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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1223 OF 2008

ANJANAPPA …Appellant

Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA …Respondent

JUDGMENT

(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.

1. This  appeal,  once  again  like  many  other  appeals,  

presents before us the plight of a woman who is burnt to  

death by her husband.  Sadly, her parents turned hostile in  

the  court.   This  raises  the  serious  question  of  witness  

protection which is not addressed as yet.  

2. Deceased Gowramma was married to the appellant on  

17/04/1987.  It is the prosecution case that at the time of  

marriage the  appellant  demanded dowry and he received

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Rs.5,000/-,  a motor bike, one gold chain and clothes from  

Hanumantharayappa,  the  father  of  Gowramma.   After  

marriage  the  appellant  was  harassing  the  deceased  for  

bringing more dowry from her parents.  The harassment was  

both physical and mental.  The appellant had caused burn  

injuries on the thighs of Gowramma to compel her to bring  

more dowry.  He had kept one Puttamma as his mistress,  

which caused mental agony to Gowramma.  On 17/10/1991  

there was a quarrel between the appellant and Gowramma  

on the question of transferring Gowramma’s property in the  

appellant’s name.  At about 6.00 p.m. the appellant poured  

kerosene on her and set her on fire. Gowramma was taken  

to  the  Victoria  hospital.   At  about  7.00  p.m.  PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy admitted her  for  treatment of  burn injuries.  

When  PW-4  Dr.  Parthasarathy  asked  her  about  the  burn  

injuries she told him that on the same day at about 6.30  

p.m. the appellant had poured kerosene on her and set her  

on fire.   He recorded the said occurrence in  the Accident  

Register.  Gowramma’s  statement  recorded  by  him  is  at  

Exhibit-P16(b).  He reported the matter to the police.  PW-5  

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HC Ramachari  of  Vijayanagara Police Station came to  the  

hospital  on  17/10/1991  at  about  10.30  p.m.  and  sought  

permission to record the statement of Gowramma from PW-4  

Dr. Parthasarathy.  As Gowramma was in a position to give  

statement  PW-4  Dr.  Parthasarathy  permitted  PW-5  HC  

Ramachari  to  obtain  her  statement.   Thereafter,  PW-5 HC  

Ramachari recorded her statement in Burns Ward, which is  

Exhibit  P-19.   She  stated  that  her  husband  had  poured  

kerosene on her and set her on fire.  PW-4 Dr.  Parthasarathy  

put an endorsement on the said statement and signed it.  

After  recording  the  statement  of  Gowramma,  PW-5  HC  

Ramachari presented the memo Exhibit-P18 and statement  

Exhibit-P19  before  the  Station  House  Officer.    PW-6  S.  

Nanjundappa, who was at the relevant time, working as ASI,  

Vijayanagara Police Station, recorded the FIR at about 11.30  

p.m. on 17/10/1991 on the basis of Gowramma’s statement  

Exhibit-P19.  The appellant came to be arrested and charged  

for offences under Sections 3 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition  

Act, 1961 and under Sections 498A and 302 of the IPC.   

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3. The prosecution examined eight witnesses.  Apart from  

the  police  witnesses  and  the  doctor,  the  prosecution  

examined PW-2 Chikkaeeramma, mother of Gowramma and  

PW-3 Hanumantharayappa, father of Gowramma.   

4. The trial court acquitted the appellant.  The trial court  

inter alia held that the dying declaration could not be relied  

upon because the doctor has not made any endorsement as  

to whether the deceased was in a fit condition to make a  

statement.  The trial court held that the deceased was given  

sedatives,  therefore,  in all  probability she was not in a fit  

condition to make a dying declaration.  In the opinion of the  

trial court it is doubtful whether the doctor was present when  

the dying declaration was being recorded.  The fact that the  

parents  of  the  deceased  did  not  support  the  prosecution  

case weighed with the trial court.  

5. The State of Karnataka carried an appeal to the High  

Court.  The High Court by the impugned order set aside the  

order of acquittal, convicted the appellant under Section 304  

Part-II  of the IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for six  

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years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default, to undergo  

further sentence of three months.  The said judgment and  

order is challenged in this appeal.  

6. We have heard learned counsel  for  the  parties.   We  

have  read  written  submissions  filed  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant.   Mr.Shekhar  Devasa,  learned  counsel  for  the  

appellant  submitted  that  the  prosecution  case  that  the  

appellant poured kerosene on the deceased and set her on  

fire is not supported by the parents of deceased Gowramma.  

