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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No.3672 OF 2009

Apparaju Malhar Rao ….Appellant(s)

VERSUS

Tula Venkataiah @ Venkat Rao  (Dead) & Ors.                           …Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) This appeal is filed by defendant No.1 against

the  final  judgment  and  order  dated  30.12.2005

passed by the High Court of Judicature of Andhra

Pradesh at Hyderabad in Second Appeal No. 743 of

2004 whereby the High Court  allowed the second

appeal  filed  by  the  plaintiff  and  set  aside  the

judgment and decree dated 24.03.2004 passed by

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the Additional District Judge (FTC), Karimnagar in

A.S.  No.  34 of  1999 and confirmed the  judgment

and  decree  dated  26.03.1999  passed  by  the

Principal Junior Civil Judge, Karimnagar in O.S. No.

338 of 1994.

2) We  herein  set  out  the  facts,  in  brief,  to

appreciate the issue involved in this appeal.  

3) The  appellant  herein  is  defendant  No.1,

respondent  No.1  is  the  plaintiff  (since  dead)  and

respondent  No.  2  is  defendant  No.3  (son  of  late

defendant No.2) and respondent No.3 is the wife of

defendant  No.2.   Defendant  No.2  died  during  the

pendency of the case before the High Court and his

legal representative is respondent No.3 herein.

4)  Respondent  No.1-Plaintiff  filed  a  suit  for

perpetual  injunction  against  the  defendants

restraining them from interfering with the peaceful

possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff in respect

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of  land  measuring  5  guntas  and  7  sq.  yds.

(hereinafter  referred  to  as  “suit  land”)  in  Survey

No.1128/A  situated  at  Mankanmathota  in

Karimnagar.   

5) On  20.01.1995,  the  defendants  filed  written

statement and denied the claim of the plaintiff.  It

was, inter alia, contended that the plaintiff is not the

owner and possessor of suit land.  

6) The Trial Court framed the issues and parties

adduced their evidence.  By judgment/decree dated

26.03.1999,  the  Trial  Court  decreed  the  suit  in

favour of the plaintiff.  

7) Aggrieved  by  the  said  judgment/decree,  the

defendants filed first appeal being Appeal Suit No.34

of 1999 before the Additional District Judge (FTC),

Karimnagar  (A.P.).     By  judgment/decree  dated

24.03.2004,  the  Additional  District  Judge  allowed

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the first  appeal,  set  aside the judgment/decree of

the Trial Court and dismissed the suit.  

8) Against the said judgment/decree, the plaintiff

filed second appeal being S.A. No.743 of 2004 before

the High Court.   

9) The  High  Court,  by  the  impugned  judgment

dated 13.12.2005, allowed the appeal and set aside

the  judgment/decree  dated 24.03.2004 passed by

the First Appellate Court in A.S. No.34 of 1999 and

restored  the  judgment/decree  dated  26.03.1999

passed by the Trial Court in O.S. No.338 of 1994

which had decreed  the plaintiff’s suit.

10) Felt  aggrieved,  defendant  No.3  has  filed  this

appeal by way of special leave before this Court.   

11) Heard Mr. D. Mahesh Babu, learned counsel

for  the  appellant.   Nobody  appears  for  the

respondents.

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12) Having  heard  the  learned  counsel  for  the

appellant and on perusal of the record of the case,

we are constrained to allow the appeal  and while

setting aside the impugned order, remand the case

to  the  High Court  for  deciding  the  second appeal

afresh in accordance with law as indicated below.  

13) The reasons to remand the case to the High

Court has occasioned because the High Court while

allowing  the  second  appeal  filed  by  the  plaintiff

(respondent  No.1  herein)  did  not  frame  any

substantial  question  of  law  as  is  required  to  be

framed  at  the  time  of  admission  of  the  second

appeal and proceeded to allow the appeal filed by

the plaintiff.  

14) A three Judge Bench of this Court in Santosh

Hazari  vs.  Purushottam  Tiwari  (Deceased)  by

L.Rs., (2001) 3 SCC 179 had examined the scope of

Section 100 of the Code of the Civil procedure, 1908

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(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”). Justice R.C.

Lahoti (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the

Bench laid down the following proposition of law in

Para 9:

“9. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second  appeal  without  formulating  the substantial  question  of  law  involved  in  the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty case on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100  of  the  Code.  (See  Kshitish  Chandra Purkait  v.  Santosh  Kumar  Purkait,(1997)  5 SCC  438  Panchugopal  Barua  v.  Umesh Chandra  Goswami,  (1997)  4  SCC  413  and Kondiba  Dagadu  Kadam v.  Savitribai  Sopan Gujar, (1999) 3 SCC 722.)”

15) His  Lordship  then  in  Paras  10  to  14  succinctly

explained  the  meaning  of  the  words  “substantial

question of law” and “question of law” and held that

in  order  to  admit  the  second  appeal,  what  is

required to be made out by the appellant being sine

qua non for exercise of powers under Section 100 of

the  Code,  is  existence  of  “substantial  question  of

law” arising in the case so as to empower the High

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Court  to  admit  the  appeal  for  final  hearing  by

formulating such question.  In the absence of any

substantial  question of  law arising  in  appeal,  the

same merits dismissal in limine  on the ground that

the  appeal  does  not  involve  any   substantial

question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of

the Code.  

16) Perusal of the impugned order shows that no such

question  was  formulated  except  to  note  the

submissions  of  learned  counsel  for  the  appellant

that it so arises but not beyond that as to whether it

actually arises and, if so, what is that question.

17) In the light of foregoing discussion and keeping in

view  the  law  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Santosh

Hazari  (supra), we are of the considered view that

the impugned order is not legally sustainable and

thus liable to be set aside.

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18) As  a  result,  the  appeal  succeeds  and  is  allowed.

Impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded

to the  High Court  for  deciding  the  second appeal

afresh in accordance with law keeping in view the

law  laid  down  in  the  case  of  Santosh  Hazari

(supra).  

               ………...................................J.

[R.K. AGRAWAL]             

   ……..................................J.          [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE]

New Delhi; September 01, 2017