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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL  APPEAL  NO. 1430 OF 2010

Arun Kumar Yadav ...Appellant

Versus

State of U.P. Thru Dist. Judge              ...Respondent

O R D E R

This appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the  

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as  

“the  Act”)  against  the  judgment  and  order  dated  

17.08.2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad in Criminal Contempt No. 13 of 2006, by way of  

which  the  High  Court  has  convicted  the  appellant  for  

committing the contempt of court under Section 12 of the  

Act and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment for  

one month and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/- in default, to

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undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two  

weeks.

On 5.9.2005 the appellant moved an application to  

surrender Chhandra Pal @ Badara s/o Shri Mathura under  

various sections of the Indian Penal Code in pursuance of  

the order passed under Section 82 of the Code of Criminal  

Procedure (for  short  “the Code”) by the learned Judicial  

Magistrate.  As the offences mentioned in the application  

and the process issued under Section 82 of the Code were  

different, the court asked a report from the police station  

concerned fixing the next date for disposal.  About 3.45  

p.m., when the Presiding Officer of the Court was in the  

midst  of  dictation  of  the  order  to  his  stenographer  in  

another case, i.e., Original Suit No. 200/90 titled Balraj V.  

Rangpal, the appellant came inside the Court and shouted  

loudly uttering as under: -

“As  to  why  you  did  not  take  my  accused  in  judicial  custody.   You  have  passed  arbitrary  orders.   Now,  my  accused  would  be  arrested  and he would be encountered. You have done  injustice.  I will see you.  If you have your official  force I am also having my own force.”

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Apart from the aforesaid loud threatening utterances  

the appellant had also used unparliamentary language for  

the  said  Judicial  Officer.   The  Judicial  Officer  sent  a  

complaint to the High Court against the appellant through  

proper channel, the cognizance of which was taken by the  

High Court, first on administrative side and, thereafter, on  

judicial  side.   After  hearing  the  parties,  the  High  Court  

framed the charges against the contemnor on 6.10.2006  

in respect of this incident dated 5.9.2005 at Khaga Court,  

District  Fatehpur,  using  abusive  language  to  Abdul  

Qayum,  learned  Civil  Judge,  (Junior  Division/Judicial  

Magistrate, Khaga, District Fatehpur) and interrupted him  

from working and shouting loudly while he was dictating  

the order to his stenographer in other case.  To the said  

charge-sheet,  the  appellant  filed  the  counter  affidavit  

dated 20.7.2006 denying all the allegations made in the  

report of the Presiding Officer.  However, at a later stage  

by  filing  an  affidavit  dated  14.11.2006  he  tendered  

unconditional apology to the court.  The matter was heard  

at length.  The High Court discussed the entire facts and  

law and came to the conclusion that it was not a fit case  

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wherein unconditional apology tendered by the appellant  

should be accepted and, thus, considering the gravity of  

the  charge  against  him,  he  had  been  convicted  and  

sentenced as referred to hereinabove.

We  have  heard  Mr.  T.N.  Saxena,  learned  counsel  

appearing for the appellant in detail, who has argued all  

the legal and factual aspects before us.  However, we can  

express our anxiety and displeasure only on the issue that  

we fail to understand how the High Court could afford to  

take such a lenient view sentencing the appellant for one  

month’s simple imprisonment only.

It has been reiterated by this Court time and again  

that the Bar and the Bench are required to maintain the  

decorum of the Court, for Court is the temple of justice for  

all.   No one has the authority  to  conduct  in  a  manner  

which would demean and disgrace the majesty of justice  

which is dispensed by a court of law.  The administration  

of justice is the paramount role of the court and both Bar  

and the Bench have an equal role in performance of the  

said sacrosanct duty.

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In  this  context,  we  may  refer  with  profit  to  the  

pronouncement  in  R.K.  Garg,  Advocate  v.  State  of  

Himachal  Pradesh1,  wherein  the  Court  has  observed  

thus:-

“The Bar and the Bench are an integral part of  the same mechanism which administers justice  to the people. Many members of the Bench are  drawn from the Bar and their past association is  a  source  of  inspiration  and  pride  to  them.  It  ought to be a matter of equal pride to the Bar. It  is  unquestionably  true  that  courtesy  breeds  courtesy  and  just  as  charity  has  to  begin  at  home,  courtesy must  begin  with  the  Judge.  A  discourteous  Judge  is  like  an  ill-tuned  instrument in the setting of a court room. But  members of the Bar will  do well  to remember  that  such  flagrant  violations  of  professional  ethics and cultured conduct will  only result  in  the  ultimate  destruction  of  a  system  without  which no democracy can survive.”

In  Mahabir Prasad Singh v.  M/s. Jacks Aviation  

Pvt. Ltd.2, this Court has observed that judicial function  

cannot and should not be permitted to be stonewalled by  

browbeating  or  bullying  methodology  whether  it  is  by  

litigants or by counsel.  In the said case the two learned  

Judges, after referring to a three-Judge Bench decision in  

Lt.  Col.  S.J.  Chaudhary  v.  State  (Delhi  

Administration)3, has opined thus: - 1 (1981) 3 SCC 166 2 AIR 1999 SC 287 3 AIR 1984 SC 618

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“It was further reminded that “having accepted  the brief, he will be committing a breach of his  professional duty, if he so fails to attend”.

“A lawyer is under obligation to do nothing  that shall detract from the dignity of the Court,  of  which  he  is  himself  a  sworn  officer  and  assistant.  He should at all times pay deferential  respect to the Judge, and scrupulously observe  the decorum of the Court room.”