They stated that  the death of  Gowramma was accidental.  

This affects the veracity of the prosecution case.  Counsel  

submitted  that  the  dying  declaration  of  deceased  

Gowramma  cannot  be  relied  upon  because  PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy has stated that he had given sedatives to the  

deceased.  The deceased, therefore, could not have been in  

a fit  condition to make a dying declaration.   Besides,  the  

doctor has not made any endorsement to that effect on the  

dying declaration.  The doctor has not stated that kerosene  

smell was emanating from the body of the deceased.  This is  

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also not mentioned in Exhibits P16, 17 and 19.  There is a  

serious doubt about the doctor’s presence when the dying  

declaration was being recorded.  Counsel submitted that in  

the circumstances the dying declaration must be rejected.  

In support of this submission he relied on Nallapati Sivaiah  

v.    Sub-Div.  Officer,  Guntur  A.P.  1  ,  Mehiboobasab  

Abbasabi Nadaf   v.   State of Karnataka  2  ,  Rasheed  

Beg and ors.   v.  State of M.P.  3   and  Kake Singh @  

Surendra Singh  v.   State of M.P.  4  .   

7. Counsel  submitted  that  there  is  a  delay  in  recording  

FIR.  Counsel further submitted that the FIR was recorded at  

10.30 p.m. on 17/10/1991.  But, it reached the Magistrate at  

4.30  p.m.  on  18/10/1991.   This  delay  casts  a  shadow  of  

doubt  on  the  FIR.   In  this  connection  he  relied  on  Bijoy  

Singh and Anr.   v.   State of Bihar  5     and Meharaj Singh  

v.   State of U.P.  6  .  Counsel further submitted that motive  

is not proved.  There is also discrepancy in the timing of the  

1 (2007) 15 SCC 465 2 (2007)13 SCC 112 3 (1974) 4 SCC 264 4 (1981) Suppl. SCC 25 5 (2002) 9 SCC 147 6 (1994) 5 SCC 188

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dying declaration.  Counsel submitted that the conviction of  

the  appellant  under  Section  304  Part-II  of  the  IPC  is  not  

maintainable as his case does not come within the purview  

of Section 300 of the IPC.  It,  therefore, cannot fall  in the  

exceptions thereto.   Besides,  no reasons are assigned for  

convicting the appellant under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC  

which renders the order of conviction unsustainable.  In this  

connection  he  relied  on  State of  U.P.    v.    Virendra  

Prasad  7  .  Counsel submitted that in the circumstances the  

impugned judgment and order deserves to be set aside.

8. Ms.  Anita  Shenoy,  learned  counsel  for  the  State  of  

Karnataka, on the other hand, submitted that parents of the  

deceased were won over  by the appellant.   However,  the  

prosecution  story  is  established  by  the  independent  

evidence of PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy and PW-5 HC Ramachari,  

who  have  deposed  about  the  dying  declaration  of  the  

deceased.   In  her  dying  declaration  the  deceased  has  

implicated the appellant.  Counsel submitted that the dying  

7 (2004) 9 SCC 37

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declaration  inspires  confidence  and,  therefore,  the  appeal  

deserves to be dismissed.  

9. It is well settled that an order of acquittal is not to be  

set aside lightly.   If  the view taken by the trial  court is a  

reasonably possible view, it is not to be disturbed.  If two  

views are possible and if the view taken by the trial court is a  

reasonably  possible  view,  then the  appellate  court  should  

not disturb it just because it feels that another view of the  

matter is possible.  However, an order of acquittal will have  

to be disturbed if it is perverse.  We have examined the trial  

court’s order of acquittal in light of above principles.  We are  

of the considered opinion that the High Court was justified in  

setting it aside as it is perverse.

10. What has weighed with the trial court is the fact that  

the parents have turned hostile.  They came out with a story  

which even the appellant did not have in mind.  He merely  

denied the prosecution story.  The parents stated that the  

deceased  was  heating  water  on  stove.   She  caught  fire  

accidentally and sustained burn injuries.  If this was true, the  

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appellant  would have stated so in  his statement recorded  

under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the  

code”).  We have perused the evidence of the parents.  We  

have  no  doubt  that  they  were  either  won  over  by  the  

appellant or pressurized into supporting the appellant.  Their  

evidence  is  a  tissue  of  lies.   In  any  case,  even  if  it  is  

obliterated and kept out of consideration, there is sufficient  

other evidence on record to establish the appellant’s guilt.

11. PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy is an independent witness.  He  

stated  that  on  17/10/1991  at  7.00  p.m.  he  admitted  

deceased Gowramma in the Victoria Hospital.  Her husband  

and mother had accompanied her.  On a query made by him,  

she told him that on the same day at 6.30 p.m. the appellant  

had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire.  He, then,  

recorded  the  occurrence  in  the  Accident  Register.   The  

relevant  pages  of  the  Accident  Register  are  on  record  at  

Exhibit-P16(a).  The statement of the deceased is at Exhibit-

P16(b) and the signature of the witnesses is at Exhibit-P(c).  

According  to  PW-4  Dr.  Parthasarathy,  Gowramma  had  

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received 34% burn injuries.  Exhibit-P17 is the case sheet of  

Gowramma.  He stated that Gowramma died on 21/10/1991  

at 7.30 p.m.  He reported the case to the police vide Memo  

dated  17/10/1991,  which  is  at  Exhibit-P18.   PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy further stated that at 11.00 p.m. on the same  

day PW-5 HC Ramachari of Vijayanagara Police Station came  

to the hospital and sought permission to record Gowramma’s  

statement.   As  Gowramma  was  in  a  position  to  give  

statement he permitted PW-5 HC Ramachari to record her  

statement.   Thereafter,  PW-5  HC  Ramachari   recorded  

Gowramma’s  statement  in  Burns  Ward.   PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy reiterated that even at that time Gowramma  

repeated the story that her husband poured kerosene on her  

and set her on fire.  He stated that he made endorsement on  

that  statement.   The  said  statement  is  at  Exhibit-19,  the  

endorsement  is  at  Exhibit-P19(a)  and  his  signature  is  at  

Exhibit-P19(b).

12. PW-4  Dr.  Parthasarathy’s  cross-examination  has  not  

yielded any material which could be said to be favourable to  

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the  defence.   In  the  cross-examination  he  stated  that  on  

17/10/1991  he  was  on  duty  from 2.00  p.m.  to  8.00  p.m.  

After  he  attended  the  last  patient  at  8.00  p.m.  another  

doctor relieved him.  He added that after 8.00 p.m. he was  

working  in  the  ward.   He  stated  that  till  morning  of  

18/10/1991 he was on duty in the Burns Ward.  He stated  

that Gowramma was admitted in Casualty Ward.  He advised  

that she should be taken to Burns Ward but before sending  

her to Burns Ward he recorded her statement.  He further  

stated  that  he  started  Gowramma’s  treatment  in  Burns  

Ward.   He  gave  her  sedatives  but  he  has  categorically  

denied the suggestion that when he recorded the statement  

of Gowramma she was not in a position to give statement.  

He denied the suggestion that she was not conscious.  This  

shows that when Gowramma gave statement she was not  

under the effect of sedatives.   

13. Evidence of PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy inspires confidence.  

There is no reason why he should make-up a story.  There is  

nothing on record to show that  he harboured any grudge  

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against the appellant.   He is  an independent witness who  

has given his evidence in a forthright manner.  His evidence  

establishes to the hilt that Gowramma was in a fit mental  

condition  to  make  a  statement  and  she  implicated  her  

husband.  He stated that he made an endorsement on the  

Gowramma’s  statement  recorded  by  PW-5  HC Ramachari.  

The High Court has noted that PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy has  

made endorsement on Exhibit-P19 that Gowramma was in a  

fit condition to make a statement.  The High Court has also  

noted  that  in  Exhibit-17,  which  is  the  case  sheet  of  

Gowramma,  it  is  stated  that  she  was  conscious.   But,  

assuming  he  has  not  made  any  endorsement  on  

Gowramma’s dying declaration that she was in a fit state of  

mind to make a statement that does not affect the credibility  

of the prosecution story.  He stated on oath in the court that  

Gowramma  was  in  a  position  to  give  statement  and,  

therefore,  he permitted PW-5 HC Ramachari  to record her  

statement.   An  independent  professional  like  PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy  must  be  trusted  when  he  makes  such  a  

categorical  statement  with  a  sense  of  responsibility.  

