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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10251 OF 2014

ASGER IBRAHIM AMIN      .. APPELLANT

VERSUS

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA      .. RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

VIKRAMAJIT SEN, J.

1     The question which falls for consideration is whether the Appellant  is  

entitled  to  claim pension even though he  resigned from service  of  his  own  

volition  and,  if  so,  whether  his  claim  on  this  count  had  become barred  by  

limitation or laches.

2     The  Appellant  joined  the  services  of  the  Respondent  Corporation  on  

30.6.1967  on  the  post  of  Assistant  Administrative  Officer  (Chartered  

Accountant) at the age of twenty seven.  He worked for 23 years and 7 months  

in  the  Corporation  before  tendering  his  resignation  on  28.1.1991,  owing  to  

“family circumstances and indifferent health”,  presumably having crossed fifty  

years in age.  The request of the Appellant for waiver of the stipulated three  

months notice was favourably considered by the Corporation vide letter dated

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28.2.1991, and the Appellant was allowed to resign from the post of Deputy  

General  Manager  (Accounts),  which he was holding at  that  time.   We shall  

again  presume that  the  reasons  that  he  had ascribed for  his  retirement,  viz.  

family  problems  and  failing  health,  were  found  to  be  legitimate  by  the  

Respondent, otherwise the waiver ought not to have been given.   Thereafter, the  

Central Government in exercise of  power conferred under Section 48 of the  

Life  Insurance  Corporation  Act,  1956  had  notified  the  LIC of  India  (Staff)  

Regulations,  1960  and  thereafter  the  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of  India  

(Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as “Pension Rules”)  

which,  though  notified  on  28.6.1995,  were  given  retrospective  effect  from  

1.11.1993.       The Pension Rules provide,  inter alia,  that resignation from  

service would lead to forfeiture of the benefits of the entire service including  

eligibility for pension.   

3 On 8.8.1995,  that  is  post  the  promulgation  by  the  Respondent  of  the  

Pension Rules,  the Appellant enquired from the Respondent whether he was  

entitled to pension under the Pension Rules, which has been understood by the  

Respondent  as  a  representation  for  pension;  the  Respondent  replied  that  the  

request of the Appellant cannot be acceded to. The Appellant took the matter no  

further  but  has  averred  that  in  2000,  prompted  by  news  in  a  Daily  and  

Judgments of  a  High Court  and a  Tribunal,  he requested the Respondent  to  

reconsider his case for pension.   This request has remained unanswered.  It was  

in 2011 that he sent a legal notice to the Respondent, in response to which the

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Respondent reiterated its stand that the Appellant, having resigned from service,  

was  not  eligible  to  claim pension  under  the  Pension  Rules.  Eventually,  the  

Appellant filed a Special Civil Application on 29.3.2012 before the High Court,  

which was dismissed by the Single Judge vide Judgment dated 5.10.2012.   The  

LPA of the Appellant also got dismissed on the grounds of the delay of almost  

14 years, as also on merits vide Judgment dated 1.3.2013, against which the  

Appellant has approached this Court.    

4       As regards the issue of delay in matters pertaining to claims of pension, it   

has already been opined by this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008)  

8 SCC 648 that in cases of continuing or successive wrongs, delay and laches or  

limitation will not thwart the claim so long as the claim, if allowed, does not  

have  any adverse  repercussions  on  the  settled  third-party  rights.  This  Court  

held:

7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will  be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is  sought  by filing a  writ  petition)  or  limitation (where remedy is  sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of  the exceptions  to  the said  rule  is  cases  relating to  a  continuing  wrong.  Where  a  service  related  claim is  based on a  continuing  wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking  remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong  commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source  of  injury.  But  there  is  an  exception  to  the  exception.  If  the  grievance  is  in  respect  of  any  order  or  administrative  decision  which  related  to  or  affected  several  others  also,  and  if  the  reopening  of  the  issue  would  affect  the  settled  rights  of  third  parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the   issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may   be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third   parties. But if  the claim involved issues relating to seniority or

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promotion,  etc.,  affecting  others,  delay  would  render  the  claim  stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as  the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is  concerned,  the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs  will  apply.  As  a  consequence,  the  High Courts  will  restrict  the  consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three  years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.  

