Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 7864-7865 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) NOs.33088-33089 OF 2010)

  Anil Gilurker          … Appellant

Versus

Bilaspur Raipur Kshetria Gramin Bank  & Anr.                     … Respondents

O R D E R

A. K. PATNAIK, J.

Leave granted.

2. These are appeals against the order dated 28.04.2010  

of the Division Bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court  

in Writ Appeal No.57 of 2010 and Writ Appeal No.82 of  

2010.

3.   The  facts  very  briefly  are  that  on  03.05.1984  the  

appellant was appointed as a Branch Manager in the  

Bilaspur  Raipur  Kshetriya  Gramin  Bank  by  way  of  

direct recruitment and he successfully completed the  

period of probation.  While he was working on the post

of Branch Manager in Branch Patewa, he sanctioned  

and  distributed  loans  to  a  large  number  of  brick  

manufacturing  units  under  the  Integrated  Gram  

Development  Programme.   The disciplinary  authority  

placed the appellant under suspension and issued a  

charge-sheet  dated  31.01.1989  against  him  for  

misconduct punishable under Regulation 30(1) of the  

Staff Service Regulations.  In the charge-sheet, it was  

alleged that the appellant sanctioned and distributed  

loans to a large number of brick manufacturing units  

in  a  very  short  period  of  time,  but  had  not  in  fact  

disbursed the entire loan amount to the borrowers and  

part of the loan amount was misappropriated by him.  

The appellant was asked to submit his written defence  

in reply to the charges.  On 11.02.1989, the appellant  

submitted his written defence denying the allegations  

made in the charge-sheet.  An Inquiry Officer enquired  

into the charges against the appellant and submitted  

his report with a finding that the witnesses produced  

by  the  Bank  had  not  said  that  what  was  actually  

advanced  was  less  than  the  loan  amount,  and  

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although  there  were  some  serious  irregularities,  the  

charge  of  financial  corruption  against  the  appellant  

had not been proved.  The disciplinary authority in his  

order dated 10.09.1991 disagreed with the findings of  

the Inquiry Officer and held that the charge of financial  

corruption against the appellant had been proved and  

that the appellant had not only violated the Rules of  

the Bank, but had also tried to cause financial loss to  

the  Bank and by  abusing  his  position,  had lowered  

down the reputation of the Bank.  In the order dated  

10.09.1991,  the  disciplinary  authority  proposed  to  

impose  the  punishment  of  removal  of  the  appellant  

along with forfeiture of the contribution of the Bank to  

the  Provident  Fund  of  the  appellant  under  Section  

50(1)  of  the  Staff  Regulations.   By  the  order  dated  

10.09.1991, the disciplinary authority directed that a  

copy of the order and report of the Inquiry Officer be  

sent to the appellant to show-cause why he should not  

be  punished  as  proposed.   On  18.09.1991,  the  

appellant submitted his reply to the show-cause notice  

and on 25.11.1991, the disciplinary authority passed  

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the order of removal.  Aggrieved, the appellant filed an  

appeal against the order of the disciplinary authority,  

but  the  appeal  was  dismissed  by  the  appellate  

authority.

4. The  appellant  then  filed  a  Writ  Petition  before  the  

Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the order of  

removal passed by the disciplinary authority.  After the  

reorganization  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  in  the  year  

2000,  the  Writ  Petition  was  transferred  to  the  

Chhattisgarh High Court and was heard by a learned  

Single  Judge  of  the  Chhattisgarh  High  Court.   The  

learned  Single  Judge  in  his  judgment  dated  

22.02.2010 found that in the charge-sheet, there is no  

reference to any specific documents or to the names of  

the persons who had not been given the loan amounts  

and accordingly took the view that in the charge-sheet  

there  were  no  specific  charges.   Relying  on  the  

decisions of this Court in Surath Chandra Chakrabarty  

v.  State  of  West  Bengal [(1970)  3  SCC 548],  Sawai   

Singh v.  State  of  Rajasthan [(1986)  3 SCC 454]  and  

Union of India & Ors. v. Gyan Chand Chattar [(2009) 12  

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SCC 78], the learned Single Judge held that when the  

charges levelled against  the delinquent officer  in the  

charge-sheet  were  vague  and  not  specific  and  the  

entire  enquiry is  vitiated.   The learned Single  Judge  

quashed the orders of the disciplinary authority and  

the appellate authority and directed reinstatement of  

the appellant in service with continuity in service and  

without loss of seniority in the post to which he would  

be  entitled  to.   The  learned  Single  Judge  further  

directed  that  the  appellant  will  be  entitled  to  

compensation of Rs.1.5 lacs in lieu of arrears of his  

salary.   