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Moreover,  in  Laxman   v.   State  of  Maharashtra  8   this  

Court has made it clear that certification by the doctor about  

the fitness of the declarant’s mind is a rule of caution.  But, if  

the doctor certifies that the patient was conscious, but does  

not  certify  that  he  was  in  a  fit  state  of  mind,  the  dying  

declaration is not liable to be rejected if the Magistrate who  

records the statement deposes about the fit state of mind of  

the  declarant.  That  would  be  sufficient  to  give  the  dying  

declaration legal acceptability.  On the same analogy once  

the doctor who examined the deceased, himself states that  

the deceased was in a position to make a statement and that  

she  was  conscious,  absence  of  his  endorsement  on  the  

statement to that effect is of no consequence.  Besides, PW-

4  Dr.  Parthasarathy  stated  that  Gowramma  had  received  

34% burns.   She  died  about  five  days  after  the  incident.  

Therefore, it is not possible to hold that she could not have  

made  any  dying  declaration.  It  is  argued  that  PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy’s  presence in  the hospital  is  doubtful.   It  is  

true that PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy stated that he was relieved  

8 AIR 2002 SC 2973

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from Emergency Ward at 8.00 p.m.  But, he has clarified that  

he was in Burns Ward till morning of 18/10/1991.  There is no  

reason to doubt his statement.  

14. PW-5  HC  Ramachari  has  corroborated  PW-4  Dr.  

Parthasarathy.   He  stated  that  on  17/10/1991  when  he  

received the information he went to  the Victoria  Hospital.  

He requested PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy to allow him to record  

the statement of Gowramma.  PW-4 Dr. Parthasarathy told  

him that he could record her statement and accompanied  

him to  Burns  Ward.   He  found that  Gowramma was  in  a  

position to talk.  He, then, recorded her statement which is  

at Exhibit-P19.  He further stated that Gowramma told him  

that  at  6.00  p.m.  the  appellant  demanded  that  house  

property  should  be  transferred  to  his  name  and  then  he  

poured  kerosene  on  her  and  set  her  on  fire.   He,  then,  

presented Memo Exhibit-P18 to  the Station House Officer.  

Thus,  evidence  of  PW-4  Dr.  Parthasarathy  is  fully  

corroborated  by  this  witness.   We  have  no  hesitation  to  

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record that both these witnesses are truthful and the trial  

court erred in rejecting their evidence.

15. As we have already noted, PW-2 Chikkaeeramma and  

PW-3  Hanumantharayappa  have  turned  hostile.   It  is  

apparent that they have tried to help the appellant.  In that  

effort they have come out with the accidental death theory  

which was not even urged by the appellant.  The appellant  

could  have  very  easily  come out  with  it  in  his  statement  

recorded  under  Section  313  of  the  Code.   PW-2  

Chikkaeeramma  and  PW-3  Hanumantharayappa  are,  

therefore, completely exposed.  It is sad that even parents  

did not stand by their daughter.  We do not understand how  

a  woman,  particularly  a  mother,  turned  her  back  on  the  

daughter.  Possibly these witnesses were bought over by the  

appellant.  Such  conduct  displays  greed  and  lack  of  

compassion.  If they were threatened by the appellant and  

were forced to depose in his favour it is a sad reflection on  

our  system  which  leaves  witnesses  unprotected.   The  

reasons why witnesses so frequently turn hostile need to be  

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ascertained.  There is no witness protection plan in place.  In  

Zahira Habibullah Sheikh (5)   v.   State of Gujarat  9    

this  Court  spoke about  importance of  witnesses and their  

protection.  The relevant paragraphs read as under:

“  “Witnesses” as Bentham said: are the eyes and  ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy  of  the  quality  of  trial  process.  If  the  witness  himself is incapacitated from acting as eyes and  ears  of  justice,  the  trial  gets  putrefied  and  paralysed,  and it  no longer can constitute a fair  trial.  The  incapacitation  may  be  due  to  several  factors, like the witness being not in a position for  reasons beyond control to speak the truth in the  court or due to negligence or ignorance or some  corrupt collusion. Time has become ripe to act on  account  of  numerous  experiences  faced  by  the  courts on account of frequent turning of witnesses  as  hostile,  either  due to  threats,  coercion,  lures  and  monetary  considerations  at  the  instance  of  those  in  power,  their  henchmen  and  hirelings,  political  clouts  and  patronage  and  innumerable  other  corrupt  practices  ingeniously  adopted  to  smother and stifle the truth and realities coming  out  to  surface  rendering  truth  and  justice,  to  become  ultimate  casualties.  Broader  public  and  societal  interests  require that  the victims of  the  crime who are not ordinarily parties to prosecution  and the interests of the State represented by their  prosecuting agencies do not  suffer  even in  slow  process but irreversibly and irretrievably, which if  allowed  would  undermine  and  destroy  public  confidence in the administration of justice, which  may ultimately pave way for anarchy, oppression  

9 (2006) 3 SCC 374

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and injustice resulting in complete breakdown and  collapse of the edifice of rule of law, enshrined and  jealously  guarded  and  protected  by  the  Constitution. There comes the need for protecting  the  witness.  Time  has  come  when  serious  and  undiluted  thoughts  are  to  be  bestowed  for  protecting witnesses so that the ultimate truth is  presented before  the  court  and justice  triumphs  and that the trial is not reduced to a mockery.