(emphasis is ours)

We respectfully concur with these observations which if extrapolated or applied  

to the factual matrix of the present case would have the effect of restricting the  

claim for pension, if  otherwise sustainable in law, to three years previous to  

when it was raised in a judicial forum.  Such claims recur month to month and  

would not  stand extinguished on the application of  the laws of  prescription,  

merely because the legal remedy pertaining to the time barred part of it  has  

become  unavailable.    This  is  too  well  entrenched  in  our  jurisprudence,  

foreclosing any fresh consideration.   

5       The second issue which confronts us is whether the termination of service  

of  the  Appellant  remains  unalterably  in  the  nature  of  resignation,  with  the  

consequence  of  disentitling  him from availing  of  or  migrating/mutating  the  

pension scheme or whether it instead be viewed as a voluntary retirement or  

whether it  requires to be regarded so in order to bestow this  benefit  on the  

Appellant; who had ‘resigned’ after reaching the age of fifty and after serving  

the LIC for over twenty three years.   The Appellant resigned from service under  

Regulation 18 of LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960, which along with the  

other provisions of relevance is reproduced for facility of reference -

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SECTION 3 – TERMINATION Determination of Service: 18. (1) An employee, other than an employee on probation or an  employee  appointed  on  a  temporary  basis,  shall  not  leave  or  discontinue  his  service  in  the  Corporation  without  first  giving  notice  in  writing  to  the  competent  authority  of  his  intention  to  leave or discontinue the service. The period of notice required shall  be-  

(a)  three  months  in  the  case  of  an  employee  belonging  to  Class I;  

(b) one month in the case of other employees.  

Provided that such notice may be waived in part or in full by the  competent  authority  at  its  discretion.  In  case  of  breach  by  an  employee of the provisions of the sub-regulation, he shall be liable  to pay the Corporation as compensation a sum equal to his salary  for  the  period  of  notice  required  of  him,  which  sum  may  be  deducted from any moneys due to him.   

Superannuation and Retirement: 19(1)  xx     (2) An employee belonging to Class I or Class II appointed to the  service of the Corporation on or after 1st September,1956, shall retire on  completion of 60 years of age, but the competent authority may, if it is  of the opinion that it is in the interest of the Corporation to do so, direct   such employee to retire on completion of 50 years of age or at any time  thereafter on giving him three months’ notice or salary in lieu thereof.

The following Regulations, on which learned Senior Counsel for the LIC has  

placed reliance, came to be introduced on 16.2.1996, that is after the Appellant  

had ‘resigned’ from service.  We have called for and perused this Notification,  

and as  we expected,  these  provisions  apply  retrospectively  with  effect  from  

1.11.1993.   These  Regulations  ordain,  inter  alia,  that  an  employee  may  be  

permitted to retire (a) on completion of the age of 55 and (b) after completing  

25  years  in  service.   In  other  words,  the  Corporation  has  the  power  to

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compulsory retire an employee who has attained the age of 50 years if in its  

opinion such decision is in the interests of the Corporation; and the employee  

may seek permission to retire upon completion of 55 years of age and after  

rendering 25 years of service.  This very position finds reiteration in Rule 31 of  

the  Pension  Rules  under  the  epithet  ‘voluntary  retirement’,  which  pandect  

appears to have been available from the inception i.e. 1.11.1993.

(2A)  (a)  Notwithstanding what is stated in sub-rules (1) and (2)  above, an employee may be permitted to retire at any time on  completion of the age  55 after giving three months notice in  writing to the appointing authority of his intention to retire.