(Warevelle’s Legal Ethics at p. 182)

Of  course,  it  is  not  a  unilateral  affair.  There is a reciprocal duty for the Court also to  be courteous to the members of the Bar and to  make  every  endeavour  for  maintaining  and  protecting  the  respect  which  members  of  the  Bar  are  entitled to  have from their  clients  as  well as from the litigant public.  Both the Bench  and the Bar are the two inextricable wings of  the judicial  forum and therefore the aforesaid  mutual respect is sine qua non for the efficient  functioning  of  the  solemn  work  carried  on  in  Courts of law.  But that does not mean that any  advocate  or  group  of  them  can  boycott  the  courts or any particular Court and ask the Court  to desist from discharging judicial functions.  At  any  rate,  no  advocate  can  ask  the  Court  to  avoid a case on the ground that  he does not  want to appear in that Court.”

In  In  Re:  Sanjiv  Datta,  Deputy  Secretary,   

Ministry  of  Information  and  Broadcasting,  New  

Delhi,  Kailash  Vasdev,  Advocate  and  Kitty  

Kumaramanglam  (Smt.),  Advocate4 certain  

4 1995 (3) SCC 619

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observations were made, though in different context, yet  

we think it apt to reproduce the same:-

“The legal  profession is  a  solemn and serious  occupation.  It  is  a  noble  calling and all  those  who belong to it are its honourable members.  Although the entry to the profession can be had  by  acquiring  merely  the  qualification  of  technical  competence,  the  honour  as  a  professional  has  to  be  maintained  by  its  members  by  their  exemplary  conduct  both  in  and outside the court.  The legal  profession is  different from other professions in that what the  lawyers  do,  affects  not  only  an  individual  but  the  administration  of  justice  which  is  the  foundation  of  the  civilised  society.  Both  as  a  leading  member  of  the  intelligentsia  of  the  society and as a responsible citizen, the lawyer  has to conduct  himself  as  a model  for  others  both in his professional and in his private and  public life. The society has a right to expect of  him such ideal behaviour.”  

In  M.B.  Sanghi  v.  High  Court  of  Punjab  and  

Haryana5, it has been opined that  

“The  tendency  of  maligning  the  reputation  of  judicial officers by disgruntled elements who fail  to  secure  the  desired  order  is  ever  on  the  increase and it is high time it is nipped in the  bud.  And,  when  a  member  of  the  profession  resorts to such cheap gimmicks with a view to  browbeating the Judge into submission, it is all  the  more  painful.  When  there  is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  scandalise  which  would  shake  the  confidence of the litigating public in the system,  the damage caused is not only to the reputation  

5 (1991) 3 SCC 600

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of the Judge concerned but also to the fair name  of the judiciary.”

From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is clear as  

noon  day  that  the  judicial  proceeding  has  its  own  

solemnity and sanctity.  No one has any authority to sully  

the same.  It is the obligation of everyone to behave with  

propriety when a judicial  proceeding is conducted.  Any  

kind of deviancy not only affects the system but corrodes  

the faith of the collective at large.  Neither any counsel  

nor a litigant can afford to behave in this manner.  This  

being the position, it is really shocking that a counsel who  

was in  his  mid fiftees  could  afford to  behave like that.  

Hence, we have expressed our displeasure.

The  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant  has  

endeavoured had to impress us that when the appellant  

had offered unconditional apology, the same should have  

been accepted.  In L.D. Jaikwal v. State of U.P.6 it has  

been observed as follows: -

“We  do  not  think  that  merely  because  the  appellant has tendered his apology we should  set  aside  the  sentence  and  allow  him  to  go  unpunished.  Otherwise,  all  that  a  person  wanting  to  intimidate  a  Judge  by  making  the  

6 (1984) 3 SCC 405

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grossest imputations against him has to do, is  to go ahead and scandalize him, and later on  tender a formal empty apology which costs him  practically nothing. If such an apology were to  be accepted, as a rule, and not as an exception,  we would in fact be virtually issuing a “licence”  to  scandalize  courts  and commit  contempt  of  court with impunity. It will be rather difficult to  persuade  members  of  the  Bar,  who  care  for  their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they  are expected to pay such a price for it. And no  sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter  as per the dictates of his conscience on account  of the fear of being scandalized and persecuted  by  an  advocate  who  does  not  mind  making  reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his  wishes.  If  this  situation  were  to  be  countenanced,  advocates  who  can  cow  down  the Judges, and make them fall in line with their  wishes,  by  threats  of  character  assassination  and  persecution,  will  be  preferred  by  the  litigants  to  the  advocates  who are  mindful  of  professional  ethics  and believe  in  maintaining  the decorum of courts.”

In the case at hand, we are absolutely convinced that  

apology or for that matter the unconditional apology was  

neither prompt nor genuine.  The concept of mercy and  

compassion  is  ordinarily  attracted  keeping  in  view  the  

infirmities of man’s nature and the fragile conduct but in a  

court of law a counsel cannot always take shelter under  

the canopy of mercy, for the law has to reign supreme.  

The sanctity of law which is sustained through dignity of  

courts  cannot  be  marred  by  errant  behaviour  by  any  

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counsel or litigant.  Even a Judge is required to maintain  

the decorum and dignity of the court.

In view of the above, we do not find any force in the  

appeal, which is accordingly dismissed.  The appellant is  

directed to surrender and deposit the fine within a period  

of thirty days from today, failing which the Chief Judicial  

Magistrate,  Fatehpur,  shall  ensure  to  give effect  to  the  

judgment and order passed by the High Court.

...................................................J.  [Dr. B. S. Chauhan]

....................................................J.  [Dipak Misra]

New Delhi; May 29, 2013

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