking  for  corroboration of  her  statement,  the  courts  should  find  no  difficulty  to  act  on  the  testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to  convict  an  accused  where  her  testimony  inspires  confidence  and  is  found  to  be  reliable.  Seeking  corroboration of her statement before relying upon  the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding  insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl  or  a  woman  who  complains  of  rape  or  sexual  molestation,  be  viewed  with  doubt,  disbelief  or  suspicion? The court while appreciating the evidence  of a prosecutrix may look for some assurance of her  statement to satisfy its judicial conscience, since  she is a witness who is interested in the outcome of  the  charge  levelled  by  her,  but  there  is  no  requirement of law to insist upon corroboration of  her statement to base conviction of an accused. The  evidence of a victim of sexual assault stands almost  on a par with the evidence of an injured witness and  to  an  extent  is  even  more  reliable.  Just  as  a  witness  who  has  sustained  some  injury  in  the  occurrence, which is not found to be self-inflicted,  is considered to be a good witness in the sense that  he is least likely to shield the real culprit, the  evidence of a victim of a sexual offence is entitled  to  great  weight,  absence  of  corroboration  notwithstanding.  Corroborative  evidence  is  not  an  imperative component of judicial credence in every  case  of  rape.  Corroboration  as  a  condition  for  judicial  reliance  on  the  testimony  of  the  prosecutrix  is  not  a  requirement  of  law  but  a  guidance of prudence under given circumstances. It  must  not  be  overlooked  that  a  woman  or  a  girl  subjected to sexual assault is not an accomplice to  the crime but is a victim of another person's lust  

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and  it  is  improper  and  undesirable  to  test  her  evidence  with  a  certain  amount  of  suspicion,  treating  her  as  if  she  were  an  accomplice.  Inferences  have  to  be  drawn  from  a  given  set  of  facts and circumstances with realistic diversity and  not dead uniformity lest that type of rigidity in  the shape of rule of law is introduced through a new  form  of  testimonial  tyranny  making  justice  a  casualty. Courts cannot cling to a fossil formula  and insist upon corroboration even if, taken as a  whole, the case spoken of by the victim of sex crime  strikes the judicial mind as probable.”

(emphasis in original)

19. In the context of Indian culture, a woman—victim  of  sexual  aggression—would  rather  suffer  silently  than to falsely implicate somebody. Any statement of  rape is an extremely humiliating experience for a  woman and until she is a victim of sex crime, she  would not blame anyone but the real culprit. While  appreciating the evidence of the prosecutrix, the  courts  must  always  keep  in  mind  that  no  self- respecting woman would put her honour at stake by  falsely  alleging  commission  of  rape  on  her  and  therefore, ordinarily a look for corroboration of  her testimony is unnecessary and uncalled for. But  for high improbability in the prosecution case, the  conviction in the case of sex crime may be based on  the sole testimony of the prosecutrix. It has been  rightly said that corroborative evidence is not an  imperative component of judicial credence in every  case  of  rape  nor  the  absence  of  injuries  on  the  private  parts  of  the  victim  can  be  construed  as  evidence of consent.”

10. The Trial Court, keeping in view the evidence of  

PW-1, has come to the conclusion that the accused persons  

have committed the offence falling within the parameters of  

Section 376 read with Section 34 of the IPC. This view of  

the Trial Court is affirmed by the High Court once again  

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after re-appreciating the entire evidence on record.  In  

our considered view, neither the Trial Court nor the High  

Court has committed any error, whatsoever, which would call  

for our interference in these appeals.  Accordingly, the  

appeals stand dismissed.

Ordered accordingly.

.......................J.

(H.L. DATTU)

.......................J.

(RANJAN GOGOI)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 13, 2013  

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