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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 388 OF 2004

ANIL KUMAR GUPTA … APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.

1. The appellant along with four others was tried for the  

charges punishable under Sections 498A and 304B, IPC  

and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act,  1961. The  

learned Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar acquitted all of  

them of the said charges. The State preferred appeal  

against  acquittal  in  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at

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Allahabad.  The  High  Court  confirmed  the  order  of  

acquittal  of  all  other  accused  except  the  appellant  

herein.  The  High  Court  accordingly  convicted  the  

appellant  herein  for  the  offences  punishable  under  

Section  498A,  IPC  and  sentenced  him  to  undergo  

rigorous  imprisonment  for  two  years  with  a  fine  of  

Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further  

undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, and for  

the  offence  punishable  under  Section  304B,  IPC,  he  

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  

ten years. The High Court also convicted the appellant  

for  the  offence  punishable  under  Section  3  of  the  

Dowry  Prohibition  Act,  1961  and  sentenced  him  to  

undergo rigorous imprisonment  for five years and to  

pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- and in default of payment of  

fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one  

year, whereas under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition  

Act,  1961,  the  appellant  was  sentenced  to  undergo  

rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine

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of  Rs.1,000/-  and  in  default  of  payment  of  fine,  he  

should further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one  

month.  The  substantive  sentences  of  imprisonment  

were however directed to run concurrently. Hence this  

appeal.

2. In order to consider as to whether the judgment of the  

High  Court  convicting  the  appellant  for  the  offences  

punishable  under  the  provisions  referred  to  

hereinabove  suffers  from any  infirmity  requiring  our  

interference,  it  is  just  and  necessary  to  notice  the  

relevant facts in brief.

3.  The appellant is the husband of the deceased Poonam.  

The  incident  is  stated  to  have  taken  place  in  the  

intervening  night  of  6th/7th  June,  1988  in  Mohalla  

Kambalwala  Bagh,  Muzaffarnagar  and  a  report  was  

lodged on 7.6.1988 at 8.50 a.m. by Dharmendra Kumar  

Jain (PW 1), father of the victim. The parents of the  

victim Poonam (deceased) are the residents of Khatauli,

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a  town  nearby  Muzafarnagar.  The  deceased  Poonam  

was married to the appellant Anil Kumar Gupta on 20th  

April, 1987. Soon after the marriage, the appellant and  

other  accused  (since  acquitted)  allegedly  started  

harassing  and  torturing  the  deceased  to  bring  more  

dowry. She was subjected to both mental and physical  

cruelty repeatedly. The deceased gave birth to a male  

child about four months before the occurrence and the  

same  constituted  another  occasion  for  the  appellant  

and other accused to demand cash and other valuable  

articles. Dharmendra Kumar Jain (PW 1), the father of  

the victim was not in a position to meet their demands.  

Consequently,  the  victim  was  subjected  to  further  

harassment. On 6th June, 1988 at about 11 a.m., the  

victim telephoned  to  her  near  relation,  namely,  Ram  

Kumar  Vaish  (PW  2)  at  Muzaffarnagar  complaining  

about her torture and requested him to see her. Ram  

Kumar Vaish (PW 2) reached her house in the evening.  

He heard shrieks of the deceased Poonam coming out

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of the house. The appellant and his brother Ajay Kumar  

and sister were shouting inside the house loudly.   PW 2  

then  rang  the  bell  evoking  Anil  Kumar  Gupta,  the  

appellant to come out, but he did not allow him to meet  

the  victim  Poonam.  PW  2,  in  turn,  informed  the  

complainant (PW 1) about all this at Khatauli at about  

10 p.m. On 7.6.1988,  the complainant  (PW 1) along  

with  his  sons  and  PW  2  reached  the  house  of  the  

accused and found that none of them were present at  

home. He was informed by the neighbours that in the  

preceding night,  the appellant,  his  brother and sister  

had taken Poonam to the hospital when her condition  

was serious and she was crying “MUJHE JAHAR DEKAR  

MAAR DIYA”. On reaching the District Hospital,    PWs 1  

and 2 came to know that Poonam had breathed her last  

and her dead body was lying there. No accused was to  

be  found in  the  hospital.  PW 1 then lodged the  FIR  

whereupon a case was registered and investigation was  

undertaken by the S.H.O. Shyam Singh Tomar (PW 8).

