IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 404 OF 2012 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CRL.)NO.8012 OF 2010)

ARADADI RAMUDU @ AGGIRAMUDU     ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE, THROUGH INSPECTOR OF POLICE, YANAM    ... RESPONDENT

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This  appeal  is  directed  against  the  judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  Madras  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.1083/2007  dated  05.11.2009.  By  the  impugned  judgment  and  order,  the  High  Court,  after  re- appreciating  the  entire  evidence  on  record,  has  confirmed  the  Order  of  the  Additional  Sessions  Judge,  Pondicherry  in  S.C.No.99  of  1997  dated  29.04.1999,  by  which  the  appellant-accused  was  

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convicted  under  Section  302  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code (for short “the IPC”) and sentenced to undergo  rigorous imprisonment for life.

3. The deceased (Gangammal) was the wife of  appellant-accused.  It  is  the  case  of  the  prosecution that the accused was an alcoholic, and  habitually  beating  his  wife  after  picking  up  a  quarrel with her for silly reasons. He also didn’t  reside  under  the  same  roof  with  her,  and  only  occasionally visited her. Gangammal was eking her  livelihood by working as a domestic servant. At the  time of the incident, Gangammal and the accused had  a son and a daughter.

4. It appears that on the previous night of  the incident, the accused severely beat Gangammal  as he doubted her fidelity. On 13.08.1997, around  6.45 a.m., the accused attacked her neck with a  kitchen  knife,  causing  her  to  bleed  profusely,  which ultimately led to her death.  

5. It has come in the evidence of P.W.2 (the  neighbour)  that  she  barged  into  the  Gangammal’s  house  on  hearing  her  shriek  in  pain,  and  found  Gangammal in a severely injured condition. In her  evidence, she has also stated that Gangammal told  her that the accused had caused the knife injury on  her neck. Thereafter, P.W.2 has deposed that she  

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asked Gangammal to change her blood soaked saree  and  arranged  for  a  rickshaw  puller  to  shift  Gangammal from the house to the Government Hospital  at Yanam.

6. In  the  hospital,  P.W.1  (the  doctor)  treated the deceased. In the Examination-in-Chief,  he has elaborated the nature of the injuries that  Gangammal had suffered and the treatment that was  given  to  her.  He  has  further  stated  that,  for  better treatment, he had advised P.W.2 to take her  to  the  Government  Hospital,  Kakinada.  He  has  further stated that Gangammal had told him that the  accused had first tried to throttle her neck and  later on stabbed her on the neck with a knife.  

7. We have the evidence of P.W.3 (son of the  accused and deceased) and P.W.4 (daughter of the  accused and deceased), who, at that time, were 16  years and 14 years respectively. Both of them, in  one  voice,  have  stated  that  there  used  to  be  quarrel between their mother and father and their  father used to beat their mother. They have also  stated that after they came back to the house, they  were informed that the accused had caused the knife  injury on the neck of their mother.

8. P.W.5 (the rickshaw puller who transported  the  deceased  to  Government  Hospital,  Yanam)  has  

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testified that the deceased had stated to him that  the accused had stabbed her on the neck. P.W.12  (the doctor who treated the deceased at Government  Hospital, Kakinada) has explained the treatment she  gave  to  the  deceased  in  her  evidence,  and  has  confirmed that the death of the deceased was caused  by the stab injury inflicted on her neck. In the  evidence  of  P.W.13  (the  medical  examiner  who  conducted  the  post  mortem)  and  the  post  mortem  report, the nature of the injury on the body of the  deceased and the seriousness of the same has come  on record.

9. The  Trial  Court,  after  appreciating  and  analysing the entire evidence on record, has came  to the conclusion that the knife injury caused by  the  accused  on  the  neck  of  the  deceased  was  sufficient to cause her death. Accordingly, it has  convicted and sentenced the accused under Section  302 of the IPC, awarding rigorous imprisonment for  life.  The  same  is  confirmed  by  the  High  Court,  which decision is impugned before us.

10. We  have  heard  Shri.  Shekhar  Prit  Jha,  learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant  and  Shri.  V.  Kanagaraj,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing for the respondent. We have also perused  the evidence on record and the testimonies of the  

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various witnesses.  

11. After a careful analysis of the evidence  on record, we are of the firm opinion that the  conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court  and confirmed by the High Court, does not suffer  from any legal infirmity which would call for our  interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

12. However, Shri Jha, learned amicus curiae  would contend before us that in the instant case,  the sentence requires to be modified from Section  302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II of IPC. According to  the learned amicus curiae that the accused had no  intention to kill the deceased and the injury which  was inflicted on the deceased was not sufficient to  convict and sentence the accused under Section 302  of the IPC.  

13. Shri. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel  appearing for the respondent has stated that the  factum of the accused causing the knife injury on  the  neck  of  the  deceased  has  come  in  the  testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5  and P.W.6 (a village elder). He would also state  that the injury sustained by the deceased was of a  serious nature and ultimately led to her death. The  learned senior counsel would submit that in light  of  the  evidence  on  record,  our  interference,  in  

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respect of the sentence, was not called for.

