Page 1

 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NO.     482     OF     2002   

ASHRAFKHAN @ BABU MUNNEKHAN  PATHAN      … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF GUJARAT       …RESPONDENT WITH

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NOS.     486-487     OF     2002   

YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDDADKHAN  PATHAN & ORS.      … APPELLANTS

VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT       …RESPONDENT

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NOS.     762-765     OF     2002   

STATE OF GUJARAT      … APPELLANT VERSUS

YUSUFKHAN @ LAPLAP KHUDADATTKHAN  PATHAN & ORS.          …RESPONDENTS

Page 2

CRIMINAL     APPEAL     NOS.     766-768     OF     2002   

STATE OF GUJARAT      … APPELLANT VERSUS

ABDUL KHURDUSH ABDUL GANI  SHAIKH & ORS.          …RESPONDENTS

J     U     D     G     M     E     N     T   

CHANDRAMAULI     KR.     PRASAD,     J.   

These appeals have been filed against the  

judgment and order dated 31st of January, 2002  

passed by Additional Designated Judge, Court No.3,  

Ahmedabad City in TADA Case Nos. 15/1995 and 6/1996  

consolidated with TADA Case Nos. 32/1994 and  

43/1996.

According to the prosecution, Abdul Wahab Abdul  

Majid Khan was arrested in a case of murder.  On  

being interrogated in that case, he made startling  

and shocking revelations.  He disclosed that  

accused Yusuf Laplap, who is involved in illegal  

business of liquor and running a gambling den is in  

2

Page 3

possession of four foreign made hand grenades,  

revolvers and AK-47 rifles.  The fountainhead of  

the weapons, according to the information is  

notorious criminal Abdul Latif Shaikh and came at  

the hand of accused Yusuf Laplap through his close  

associate accused Abdul Sattar @ Sattar Chacha.  

Sattar gave the arms and explosives to accused  

Siraj @ Siraj Dadhi, a constable attached to  

Vejalpur Police Station.  He in turn delivered  

those arms and explosives to accused Imtiyaz  

Nuruddin, the servant of Yusuf Laplap at latter’s  

instance.  The aforesaid information was passed on  

to A.K. Suroliya, the Deputy Commissioner of  

Police, Crime Branch. The police party searched the  

house of the accused Yusuf Laplap in the night and  

found him leaving the house with two bags.  From  

one of the bags one revolver with ISI mark and five  

foreign made hand grenades were recovered and from  

another bag five detonators having clips affixed to  

it were found.

3

Page 4

According to the allegation, the arms and  

explosives seized were similar to those used in the  

Ahmedabad City earlier by gang of criminals and  

intended to be used in the forthcoming “Jagannath  

Rath Yatra”.  The information given by the Police  

Inspector, U.T. Brahmbhatt led to registration of  

Crime No.   1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9th of June,  

1994, at the Crime Branch Police Station under  

Section 120B of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 &  

5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities  

(Prevention) Act (hereinafter referred to as  

‘TADA’), Section 7 & 25 (1) of the Arms Act and  

Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act  

against seven accused persons1.  

It is the case of the prosecution that the  

Police Inspector U.T. Brahmbhatt, before recording  

the first information report, sought prior approval  

of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch,  

for registration of the case which was granted.  

It is only thereafter, the first information report  

1 List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of 1994 dated 9th of  June, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.-I.  

4

Page 5

was registered and the investigation proceeded.  It  

is also their case that another approval was  

granted on 15th of June, 1994 by the Additional  

Chief Secretary, Home Department. Not only that,  

the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch,  

PW-65 A.R. Suroliya gave another approval on  

11th of August, 1994.

During the course of investigation, the  

complicity of large number of persons surfaced.  In  

all 46 AK-56 rifles, 40 boxes of cartridges, 99  

bombs, 110 fuse pins and 110 magazines were brought  

to Ahmedabad and seized by the investigating agency  

from various accused persons.  These were  

distributed to the accused persons for killing and  

terrorising the Hindu community during “Jagannath  

Rath Yatra”.  All those persons who were either  

found in possession or involved in transporting or  

facilitating transportation of those weapons were  

charge-sheeted. All these were intended to be used  

to disturb peace and communal harmony during  

“Jagannath Rath Yatra”.

5

Page 6

Ultimately, the investigating agency, on 16th  

of December, 1994 submitted first2 charge-sheet  

against 14 accused persons under Section 120B,  

121A, 122, 123 and 188 of Indian Penal Code,  

Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 4, 5 and 6 of  

Explosive Substances Act, Section 25(1A) of Arms  

Act, Section 135 of Customs Act and Section 135 (1)  

of Bombay Police Act. Second3 charge-sheet came to  

be filed on 23rd of May, 1995 against 2 accused  

persons.  Investigation did not end there and  

third4, fourth5 and fifth6 charge-sheets were  

submitted on 17th of April, 1996, 20th of December,  

1996 and 24th of May, 2000 against 33, 11 and 2  

accused persons respectively. Thus, altogether 62  

persons were charge-sheeted.

2 List of persons charge-sheeted in the first charge-sheet dated 16th of  December, 1994 is appended at Schedule No.–II.   3 List of persons charge-sheeted in the second charge-sheet dated 23rd  May, 1995 is appended at Schedule No.–III.   

4 List of persons charge-sheeted in the third charge-sheet dated 17th of  April, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–IV.   5 List of persons charge-sheeted in the fourth charge-sheet dated 20th of  December, 1996 is appended at Schedule No.–V.   6 List of persons charge-sheeted in the fifth charge-sheet dated 24th of  May, 2000 is appended at Schedule No.–VI.   

6

Page 7

The Designated Court framed charges against 60  

accused persons under Section 120B of the Indian  

Penal Code, Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 4, 5  

and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act and Section  

25 (1A) of the Arms Act.  However, Accused No. 57  

namely, Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz @ Chhote  

Rahim, has been discharged by the Designated Court  

by its order dated 24th of August, 2001.  During the  

course of trial six accused namely, Adambhai  

Yusufbhai Mandli (Shaikh), Accused No. 11, Fanes  

Aehmohmad Ansari, Accused No. 18, Abdullatif  

Abdulvahab Shaikh, Accused No. 35, Ikbal Jabbarkhan  

Pathan, Accused No. 38, Firoz @ Firoz Kankani,  

Accused No. 56 and Jay Prakash Singh @ Bachchi  

Singh, Accused No. 60 died. One accused namely,  

Accused No. 9, Mohmad Ismail Abdul  

Shaikh absconded.   

