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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.  1590-1591 OF 2013  (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.6652-6653 of 2013)

Anil Kumar & Ors. ….. Appellants

Versus

M.K. Aiyappa & Anr.  ….. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

K.S. RADHAKRISHNAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We  are  in  this  case  concerned  with  the  question  

whether the Special Judge/Magistrate is justified in referring  

a  private  complaint  made  under  Section  200  Cr.P.C.  for  

investigation  by  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  –

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Karnataka Lokayukta, in exercise of powers conferred under  

Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.  without  the  production  of  a  valid  

sanction  order  under  Section  19  of  the  Prevention  of  

Corruption Act, 1988.  

3. The Appellants herein filed a private complaint under  

Section 200 of Cr.P.C.  before the Additional  City Civil  and  

Special Judge for Prevention of Corruption on 9.10.2012.  The  

complaint  of  the  Appellants  was  that  the  first  respondent  

with mala fide intention passed an order dated 30.6.2012 in  

connivance with other officers and restored valuable land in  

favour of a private person.  On a complaint being raised, the  

first  respondent  vide  order  dated  6.10.2012  recalled  the  

earlier order.  Alleging that the offence which led to issuance  

of  the  order  dated  30.6.2012  constituted  ingredients  

contained under Section 406, 409, 420, 426, 463, 465, 468,  

471, 474 read with Section 120-B IPC and Section 149 IPC  

and Section 8, 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d),  13(1)(e), 13(2) read with  

Section  12  of  the  Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  a  private

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complaint  was  preferred  under  Section  200  Cr.P.C.   On  

receipt of the complaint, the Special Judge passed an order  

on 20.10.2012 which reads as follows :-

“On going through the complaint, documents  and hearing the complainant, I am of the sincere  view that  the matter  requires to  be referred for  investigation  by  the  Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police,  Karnataka  Lokayukta,  Bangalore  Urban,  under  Section  156(3)  of  Cr.P.C.   Accordingly,  I  answer point No.1 in the affirmative.

Point No.2 :  In view of my finding on point  No.1 and for the foregoing reasons, I  proceed to  pass the following :

ORDER

The  complaint  is  referred  to  Deputy  Superintendent of Police – 3 Karnataka Lokayukta,  Bangalore Urban under Section 156(3) of Cr.PC for  investigation and to report.”

4. Aggrieved by the said order, the first respondent herein  

approached  the  High  Court  of  Karnataka  by  filing  Writ  

Petition Nos.13779-13780 of 2013.  It was contended before  

the High Court that since the appellant is a pubic servant, a  

complaint brought against him without being accompanied  

by a valid sanction order could not have been entertained by

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the Special Court on the allegations of offences punishable  

under the Prevention of Corruption Act.   It  was submitted  

that  even  though  the  power  to  order  investigation  under  

Section  156(3)  can  be  exercised  by  a  Magistrate  or  the  

Special  Judge  at  pre-cognizance  stage,  yet,  the  

governmental  sanction  cannot  be  dispensed with.   It  was  

also contended that the requirement of a sanction is the pre-

requisite even to present a private complaint in respect of a  

public servant concerning the alleged offence said to have  

been committed in discharge of his public duty.   

5. The High Court, after hearing the parties, took the view  

that the Special  Judge could not have taken notice of the  

private complaint unless the same was accompanied by a  

sanction order, irrespective of whether the Court was acting  

at a pre-cognizance stage or the post-cognizance stage, if  

the complaint pertains to a public servant who is alleged to  

have committed offences in discharge of his official duties.  

The High Court, therefore, quashed the order passed by the

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Special  Judge,  as  well  as  the  complaint  filed  against  the  

appellant.   Aggrieved by the same, as already stated, the  

complainants have come up with these appeals.   