14. Though  the  submission  of  the  learned  amicus curiae looks attractive at the first blush,  weighing the same with the facts of the present  case and evidence on record, in our opinion, the  same has no merit.

15. In State of UP v. Indrajeet, (2000) 7 SCC  249, this Court held:

“7……Absence  of  intention  to  cause  death  coupled  with  the  lack  of  knowledge  that  death  would  be  inevitably  caused  on  account  of  the  injury  would  make  the  offence fall only under Section 304 Part  II IPC, and not under Section 302 IPC……”

In Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa, (2009) 17  SCC 724, this Court held:

“41……It is trite law that Section 304 Part  II  comes  into  play  when  the  death  is  caused by doing an act with knowledge that  it is likely to cause death but there is  no intention on the part of the accused  either  to  cause  death  or  to  cause  such  bodily  injury  as  is  likely  to  cause  death.”

16. In other words, this Court has held that  for modification of sentence from Section 302 to  Section 304 Part II, not only should there be an  absence of the intention to cause death, but also  an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury  

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that in the ordinary course of things was likely to  cause death.  

17. There is concurrent affirmative finding of  fact  by  both  the  Courts  below  regarding  the  intention  of  the  accused  to  kill  the  deceased.  Having  perused  the  evidence  on  record,  and  on  account of the concurrent findings, we are unable  to accept the submission of Shri. Jha that there  was an absence of intention to kill on the part of  the accused, meriting our interference in sentence.  Further, this Court, in Chahat Khan v. State of  Haryana, (1972) 3 SCC 408, held:

“9……When a person is causing an injury on  such a vital part the intention to kill  can certainly attributed to him…”

18. Assuming for a moment that the accused had  no intention to kill the deceased, it can still be  said that he had the intention to cause an injury  which would in the ordinary course of things would  cause her death. In Virsa Singh v. The State of  Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495, this Court, speaking through  Vivian Bose, J., held (at pg. 1501):

“…It  does  not  matter  that  there  was  no  intention  to  cause  death.  It  does  not  matter that there was no intention even to  cause  an  injury  of  a  kind  that  is  

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sufficient to cause death in the ordinary  course of nature (not that there is any  real distinction between the two). It does  not even matter that there is no knowledge  that an act of that kind will be likely to  cause death. Once the intention to cause  the  bodily  injury  actually  found  to  be  present is proved, the rest of the enquiry  is purely objective and the only question  is  whether,  as  a  matter  of  purely  objective  inference,  the  injury  is  sufficient  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  to  cause  death.  No  one  has  a  license to run around inflicting injuries  that are sufficient to cause death in the  ordinary course of nature and claim that  they  are  not  guilty  of  murder.  If  they  inflict injuries of that kind, they must  face the consequences; and they can only  escape if it can be shown, or reasonably  deduced that the injury was accidental or  otherwise unintentional.”

19. In Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010) 6  SCC 457, held:

“22…… The appellant in this instance has  used a kitchen knife. A kitchen knife with  sharp edges is a dangerous weapon and it  is  very  obvious  that  the  appellant  was  aware that the use of such a weapon can  cause death……”

20. In the instant case, it has come on record  that the accused was an alcoholic and he was in the  habit of beating his wife regularly after consuming  enough and more liquor. It is also a matter of fact  confirmed by the two Courts below that on the date  

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of the incident, there was a quarrel between the  accused and the deceased, and the accused caused  injury on the neck of the deceased with a kitchen  knife.  

21. The doctor (P.W.1) in his medical report  has stated the nature of the injuries suffered by  the deceased due to the knife injury caused by the  accused.  A  perusal  of  the  medical  report  would  definitely  indicate  that  those  injuries  were  sufficient  enough  to  cause  the  death  of  the  deceased. That apart, we should also notice that  before the deceased was shifted to the Government  Hospital at Yanam for treatment of the injuries,  the saree worn by the deceased was literally soaked  in blood. Therefore, her neighbour, who has come on  record  as  (P.W.2),  has  stated  that  she  had  to  advise the deceased to change her saree. This would  indicate  that  because  of  the  injuries  suffered,  there was profuse loss of blood which itself was  sufficient  enough  to  cause  the  death  of  the  deceased.  

22. In  our  view,  the  evidence  on  record  is  more than sufficient to indicate that the accused  had the intention to cause such injury on the body  of the deceased that would be in all likelihood  cause her death in the natural course of things,  

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fulfilling the conditions imposed by Section 300 of  IPC for punishment under Section 302.

23. Keeping  in  view  all  these  aspects,  the  submission of Shri. Jha, learned amicus curiae that  the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial  Court and confirmed by the High Court requires to  be modified from Section 302 IPC to Section 304  Part-II IPC, cannot be accepted by us.

24. In view of the above, we do not see any  merit  in  this  appeal.  Accordingly,  the  appeal  stands dismissed.

Ordered accordingly.

...................J.  (H.L. DATTU)

...................J. (ANIL R. DAVE)

NEW DELHI, FEBRUARY 15, 2012  

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