In order to bring home the charge, the  

prosecution altogether examined 70 witnesses and a  

large number of documents were also exhibited.  The  

7

Page 8

accused were given opportunity to explain the  

circumstances appearing in the evidence against  

them and their defence was denial simpliciter.  The  

Designated Court, on analysis of the evidence, both  

oral and documentary, vide its order dated 31st of  

January, 2002 convicted 11 accused persons7 under  

Section 3 and 5 of TADA, Section 7 and 25(1A) of  

the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6 of the  

Explosive Substances Act.  They have been sentenced  

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years for  

the offence punishable under Section 3 and 5 of  

TADA and fine with default clause.  The Designated  

Court further sentenced those convicted under  

Section 4, 5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act  

to suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and  

fine with default clause.  They were further  

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five  

years and fine with default clause under Section 7  

and 25(1A) of the Arms Act.  All the sentences were  

directed to run concurrently.  The Designated  

7 List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31st of  January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VII.

8

Page 9

Court, however, acquitted 41 accused8 of all the  

charges leveled against them.   

Those found guilty have preferred Criminal  

Appeal No. 482 of 2002 (Ashrafkhan @ Babu Munnekhan  

Pathan & Anr. Vs. State of Gujarat) and Criminal  

Appeal Nos. 486-487 of 2002 (Yusufkhan @ Laplap  

Khuddadkhan Pathan & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat).  

State of Gujarat, aggrieved by the inadequacy of  

sentence, preferred Criminal Appeal Nos. 762-765 of  

2002 (State of Gujarat Vs.  Yusufkhan @ Laplap  

Khudadattkhan Pathan & Ors.) and also preferred  

Criminal Appeal Nos. 766-768 of 2002 (State of  

Gujarat Vs. Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani Shaikh &  

Ors.) against acquittal.

As all these appeals arise out of the same  

judgment, they were heard together and are being  

disposed of by this common judgment.

8 List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide its order dated 31st of  January, 2002 is appended at Schedule No.-VIII.

• All Schedules appended shall form part of the judgment.

9

Page 10

We have heard Mr. Sushil Kumar and Mr. Ranjit  

Kumar learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Garvesh Kabra,  

learned amicus curiae, Mr. Sanjay Jain and Ms.  

Meenakshi Arora, learned counsel on behalf of the  

accused.  Mr. Yashank Adhyaru, learned Senior  

Counsel was heard on behalf of the State of  

Gujarat.   

In order to assail the conviction several  

submissions were made by the learned counsel  

representing the accused.  However, as the  

conviction has to be set aside on a very short  

ground, we do not consider it either expedient to  

incorporate or answer those submissions.   

We may record here that we have incorporated  

only those parts of the prosecution case which have  

bearing on the said point and shall discuss  

hereinafter only those materials which are relevant  

for adjudication of the said issue.   

It is the contention of the accused that the  

first information report under the provisions of  

1

Page 11

TADA was registered without approval of the  

District Superintendent of Police as contemplated  

under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and this itself  

vitiates the conviction.   

Plea of the State, however, is that such an  

approval was granted by A.R. Suroliya, the Deputy  

Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch, who is an  

officer of the rank of District Superintendent of  

Police.  Alternatively, the State contends that  

Section 20-A of TADA is a two tiered provision  

which provides for approval by the Deputy  

Commissioner under Section 20-A(1) and sanction by  

the Commissioner under Section 20-A(2) of TADA.  In  

the absence of challenge to the sanction, challenge  

only to the approval, to use the counsel’s word  

“would be curable defect under Section 465 of the  

Code of Criminal Procedure”.  It has also been  

pointed out that the accused having not challenged  

the sanction granted by the Commissioner of Police  

under Section 20-A(2) of TADA, they cannot assail  

their conviction on the ground of absence of  

1

Page 12

approval under Section 20-A(1) by the Deputy  

Commissioner.  In order to defend the conviction,  

the State of Gujarat further pleads that the  

Designated Court having taken cognizance and  

decided to try the case by itself under Section 18  

of TADA, the prior defects, if any, are rendered  

irrelevant and cannot be raised.  It has also been  

pointed out that the Designated Court having been  

empowered to take cognizance under Section 14 of  

TADA irrespective of absence of compliance of  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-compliance would  

not be fatal to the prosecution.  It has also been  

highlighted that several safeguards have been  

provided under the scheme of TADA including the  

power of the court to take cognizance and proceed  

with the trial and once cognizance has been taken,  

defects prior to that cannot be allowed to be  

raised.  In any view of the matter, according to  

the State, absence of approval under  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA would not vitiate the  

1

Page 13

conviction of the accused persons under other penal  

provisions.   

In view of the rival submissions the question  

for determination is as to whether the Deputy  

Commissioner, A.R. Suroliya gave prior approval on  

9th of June, 1994 or 11th of August, 1994 for  

recording the first information report as  

contemplated under Section 20-A(1) of TADA and in  

case it is found on facts that no such approval was  

granted, the effect thereof on the conviction of  

the accused.  Further, the effect of approval by  

the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department on  

15th of June,1994 is also required to be gone into.  

To prove prior approval by the Deputy  

Commissioner before the lodging of the first  

information report, the prosecution has mainly  

relied on the evidence of the Inspector of Police  

U.T. Brahmbhatt, PW-10 and Deputy Commissioner A.R.  

Suroliya, PW-65.  Xerox copy of the approval (Exh.  

775)has also been brought on record to establish  

1

Page 14

that. It is not in dispute that officer of the rank  

of Deputy Commissioner is equivalent to District  

Superintendent of Police.  U.T. Brahmbhatt has  

stated in his evidence that “Mr. Suroliya passed an  

order, sanctioned the same and an endorsement is  

also made regarding that”.  This witness has been  

subjected to cross-examination and in the cross-

examination he has admitted that the letter asking  

for approval to investigate and the report under  

Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure  

(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) has been  

lost while producing the same in the Supreme Court.  