(b)  (i)  Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  Clause  (a),  an  employee  governed  by  the  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of  India (Employees) Pension Rules 1995 may be permitted to  retire  at  any  time  after  he  has  completed  twenty  years  of  qualifying service,  by giving notice of  not  less  than ninety  days in writing to the appointing authority.

Provided  that  this  sub-clause  shall  not  apply  to  an  employee  who  is  on  deputation  unless  after  having  been  transferred or having returned to India, he has resumed charge  on the post in India and has served for a period of not less  than one year.

 Provided further that this sub-clause shall not apply to  an  employee  who  seeks  retirement  from  service  for  being  absorbed  permanently  in  an  autonomous  body  or  a  public  sector undertaking to which he is on deputation at the time of  seeking voluntary retirement.

(ii) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-clause  (i)  of  clause (b)  shall  require  acceptance by the appointing  authority.

 Provided that where the appointing authority does not  refuse to grant the permission for retirement before the expiry  of the period specified in the said notice, the retirement shall

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become effective from the date of expiry of the said period.”    

6 As we have already recounted, the Appellant received a waiver of the  

requirement of giving three months prior notice of his resolve to “discontinue  

his  service  in  the  Corporation”,  bestowing  legitimacy  to  the  reasons  that  

compelled  him  to  do  so.   It  also  brings  to  the  fore  that  the  1960  Staff  

Regulations did not provide for voluntary retirement or VRS as has become  

commonplace today.   This Court has clarified and highlighted that ‘resignation’  

and ‘retirement’ have disparate connotations; that an employee can ‘resign’ at  

any  time  but,  in  contradistinction,  can  ‘retire’ only  on  completion  of  the  

prescribed period of qualifying service and in consonance with extant Rules and  

Regulations.   

7 We shall now consider the Pension Rules of 1995.    Rule 3 of Chapter II  

thereof, provides that the Rules are applicable to employees (1) who were in the  

service of the Corporation on or after 1.1.1986 and had retired before 1.11. 1993  

i.e. the notified date, or (2) who retired after 1.11.1993; or (3)who were in the  

service before the notified date and continued to be in service on or after the  

notified date; or (4) who were in the service on or after 1.1.1986 but had retired  

on or after 1.11.1993 and before the notified date.  What is discernible from  

these  dates  is  that  the  Pension Rules  of  1995 have  included two classes  of  

beneficiaries into one homogenous class, to wit, the employees who had retired  

before the notified date and those who were to retire after the notified date.  In  

our opinion, the advantage of these beneficent Rules should be extended even to

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the Appellant who was similarly placed as the retirees mentioned in Rule 3 but  

for the fact that he had ‘resigned’ rather than retired.     The two provisions  

caught in the crossfire are Rule 2(s), which defines “retirement” and Rule 23,  

which deals with the “forfeiture of service”:

2(s) “retirement” means,-  (i)  retirement  in  accordance  with  the  provisions contained in sub-regulation (1) or sub-regulation (2) or  sub-regulation  (3)  of  regulation  19  of  the  Life  Insurance  Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 and rule 14 of the  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of  India  Class  III  and  Class  IV  Employees (Revision of Terms and Conditions of Service) Rules,  1985 made under the Act;  

(ii)  voluntary  retirement  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  contained in rule 31 of these rules.            (emphasis added)

23. Forfeiture of service - Resignation or dismissal or removal or  termination  or  compulsory  retirement  of  an  employee  from the  service of the Corporation shall entail forfeiture of his entire past  service and consequently shall not qualify for pensionary benefits.

Voluntary retirement, noted in the sub-Rule (ii) of Rule 2(s), has been defined in  

Rule 31, and it reads as follows:

31. Pension on voluntary retirement -  (1) At any time after an  employee  has  completed  twenty  years  of  qualifying  service  he  may, by giving notice of not less than ninety days, in writing, to the  appointing authority, retire from service:  

Provided that this sub-rule shall not apply to an employee who  is  on  deputation  unless  after  having been  transferred  or  having  returned to India he has resumed charge of the post in India and  has served for a period of not less than one year:  

Provided  further  that  this  sub-rule  shall  not  apply  to  an  employee who seeks retirement from service for being absorbed  permanently in an autonomous body or a public sector undertaking  to  which  he  is  on  deputation  at  the  time  of  seeking  voluntary  retirement.