6. We have heard the senior counsel on either side.  Shri  

Kailash  Vasdev,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  

appellants, submitted that if the interpretation of the High  

Court is accepted, then the provisions of Section 19(3) of the  

PC Act would be rendered otiose.  Learned senior counsel  

also  submitted  that,  going  through  the  above  mentioned  

provision, the requirement of sanction under Section 19(1) is  

only procedural in nature and the same can be cured at a  

subsequent stage of the proceedings even after filing of the  

charge-sheet  and  hence  the  requirement  of  “previous  

sanction” is merely directory and not mandatory.   Reliance  

was placed on the judgments of this Court in R. S. Nayak v.  

A.R. Antulay (1984) 2 SCR 495 and P. V. Narasimha Rao  

v.  State  (CBI/SPE) (1998)  4  SCC  626.   Learned  senior  

counsel  further  submitted  that  the  High  Court  also

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committed  an  error  in  holding  that  the  sanction  was  

necessary even while the Court was exercising its jurisdiction  

under  Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.   Learned  senior  counsel  

submitted  that  the  order  directing  investigation  under  

Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.  would  not  amount  to  taking  

cognizance  of  the  offence.    Reference  was  made to  the  

judgments  of  this  Court  in  Tula  Ram  and  Others  v.  

Kishore Singh (1977) 4 SCC 459 and  Srinivas Gundluri  

and  Others  v.  SEPCO  Electric  Power  Construction  

Corporation and Others (2010) 8 SCC 206.     

7. Shri Uday U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the  respondents,  on  the  other  hand,  submitted  that  the  

question  raised  in  this  case  is  no  more  res  integra.  

Reference  was  made  to  the  judgment  of  this  Court  in  

Subramanium  Swamy  v.  Manmohan  Singh  and  

another  (2012)  3  SCC  64.   Learned  senior  counsel  

submitted  that  the  question  of  sanction  is  of  paramount  

importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in

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good  faith  while  performing  his  duties.   The  purpose  of  

obtaining sanction is to see that the public servant be not  

unnecessarily harassed on a complaint, failing which it would  

not be possible for a public servant to discharge his duties  

without fear and favour.   Learned senior counsel also placed  

reliance on the judgment of this Court in Maksud Saiyed v.  

State  of  Gujarat  and  Others (2008)  5  SCC  668 and  

submitted that the requirement of application of mind by the  

Magistrate  before  exercising  jurisdiction  under  Section  

156(3) Cr.P.C. is of paramount importance.  Learned senior  

counsel  submitted  that  the  requirement  of  sanction  is  a  

prerequisite even for presenting a private complaint under  

Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the High Court has rightly quashed  

the  proceedings  and  the  complaint  made  against  the  

respondents.

8. We may  first  examine  whether  the  Magistrate,  while  

exercising his powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., could act  

in  a  mechanical  or  casual  manner  and  go  on  with  the

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complaint after getting the report. The scope of the above  

mentioned provision came up for consideration before this  

Court in several cases.  This Court in Maksud Saiyed case  

(supra) examined the requirement of the application of mind  

by  the  Magistrate  before  exercising  jurisdiction  under  

Section 156(3) and held that where a jurisdiction is exercised  

on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section  

200 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in  

such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the  

matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without  

a  valid  sanction  order.    The  application  of  mind  by  the  

Magistrate  should  be  reflected  in  the  order.    The  mere  

statement  that  he  has  gone  through  the  complaint,  

documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected  

in the order, will not be sufficient.  After going through the  

complaint,  documents  and  hearing  the  complainant,  what  

weighed  with  the  Magistrate  to  order  investigation  under  

Section  156(3)  Cr.P.C.,  should  be  reflected  in  the  order,  

though a detailed expression of his views is neither required

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nor warranted.  We have already extracted the order passed  

by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated  

no reasons for ordering investigation.    