A.R. Suroliya, PW-65, in his evidence has supported  

the case of the prosecution regarding prior  

approval. While explaining the absence of the  

original approval, this witness has stated in his  

evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court for  

hearing of the application filed by the accused  

Yusuf Laplap and handed over the original papers to  

the senior counsel.  According to him, the senior  

counsel told him that after producing the necessary  

1

Page 15

papers before the Supreme Court, the original  

papers would be sent back but it has not come and  

despite efforts and inquiry, it could not be traced  

out.  According to his evidence “as the original  

letter of approval thereof is not found” the xerox  

copy thereof was produced. It was marked as  

Exh.775.  In the cross-examination, he reiterated  

that he had gone to the Supreme Court along with  

original approval letter and in the bail  

application of accused Yusuf Laplap, the said  

approval was produced.  He feigned ignorance as to  

whether entry was made into outward register  

regarding approval and denied suggestion that he  

did not receive any proposal for approval nor  

granted the same and with a view to see that the  

case does not fall, he had deposed falsely  

regarding approval.  In his cross-examination he  

has stated as follows:

“I do not know whether there is any  such paper in my office or not for  grant of approval for which I have  deposed.”

1

Page 16

The Designated Court accepted the case of the  

prosecution and held that prior approval was  

granted by the Deputy Commissioner under Section  

20-A(1) of TADA.  While doing so, the Designated  

Court observed as follows:

“…The original documents were sent to  the honorable Supreme Court for the  purpose of producing the same in court  in connection with the same petition  and thereafter the same have been  misplaced or lost….”

It further observed as follows:

“….On receiving certain information  from Abdul Wahab and Yusuf Laplap Mr.  Brahmbhatt lodged the FIR against  seven accused persons and it was sent  for the approval of DCP and on getting  the approval under section 20-A(1),  the offence was registered under the  TADA Act.  Thereafter on perusal of  the deposition, it becomes clear that  there was total compliance of Section  20-A(1) of the TADA Act before lodging  the FIR and on getting the approval  from DCP the offence was registered.

Having given our anxious consideration to the  

facts of the present case and the evidence on  

record, we are of the opinion that the case of the  

1

Page 17

prosecution that the Deputy Commissioner granted  

approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA before  

registration of the case is fit to be rejected.  It  

is interesting to note that the Deputy Commissioner  

A.R. Suroliya has categorically stated in his  

evidence that he had gone to the Supreme Court with  

original records, which included the first  

information report, on which he had granted  

approval and handed over the same to the counsel.  

Thereafter, according to him, the said original  

first information report got lost or misplaced.  It  

has been brought to our notice that accused Yusuf  

Laplap had not come to this Court for grant of bail  

and, therefore, the Deputy Commissioner had no  

occasion to come with the original record in  

connection with that case.  True it is that some of  

the accused persons in the case had approached this  

Court for various reliefs, but in the face of the  

evidence of the Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya  

that he came along with the record in connection  

1

Page 18

with the case of the accused Yusuf Laplap is fit to  

be rejected.  There are various other reasons also  

to reject this part of the prosecution story.   

As stated earlier, charge-sheet in the case has  

been filed in five stages.  Further, report under  

Section 157 of the Code has been filed and all  

these acts had taken place before the alleged loss  

of the document in the Supreme Court and,  

therefore, should have formed part of the charge-

sheet and the report given under Section 157 of the  

Code.  It has also come on record that later on,  

the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Crime Branch  

had sought for approval of the Deputy Commissioner  

which he granted on 11th of August, 1994. The  

communication of the Assistant Commissioner of  

Police (Exh.1173) does not refer to any approval  

granted by the Deputy Commissioner earlier and, not  

only that, the Deputy Commissioner while giving  

approval on 11th of August, 1994 has nowhere  

whispered that earlier he had already granted the  

1

Page 19

approval.  No explanation is forthcoming from the  

side of the prosecution that when Deputy  

Commissioner A.R. Suroliya had already granted  

approval on 9th of June, 1994, what was the occasion  

to write to him for grant of another approval and  

the Deputy Commissioner granting the same.  To  

prove prior approval, the prosecution has produced  

the xerox copy.  According to the evidence of  

Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, he had got it  

prepared from the copy kept in his office.  We  

wonder as to how and why when a copy of the  

approval was kept in the office of the Deputy  

Commissioner itself, xerox copy was produced.  It  

is relevant here to state that this witness, in his  

cross-examination, has admitted that he does not  

remember whether “there is any such paper in my  

office or not for grant of approval for which” he  

had deposed.   

In the face of what we have observed above the  

case of the prosecution that prior approval was  

1

Page 20

granted on 9th of June, 1994 is fit to be rejected.  

It seems that the prosecution has come out with a  

story of grant of prior approval under  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA in view of the decision of  

this Court in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. State of  

Gujarat, (1997) 8 SCC 459.  There the prosecution  

has propounded the theory of oral permission which  

was rejected.  In that case also the prosecution  

has pressed into service the permission granted on  

11th of August, 1994 by the same Deputy Commissioner  

i.e. A.R. Suroliya and earlier oral permission.  

While rejecting the same this Court has observed as  

follows:

“4. It is, however, contended by the  prosecution that on the very date when  investigation had been made in this  case, the Commissioner of Police,  Ahmedabad was present and he had given  oral permission under Section 20-A(1)  of TADA. We may indicate here that  considering the serious consequences  in a criminal case initiated under the  provisions of TADA, oral permission  cannot be accepted. In our view,  Section 20-A(1) must be construed by  indicating that prior approval of the  statutory authority referred to in the  

2

Page 21

said sub-section must be in writing so  that there is transparency in the  action of the statutory authority and  there is no occasion for any  subterfuge subsequently by introducing  oral permission.”

From the analysis of the evidence on record, we  

have no manner of doubt that the Deputy  

Commissioner A.R. Suroliya did not grant prior  

approval before registration of the case.

As stated earlier, the prosecution has relied  

on another approval dated 11th of August, 1994  

granted by the Deputy Commissioner.  In order to  

prove this, reference is made to the letter of the  

Assistant Commissioner addressed to the Deputy  

Commissioner of Police (Exh. 1173).  In the said  

letter, the Assistant Commissioner of Police has  

observed that the Home Department of the Government  

has given approval to apply sections of TADA and  

the approval of the Deputy Commissioner is  

necessary in this regard.  The Deputy Commissioner  

of Police on the same day granted approval.  

2

Page 22

However, Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya, in his  

evidence, has nowhere stated about the approval  

granted on 11th of August, 1994 though he had  

deposed about the approval granted on 9th of June,  

1994.  In the face of it, the case of the  

prosecution that Deputy Commissioner A.R. Suroliya  

gave another approval on 11th of August, 1994 is fit  

to be rejected.   