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(2) The notice of voluntary retirement given under sub-rule  (1) shall require acceptance by the appointing authority:  

Provided that where the appointing authority does not refuse  to  grant  the  permission  for  retirement  before  the  expiry  of  the  period specified  in  the  said  notice,  the  retirement  shall  become  effective from the date of expiry of the said period.  

(3) (a) An employee referred to in sub-rule (1) may make a  request in writing to the appointing authority to accept notice of  voluntary  retirement  of  less  than  ninety  days  giving  reasons  therefor;  

(b)  on  receipt  of  a  request  under  clause(a),  the  appointing  authority may, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), consider  such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of ninety  days  on  merits  and  if  it  is  satisfied  that  the  curtailment  of  the  period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience,  the appointing authority may relax the requirement  of  notice of  ninety days on the condition that the employee shall not apply for  commutation  of  a  part  of  his  pension  before  the  expiry  of  the  notice of ninety days.  

(4) An employee, who has elected to retire under this rule and  has given necessary notice to that effect to the appointing authority,  shall  be precluded from withdrawing his  notice except  with the  specific approval of such authority:  

Provided that the request for such withdrawal shall be made  before the intended date of his retirement.  

(5) The qualifying service of an employee retiring voluntarily  under this rule shall be increased by a period not exceeding five  years,  subject  to  the  condition  that  the  total  qualifying  service  rendered by such employee shall  not  in any case exceed thirty- three years and it does not take him beyond the date of retirement.  

(6) The pension of an employee retiring under this rule shall  be based on the average emoluments as defined under clause(d) of  rule 2 of these rules and the increase, not exceeding five years in  his qualifying service, shall not entitle him to any notional fixation  of pay for the purpose of calculating his pension.

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It  seems  obvious  to  us  that  the  Appellant’s  case  does  not  fall  within  the  

postulation of Rule 23 as the last four categories or genres or types of cessation  

of services are in character punitive; and the first envisages those resignations  

where the right  to  pension has not  been earned by that  time or  where it  is  

without the permission of the Corporation.

8       The Respondent Corporation has vehemently argued that the termination  

of services is under Regulation 18 (supra) of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960  

and is not covered by the Pension Rules of 1995. Respondent Corporation has  

controverted the plea of the Appellant that at the relevant date and time, viz.  

28.1.1991 there  was no alternative for  him except  to  tender  his  resignation,  

pointing  out  that  he  could  not  have  sought  voluntary  retirement  under  

Regulation 19(2A) of  LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960.    If that be so, the  

Respondent  being  a  model  employer  could  and  should  have  extended  the  

advantage  of  these  Regulations  to  the  Appellant  thereby  safeguarding  his  

pension entitlement.   However, we find no substance in the argument of the  

Respondent since Regulation 19(2A) was,  in fact,  notified in the Gazette  of  

India on 16.2.1996, that is after the pension scheme came into existence with  

effect from 1.11.1993.      Otherwise there would have been no conceivable  

reason for the Appellant not to have taken advantage of this provision which  

would have protected his pensionary rights.     

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9 We  also  record  that  the  provisions  covered  by  the  definition  of  

“retirement”, which do not entail forfeiture of service, are sub-regulation (1),  

sub-regulation (2), and sub-regulation (3) of Regulation 19 of the Life Insurance  

Corporation  of  India  (Staff)  Regulations,  1960  and  Rule  14  of  the  Life  

Insurance Corporation of India Class III and Class IV Employees (Revision of  

Terms  and  Conditions  of  Service)  Rules,  1985.  None  of  these  provisions  

provides for voluntary retirement like Rule 31 of the Pension Rules nor does the  

definition  of  “retirement”  make  any  mention  of  aforementioned  Regulation  

19(2A).  