5. Aggrieved  by  the  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  

granting only Rs.1.5 lacs as compensation in lieu of  

arrears of salary, the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.57  

of  2010  and  aggrieved  by  the  impugned  order  of  

learned Single Judge in the Writ Petition quashing the  

orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate  

authority, the respondents filed Writ Appeal No.82 of  

2010.   After  hearing  the  Writ  Appeals,  the  Division  

Bench  of  the  Chhattisgarh  High  Court  held  in  the  

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impugned order that the charges against the appellant  

as described in the charge-sheet were not vague as on  

the basis of documents mentioned in the charge-sheet,  

it has been alleged that the appellant had sanctioned  

the loans and had shown the loans only on paper but  

had not actually disbursed the loans to the borrowers.  

The Division Bench of the High Court, however, held  

that as the disciplinary authority had disagreed with  

the  findings  in  the  inquiry  report,  he  should  have  

furnished  his  reasons  for  the  disagreement  to  the  

appellant before passing the order of punishment.  The  

Division Bench of the High Court further held that the  

disciplinary authority cannot conduct further enquiry  

suo  motu to  fill  up  the  lacuna  in  the  enquiry.  The  

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  allowed  both  the  

appeals  and  directed  that  the  disciplinary  authority  

will consider the inquiry report, the evidence recorded  

by the Enquiry Officer and the documents relied upon  

in  the  charge-sheet  and  take  a  fresh  decision  in  

accordance with law.  The Division Bench of the High  

Court further observed in the impugned order that if  

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the  disciplinary  authority  takes  a  view  on  

reconsideration of the matter not to take any further  

action against the appellant, he shall be given all the  

consequential benefits along with reinstatement.   

6. We  have  heard  Mr.  Ravindra  Shrivastava,  learned  

counsel for the appellant and Mr. Akshat Shrivastava,  

learned counsel for the respondents, and we are of the  

considered opinion that the Division Bench of the High  

Court was not correct in taking a view in the impugned  

order that the charges against the appellant were not  

vague.  The English translation of the charges and the  

statement  of  imputations extracted from the charge-

sheet  dated  31.01.1989  served  on  the  appellant  is  

reproduced hereinbelow:  

Charge Sheet No. D/A/756 dated 31.1.89

Statement of imputations Charge While  working  as  Branch  Manager  in  Branch  Patewa,  in  the  first  quarter  of  the  year  1988,  have  sanctioned  and distributed loan of brick  manufacturing  in  large  number under the Integrated  Gram  Development  Programme  by  committing  unauthorized  irregularities  contrary  to  the  rules  and  

Tempted  with  his  malafide  intention serious violation of  the Rules and interests of the  Bank and Administration, in  a  very  short  period  of  time  sanction  the  loan  of  Brick  manufacturing in large scale  under  the  “I.  Gram.  Dev.  Prog.” And distributed and in  most  of  the  loan  cases,  without  actually  distribution  

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interest  of  the  bank  and  administration.  In  most  of  these  loan  cases  you  have  shown  cash  distribution  of  the entire loan and has given  only  one  minor  part  of  the  loan amount to the Borrower  in cash and from the balance  amount,  some  amount  has  been  deposited  in  their  saving  accounts  (deducting  contribution  amount  equivalent to the amount for  closing the loan account) and  the  remaining  amount  has  been grabbed by you, branch  employees and in collusions  with the Gram Sewaks.  After  a  very  little  time  adjusting  the  contribution  amount  in  these  loan  accounts,  you  have withdrawn the amount  from the Saving Accounts of  the  concerned  borrowers,  you have closed most of the  loan  accounts  much  before  the  time  fixed  for  the  repayment.  