Another approval said to have been granted by  

the Additional Chief Secretary, Home Department for  

“using TADA sections”  (Exh. 439) has also been  

proved by the prosecution to establish compliance  

of Section 20-A(1) of TADA.  Accused has not joined  

issue on this count and in view of the evidence on  

record, we have no hesitation in accepting the case  

of the prosecution that the Additional Chief  

Secretary, Home Department, on 15th of June, 1994  

had given approval.  However, its consequences on  

the conviction of the accused shall be discussed  

later on.

2

Page 23

Having found that the Deputy Commissioner has  

not granted the prior approval, as required under  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA, we proceed to consider the  

consequence thereof.  For that, we deem it  

expedient to reproduce Section 20-A of TADA which  

reads as under:

20-A Cognizance of offence. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained  in the Code, no information about the  commission of an offence under this  Act shall be recorded by the police  without the prior approval of the  District Superintendent of Police.

(2) No court shall take cognizance of  any offence under this Act without the  previous sanction of the Inspector- General of Police, or as the case may  be, the Commissioner of Police.

It is worth mentioning here that TADA, as  

originally enacted, did not contain this provision  

and it has been inserted by Section 9 of the  

Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)  

Amendment Act (Act 43 of 1993).  From a plain  

2

Page 24

reading of the aforesaid provision it is evident  

that no information about the commission of an  

offence shall be recorded by the police without the  

prior approval of the District Superintendent of  

Police.  The legislature, by using the negative  

word in Section 20-A(1) of TADA, had made its  

intention clear.  The scheme of TADA is different  

than that of ordinary criminal statutes and,  

therefore, its provisions have to be strictly  

construed.  Negative words can rarely be held  

directory.  The plain ordinary grammatical meaning  

affords the best guide to ascertain the intention  

of the legislature.  Other methods to understand  

the meaning of the statute is resorted to if the  

language is ambiguous or leads to absurd result.  

No such situation exists here.  In the face of it,  

the requirement of prior approval by the District  

Superintendent of Police, on principle, cannot be  

said to be directory in nature.  There are  

authorities which support the view we have taken.  

Reference, in this connection, can be made to a  

2

Page 25

three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in the  

case of Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja v. State  

of Gujarat, (1995) 5 SCC 302.  As in the present  

case, in the said case also the permission granted  

by the Additional Chief Secretary was considered.  

The effect of absence of prior approval by the  

District Superintendent of Police and the grant of  

approval by the Additional Chief Secretary were not  

found to be in conformity with the scheme of TADA.  

Paragraph 11 of the judgment which is relevant for  

the purpose reads as follows:

“11. The case against the appellants  originally was registered on 19-3-1995  under the Arms Act. The DSP did not  give any prior approval on his own to  record any information about the  commission of an offence under TADA.  On the contrary, he made a report to  the Additional Chief Secretary and  asked for permission to proceed under  TADA. Why? Was it because he was  reluctant to exercise jurisdiction  vested in him by the provision of  Section 20-A(1)? This is a case of  power conferred upon one authority  being really exercised by another. If  a statutory authority has been vested  with jurisdiction, he has to exercise  it according to its own discretion. If  

2

Page 26

the discretion is exercised under the  direction or in compliance with some  higher authority's instruction, then  it will be a case of failure to  exercise discretion altogether. In  other words, the discretion vested in  the DSP in this case by Section 20- A(1) was not exercised by the DSP  at all.”

The effect of non-compliance of         Section  

20-A(1) of TADA also came up for consideration  

before this Court in the case of Mukhtiar Ahmed  

Ansari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2005) 5 SCC 258  

and while holding that absence of prior approval  

would vitiate the conviction, the Court observed as  

under:

“23. We are unable to uphold the  argument. In this case, the Deputy  Commissioner of Police himself had  been examined as prosecution witness  (PW 4). In his deposition, he had not  stated that he had given any such  direction to PW 11 Ram Mehar Singh to  register case against the accused  under TADA. On the contrary, he had  expressly stated that he had granted  sanction (which was in writing) which  is at Ext. P-4/1. As already adverted  earlier, it was under the Arms Act and  not under TADA.

2

Page 27

24. In our opinion, therefore, from  the facts of the case, it cannot be  held that prior approval as required  by Section 20-A(1) has been accorded  by the competent authority under TADA.  All proceedings were, therefore,  vitiated. The contention of the  appellant-accused must be upheld and  the conviction of the appellant- accused under TADA must be set aside.”

In the present case, we have found that no  

prior approval was granted by the Deputy  

Commissioner of Police and in the face of the  

judgments of this Court in the case of  

Anirudhsinhji Karansinhji Jadeja (supra) and  

Mukhtiar Ahmed Ansari (supra), the conviction of  

the accused cannot be upheld.  It is worth  

mentioning that this Court had taken the same view  

in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) and on fact,  

having found that no permission was granted, the  

charge was held to have been vitiated.  It is worth  

mentioning here that in Mohd. Yunus (supra) this  

Court observed that no oral permission is  

permissible but in Kalpnath Rai v. State, (1997) 8  

2

Page 28

SCC 732 this Court held that District  

Superintendent of Police, in a given contingency,  

can grant oral approval and that would satisfy the  

requirement of Section 20-A(1) of TADA.   

The conflict between the decisions of this  

Court in Mohd. Yunus (supra) and Kalpnath Rai  

(supra) was considered by a three-Judge Bench in  

the case of State of A.P. v. A. Sathyanarayana,  

(2001) 10 SCC 597 and this Court held that oral  

approval is permissible and while over-ruling the  

decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra), upheld  

the ratio laid down in the case of    Kalpnath Rai  

(supra) that the prior approval may be either in  

writing or oral also.  But, at the same time, the  

decision in the case of Mohd. Yunus (supra) that  

prior approval is sine qua non for prosecution, has  

not been watered down and, in fact, reiterated.  

This would be evident from paragraph 8 of the  

judgment which reads as follows:

2

Page 29

“8. Having applied our mind to the  aforesaid two judgments of this Court,  we are in approval of the latter  judgment and we hold that it is not  the requirement under Section 20-A(1)  to have the prior approval only in  writing. Prior     approval     is     a     condition    precedent     for     registering     a     case,     but    it     may     be     either     in     writing     or     oral    also, as has been observed by this  Court in Kalpnath Rai case, 1997 (8)  SCC 732 and, therefore, in the case in  hand, the learned Designated Judge was  wholly in error in refusing to  register the case under Sections 4 and  5 of TADA. We, therefore, set aside  the impugned order of the learned  Designated Judge and direct that the  matter should be proceeded with in  accordance with law.”

