17 April 2013
Supreme Court
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ANNAPURNA Vs STATE OF U.P.

Bench: B.S. CHAUHAN,FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001039-001039 / 2008
Diary number: 29367 / 2007
Advocates: Vs RAVI PRAKASH MEHROTRA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1039 of 2008

Annapurna                                                                 …Appellant

Versus

State of U.P.                                                               …Respondent

O R D E R  

1. This appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and  

order  dated  13.4.2007  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at  

Allahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 3443 of 2000 by way of which, the  

High  Court  has  affirmed  the  impugned  judgment  and  order  dated  

15.12.2000 of the Sessions Court passed in Sessions Trial No. 3 of  

2000,  convicting  the  appellant  under  Section  302  of  Indian  Penal  

Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `IPC’) and sentencing her to  

undergo imprisonment for life.

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2. As per the prosecution case,  the appellant  is  alleged to have  

poured kerosene oil on her daughter in law Santoshi and set her on  

fire.   On hearing hue and cry of the deceased,  her neighbour Ram  

Singh took her daughter in law to the hospital.  In the hospital, two  

dying declarations were recorded, one by the Investigating Officer and  

another  by  Shri  Ved  Priya  Arya,  Naib  Tehsildar-cum-Magistrate  

(PW.8).   The dying declaration was recorded by the said Magistrate  

on 26.6.1999 after getting a certificate from Dr. P.K. Pathak that she  

was  fit  to  make  the  statement.   In  her  dying  declaration,  she  had  

clearly stated that she had married to Satish on 4.5.1999 and she was  

pregnant.  She was not sent to her parental house because her in laws  

were  demanding  ring  and  money.   Her  mother  in  law  sprinkled  

kerosene oil on her and burnt her.  She was subjected to cruelty for  

dowry.   

3. The trial court also applied the provisions of Section 113-B of  

the Evidence Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as `the Evidence Act’),  

which gives a presumption of demanding of dowry in such a case and  

recorded the findings of guilty of the appellant.  The said findings had  

been affirmed by the High Court.   

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4. We  have  gone  through  the  entire  record  and  we  are  not  

impressed by any of the argument advanced by Shri Manoj Prasad,  

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, and we are of  

the  view that  no  fault  can  be  found  with  the  judgment  and  order  

impugned before us. Undoubtedly, the deceased Santoshi, was only 22  

years of age when she got married on 4.5.1999. She got injured in the  

said incident on 25.6.1999 and died on 17.7.1999, i.e. within a period  

of two months from the date of marriage.  She got injured at 8.00 a.m.  

in  her  in  laws  house  when  the  appellant,  her  mother  in  law,  was  

present there.  In her dying declaration, she had also disclosed that her  

sister in law was also present there.  She did not make any allegation,  

whatsoever, against her.  Thus, the veracity of her dying declaration  

cannot be doubted and we do not find any cogent reason to interfere  

with the impugned judgment and order. The appeal lacks merit and is  

dismissed.

5. It is submitted by Shri Manoj Prasad, learned counsel for the  

appellant, that the appellant has already served 14 years and 6 months  

of imprisonment in jail and her case has not been considered by the  

State for premature release under Section 432 Cr.P.C.  Further, Shri  

Mehrotra, learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the State of  

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U.P., assured the Court that her case for premature release would be  

considered within a period of 3 months from today.   In view of the  

above,  Shri  Mehrotra  will  send  a  copy  of  this  judgment  to  the  

concerned authorities.  We request the said authorities to consider the  

case of the appellant for premature release strictly in accordance with  

law.   

……………………………………..........................J.  (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN)  

                                                                ………………………………................................. J.                                     (FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)  

NEW DELHI;  APRIL 17,  2013       

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