10       The facts of the case disclose that the Appellant has worked for over  

twenty years and had tendered his resignation in accordance with the provision  

of  Regulation  18  of  LIC  of  India  (Staff)  Regulations,  1960,  which,  as  is  

apparent  from its  reading,  does  not  dissimulate  between  the  termination  of  

service by way of resignation on the one hand and voluntary retirement on the  

other, or distinguish one from the other.   Significantly, there was no provision  

for voluntary retirement at the relevant time, and it was for this reason that the  

Pension  Rules  of  1995  specifically  provided  for  it  under  Rule  31.  In  this  

backdrop of facts, we need not dwell much on the issue because the case of  

Sheelkumar Jain v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 12 SCC 197 is on all  

fours of this case.   

11    In  Sheelkumar,  the  Appellant  resigned  from  the  services  of  the  

Respondent  Company  after  serving  for  over  20  years  on  16.12.1991.  His

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resignation  was  offered  and  granted  under  Clause  5  of  General  Insurance  

(Termination,  Superannuation  and  Retirement  of  Officers  and  Development  

Staff) Scheme, 1976.  Thereafter, the Central Government formulated General  

Insurance  (Employees') Pension Scheme,  1995  with  retrospective  effect  from  

1.11.1993.  Sheelkumar  applied  for  pension  under  this  Scheme,  which  was  

declined on the ground that resignation from service would entail forfeiture of  

service  under  Clause  22  of  the General  Insurance  (Employees')  

Pension Scheme, 1995. The Appellant moved the High Court challenging the  

rejection of his claim. His writ petition as well as the writ appeal was dismissed  

by the High Court.   The Appellant then moved this Court, whereby we noted  

that Clause 5 of the Scheme of 1976 did not mention resignation nor was the  

Appellant  made  aware  of  the  distinction  between  resignation  and  voluntary  

retirement;  that  this  distinction  was  a  product  of  the  General  Insurance  

(Employees’) Pension Scheme of 1995.   This Court observed:

20. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not state that the termination  of service pursuant to the notice given by an officer or a person of  the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his service amounts  to “resignation” nor does it state that such termination of service of  an officer  or  a  person of  the  Development  Staff  on his  serving  notice  in  writing  to  leave  or  discontinue  in  service  amounts  to  “voluntary retirement”. Sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not also make  a distinction between “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” and  it  only  provides  that  an  employee  who  wants  to  leave  or  discontinue his service has to serve a notice of three months to the  appointing authority.

21. We also notice that sub-para (1) of Para 5 does not require  that the appointing authority must accept the request of an officer  or a person of the Development Staff to leave or discontinue his

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service  but  in  the  facts  of  the  present  case,  the  request  of  the  appellant to relieve him from his service after three months’ notice  was accepted by the competent authority and such acceptance was  conveyed  by  the  letter  dated  28-10-1991  of  the  Assistant  Administrative Officer, Indore. xxxxx

23. The 1995 Pension Scheme was framed and notified only  in 1995 and yet the 1995 Pension Scheme was made applicable  also  to  employees  who  had  left  the  services  of  Respondent  1  Company  before  1995.  Paras  22  and  30  of  the  1995  Pension  Scheme quoted above were not  in existence when the appellant  submitted his  letter  dated 16-9-1991 to the General  Manager of  Respondent  1  Company.  Hence,  when  the  appellant  served  his  letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General Manager of Respondent 1  Company,  he  had  no  knowledge  of  the  difference  between  “resignation” under Para 22 and “voluntary retirement” under Para  30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme. Similarly, Respondent 1 Company  employer  had  no  knowledge  of  the  difference  between  “resignation” and “voluntary retirement” under Paras 22 and 30 of  the 1995 Pension Scheme, respectively.