(underlining ours)

Another question which needs our attention is  

the effect of approval dated 15th of June, 1994  

given by the Additional Chief Secretary, Home  

Department of the State.  Section 20-A of TADA  

authorises the District Superintendent of Police to  

grant approval for recording the offence and  

Additional Chief Secretary of the Home Department  

or for that matter, State Government does not  

figure in that.  The legislature has put trust on  

2

Page 30

the District Superintendent of Police and therefore  

it is for him to uphold that trust and nobody else.  

Hence approval by the Additional Chief Secretary is  

inconsequential and it will not save the  

prosecution on this count, if found vulnerable  

otherwise.  We may however observe that in order to  

prevent the abuse of TADA, the State Government may  

put other conditions and prescribe approval by the  

Government or higher officer in the hierarchy but  

the same cannot substitute the requirement of  

approval by the District Superintendent of Police.  

Not only this, the District Superintendent of  

Police is obliged to grant approval on its own  

wisdom and outside dictate would vitiate his  

decision.  This view finds support from the  

decision of this Court in the case of Anirudhsinhji  

Karansinhji Jadeja (Supra).

Now we proceed to consider the submission  

advanced by the State that non-compliance of  

Section 20-A(1) i.e. absence of approval of the  

3

Page 31

District Superintendent of Police, is a curable  

defect under Section 465 of the Code.  We do not  

have the slightest hesitation in holding that  

Section 465 of the Code shall be attracted in the  

trial of an offence by the Designated Court under  

TADA.  This would be evident from Section 14 (3) of  

TADA which reads as follows:

“S.14.Procedure and powers of  Designated Courts

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Subject to the other provisions of  this Act, a Designated Court shall,  for the purpose of trial of any  offence, have all the powers of a  Court of Session and shall try such  offence as if it were a Court of  Session so far as may be in accordance  with the procedure prescribed in the  Code for the trial before the Court of  Session.”

From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision  

it is evident that for the purpose of trial  

Designated Court is a Court of Session.  It has all  

the powers of a Court of Session and while trying  

3

Page 32

the case under TADA, the Designated Court has to  

follow the procedure prescribed in the Code for the  

trial before a Court of Session.  Section 465 of  

the Code, which falls in Chapter XXXV, covers cases  triable by a Court of Session also.  Hence, the  

prosecution can take shelter behind Section 465 of  

the Code.  But Section 465 of the Code shall not be  

a panacea for all error, omission or irregularity.  

Omission to grant prior approval for registration  

of the case under TADA by the Superintendent of  

Police is not the kind of omission which is covered  

under Section 465 of the Code.  It is a defect  

which goes to the root of the matter and it is not  

one of the curable defects.   

The submission that absence of sanction under  

Section 20-A(2) by the Commissioner of Police has  

been held to be a curable defect and for parity of  

reasons the absence of approval under Section 20-

A(1) would be curable is also without substance and  

reliance on the decision of Lal Singh v. State of  

3

Page 33

Gujarat, (1998) 5 SCC 529, in this connection, is  

absolutely misconceived.  An Act which is harsh,  

containing stringent provision and prescribing  

procedure substantially departing from the  

prevalent ordinary procedural law cannot be  

construed liberally.  For ensuring rule of law its  

strict adherence has to be ensured.  In the case of  

Lal Singh (supra) relied on by the State, Section  20-A(1) of TADA was not under scanner.  Further,  

this Court in the said judgment nowhere held that  

absence of sanction under Section 20-A(2) is a  

curable defect.  In Lal Singh (supra) the question  of sanction was not raised before the Designated  

Court and sought to be raised before this Court for  

the first time which was not allowed.  This would  

be evident from the following paragraph of the  

judgment

“4. Sub-section (2) makes it clear  that when the objection could and  should have been raised at an earlier  stage in the proceeding and has not  been raised, mere error or  irregularity in any sanction of  

3

Page 34

prosecution becomes ignorable. We  therefore     do     not     permit     the     appellants    to     raise     the     plea     of     defect     in    sanction.”

  (underlining ours)

The decision of this Court in the case of  

Ahmad Umar Saeed Sheikh v. State of U.P., (1996) 11  

SCC 61, relied on by the State, instead of  

supporting its contention clearly goes against it.  

As observed earlier, the omission to grant approval  

does not come within the purview of Section 465 of  

the Code and, hence, the rigors of Section 465 (2)  

shall be wholly inapplicable.  Otherwise also, the  

accused have raised this point at the earliest.  

Grant or absence of approval by the District  

Superintendent of Police is a mixed question of law  

and fact.  The very existence of the approval under  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA has been questioned by the  

accused during the course of trial, which is  

evident from the trend of cross-examination.  Not  

only this, it was raised before the Designated  

Court during argument and has been rejected.  Thus,  

3

Page 35

it cannot be said that it was not raised at the  

earliest.

The plea of the State is that the Commissioner  

of Police having granted the sanction under Section  

20-A(2) of TADA, the conviction of the accused  

cannot be held to be bad only on the ground of  

absence of approval under Section 20-A(1) by the  

Deputy Commissioner.  As observed earlier, the  

provisions of TADA are stringent and consequences  

are serious and in order to prevent persecution,  

the legislature in its wisdom had given various  

safeguards at different stages.  It has mandated  

that no information about the commission of an  

offence under TADA shall be recorded by the police  

without the prior approval of the District  

Superintendent of Police.  Not only this, further  

safeguard has been provided and restriction has  

been put on the court not to take cognizance of any  

offence without the previous sanction of the  

Inspector-General of Police or as the case may be,  

3

Page 36

the Commissioner of Police.  Both operate in  

different and distinct stages and, therefore, for  

successful prosecution both the requirements have  

to be complied with.  We have not come across any  

principle nor we are inclined to lay down that in a  

case in which different safeguards have been  

provided at different stages, the adherence to the  

last safeguard would only be relevant and breach of  

other safeguards shall have no bearing on the  

trial.  Therefore, we reject the contention of the  

State that the accused cannot assail their  

conviction on the ground of absence of approval  

under Section 20-A(1) of TADA by the Deputy  

Commissioner, when the Commissioner of Police had  

granted sanction under Section 20-A(2) of TADA.