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4. There  is  no  dispute  whatsoever  that  the  victim  was  

admitted in the hospital on 7.6.1988 at about 1 a.m.  

under  a  case  of  suspected  poisoning.  Dr.  N.C.  Tyagi  

(PW 7)  had  examined  the  victim.  Her  condition  was  

very  critical  and  she  was  unconscious.  She  had  

breathed  her  last  at  1.40  a.m.  Postmortem  was  

conducted by Dr. Suresh Chandra (PW 5) on the same  

day at about 4 p.m. The following ante mortem injuries  

were found on her person:

1. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with pin-pointed spots  

in an area of 2 cm. x 1 cm. on the dorsum of right  

big toe just behind the base of nail.

2.  Multiple  pin-point  abrasions  with  pinpoint  bleeding  

(clotted) spots on the dorsum of 4th toe just behind  

the base of nail.

3. Multiple pin-point abrasions with clotted blood on the  

dorsum of left great toe just-behind the nail.

4. Multiple pin-point abrasions in an area of 1 cm. x 1  

cm. on the front of left greater toe nail.

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5. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in  

front of nail of left 4th toe.

6. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in  

front of left 4th toe.

7. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in  

front of left 3rd toe.

According  to  the  medical  opinion,  the  cause  of  death  

could not be ascertained, hence viscera was preserved.  

As  per  the  report  of  the  serologist,  viscera  contained  

insecticide poison.

5.  The  prosecution,  in  order  to  establish  its  case,  

altogether  examined  ten  witnesses  and  the  accused  

produced two witnesses in their defence. There is no  

direct evidence whatsoever and the entire case rests  

upon  the  circumstantial  evidence.  The  trial  Court,  

meticulously analyzed the evidence available on record  

and recorded the following findings:

(i) The prosecution miserably failed to establish that  

while  victim  was  being  taken  to  hospital,  she

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shouted that she had been administered poison.  

Ram  Kumar  Vaish  (PW  2)  did  not  make  any  

statement  to  that  effect  before  the  police.  

However,  in  his  evidence,  he  stated  that  the  

neighbours  stated  about  the  same.  The  fact  

remains that no neighbour has been examined to  

establish this fact.

(ii) The  trial  Court  also  found  that  there  is  no  

evidence  that  one  day  prior  to  her  death,  the  

victim spoke to PW 2.

(iii) The  trial  Court  did  not  accept  the  evidence  of  

Dharmendra  Kumar  Jain  (PW  1),  father  of  the  

victim on the ground that the evidence given by  

him is full of contradictions. As per the evidence of  

PW 1 and as well as in FIR, there is no mention of  

any  demand  for  dowry  before  or  after  the  

marriage.  The  alleged  demand  was  made  only  

after  the  birth  of  a  male  child.  The  letters

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produced  by  the  prosecution  do  not  prove  any  

demand for  dowry.  The  letters  (Exts.  Ka-2  and  

Ka-3)  do  not  mention  that  the  accused  have  

demanded  any  dowry  either  in  the  form  of  

Camera  or  Scooter.  On  the  other  hand,  letter  

(Ext. Ka-13) written by Smt. Poonam (deceased)  

from  her  father’s  house  to  the  appellant  only  

showed  family  matters,  about  the  love  and  

affection between the husband and wife and how  

painful it was to stay away from her husband.

6. The trial Court further found that the suicide note (Ext.  

Ka-78)  stands  proved  to  have  been  written  by  the  

deceased, as established by the Handwriting and Finger  

Print Expert.  

7. The  High  Court,  while  reappreciating  the  evidence  

available on record, did not discuss that portion of the  

evidence  which  was  taken  into  consideration  by  the  

trial Court. However, the High Court concluded that the

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deceased died an unnatural death by poisoning within  

about 14 months of  her marriage with the appellant  

and  there  was  consistent  demand  of  dowry  by  him  

after the marriage. The High Court also observed that  

the victim was treated with cruelty  by the appellant  

over the demand for dowry. The appellant was never  

satisfied even though some of the demands were met  

by the parents of the deceased. That after the birth of  

the  child,  the  appellant  further  demanded  VCR  and  

Rs.20,000/-  in  cash  and  on  non-fulfillment  of  the  

demand,  the  appellant  continued  to  subject  the  

deceased to cruelty and harassment. Adverting to the  

circumstances, the High Court noted that the appellant  

prevented  Ram  Kumar  Vaish  (PW  2)  to  meet  the  

deceased in the preceding evening when he reached  

their  house  on  receipt  of  a  telephone  call  from  the  

deceased. One of the most important circumstance that  

was taken into consideration by the High Court is that  

the  appellant  was  nearest  to  the  lady  and  was

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undoubtedly  with  her  on  that  fateful  night  and  