24. Both  the  appellant  and  Respondent  1  have  acted  in  accordance with the provisions of sub-para (1)  of Para 5 of the  1976 Scheme at the time of termination of service of the appellant  in  the year  1991.  It  is  in  this  background that  we have now to  decide whether the termination of service of the appellant under  sub-para (1) of Para 5 of the 1976 Scheme amounts to resignation  in terms of Para 22 of the 1995 Pension Scheme or amounts to  voluntary  retirement  in  terms  of  Para  30  of  the  1995  Pension  Scheme.

25. Para  22  of  the  1995  Pension  Scheme  states  that  the  resignation of an employee from the service of the corporation or a  company  shall  entail  forfeiture  of  his  entire  past  service  and  consequently he shall not qualify for pensionary benefits, but does  not define the term “resignation”. Under sub-para (1) of Para 30 of  the 1995 Pension Scheme, an employee,  who has completed 20  years of qualifying service, may by giving notice of not less than  90 days in writing to the appointing authority retire from service  and under sub-para (2) of Para 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme, the  notice  of  voluntary  retirement  shall  require  acceptance  by  the  appointing  authority.  Since  “voluntary  retirement”  unlike

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“resignation” does not entail forfeiture of past services and instead  qualifies for pension, an employee to whom Para 30 of the 1995  Pension Scheme applies cannot be said to have “resigned” from  service.

26. In the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant  had completed 20 years of qualifying service and had given notice  of not less than 90 days in writing to the appointing authority of his  intention  to  leave  the  service  and  the  appointing  authority  had  accepted notice  of  the appellant  and relieved him from service.  Hence,  Para  30  of  the  1995  Pension  Scheme  applied  to  the  appellant even though in his letter dated 16-9-1991 to the General  Manager  of  Respondent  1  Company  he  had  used  the  word  “resign”.

12       What is unmistakably evident in the case at hand is that the Appellant  

had worked continuously for over 20 years, that he sought to discontinue his  

services and requested waiver of three months notice in writing, and that the  

said notice was accepted by the Respondent Corporation and the Appellant was  

thereby allowed to discontinue his services. If one would examine Rule 31 of  

the Pension Rules juxtaposed with the aforementioned facts, it would at once be  

obvious  and  perceptible  that  the  essential  components  of  that  Rule  stand  

substantially fulfilled in the present case.   In Sheelkumar, this Court was alive  

to the factum that each case calls for scrutiny on its own merits, but that such  

scrutiny  should  not  be  detached  from  the  purpose  and  objective  of  the  

concerned statute.   It thus observed:

30. The aforesaid authorities would show that the court will  have to construe the statutory provisions in each case to find out  whether  the  termination  of  service  of  an  employee  was  a  termination  by  way  of  resignation  or  a  termination  by  way  of  voluntary retirement and while construing the statutory provisions,

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the court will have to keep in mind the purposes of the statutory  provisions.

31. The general purpose of the 1995 Pension Scheme, read as  a whole,  is  to grant pensionary benefits to employees,  who had  rendered service in the insurance companies and had retired after  putting in the qualifying service in the insurance companies. Paras  22 and 30 of the 1995 Pension Scheme cannot be so construed so  as to deprive of an employee of an insurance company, such as the  appellant, who had put in the qualifying service for pension and  who had voluntarily given up his service after  serving 90 days’  notice  in  accordance  with  sub-para  (1)  of  Para  5  of  the  1976  Scheme  and  after  his  notice  was  accepted  by  the  appointing  authority.

