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NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL  NO.   5513  OF 2014 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 35943 OF 2012)

Anil Bajaj & Anr.       ...  APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS

Vinod Ahuja       ...  RESPONDENT (S)

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2.  The  appellants,  who  are  the  landlords,  seek  to  

challenge the order dated 20.09.2012 passed by the High  

Court  of  Delhi  granting leave to  the respondent-tenant  to  

contest the proceedings for his eviction under Section 14(1)

(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,  1958.  The order of the  

High  Court  is  in  reversal  of  the  order  dated  02.09.2011  

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passed by the Additional Rent Controller who had refused to  

grant leave to defend to the tenant.

3. The matter lies within a short compass notwithstanding  

the  elaborate  application  filed  by  the  respondent-tenant  

seeking leave duly supported by an affidavit and the detailed  

manner in which the appellant-landlords had contested the  

claim of the tenant.   

Briefly stated, leave was sought by the tenant on the  

ground that the landlords own several other properties in the  

vicinity  of  the  tenanted  premises  from  where  they  are  

carrying on business or have rented out the same.  As such,  

the tenanted premises i.e. No.38-UB, Jawahar Nagar, Kamla  

Nagar,  Delhi  is  not  bonafide  required  for  the  use  of  the  

landlords.   

In  response,  the  landlords  contend  that  the  first  

appellant, Anil  Bajaj is running a kiryana shop in premises  

No. 25-UB, Jawahar Nagar, which is located in a lane 15 feet  

in  width.   According  to  the  appellants  on  account  of  the  

location  of  the  tenanted  premises,  the  appellant  No.1  is  

unable  to  generate  sufficient  business  causing  acute  2

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hardship to his large family.  Therefore, the appellants need  

the tenanted premises which is situated on the main road.  

According to the appellants they had offered the premises in  

possession  of  the  Appellant  No.1  i.e.  No.25-UB  Jawahar  

Nagar to the tenant in exchange for the tenanted premises  

i.e. 38-UB, Jawahar Nagar which offer has been declined by  

the tenant. The appellants have further averred that while  

most of the other properties alleged to be in their ownership  

are not presently owned by the appellants, some other items  

of  property  mentioned  by  the  tenant  in  the  application  

seeking  leave  to  defend are  owned  and utilized  by  other  

family members of the appellants and the first appellant has  

no connection with such properties or business carried on by  

the other members of the family.

4. On the  aforesaid  broad  pleadings  of  the  parties,  the  

learned Additional Rent Controller thought it fit to come to  

the conclusion that the contentions made by the tenant are  

mere assertions without any basis and that no triable issue is  

disclosed warranting grant of leave to defend.  In reversal,  

the High Court  held that  the precise relationship between  

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the  two  appellants  and  the  holding/interest  of  the  first  

appellant in other items of property standing in the name of  

other family members require a probe for which leave ought  

to be granted. Hence the impugned order and the present  

appeal arising therefrom.

5. The principles  governing  grant  or  refusal  of  leave to  

defend  under  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act,  1958  had  been  

squarely dealt with in  Charan Dass Duggal  vs. Brahma  

Nand1.   The  issue  has  been  aptly  summarized  in  the  

following observations of the Court.   

“5. What should be the approach when leave to defend  is sought? There appears to be a mistaken belief that   unless  the  tenant  at  that  stage  makes  out  such  a   strong case as  would  non-suit  the  landlord,  leave  to   defend  cannot  be  granted.  This  approach  is  wholly   improper. When leave to defend is sought, the tenant   must make out such a prima facie case raising such   pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our   opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is   the test of a triable issue and not the final success in   the action (see Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh2).  At  the  stage  of  granting  the  leave  parties  rely  in   support  of  their  rival  contentions  on  affidavits  and   assertions and counter-assertions on affidavits may not   afford  such  incontrovertible  evidence  to  lead  to  an   affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding   that  when  possession  is  sought  on  the  ground  of   personal  requirement,  an absolute need is  not  to  be  

1 (1983) 1 SCC 301 2 1958 SCR 1211

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satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It   has  to  be  something  more  than a  mere  desire.  And   being  an  enabling  provision,  the  burden  is  on  the   landlord  to  establish  his  case  affirmatively.  …… ……  ……. ….

7. The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to   principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them  being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary   consequence  at  his  back  without  giving  him  an   adequate  and  effective  opportunity  to  participate  to   disprove the case against him and prove his own case.   Summary procedure does not clothe an authority with   power to enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly   frivolous  defence  may  not  entitle  a  person  leave  to   defend.  But  equally  a  triable  issue  raised,  enjoins  a   duty to grant leave. May be in the end the defence may   fail. It is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to   defend is refused the party seeking leave is denied an   opportunity to test the truth of the averments of the   opposite party by cross-examination and rival affidavits   may  not  furnish  reliable  evidence for  concluding  the   point  one  way  or  the  other.  It  is  not  for  a  moment   suggested that  leave to  defend must  be  granted  on  mere  asking  but  it  is  equally  improper  to  refuse  to   grant  leave though triable  issues  are  raised  and the   controversy  can  be  properly  adjudicated  after   ascertainment  of  truth  through  cross-examination  of   witnesses who have filed their affidavits.”  

6. In the present case it  is clear that while the landlord  

(appellant  No.  1)  is  carrying on his  business  from a shop  

premise located in a narrow lane, the tenant is in occupation  

of the premises located on the main road which the landlord  

considers  to  be more suitable  for  his  own business.   The  5

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materials on record, in fact, disclose that the landlord had  

offered to the tenant the premises located in the narrow lane  

in  exchange  for  the  tenanted  premises  which  offer  was  

declined by the tenant.  It is not the tenant’s case that the  

landlord-appellant  No.  1  does  not  propose  to  utilize  the  

tenanted  premises  from  which  eviction  is  sought  for  the  

purposes of his business.  It is also not the tenant’s case that  

the landlord proposes to rent out/keep vacant the tenanted  

premises after  obtaining possession thereof  or  to  use the  

same is any way inconsistent with the need of the landlord.  

What the tenant contends is that the landlord has several  

other  shop houses from which he is  carrying on  different  

business and further that the landlord has other premises  

from  where  the  business  proposed  from  the  tenanted  

premises  can  be  effectively  carried  out.   It  would  hardly  

require any reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is  

not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the  

property belonging to the landlord should be utilized by him  

for  the  purpose  of  his  business.   Also,  the  fact  that  the  

landlord  is  doing  business  from  various  other  premises  

cannot foreclose his right to seek eviction from the tenanted  6

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premises  so  long as  he  intends  to  use  the  said  tenanted  

premises for his own business.  The grounds on which leave  

to defend was sought by the tenant and has been granted by  

the High Court runs counter to the fundamental principles  

governing  the  right  of  a  tenant  to  contest  the  claim  of  

bonafide requirement of the suit premises by the landlord  

under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.  Even assuming the  

assertions made by the tenant to be correct, the same do  

not disclose any triable issue so as to entitle the tenant to  

grant of leave to defend.  

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6. We are, therefore, of the view that the impugned order  

dated  20.09.2012  of  the  High  Court  of  Delhi  is  not  

legally  sustainable.   We,  accordingly,  set  aside  the  

same and allow this appeal and restore the order dated  

02.09.2011  passed  by  the  learned  Additional  Rent  

Controller, Delhi.

7. …………………...........………………………J.

  [SUDHANSHU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA]

.…………………..........………………………J. [RANJAN GOGOI]

NEW DELHI, MAY 08, 2014.

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