therefore,  the  inference  is  inescapable  that  it  is  the  

appellant  who administered  poison on her.  The High  

Court further found that the appellant was engaged in  

manufacturing medicines and well acquainted with the  

property, composition, potentiality and effectiveness of  

the deadly poison responsible for the death of the lady.  

In  order  to  show his  innocence,  he  took  her  to  the  

hospital  on  scooter  where  she  collapsed  within  40  

minutes.  Another  circumstance  that  was  taken  into  

consideration by the High Court was that the appellant  

did not inform the police nor he informed the parents  

of the deceased about her death. Instead, he was not  

to be found in the hospital near the dead body of the  

deceased in the next morning when deceased’s father  

and others reached there.

8.  Shri R.K. Shukla, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the appellant mainly contended that the High Court in  

the process of reappreciating the evidence, ignored the

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vital evidence on record which proves the innocence of  

the appellant. It was submitted that the approach of  

the High Court is completely contrary to the decision of  

this  Court  in  Ramesh Babulal  Doshi  Vs.  State  of  

Gujarat1 which was followed by this Court in Dwarka  

Das & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana2. The submission  

was that the High Court  miserably failed to examine  

the reasons given by the trial Court for recording the  

order of acquittal.

9.  Learned counsel for the State of U.P. supported the  

impugned  judgment  mainly  relying  on  the  

circumstances that on that fateful night, the appellant  

alone was in the company of the deceased and it is one  

of  the  strong  circumstances  to  hold  that  it  is  the  

appellant who administered poison to the deceased.

10. In  Ramesh Babulal Doshi, this Court held that “the  

mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the  

trial  Court  can  be  legitimately  arrived  at  by  the  1 (1996) 9 SCC 225 2 (2003) 1 SCC 204

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appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence, cannot  

constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere an  

order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that  

the entire approach of the trial  Court in dealing with  

the  evidence  was  patently  illegal  or  the  conclusions  

arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in  

judgment over an acquittal, the appellate Court is first  

required to seek an answer to the question whether the  

findings  of  the  trial  Court  are  palpably  wrong,  

manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If  

the appellate Court answers the above question in the  

negative, the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed.  

Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to  

be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be  

sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can  

then—and  then  only—reappraise  the  evidence  to  

arrive at its own conclusions”. (emphasis supplied)

11. In  Dwarka Das, this  Court  following the decision in  

Ramesh Babulal Doshi, further observed that “there

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cannot be any denial of the factum that the power and  

authority to appraise the evidence in an appeal, either  

against  acquittal  or  conviction stands out to be very  

comprehensive  and  wide,  but  if  two  views  are  

reasonably  possible,  on  the  state  of  evidence:  one  

supporting  the  acquittal  and  the  other  indicating  

conviction,  then  and  in  that  event,  the  High  Court  

would not be justified in interfering with an order of  

acquittal,  merely because it feels that it, sitting as a  

trial  court,  would  have  taken  the  other  view.  While  

reappreciating  the  evidence,  the  rule  of  prudence  

requires that the High Court should give proper weight  

and consideration to the views of the trial Judge. But if  

the  judgment  of  the  Sessions  Judge  was  absolutely  

perverse,  legally  erroneous  and  based  on  a  wrong  

appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and  

proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of  

acquittal,  recorded  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  as  

otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice”.

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12. In Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka3, this  

Court  reappreciating  the  aforesaid  principles,  further  

observed that “in case of acquittal, there is a double  

presumption  in  favour  of  the  accused.  Firstly, the  

presumption of innocence available to him under the  

fundamental  principle  of  criminal  jurisprudence  that  

every  person  should  be  presumed  to  be  innocent  

unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court  

of  law.  Secondly,  the  accused  having  secured  an  

acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly  

not  weakened  but  reinforced,  reaffirmed  and  

strengthened  by  the  trial  Court.  Though  the  above  

principles  are  well  established,  a  different  note  was  

struck in several decisions by various High Courts and  

even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we  

consider some of the leading decisions on the point”.  