of  the  entire  loan  amount,  you  have  completed  the  documentary  proceedings,  and  showing  the  cash  distribution of the entire loan  amount,  only a minor share  of  the  loan  has  been  given  cash  to  the  concerned  borrower  and  from  the  remaining  amount  some  amount  has  been  deposited  in  the  account  of  the  borrower  and  the  balance  amount  in  connivance  with  other  persons  have  been  grabbed.  With  the  intention  to  cover  up  your  this  act,  only  after  a  few time of  the  loan  distribution,  you  have  withdrawn the amount from  the  saving  accounts  of  the  concerned  borrowers  and  most  of  the  accounts  have  been closed before time.  As  such  for  the  fulfillment  of  your personal gain you have  deliberately  misused  the  position of your post and has  committed  financial  corruption  in  large  scale.  From  which  cause  serious  shock  the  interests  of  the  bank administration and the  borrower also, the reputation  of  the  bank  has  also  been  lowered down.  Your this act  is  a  misconduct  under  Sections 17, 19 and 30(1) of  the  Employees  Collection  Service Regulations.   

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7. A plain reading of the charges and the statement of  

imputations reproduced above would show that only  

vague allegations were made against the appellant that  

he had sanctioned loans to a large number of  brick  

manufacturing units by committing irregularities, but  

did  not  disburse  the  entire  loan  amount  to  the  

borrowers and while a portion of the loan amount was  

deposited in the account of the borrowers, the balance  

was misappropriated by him and others.  The details of  

the loan accounts or the names of the borrowers have  

not been mentioned in the charges.  The amounts of  

loan which were sanctioned and the amounts which  

were  actually  disbursed  to  the  borrowers  and  the  

amounts alleged to have been misappropriated by the  

appellant have not been mentioned.   

8. We also find that  along with the  charge-sheet dated  

31.01.1989  no  statement  of  imputations  giving  the  

particulars of the loan accounts or the names of the  

borrowers, the amounts of loans sanctioned, disbursed  

and misappropriated were furnished to the appellant,  

and yet the disciplinary authority has called upon the  

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appellant to submit his written defence statement in  

reply to the charges.   We fail  to appreciate how the  

appellant could have submitted his written statement  

in  defence in respect  of  the  charges and how a fair  

enquiry could be held unless he was furnished with  

the particulars of the loan accounts or the names of  

the  borrowers,  the  amounts  of  loan  sanctioned,  the  

amounts  actually  disbursed  and  the  amounts  

misappropriated  were  also  furnished  in  the  charge-

sheet.   

9. As has  been held  by  this  Court  in  Surath  Chandra  

Chakrabarty v. State of West Bengal (supra):  

“5. …..The grounds on which it is proposed to  take action have to be reduced to the form of a  definite  charge  or  charges  which  have  to  be  communicated to the person charged together  with a statement of the allegations on which  each  charge  is  based  and  any  other  circumstance which it is proposed to be taken  into consideration in passing orders has also  to be stated.  This rule embodies a principle  which  is  one  of  the  basic  contents  of  a  reasonable  or  adequate  opportunity  for  defending  oneself.   If  a  person  is  not  told  clearly and definitely what the allegations are  on  which  the  charges  preferred  against  him  are founded he cannot possibly, by projecting  his own imagination, discover all the facts and  circumstances  that  may  be  in  the  

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contemplation  of  the  authorities  to  be  established against him…..”   

10.   This position of law has been reiterated in the recent  

case of  Union of India & Ors. v.  Gyan Chand Chattar   

(supra) and in Para 35 of the judgment as reported in  

the SCC, this Court has observed that the law can be  

summarized that an enquiry is to be conducted against  

any  person  giving  strict  adherence  to  the  statutory  

provisions  and  principles  of  natural  justice  and  the  

charges should be specific, definite and giving details  

of the incident which formed the basis of charges and  

no enquiry can be sustained on vague charges.  

11. We,  therefore,  allow  these  appeals,  set  aside  the  

impugned order of the Division Bench and restore the  

order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge.   Considering  the  

peculiar  facts  and  circumstances,  we  delete  the  

direction of the learned Single Judge to pay Rs.1.5 lacs  

to the appellant as compensation in lieu of arrears of  

salary  and  we  are  also  not  inclined  to  grant  any  

backwages to the appellant.  There shall be no order as  

to costs.    

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.……………………….J.                                                             (R. V. Raveendran)

………………………..J.                                                             (A. K. Patnaik) New Delhi, September 15, 2011.   

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