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REPORTABLE  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 423-424  OF  2018  (Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.9728-9729 of 2005)  

  ANDANUR KALAMMA AND ORS.       …..Appellant(s)          

:Versus:    

GANGAMMA (DEAD) BY L.RS.       ....Respondent(s)    

J U D G M E N T  

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.  

1. These appeals, by special leave, are directed against the  

judgment and order dated 4th January, 2005 and order dated  

11th March, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge of the  

High Court of Karnataka in RFA No.410/1998 and R.P.  

No.124/2005, respectively, whereby the learned Single Judge  

confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court  

dismissing the suit filed by the appellants on the ground of res  

judicata and also dismissed the review petition.

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 2. Appellants in the present appeals are the plaintiffs and  

the respondents are defendants in the original suit.   

3. Briefly stated, Appellant No.1 is the wife of one late Sri  

Andanur Umapathiyappa and other appellants are his sons  

and daughter.  Respondent No.1 is the wife of one late Sri  

Belakerappa and the other respondents are his sons and  

daughter.   

4. The father of late Sri Andanur Umapathiyappa (late  

Andanur Kotrappa) was a defaulter under the provisions of the  

Income Tax Act to the extent of Rs.2,600/-. For recovery of  

arrears of tax, the Income Tax Department had referred the  

matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga, under  

Section 158 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (for  

short, “the Act”). The land belonging to late Sri Andanur  

Umapathiyappa bearing Sy. No. 63 of Bisaleri Village,  

Davanagere Taluk, measuring an extent of 23 acres and 15  

guntas, was brought to sale for the recovery of tax dues. The  

sale was held on 7th January, 1966 and the father of the

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respondents one Sri late Belekerappa was the highest bidder  

at Rs.2,600/- and the Assistant Commissioner who had  

conducted the auction sale recommended to the Deputy  

Commissioner Chitradurga, for confirmation of the sale.  

5. The predecessor of the appellants had filed an application  

on 3.2.1966 for setting aside the sale. The Deputy  

Commissioner, vide order dated 3rd May, 1966, however,  

confirmed the sale. Resultantly, a sale certificate was issued  

sometime in the month of June, 1966 in favour of late Sri  

Belekerappa and he was also put in possession of the suit  

schedule property.   

6. Appellants’ predecessor late Sri Andanur Umapathiyappa  

S/o late Andanur Kotrappa then questioned the order dated  

3rd May, 1966 before the Mysore Appellate Tribunal by filing   

Appeal No.486/1967 (LR) under Section 49 of the Mysore Land  

Revenue Act, 1964. He asserted that without deciding his  

application for setting aside the sale dated 3rd February, 1966,  

the Deputy Commissioner was not justified in passing a final  

order to confirm the auction sale. The Tribunal by its order

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dated 27th September, 1967 allowed the appeal and set aside  

the sale, on the ground that under Section 177 of the  

Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, the Deputy Commissioner  

could confirm the sale only after the application for setting  

aside the sale is rejected. Accordingly, the Tribunal after  

setting aside the sale, remanded the matter to the Deputy  

Commissioner, Chitradurga, to conduct fresh enquiry into the  

allegation made by the appellant in his application dated 3rd  

February,1966 and to dispose of the same in accordance with  

law.  

7. Pursuant to the remand order passed, the petition filed  

by the appellants’ predecessor was taken up for hearing on 8th  

June, 1969 by the Deputy Commissioner and since no one  

appeared, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the same for  

non-prosecution. Restoration application filed to restore the  

said application was also rejected by the Deputy  

Commissioner.  

8. Appellants’ predecessor then carried the matter to the  

Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal by filing an appeal against

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the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner, being Appeal  

No.167/1971. The same was also rejected by an order dated  

on 13th April, 1971 as time barred. A review petition filed to  

review the aforesaid order was also rejected by the Tribunal.  

 9. Appellants’ predecessor being aggrieved, filed a writ  

petition being W.P. No.1810/1971 before the High Court of  

Karnataka. The High Court while rejecting the writ petition by  

its order dated 23rd October, 1973, however, observed that if  

for any reason the sale was not yet confirmed by the Deputy  

Commissioner, Chitradurga, after the remand order passed by  

the Tribunal in appeal No.486/1967 (LR) and if the writ  

petitioner (predecessor in title of the appellants) deposited the  

sale amount, then the Deputy Commissioner could exercise  

his suo-motu  power to set aside the sale as provided in  

proviso to Section 177 of Mysore Land Revenue Act.  

10. The respondents in the petition challenged that decision  

by filing an appeal before the High Court bearing number W.A.  