Having stated so, this Court also held that an appellate  

Court  has  full  power  to  reappreciate,  review  and  

reconsider  the  evidence  upon  which  the  order  of  3 (2007) 4 SCC 415

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acquittal  is founded. But it  is well  established that if  

two  views  are  possible  on  the  basis  of  evidence  on  

record  and  one  favourable  view  to  the  accused  has  

been  taken  by  the  trial  Court,  it  ought  not  to  be  

disturbed by the appellate Court.

13. Therefore,  keeping the  above  principles  in  mind,  we  

have to first ascertain whether there are any reasons  

recorded by the High Court in order to observe that the  

findings of the trial Court are unsustainable. The High  

Court in its judgment expressed that “the acquittal is  

wholly  unjustified”  and  that  the  learned  trial  Judge  

failed to make proper analysis of the evidence adduced  

by  the  prosecution  and  other  surrounding  

circumstances. There is no finding recorded as such by  

the High Court to the effect that the trial Court misread  

the evidence and its findings therefore were perverse  

in their entirety. The High Court was mainly impressed  

by its finding that the suicide note produced on behalf  

of the defence was found to be fabricated.

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14. The defence, in its anxiety might have pressed some  

suicidal note into service which was ultimately found to  

be  not  acceptable  by  the  High  Court,  but  the  High  

Court  did  not  consider  the rest  of  the circumstantial  

evidence that was taken into consideration by the trial  

Court for acquitting the accused. The High Court has  

mainly taken one singular circumstance into account,  

namely, that on the fateful night, the appellant alone  

was nearest to the victim and therefore, the inference  

is inescapable that it is he who administered poison to  

her.  In  the  entire  judgment,  there  is  not  even  a  

whisper as to how the reasons recorded by the trial  

Court were perverse or erroneous.

15. It appears to us that the High Court very conveniently  

ignored the exchange of letters between the deceased  

Poonam  and  her  mother  which  disclosed  cordial  

relations between the two families. The prosecution did  

not find any letter by the deceased Poonam in response  

to  her  mother’s  letter  when  her  mother’s  letters

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indicated  receipt  of  Poonam’s  letters.  There  is  no  

explanation  forthcoming  as  to  why  the  prosecution  

withheld  that  evidence.  The  benefit  of  doubt  in  this  

regard may have to go in favour of the appellant.

16. The  High  Court  while  ignoring  the  vital  evidence  

available on record regarding the purchase of scooter  

by  appellant  himself  with  his  own funds  relied  upon  

oral assertion made by PW-1 that parents of the victim  

paid a sum of Rs. 2,000/- for replacing the Camera and  

a  further  sum  of  Rs.  5,000/-  for  purchase  of  the  

scooter.  The Trial  Court,  on appreciation of  evidence  

available on record found that the scooter was actually  

purchased by the appellant himself, through raising a  

bank loan and in fact it was purchased much prior to  

the letter alleged to have been written by the victim to  

her  parents.   The  appellant  even  got  the  scooter  

insured. This vital evidence regarding the ownership of  

the scooter has been completely ignored by the High  

Court and arrived at the conclusion as if the appellant

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demanded scooter from the parents of the victim as a  

dowry.   The  evidence  available  on  record  does  not  

justify such a conclusion reached by the High Court.  

The High Court in this regard did not assign any reason  

as to how and why the conclusion arrived at by the trial  

court in this regard was not sound and perverse.  

17.Similarly the High Court, on a very peculiar reasoning  

ignores  the  relevant  piece  of  evidence  that  it  is  the  

appellant  who took the victim to the hospital  on his  

scooter to save her life.  The High Court for no reason  

characterized the act of appellant taking the victim to  

the hospital as one of showmanship in order to avoid  

any  suspicion  of  his  involvement  in  the  crime.  

According  to  the  High  Court  the  move  was  an  

anticipatory self-defence. It is difficult to discern as to  

on  what  basis  the  High  Court  arrived  at  such  a  

conclusion.   The  High  Court  without  any  reason  

whatsoever  concludes  that  the  appellant  took  the  

victim on his scooter to the hospital only in order to

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show that as if he was innocent.  The evidence of the  

duty  doctor  and  entries  in  the  hospital  register  in  

unmistakable terms reveals that it is the appellant who  

got admitted the victim into the hospital.  If it is the  

appellant who removed the victim to the hospital on his  

scooter,  then  the  version  given  by  the  prosecution  

(PW-2) that neighbours informed him to the effect that  

the victim Poonam came out of her house crying and  

shouting that she has been administered poison by the  

accused  person  becomes  totally  unacceptable.  This  

vital portion of the evidence upon which the High Court  

relied  comes  from  the  statement  of  PW-2  which  is  

undoubtedly  an  improvement  since  he  did  not  state  

anything to that effect in his statement to the police.  