9. We  will  now  examine  whether  the  order  directing  

investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. would amount to  

taking  cognizance  of  the  offence,  since  a  contention  was  

raised that the expression “cognizance” appearing in Section  

19(1)  of  the  PC  Act  will  have  to  be  construed  as  post-

cognizance stage, not pre-cognizance stage and, therefore,  

the requirement of sanction does not arise prior  to taking  

cognizance of the offences punishable under the provisions  

of the PC Act.  The expression “cognizance” which appears  

in Section 197 Cr.P.C.  came up for  consideration before a  

three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh  

v.  Paras  Nath Singh (2009)  6  SCC 372,  and this  Court  

expressed the following view:

“6.   .............And the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to  take  cognizance  of  any  offence  is  provided  by  Section  190  of  the  Code,  either  on  receipt  of  a  complaint,  or  upon  a  police  report  or  upon

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information received from any person other than a  police  officer,  or  upon  his  knowledge  that  such  offence  has  been  committed.  So  far  as  public  servants  are  concerned,  the  cognizance  of  any  offence, by any court, is barred by Section 197 of  the  Code  unless  sanction  is  obtained  from  the  appropriate  authority,  if  the  offence,  alleged  to  have  been  committed,  was  in  discharge  of  the  official  duty.  The  section  not  only  specifies  the  persons to whom the protection is afforded but it  also specifies the conditions and circumstances in  which it shall be available and the effect in law if  the  conditions  are  satisfied.  The  mandatory  character  of  the  protection  afforded  to  a  public  servant is brought out by the expression, ‘no court  shall  take cognizance of such offence except with  the previous sanction’.  Use of the words ‘no’ and  ‘shall’ makes it abundantly clear that the bar on the  exercise of power of the court to take cognizance of  any  offence  is  absolute  and  complete.  The  very  cognizance is barred. That is, the complaint cannot  be  taken  notice  of.  According  to  Black’s  Law  Dictionary the  word  ‘cognizance’  means  ‘jurisdiction’  or  ‘the  exercise  of  jurisdiction’  or  ‘power  to  try  and determine causes’.  In  common  parlance,  it  means  taking  notice  of.  A  court,  therefore,  is  precluded  from  entertaining  a  complaint  or  taking  notice  of  it  or  exercising  jurisdiction if it is in respect of a public servant who  is  accused  of  an  offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed during discharge of his official duty.  

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx”

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In  State of West Bengal and Another v. Mohd. Khalid   

and Others  (1995) 1 SCC 684, this Court has observed as  

follows:

“It  is  necessary  to  mention  here  that  taking  cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as  issuance  of  process.  Cognizance  is  taken  at  the  initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial  mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a  police report or upon information received from any  other person that an offence has been committed.  The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage  when after considering the material placed before it  the court decides to proceed against the offenders  against whom a prima facie case is made out.”

10. The  meaning  of  the  said  expression  was  also  

considered  by  this  Court  in  Subramanium Swamy case  

(supra).   The  judgments  referred  to  herein  above  clearly  

indicate that the word “cognizance” has a wider connotation  

and not merely confined to the stage of taking cognizance of  

the offence.   When a Special Judge refers a complaint for  

investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., obviously, he has  

not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a  

pre-cognizance  stage  and  cannot  be  equated  with  post-

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cognizance stage.  When a Special Judge takes cognizance of  

the  offence  on  a  complaint  presented  under  Section  200  

Cr.P.C. and the next step to be taken is to follow up under  

Section 202 Cr.P.C.  Consequently, a Special Judge referring  

the  case  for  investigation under  Section  156(3)  is  at  pre-

cognizance stage.

11. A Special  Judge is  deemed to  be a  Magistrate under  

Section 5(4) of the PC Act and, therefore, clothed with all the  

magisterial  powers  provided  under  the  Code  of  Criminal  

Procedure.    When a private complaint is filed before the  

Magistrate, he has two options.  He may take cognizance of  

the offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C. or proceed further in  

enquiry or trial.  A Magistrate, who is otherwise competent to  

take cognizance,  without  taking cognizance under  Section  

190,  may  direct  an  investigation  under  Section  156(3)  

Cr.P.C.   The Magistrate, who is empowered under Section  

190  to  take  cognizance,  alone  has  the  power  to  refer  a

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private  complaint  for  police  investigation  under  Section  

156(3) Cr.P.C.