No.152/1973, being aggrieved by certain observations and  

directions issued by the learned Single Judge while rejecting

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the writ petition. The Division Bench of the High Court after  

referring to the provisions of Section 177 of the Act observed  

that in view of the dismissal of the writ petition, there was no  

application pending for setting aside the sale. Even so, since  

the Deputy Commissioner was bestowed with discretion to set  

aside the sale, he could do so on such conditions as he  

deemed proper, on its own merits and in accordance with the  

law. The Division Bench also observed that the learned Single  

Judge while rejecting the petition could not have made any  

further observations or issued any directions in the writ  

proceedings. With the aforesaid observations, the Division  

Bench of the High Court by its order dated 7th January, 1975  

allowed the appeal.  

 11.  During the pendency of the writ appeal, the predecessor   

of the appellants had made an application before the Deputy  

Commissioner on 24th November, 1973 under Section 177 of  

the Act, inter alia, requesting the authority to set aside the  

auction sale held on 7th January, 1966 as envisaged in the  

proviso to Section 177 of the Mysore Land Revenue Act. At the

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first instance, by an order made on 9th June, 1975 the  

application was rejected and on an application filed for review  

of the said order, the Deputy Commissioner passed an order  

on 29th September, 1975, holding that the review petition was  

maintainable.   

12. The respondents, aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the  

Deputy Commissioner, filed a revision petition before the  

Karnataka Appellate Tribunal being No.304/1973, inter alia,  

questioning the said order on the ground that the Deputy  

Commissioner had no jurisdiction under Section 177 of the  

Act to exercise his suo-motu powers on an application filed by  

a defaulter. The Tribunal initially allowed the petition by its  

order dated 4th August, 1978 and on a review petition filed by  

the appellants being No.27/1978, it allowed the review petition  

and set aside the order passed in revision petition  

No.304/1973. Further, vide order dated 24th March, 1980, the  

Tribunal directed that the revision petition be posted for  

hearing afresh on merits, and by subsequent order dated 30th

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January, 1981 it rejected the revision petition filed by the  

respondents.  

13. The respondents thereafter filed a writ petition before the  

High Court being No.14012/1981, inter alia, questioning the  

orders passed by the Tribunal in revision petition  

No.304/1973 dated 4.8.1978, 24.3.1980 and 30.1.1981,  

respectively. The learned Single Judge of the High Court by his  

order dated 31st July, 1989 was pleased to set aside the  

aforementioned orders passed by the Tribunal in the revision  

petition and made an observation that the auction sale had  

been confirmed long back.  

14. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants filed a writ appeal,  

being Appeal No.2176/1989. The Division Bench of the High  

Court by its order dated 8th December, 1989 rejected the  

appeal, holding that the view taken by the learned Single  

Judge with regard to Section 177 of the Karnataka Land  

Revenue Act did not call for any interference.   

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15. Appellants, thereafter, filed a suit being O.S. No.27/1990  

before the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Davanagere,  

with a prayer to declare that they are the owners of the suit  

schedule property and also for a direction to the respondents  

to re-deliver the possession of the property. After referring to  

the earlier proceedings before the Deputy Commissioner,  

Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal and before the High  

Court, appellants  asserted that after disposal of the appeal by  

the Mysore Appellate Tribunal in appeal No.486/1967 (LR),  

wherein the confirmation of sale made by the Deputy  

Commissioner, Chitradurga  was set aside and the matter was  

remanded back to the Deputy Commissioner, for fresh  

disposal in accordance with law, no steps have been taken for  

confirmation of sale and for issue of sale certificate by the  

Deputy Commissioner, Chitradurga till date of the suit.  

Therefore, various orders passed in different proceedings  

before the revenue authorities and the Tribunal will not and  

cannot affect the right, title and interest of the appellants in  

any way in respect of the suit schedule property. The  

appellants, therefore, asserted that they are the owners of the

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suit schedule property. Appellants also assert that their  

predecessor, during the pendency of the various proceedings  

before various forums, had deposited the entire amount due to  

the Income Tax Department and, therefore, the confirmation of  

the sale subsequent to receipt of income tax dues does not  

arise. Appellants would further assert that though the  

respondents were put in possession of the suit schedule  

property, under the guise of sale certificate issued by the  

Deputy Commissioner and since the same had been set aside  

by the Tribunal in Appeal No.486/1967 (LR), their possession  

is litigious possession and it would not give them any right to  

continue in possession of the suit schedule property. It is their  

further assertion in the suit that though the appellants  

demanded the respondents to hand over the possession of the  

suit schedule property, the respondents have refused to do the  

same and therefore, appellants were constrained to file the  

suit for declaration and possession of the suit schedule  

property. The cause of action for filing the suit, according to  

the appellants, arose on or about 1st May, 1990 and also in

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July, 1989, when the High Court dismissed the appellants’  

Writ Appeal No.2176/1989.  

