REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL Nos.1466­1467 OF 2008

Ashok Kumar Mehra & Anr.              ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

The State of Punjab ETC.           …Respondent(s)

                J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.  

1. These appeals are directed against the final

judgment and  order  dated  21.07.2008  passed  by

the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh

in Criminal Appeal No.681­DBA of 2000 and

Criminal Revision No.1242 of 2000 whereby the

High Court allowed the criminal appeal filed by

respondent No.1(State) herein and the criminal

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revision filed by respondent No.2(Complainant)

herein by setting aside the judgment dated

06.06.2000 passed by the Sessions Judge,

Rupnagar in Sessions Case No.10 of 1998 and

convicted both the appellants for the offence

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34

of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(hereinafter referred

to as “IPC”) and sentenced them to undergo

imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/­

each.   In default of payment of fine, they shall

undergo further rigorous imprisonment for a period

of six months each.

2. A few facts need mention hereinbelow for the

disposal of these appeals.

3. Appellant No.1­Ashok Kumar Mehra is the

father of appellant No.2­Kushwant@Sukhwant

Kumar Mehra. Both the appellants, i.e., father and

son were prosecuted for commission of the offence

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of committing murder of one Inderjit Dhiman. The

Sessions Judge by judgment/order dated

06.06.2000  passed in  Sessions  Case  No.10/1998

acquitted both the appellants.  

4. The State and the Complainant both felt

aggrieved and filed criminal appeal and criminal

revision in the High Court. By impugned order, the

High Court allowed the criminal appeal as well as

the criminal revision and while reversing the

judgment of acquittal passed by the Sessions Judge,

convicted both the appellants and awarded them life

sentence,  which has given rise to filing of these

appeals  by  both the  accused  persons, i.e., father

and son.

5. Heard Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel

for the appellants and  Mr. Ankit Swarup  &  Ms.

Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel for the

respondents.

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6. Mr. T.S. Doabia, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, at the outset, stated that so far as the

appellant No.1­Ashok Kumar Mehra, i.e., father is

concerned, he has expired during the pendency of

these appeals. Learned counsel then brought to our

notice that so far  as  appellant  No.2­Kushwant  @

Sukhwant Kumar Mehra, i.e., son is concerned, he

was juvenile on the date of commission of the

offence.

7. In our opinion, so far as appeal filed by

appellant No.1­Ashok Kumar Mehra, i.e., father is

concerned, the same stands abated on account of

his death.  In this view of  the matter,  the appeal

filed by appellant No.1 is accordingly dismissed as

abated.

8. Now so far as the  appeal filed  by  appellant

No.2 ­ Sukhwant Kumar, i.e., son is concerned, the

same, in  our  view,  deserves to  be  allowed  in  the

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light of law laid  down by this  Court in a recent

decision of this  Court in  Raju  vs.  The  State  of

Haryana,  2019(4) SCALE 398  wherein a similar

question was involved.   This  is what was held by

this Court (Three Judge Bench) in Paras 9, 10, and

25 as under:       

“9.  It is by now well­settled, as was held in Hari  Ram  v.  State of Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, that in light of Sections 2(k), 2(I), 7A read with Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended in 2006, a juvenile  who had not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the offence is entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Mali v.  State of  Madhya Pradesh, (2010)  6 SCC 669; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana, (2011) 2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi (supra); Jitendra Singh  @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2013) 11 SCC 193). It is equally  well­settled that the claim  of juvenility can be raised at any stage before any Court by an accused, including this Court, even after the final disposal of a case, in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act (see Dharambir  v.  State (NCT) of  Delhi, (supra), Abuzar Hossain  v.  State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489; Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of UP, (supra); Abdul Razzaq v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637).

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10.  In light of the above legal position, it is evident that the Appellant would be entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act if  his age is determined to be below 18 years on the date of commission  of the  offence.  Moreover, it would be irrelevant that the plea of juvenility was not raised before the Trial Court, in light of Section 7A. As per the report of the inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, in this case, the Appellant was below 18 years of age on the date of commission of the offence. The only question before us that needs to be determined is whether such report may be given precedence over the contrary view taken by the  High  Court, so that the benefit of the 2000 Act may be given to the Appellant.

25.  Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed and the order of the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set aside. Seeing that the Appellant has already spent 6 years in imprisonment, whereas the maximum period for which a juvenile may be sent to a special home is only 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g)  of  the 2000 Act,  and since the Appellant has already been enlarged on bail by virtue of the order of the Court dated 09.05.2014, he need not be taken into custody. His bail bonds stand discharged and all  proceedings  against  him,  so far  as they relate to the present case, stand terminated.”

9. When we examine the facts of the case of

appellant No.2 in the light of law laid down in the

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case of  Raju  (supra),  we  find  that  appellant  No.2

was born on 14.06.1980 whereas the date of

commission of the offence is 04.01.1998.  

10. It is, therefore, an admitted fact that appellant

No. 2 was a juvenile (he was below the age of 18

years, i.e., he was 17 years and 5 months) on the

date of the commission of the offence (04.01.1998).

In other words, appellant No. 2 had not completed

the age of 18 years on the date of commission of the

offence, i.e., on 04.01.1998.  

11. Though this fact  was neither  brought to the

notice of the Sessions Judge and nor the High Court

and was brought to the notice of this Court for the

first time by appellant No. 2 in this appeal, yet in

the light of law laid down by this Court in several

decisions referred to in Para 10 of the decision in

Raju (supra), appellant No. 2 is entitled to raise this

plea even in this appeal.  

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12. Now, so far as the issue relating to the

genuineness of the date of birth of appellant No. 2 is

concerned, firstly, it is not in dispute that  appellant

No.2  had filed  his  date  of  birth  certificate in the

Sessions Court;  Secondly, the prosecution did not

object to the correctness of the birth certificate

before  the Sessions Judge;  Thirdly, this  Court  by

order  dated  11.07.2011  granted  bail to appellant

No. 2 on this ground observing therein that since he

was juvenile at the time of commission of the

offence and  was  below  18 years,  which  was not

disputed by the respondent­State; and lastly, even

at the time of hearing of this appeal, learned

counsel for the respondent­State did not dispute the

date of birth certificate of appellant No.2.  

13. In the light of these four reasons, we are of the

view  that it is  not  necessary to  hold  any further

inquiry on this question.

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14. In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of

the considered opinion that since appellant  No.2

was  a juvenile on the  date  of commission  of the

offence and though till date he has already

undergone considerable jail  sentence partly as an

under­trial and partly as a convict, yet the appeal

filed by appellant No. 2 has to be allowed as was

done in the case of Raju  (supra) without going into

the merits of the case and passing any other

consequential order in that regard.

15. The appeal  of  appellant  No.  2 is  accordingly

allowed.  The impugned order qua appellant No.2 is

set aside.          

                                    .………...................................J.                                    [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]                                    

    …...……..................................J.                     [DINESH MAHESHWARI]

New Delhi; April 15, 2019

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