As regards submission of the State that the  

Designated Court having taken cognizance and  

decided to try the case by itself in exercise of  

the power under Section 18 of TADA, the prior  

defects, if any, are rendered irrelevant and cannot  

3

Page 37

be raised, has only been noted to be rejected.  

Section 18 of TADA confers jurisdiction on the  

Designated Court to transfer such cases for the  

trial of such offences in which it has no  

jurisdiction to try and in such cases, the court to  

which the case is transferred, may proceed with the  

trial of the offence as if it had taken cognizance  

of the offence.  The power of the Designated Court  

to transfer the case to be tried by a court of  

competent jurisdiction would not mean that in case  

the Designated Court has decided to proceed with  

the trial, any defect in trial, cannot be agitated  

at later stage.  Many ingredients which are  

required to be established to confer jurisdiction  

on a Designated Court are required to be proved  

during trial.  At the stage of Section 18 the  

Designated Court has to decide as to whether to try  

the case itself or transfer the case for trial to  

another court of competent jurisdiction.  For that,  

the materials collected during the course of  

investigation have only to be seen.  The  

3

Page 38

investigating agency, in the present case, has come  

out with a case that prior approval was given for  

registration of the case and the allegations made  

do constitute an offence under TADA.  In the face  

of it, the Designated Court had no option than to  

proceed with the trial.  However, the decision by  

the Designated Court to proceed with the trial  

shall not prevent the accused to contend in future  

that they cannot be validly prosecuted under TADA.  

We hasten to add that even in a case which is not  

fit to be tried by the Designated Court but it  

decides to do the same instead of referring the  

case to be tried by a court of competent  

jurisdiction, it will not prevent the accused to  

challenge the trial or conviction later on.  

The submission of the State that the Designated  

Court having been empowered to take cognizance  

under Section 14 of TADA irrespective of absence of  

compliance of Section 20-A(1) of TADA, its non-

compliance would not be fatal to the prosecution,  

does not commend us.  Section 14 of TADA confers  

3

Page 39

jurisdiction on a Designated Court to take  

cognizance of any offence when the accused being  

committed to it for trial upon receiving a  

complaint of facts which constitute such offence or  

upon a police report of such facts.  The offence  

under TADA is to be tried by a Designated Court.  

The Designated Court has all the powers of Court of  

Session and it has to try the offence as if it is a  

Court of Session.  The Code provides for commitment  

of the case for trial by the Court of Session.  

Section 14(1) of TADA provides that the Designated  

Court may take cognizance on receiving a complaint  

of facts or upon a police report.  Had this  

provision not been there, the cases under TADA  

would have been tried by the Designated Court only  

after commitment.  In any view of the matter, the  

accused during the trial under TADA can very well  

contend that their trial is vitiated on one or the  

other ground notwithstanding the fact that the  

Designated Court had taken cognizance.  Taking  

3

Page 40

cognizance by the Designated Court shall not make  

all other provisions inconsequential.   

Lastly, it has been submitted that absence of  

approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA would not  

vitiate the conviction of the accused under other  

penal provisions.  As stated earlier, the accused  

persons besides being held guilty under Section 3  

and 5 of TADA, have also been found guilty under  

Section 7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4,  

5 and 6 of the Explosive Substances Act.  According  

to the State, the conviction under the Arms Act and  

the Explosive Substances Act, therefore, cannot be  

held to be illegal.  It is relevant here to state  

that the Designated Court, besides trying the case  

under TADA, can also try any other offence with  

which the accused may be charged at the same trial  

if the offence is connected with the offence under  

TADA.  When the Designated Court had the power to  

try offences under TADA as well as other offences,  

it is implicit that it has the power to convict  

also and that conviction is permissible to be  

4

Page 41

ordered under TADA or other penal laws or both.  In  

our opinion it is not necessary for the Designated  

Court to first order conviction under TADA and only  

thereafter under other penal law.  In view of the  

five-Judge Constitution Bench judgment of this  

Court in Prakash Kumar v. State of Gujarat, (2005)  

2 SCC 409,  this point does not need further  

elaboration.  In the said case this Court has  

observed that “the Designated Court is empowered to  

convict the accused for the offence under any other  

law notwithstanding the fact that no offence under  

TADA is made out.”  This would be evident from  

paragraph 37 of the judgment which reads as  

follows:

“37. The legislative intendment  underlying Sections 12(1) and (2) is  clearly discernible, to empower the  Designated Court to try and convict  the accused for offences committed  under any other law along with  offences committed under the Act, if  the offence is connected with such  other offence. The language “if the  offence is connected with such other  offence”  employed in Section 12(1) of  the Act has great significance. The  

4

Page 42

necessary corollary is that once the  other offence is connected with the  offence under TADA and if the accused  is charged under the Code and tried  together in the same trial, the  Designated Court is empowered to  convict the accused for the offence  under any other law, notwithstanding  the fact that no offence under TADA is  made out. This could be the only  intendment of the legislature. To hold  otherwise, would amount to rewrite or  recast legislation and read something  into it which is not there.”

We have held the conviction of the accused to  

have been vitiated on account of non-compliance of  

Section 20-A(1) of TADA and thus, it may be  

permissible in law to maintain the conviction under  

the Arms Act and the Explosive Substances Act but  

that shall only be possible when there are legally  

admissible evidence to establish those charges.  

The Designated Court has only relied on the  

confessions recorded under TADA to convict the  

accused for offences under the Arms Act and the  

Explosive Substances Act. In view of our finding  

that their conviction is vitiated on account of  

non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of  

4

Page 43

prior approval under Section 20-A(1) of TADA, the  

confessions recorded cannot be looked into to  

establish the guilt under the aforesaid Acts.  

Hence, the conviction of the accused under Section  

7 and 25(1A) of the Arms Act and Section 4, 5 and 6  

of the Explosive Substances Act cannot also be  

allowed to stand.

As we have held the conviction and sentence of  

the accused to be illegal and unsustainable, the  

appeals filed by the State against acquittal and  

inadequacy of sentence have necessarily to be  

dismissed.

We appreciate the anxiety of the police  

officers entrusted with the task of preventing  

terrorism and the difficulty faced by them.  

Terrorism is a crime far serious in nature, more  

graver in impact and highly dangerous in  

consequence.  It can put the nation in shock,  

create fear and panic and disrupt communal peace  

4

Page 44

and harmony.  This task becomes more difficult when  

it is done by organized group with outside support.  