… … … … … …

The State has a definite role to play in protecting  the witnesses,  to  start  with  at  least  in  sensitive  cases involving those in power, who have political  patronage  and  could  wield  muscle  and  money  power, to avert trial getting tainted and derailed  and truth becoming a casualty. As a protector of  its citizens it has to ensure that during a trial in  the court the witness could safely depose the truth  without  any  fear  of  being  haunted  by  those  against whom he had deposed… … ….”  

We share the above sentiments.  Unless the witnesses  

are  protected  the  rise  in  unmerited  acquittals  cannot  be  

checked.  It is unfortunate that this important issue has not  

received necessary attention.

16. In any case, the trial court should have seen through  

the insincerity and dishonesty of  PW-2 Chikkaeeramma and  

PW-3  Hanumantharayappa  and  having  regard  to  the  

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independent evidence of  PW-4 Dr.  Parthasarathy,  which is  

corroborated by the evidence of PW-5 HC Ramachari the trial  

court should have held that the deceased was in a fit mental  

condition to  make a dying declaration and,  therefore,  her  

dying declaration can be relied upon.  

17. It is well settled that a conviction can be based on a  

dying declaration recorded properly when the declarant is in  

a fit mental condition to make it.  It should be truthful and  

voluntary.  All these tests are satisfied in the present case.  

Judgments  on  which  reliance  is  placed  by  the  appellant’s  

counsel  are  not  applicable  to  the  case  on  hand.   In  

Nallapati the  medical  evidence  on  record  and  other  

attendant circumstances were altogether ignored and dying  

declaration  was  relied  upon.   In  those  circumstances  this  

Court while reiterating its view in Laxman rejected the dying  

declaration  in  the  peculiar  facts  of  the  case.   In  

Mehiboobasab the  deceased  wife  had  made  four  dying  

declarations  in  which  she had taken contradictory  stands.  

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This  Court  was  primarily  dealing  with  inconsistent  dying  

declarations.  While  observing  that  a  conviction  can  

indisputably  be  based  on  a  dying  declaration  if  it  is  

voluntarily  and  truthfully  made  this  Court  set  aside  the  

conviction based on the dying declarations on the ground of  

their inconsistency. Inconsistency in dying declaration is not  

a  ground  of  attack  in  this  case.   In  any  case,  there  is  

consistency between the statement of Gowramma recorded  

by PW-4 Dr.  Parthasarathy,  which is  at Exhibit-P16(b),  the  

history  recorded  in  Gowramma’s  case  sheet,  which  is  

Exhibit-P17 and statement of Gowramma recorded by PW-5  

HC Ramachari,  which is  at Exhibit-P19.   This judgment is,  

therefore, not applicable to the present case.  Rasheed Beg  

also  turns  on  its  own  facts.   There  in  the  second  dying  

declaration two additional  names were added.  This Court  

found it  not  safe  to  rely  on  the  dying  declarations.   This  

judgment  must  be restricted to  its  own facts  and has no  

application to the present case.  In Kake     Singh    a good part  

of the brain of the deceased was burnt.  The doctor had not  

categorically stated that the deceased was conscious when  

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he  made  the  dying  declaration.   Hence,  no  reliance  was  

placed on it.  In the present case the doctor has categorically  

stated  that  the  deceased  was  in  a  position  to  make  a  

statement.  No parallel can, therefore, be drawn from Kake  

Singh.   The doctor’s  evidence which is  supported by the  

evidence  of  PW-5  HC  Ramachari  and  other  attendant  

circumstances  establishes  that  the  dying  declaration  of  

Gowramma is  truthful  and it  was voluntarily  made by her  

when she was in a fit state of mind.  

18. There is also no substance in the submission that there  

is no motive.  The appellant wanted the property standing in  

the name of the deceased to be transferred to his name,  

which the deceased was not prepared to do.  There is no  

reason to disbelieve PW-5 HC Ramachari on this aspect.