13        The Appellant ought not to be deprived of pension benefits merely  

because he styled his termination of services as “resignation” or because there  

was no provision to retire voluntarily at that time. The commendable objective  

of the Pension Rule is to extend benefits to a class of people to tide over the  

crisis and vicissitudes of old age, and if there are some inconsistencies between  

the  statutory  provisions  and  the  avowed  objective  of  the  statute  so  as  to  

discriminate  between  the  beneficiaries  within  the  class,  the  end  of  justice  

obligates us to palliate the differences between the two and reconcile them as far  

as possible.  We would be failing in our duty, if we go by the letter and not by  

the  laudatory  spirit  of  statutory  provisions  and  the  fundamental  rights  

guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

14      Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, (2004) 9 SCC 461 relied  

upon  by  the  Respondent,  although distinguishable  on  facts,  has  ventured  to  

distinguish “voluntary retirement” from “resignation” in the following terms:

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10. In  service  jurisprudence,  the  expressions  “superannuation”,  “voluntary  retirement”,  “compulsory  retirement”  and  “resignation”  convey  different  connotations.  Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the   part  of  the  employee  to  leave  service.  Though  both  involve   voluntary  acts,  they  operate  differently.  One  of  the  basic   distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any   time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought   for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other   fundamental  distinction  is  that  in  case  of  the  former,  normally   retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not   denied.  In  case  of  the  former,  permission  or  notice  is  not   mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer   concerned  is  a  requisite  condition. Though  resignation  is  a  bilateral  concept,  and  becomes  effective  on  acceptance  by  the  competent  authority,  yet  the  general  rule  can  be  displaced  by  express provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K.  Mittal (1989 Supp (2) SCC 175) on interpretation of Regulation  20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that  resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified  in  the  notice  as  there  was  no  provision  for  any  acceptance  or  rejection of the resignation by the employer. In  Union of India v.  Gopal Chandra Misra ((1978) 2 SCC 301) it was held in the case  of a judge of the High Court having regard to Article 217 of the  Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his  office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which  he, of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision  empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain  circumstances  e.g.  pendency  of  disciplinary  proceedings,  the  employer can exercise the power.

(emphasis is ours)

The legal position deducible from the above observations further amplifies that  

the  so-called  resignation  tendered  by  the  Appellant  was  after  satisfactorily  

serving  the  period  of  20  years  ordinarily  qualifying  or  enabling  voluntary  

retirement.  Furthermore, while there was no compulsion to do so, a waiver of  

the three months notice period was granted by the Respondent  Corporation.

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The State being a model employer should construe the provisions of a beneficial  

legislation  in  a  way  that  extends  the  benefit  to  its  employees,  instead  of  

curtailing it.  

15       The cases of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521;  

State of M.P. v. Yogendra Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538; M.R. Prabhakar v.  

Canara Bank, (2012) 9 SCC 671; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kirpal Singh,  

(2014) 5 SCC 189; UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal, (2004) 4 SCC 412 relied upon by  

the parties are distinguishable on facts from the present case.

16 We thus hold that the termination of services of the Appellant, in essence,  

was voluntary retirement within the ambit of Rule 31 of the Pension Rules of  

1995.  The Appellant is entitled for pension, provided he fulfils the condition of  

refunding  of  the  entire  amount  of  the  Corporation’s  contribution  to  the  

Provident Fund along with interest accrued thereon as provided in the Pension  

Rules of 1995. Considering the huge delay, not explained by proper reasons, on  

part of the Appellant in approaching the Court, we limit the benefits of arrears  

of pension payable to the Appellant to three years preceding the date of the  

petition filed before the High Court. These arrears of pension should be paid to  

the Appellant in one instalment within four weeks from the date of refund of the  

entire amount payable by the Appellant in accordance of the Pension Rules of  

1995.  In the alternative, the Appellant may opt to get the amount of refund  

adjusted against the arrears of pension.   In the latter case, if the amount of  

arrear is more than the amount of refund required, then the remaining amount

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shall  be paid within two weeks from the date  of  such request  made by the  

Appellant.  However, if the amount of arrears is less than the amount of refund  

required, then the pension shall be payable on monthly basis after the date on  

which the amount of refund is entirely adjusted.  

17 The impugned Judgments of the High Court are set aside and the Appeal  

stands allowed in the terms above.   However, parties shall bear their respective  

costs.

......................................................J (VIKRAMAJIT SEN)

......................................................J (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

New Delhi, October 12, 2015.