Had the investigating agency not succeeded in  

seizing the arms and explosives, the destruction  

would have been enormous.  However, while resorting  

to TADA, the safeguards provided therein must  

scrupulously be followed.  In the country of  

Mahatma, “means are more important than the end”.  

Invocation of TADA without following the safeguards  

resulting into acquittal gives an opportunity to  

many and also to the enemies of the country to  

propagate that it has been misused and abused.  

District Superintendent of Police and Inspector  

General of Police and all others entrusted with the  

task of operating the law must not do anything  

which allows its misuse and abuse and ensure that  

no innocent person has the feeling of sufferance  

only because “My name is Khan, but I am not a  

terrorist”.  

The facts of the case might induce mournful  

reflection how an attempt by the investigating  

4

Page 45

agency charged with the duty of preventing  

terrorism and securing conviction has been  

frustrated by what is popularly called a technical  

error.  We emphasize and deem it necessary to  

repeat that the gravity of the evil to the  

community from terrorism can never furnish an  

adequate reason for invading the personal liberty,  

except in accordance with the procedure established  

by the Constitution and the laws.  

We have been told that many of the accused,  

because of poverty or for the reason that they had  

already undergone the sentence, have not preferred  

appeals before this Court.  Further, this Court had  

not gone into the merits of the appeals preferred  

by few convicts on the ground that they have  

already served out the sentence and released  

thereafter.  The view which we have taken goes to  

the root of the matter and vitiates the conviction  

and, hence, we deem it expedient to grant benefit  

of this judgment to all those accused who have been  

held guilty and not preferred appeal and also those  

4

Page 46

convicts whose appeals have been dismissed by this  

Court as infructuous on the ground that they had  

already undergone the sentence awarded.

In the result, we allow the appeals preferred  

by those accused who have been convicted and  

sentenced by the Designated Court and set aside the  

judgment and order of their conviction and  

sentence.  However, we dismiss the appeals  

preferred by the State against the inadequacy of  

sentence and acquittal of some of the accused  

persons.

                      ………………….………………………………….J. (H.L. DATTU)

 ………..………..……………………………….J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

NEW DELHI, SEPTEMBER 26, 2012.

4

Page 47

SCHEDULE - I List of persons named in Crime No. 1-CR No. 11 of  1994 dated 9th of June, 1994. Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Yusufkhan Khudadatkhan Pathan  @ Laplap

Accused No. 1

2 Abdul Latif Abdul Vahab  Shaikh

Accused No. 2

3 Rasulkhan @ Yaz Accused No. 3 4 A.H.C. Sirajmiya Akbarmiya  

@ Siraj Dadhi Accused No. 4

5 Imtiyaz Accused No. 5 6 Gulal Accused No. 6 7 Sattar Battery @ Sattar  

Chacha Accused No. 7

4

Page 48

SCHEDULE   –   II   List of persons named in the First Charge-Sheet dated  16th of December, 1994 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap  Khudadatkhan Pathan  

Accused No. 1

2 Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore Accused No. 2

3 Abdulkhurdush Abdulgani  Shaikh

Accused No. 3

4 Mohmad Farukh @ Farukbawa  Allarakha Shaikh

Accused No. 4

5 Sajidali @ Benimohmadali  Saiyed

Accused No. 5

6 Anwarkhan Mohmadkhan Pathan Accused No. 6 7 Mohmad Jalaluddin @ Jalababa  

Tamizuddin Saiyed Accused No. 7

8 Gulamkadar Gulamhusain Shaikh Accused No. 8 9 Mohmad Ismail Abdul Vahab  

Shaikh Accused No. 9

10 Haiderkhan Lalkhan Pathan Accused No. 10 11 Adambhai Yusufbhai Mandli  

(Shaikh) Accused No. 11

4

Page 49

Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos. 12 Mohmad Soyeb @ Soyeb Baba  

Abdul Gani Shaikh Accused No. 12

13 Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyed Husain  Saiyed

Accused No. 13

14 Mohmad Hanif @ Anudin Husain  Miya Shaikh

Accused No. 14

4

Page 50

SCHEDULE     -     III   List of persons named in the Second Charge-Sheet  dated 23rd of May, 1995 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Gajanfarkhan @ Gajukhan Accused No. 15 2 Asrafkhan @ Babu Accused No. 16

5

Page 51

SCHEDULE   –   IV   List of persons named in the Third Charge-Sheet dated  17th of April, 1996 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Munavar Ullakhan @ Imtiyaz  Ullakhan @ Pappu

Accused No. 17

2 Fanes Aehmohmad Ansari Accused No. 18 3 Afzalhusain Accused No. 19 4 Samimulla @ Sammu Accused No. 20 5 Barikkhan @ Abdulsalim Accused No. 21 6 Babukhan @ Lala Accused No. 22 7 Maksud Ahmed Fatehahmed  

Shaikh Accused No. 23

8 Mohmedsafi Abdul Rahman Saikh Accused No. 24 9 Hafizudin Fajiudin Kaji Accused No. 25 10 Sohrabduin @ Salim Accused No. 26 11 Abdulgafar @ Gafar Accused No. 27 12 Abdulkayam Nizamudin Shaikh Accused No. 28 13 Mohmed Rafik @ Haji Rafikbhai  

Kapadia Accused No. 29

14 Usmangani Musabhai Vohra Accused No. 30

Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos. 15 Abdulvahab Abdulmajid Baloch Accused No. 31 16 Abdul Sattar @ Sattar Battery Accused No. 32 17 Abdulrauf @ Rauf Accused No. 33 18 Imtiyazahmed Nurharanmiya  

Kadri Accused No. 34

19 Abdullatif Abdulvahab Shaikh Accused No. 35 20 Sabbirhusain Husainmiya  

Shaikh Accused No. 36

21 Mustak Ahmed Istiyak Ahmed  Pathan

Accused No. 37

5

Page 52

22 Ikbal Jabbarkhan Pathan Accused No. 38 23 Ayub @ Lala Accused No. 39 24 Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandli Accused No. 40 25 Musabhai Yusufbhai Madli Accused No. 41 26 Daubhai Musabhia Shaikh Accused No. 42 27 Mohmedamin @ Amin Chobeli Accused No. 43 28 Musrafkhan Gorekhan Pathan Accused No. 44 29 Mehmood @ Pepa Pelhwan  

Husenkhan Nilgaramal Accused No. 45

5

Page 53

Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos. 30 Sahibudin @ Konjibaba Accused No. 46 31 Husanbhai @ Bhajia Accused No. 47 32 Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai  