19. Besides, the conduct of the appellant speaks volumes.  

He  was  absconding  and  could  be  arrested  only  on  

19/02/1992.   Moreover,  in  his  statement  recorded  under  

Section  313  of  the  Code  he  has  not  explained  how  the  

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deceased  received  burn  injuries.   He  did  not  set  up  the  

defence of alibi.   It was obligatory on him to explain how the  

deceased received burn injuries in his house.  His silence on  

this aspect gives rise to an adverse inference against him.  It  

forms a link in the chain of circumstances which point to his  

guilt.   

20. Minor  discrepancy  in  the  time  of  recording  of  dying  

declaration creates no dent in the prosecution story which is,  

otherwise,  substantiated  by  reliable  evidence.   Certain  

documents like inquest panchanama and post-mortem notes  

do not state that kerosene smell  was emanating from the  

body of Gowramma.  When there is overwhelming evidence  

on  record  to  establish  that  kerosene  was  poured  on  

Gowramma and she was set on fire, it is absurd to argue that  

the prosecution case should be disbelieved because it is not  

mentioned  in  certain  documents  that  kerosene  smell  was  

emanating from her body.     

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21. The submission that there is delay in lodging the FIR  

must be rejected.  PW-5 HC Ramachari recorded the dying  

declaration at about 10.30 p.m. on 17/10/1991.  He, then,  

presented Memo Exhibit-P18 to  the Station House Officer.  

Thereafter, PW-6 ASI S. Nanjudappa of Vijayanagara Police  

Station recorded the FIR at about 11.30 p.m.  In the facts of  

this case, we find that there is no delay in recording the FIR.  

Hence, it is not necessary to refer to Meharaj Singh which  

is relied upon on this aspect.

22. Similarly, we find that there is no unexplained delay in  

forwarding FIR to the Magistrate.  FIR was recorded at about  

11.30  p.m.  on  17/10/1991.   PW-6  ASI  S  Nanjudappa  has  

explained that since the constable was going to the Court on  

the next day, he gave the FIR to him on the next day i.e.  

18/10/1991 and it reached the Magistrate at about 4.30 p.m.  

on 18/10/1991.  In the facts of this case this time lag can  

hardly be described as delay and, in any case, acceptable  

explanation  is  offered  by  PW-6  ASI  S  Nanjudappa.   It  is,  

therefore, not necessary to refer to Bijoy Singh  where this  

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Court was dealing with a case where FIR was registered on  

25/08/1991  at  about  2.30  a.m.  and  copy  thereof  was  

received by the Magistrate on 27/08/1991.  It is pertinent to  

note that even in that case this Court observed that sending  

copy of the special report to the Magistrate under Section  

157 of the Code is the only external check on the working of  

the  police  agency  imposed by  law which  is  to  be  strictly  

followed.   But,  that  delay  by  itself  does  not  render  the  

prosecution  case  doubtful.   If  the  delay  is  reasonably  

explained no adverse inference can be drawn against  the  

prosecution.  

23. In the ultimate analysis, therefore, we are of the view  

that the High Court was perfectly justified in interfering with  

the trial  court’s order.  The acquittal  of the appellant was  

wrongly  recorded.   The  High  Court,  however,  adopted  a  

kindly approach and convicted the appellant under Section  

304  Part-II  of  the  IPC  and  sentenced  him to  six  years  RI  

because the incident is of the year 1991.  Surprisingly, the  

appellant has made a grievance about this and stated that  

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the appellant’s case does not fall under Section 300 of the  

IPC and, therefore, it cannot fall under any of its exceptions  

and that the High Court has not assigned any reasons for  

convicting  the  appellant  under  Section  304  Part-II.   This  

submission deserves to be rejected.  Besides, the High Court  

has given reasons.  So, it is wrong to say that no reasons are  

assigned  by  the  High  Court.   Since  the  State  has  not  

approached this Court with a grievance that the sentence  

awarded is too low and should be enhanced, we refrain from  

commenting on this  argument.   Judgment of this Court in  

State of U.P.  v.  Virendra Prasad  10   is not at all applicable  

to this case and hence, it is not necessary to discuss it.  The  

High Court was merciful.  In the absence of State appeal, at  

this distance of time, we are inclined to simply dismiss the  

appeal.  The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.  The appellant  

is on bail.  His bail bonds stand cancelled.  He shall surrender  

before the concerned court.

.…………………………..J. 10 (2004) 9 SCC 37

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(Ranjana Prakash  

Desai)

.…………………………..J. (Madan B. Lokur)

New Delhi; November 12, 2013.   

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