The fact remains that no neighbour was examined to  

justify that the victim Poonam came out of her house  

running and shouting that accused administered poison  

to  her.   The  trial  court  meticulously  examined  the  

evidence  available  on  record  in  this  regard  and

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accordingly  found  that  the  prosecution  story  of  the  

victim revealing that she was administered poison was  

totally unacceptable.  There is no reason given by the  

High Court as to why it did not agree with the findings  

of the trial court.  

18.Be it noted that on the same evidence, the High Court  

did  not  find  any  case  whatsoever  against  the  other  

accused but found only the appellant guilty on the sole  

ground that on that fateful night, it was the appellant  

who was proximate to the deceased and therefore, it is  

the  appellant  who  administered  poison  to  the  

deceased. The factum itself that the deceased and the  

appellant  were  together  cannot  be  a  ground  to  

conclude that  it  was the  appellant  who administered  

poison  to  the  deceased.  The  cause  of  death  of  the  

victim  undoubtedly  is  on  account  of  consumption  of  

poison  but  there  are  no  circumstances  available  on  

record based on which one could conclude that it was a  

case that someone forcibly administered poison.

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19. In  the  same  manner,  the  High  Court  recorded  the  

finding  that  the  appellant  is  very  well  versed  in  

manufacturing  medicines  and  knew  their  property,  

composition etc. The appellant looks after the accounts  

of a manufacturing concern. He has no acquaintance  

with any medical or chemical technology.  We fail  to  

appreciate  as  to  the  relevance  of  appellant’s  

employment with a manufacturer of medicine has any  

bearing on his knowledge in manufacture of poison.  It  

sounds very strange that High Court not only presumes  

that  the  appellant  has  not  only  special  knowledge  

about preparation of poison but it is the appellant who  

administered poison to the victim

20. In our considered opinion, the High Court committed a  

serious error in arriving at its own conclusions without  

properly  appreciating  the  findings  and  conclusions  

arrived at by the trial Court and the reasons assigned  

in  support  of  those  conclusions  and  findings.  In  the  

absence of  any  conclusion  by the High  Court  to  the

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effect that “the trial  Court misread the evidence and  

the findings were therefore perverse”, no interference  

was called for.  The High Court virtually substituted all  

the  findings  and  conclusions  of  the  trial  court  but  

without  assigning  any  reason  whatsoever  as  to  why  

and how those conclusions of the trial court were not  

sound  or  perverse  in  their  nature.   The  High  Court  

normally does not interfere with the findings of the trial  

court merely because there is a possibility of taking a  

different view on the available evidence on record. That  

is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial  

court.  

21.We  are  satisfied  that  the  trial  court,  for  good  and  

cogent reasons, acquitted all the accused including the  

appellant  and  it  is  the  High  Court  which  committed  

error in reversing the well considered judgment of the  

trial court so far as the appellant is concerned.  Be it  

noted,  that  on  the  same  evidence  the  High  Court  

agreed with the trial court to acquit the other accused

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by  refusing  to  rely  on  the  prosecution  story  but  a  

different  yardstick  has  been  applied  so  far  as  the  

appellant  is  concerned  solely  on  the  ground  of  his  

proximity with the victim on that fateful night.  That  

singular circumstance in our considered opinion is not  

enough  to  conclude  that  the  appellant  forcibly  

administered  the  poison  to  the  victim.  Even  the  

medical evidence available on record does not support  

the conclusion.  The view taken by the High Court to  

reverse the order of acquittal is unsustainable both in  

law and on facts.  

22. The impugned judgment is accordingly set aside. The  

appellant is acquitted of all the charges. The judgment  

of the trial  Court acquitting the appellant shall  stand  

restored. The bail bond executed by the appellant shall  

stand cancelled.  

23.The appeal is allowed.

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..………………………………….J.  (B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

..………………………………….J.  (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

New Delhi,

March 9, 2011