Ajmeri Accused No. 48

33 Gulam Mohmed @ Gulu Accused No. 49

5

Page 54

SCHEDULE   –   V   List of persons named in the Fourth Charge-Sheet  dated 20th of December, 1996 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Mahebub Bag @ Mehbub Senior Accused No. 50 2 Mohmad Rafik @ R.D. @ Mustak  

@ Nazim Accused No. 51

3 Gulam Mohmad@ Gulal @ Arif Accused No. 52 4 Imtiyaz @ Fatush Accused No. 53 5 Parminder Singh @ Kaka Accused No. 54 6 Aminkhan @ Alamkhan Accused No. 55 7 Firoz @ Firoz Kankani Accused No. 56 8 Mohmad Harun @ Munna @ Riyaz  

@ Chhote Rahim Accused No. 57

9 Mujfarkhan @ Nasir Luhar Accused No. 58 10 Mohmad Yakil @ Yakil Accused No. 59 11 Jay Prakash Singh @ Bachhi  

Sing Accused No. 60

5

Page 55

SCHEDULE   –   VI   List of persons named in the Fifth Charge-Sheet dated  24th of May, 1994 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Jahangir Khan Fazalkhan  Pathan

Accused No. 61

2 Mohmad Anwarkhan @ Rushi  Pathan

Accused No. 62

5

Page 56

SCHEDULE   –   VII   List of persons convicted by Designated Court vide  its order dated 31st of January, 2002 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Yusufkhan @ Yusuf Laplap  Khudadadkhan Pathan  

Accused No. 1

2 Shirajmiya Akbarmiya Thakore Accused No. 2

3 Sajidali @ Deni Mohammedali  Saiyed

Accused No. 5

4 Iqbal @ Bapu Saiyedhussein  Saiyed

Accused No. 13

5 Gajnafarkhan @ Gajjukhan  Sabdrkhan Pathan   

Accused No. 15

6 Asharafkhan @ Babu Munnakhan  Pathan

Accused No. 16

7 Shohrabuddin @ Salim  Anvaruddin Shaikh

Accused No. 26

8 Abdulsattar @ Sattar Battery  Abdulgani Shaikh

Accused No. 32

9 Abdul Raoof @ Raoof Abdul  Kadar Shaikh   

Accused No. 33

10 Hussainbhai @ Bhajiya  Mohammedbhai Patani   

Accused No. 47

11 Mujffarkhan @ Nashir Luhar  Umardarajkhan Pathan

Accused No. 58

5

Page 57

SCHEDULE   –   VIII   List of persons acquitted by Designated Court vide  its order dated 31st of January, 2002 Sr.No. Names of accused persons Accused Nos.

1 Abdul Khurdush Abdul Gani  Shaikh

Accused No. 3

2 Mohammed Faruq @ Faruqbava  Allarakha  

Accused No. 4

3 Anvarkhan Mohammedkhan Pathan Accused No. 6 4 Mohammed Jalaluddin @  

Jalalbaba Tamijuddin Saiyed Accused No. 7

5 Gulam Kadar Gulam Hussain  Shaikh

Accused No. 8

6 Hyderkhan Lalkhan Pathan Accused No. 10 7 Mohammed Soeb @ Soebbava  

Abdul Gani Shaikh Accused No. 12

8 Mohammed Hanif @ Anudi  Husseinmiya Shaikh

Accused No. 14

9 Munavarullakhan @  Imtiyazullakhan @ Pappu  Mohammed Safiullakhan

Accused No. 17

10 Afzalhussain Ajgarhussein  Rangrej

Accused No. 19

11 Shamtullakhan @ Sammu  Mohammed Safiulla Pathan

Accused No. 20

12 Bariqkhan @ Abdul Salim  Hussein Khan @ Abdul Hussein  Shaikh

Accused No. 21

5

Page 58

13 Babukhan @ Lala Niyajkhan @  Niyajmohammed Pathan

Accused No. 22

14 Maksud Ahmed Fatehmohammed  Shaikh

Accused No. 23

15 Mohammed Safi Abdul Rehman  Saikh

Accused No. 24

16 Hafizuddin Fazluddin Kazi Accused No. 25 17 Abdulgafar @ Gafar Party  

Mohammed Rafiq Shaikh   

Accused No. 27

18 Abdul Kaiyum Nizamuddin  Shaikh

Accused No. 28

19 Mohammed Rafiq @ Haji  Rafiqbhai Husseinbhai Kapadia

Accused No. 29

20 Usmangani Musabhai Vora Accused No. 30 21 Abdul Wahab Abdul Majid  

Baloch Accused No. 31

22 Imtieaz Ahmed Noorhadanmiya  Kadari

Accused No. 34

23 Sabbirhussein Husseinmiya  Shaikh

Accused No. 36

24 Mustaq Ahmed Istiyaq Ahmed  Pathan

Accused No. 37

25 Aiyub @ Lala Yusufbhai  Mandali

Accused No. 39

26 Kadarbhai Musabhai Mandali Accused No. 40 27 Musabhai Yusufbhai Mandali Accused No. 41 28 Daoodbhai Musabhai Shaikh Accused No. 42 29 Mohammed Amin @ Amin Chotely  

Rahimmiya Accused No. 43

5

Page 59

30 Musharrafkhan Gorekhan Pathan Accused No. 44 31 Mehmood @ Pepa Pahelvan  

Hussainkhan Nilgadamal Accused No. 45

32 Shahbuddin @ Kanijbaba  Badruddin Shaikh

Accused No. 46

33 Ahmedbhai Haji Kasambhai  Ajmeri

Accused No. 48

34 Gulammohammed @ Gulu Gulam  Hyder Momin

Accused No. 49

35 Mehboobbeg @ Mehboob Senior  Chhotubeg Mogal

Accused No. 50

36 Mohammed Rafiq @ R.D. @  Mustaq @ Nazim Majidkhan

Accused No. 51

37 Gulam Mohammed @ Gulal @ Arif  Abdul Kadar Shaikh

Accused No. 52

38 Imtiyaz @ Fetas Ibrahim  Ismial Bhathiyara

Accused No. 53

39 Parmindarsing @ Kaka  Maliksing Sikh

Accused No. 54

40 Aminkhan @ Alamkhan Mojkhan  Pathan

Accused No. 55

41 Mohammed Yaakil @ Aakil  Maiyuddin Malek

Accused No. 59

5