12. We may now examine whether, in the above mentioned  

legal situation, the requirement of sanction is a pre-condition  

for ordering investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., even  

at a pre-cognizance stage.  Section 2(c) of the PC Act deals  

with  the definition of  the expression “public  servant”  and  

provides under Clauses (viii) and (xii) as under:

“(viii) any person who holds an office by virtue  of which he is authorised or required to perform any  public duty.

(xii)  any  person  who  is  an  office-bearer  or  an  employee  of  an  educational,  scientific,  social,  cultural  or  other  institution,  in  whatever  manner  established,  receiving  or  having  received  any  financial assistance from the Central Government or  any  State  Government,  or  local  or  other  public  authority.”

The relevant provision for sanction is given in Section 19(1)  

of the PC Act, which reads as under:

“19.  Previous  sanction  necessary  for  prosecution.—(1)  No court  shall  take cognizance

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of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11,  13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a  public servant, except with the previous sanction—

(a) in the case of a person who is employed  in connection with the affairs of the Union  and is not removable from his office save by  or  with  the  sanction  of  the  Central  Government, of that Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed  in connection with the affairs of a State and  is not removeable from his office save by or  with the sanction of the State Government,  of that Government;

(c) in  the case of  any other  person,  of  the  authority competent to remove him from his  office.”

Section 19(3) of the PC Act also has some relevance;  the  

operative portion of the same is extracted hereunder:

“Section  19(3) –  Notwithstanding  anything  contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973  (2 of 1974)-

(a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a  special judge shall be reversed or altered by  a court  in appeal,  confirmation or revision  on the ground of absence of, or any error,  omission  or  irregularity  in  the  sanction  required under sub-section (1), unless in the  opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has  in fact been occasioned thereby;

(b) xxx xxx xxx

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(c) xxx xxx xxx”

13. Learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  

raised the contention that the requirement of sanction is only  

procedural  in  nature  and hence,  directory  or  else  Section  

19(3) would be rendered otiose.   We find it difficult to accept  

that contention.  Sub-section (3) of Section 19 has an object  

to achieve, which applies in circumstances where a Special  

Judge has already rendered a finding, sentence or order.   In  

such an event, it shall not be reversed or altered by a court  

in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence  

of sanction.   That does not mean that the requirement to  

obtain sanction is not a mandatory requirement.  Once it is  

noticed  that  there  was  no  previous  sanction,  as  already  

indicated in various judgments referred to hereinabove, the  

Magistrate  cannot  order  investigation  against  a  public  

servant while invoking powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.  

The  above  legal  position,  as  already  indicated,  has  been

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clearly spelt out in  Paras Nath Singh and Subramanium  

Swamy cases (supra).   

14. Further,  this  Court  in  Criminal  Appeal  No.  257  of  

2011 in the case of General Officer, Commanding v. CBI  

and opined as follows:

“Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue  of sanction can be summarized to the effect that  the  question  of  sanction  is  of  paramount  importance for protecting a public servant who has  acted in good faith while performing his duty.  In  order  that  the  public  servant  may  not  be  unnecessarily  harassed  on  a  complaint  of  an  unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of  the  executive  authority  to  protect  him…..  If  the  law  requires  sanction,  and  the  court  proceeds  against  a  public  servant  without  sanction,  the  public  servant  has  a  right  to  raise  the  issue  of  jurisdiction as the entire action may be rendered  void ab-initio.”

15. We are of the view that the principles laid down by this  

Court in the above referred judgments squarely apply to the  

facts of the present case.  We, therefore, find no error in the  

order passed by the High Court.  The appeals lack merit and  

are accordingly dismissed.

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…….……………………….J. (K.S. Radhakrishnan)

……………………………J. (A.K. Sikri)

New Delhi,  October 01, 2013