  16. The respondents resisted the suit. According to them, in  

view of the proceedings and the order passed in W.P.  

No.14012/1981 dated 31st July, 1989, the averments in the  

plaint regarding the proceedings before the Deputy  

Commissioner and before the revenue authorities have no  

consequence at all and by virtue of those orders, the parties  

have been restored to the original status quo as on 3rd May,  

1966 i.e. the date of confirmation of sale certificate by the  

Deputy Commissioner, and there is no necessity to grant of  

fresh sale certificate. Apart from the above defence, there is no  

other defence pleaded by the respondents in the written  

statements filed before the trial Court.   

17. The Trial Court, based on the pleadings of the parties to  

the suit, framed six issues for its consideration,  as follows:-  

“(i) Whether plaintiffs prove that they are the  

owners entitled for possession of the suit property?

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(ii) Do they further prove that they are entitled for  

possession of the suit property?  

(iii) Whether plaintiffs suit is hit by Sec. 11 of CPC  

as contended in the written statement?  

(iv) Whether defendants are entitled for  

compensatory costs?  

(v) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the reliefs  

as prayed for?  

(vi) What order or decree?”  

18. The Trial Court keeping in view the order passed by the  

High Court in Writ Petition No.14012/1981 and in Writ Appeal  

No.2176/1989, has held that the prayer made in the suit  

challenging the auction sale dated 3rd June, 1966 is hit by  

Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To come to this  

conclusion, the Trial Court has traced the history of various  

proceedings that were initiated by the appellants’ predecessor  

before the revenue authorities and High Court and then  

observed that in view of the order passed by the High Court in  

W.P. No.14012/1981, the suit is hit by principles of res  

judicata.   

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19. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by  

the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), the appellants filed  

Regular First Appeal No.410 of 1998 before the High Court of  

Karnataka at Bangalore.  The High Court took notice of all the  

proceedings that culminated with the dismissal of writ appeal  

filed by the appellants against the decision of the learned  

Single Judge dated 31st July, 1989 in Writ Petition  

No.14012/1981, whereby the correctness of all the orders  

passed by the Revenue Authorities including the Karnataka  

Appellate Tribunal were analysed and the plea of the  

appellants founded on their application dated 24th November,  

1973 and 9th June, 1975 for setting aside the auction sale  

came to be negatived and which judgment was affirmed by the  

Division Bench of the High Court by dismissing the writ appeal  

preferred by the appellants. The High Court, taking notice of  

the decisions in the cases of Shirlakoppa Town  

Municipality Vs. Sree Sharada Rice Mill and Others;1 U.  

Nilan Vs. Kannayyan through LRs.;2 State Bank of  

                                                           1   1982 (1) KLJ 137  

2   AIR 1999 SC 3750

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Travancore Vs. Mytheen Kannu Mastan Kanju;3 Madhavi  

Amma Bhavani Amma and others Vs. Kunjikutty Pillai  

Meenakshi Pillai and others;4  Re: Forward Construction  

Co. and others Vs. Prabhat Mandal (Regd.), Andheri and  

others;5 Ashok Kumar Srivastav Vs. National Insurance  

Co. Ltd.;6 and Re: Gulabchand Chotalal Parikh Vs. State  

of Gujarat;7  summed up the legal position on the doctrine of  

res judicata of triple test requirement regarding the factum of  

identity of the parties, cause of action and the subject matter.  

In other words, any issue that has been raised and decided  

and which was necessary for determining the rights and duties  

of the parties by a final conclusive judgment on the merits  

cannot be re-litigated by the same parties and a party is  

precluded from re-litigating the issue that has already been  

decided and also an issue which it could and should have  

brought forward in the earlier proceedings but chose not to do  

                                                           3   AIR 1980 Kerala 236  

4   2000 AIR SCW 2432  

5   AIR 1986 SC 391  

6   AIR 1998 SC 2046  

7   AIR 1965 SC 1153

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so. Keeping in view those principles, the High Court went on to  

observe as follows:  

“31. The triple identity which I have referred to in the  

earlier paragraphs of my order assumes importance for  

deciding the issues which I have raised for my  

consideration. At the cost repetition, let me once  

again notice the triple requirement for the doctrine  

of res judicata to apply. They are, identity of the  

parties, cause of action and the subject matter. The  

identity of the parties is not in dispute nor it can  

be disputed by the plaintiffs. In fact, their father  

was agitating the auction sale held and its  

confirmation before various forums and after his  

death, the plaintiffs have stepped in to his shows  

(sic) to continue the proceedings till this stage. The  

second requirement is the cause of action. A cause  

of action comprises of all the facts and  

circumstances necessary to give rise to the relief.  

Before the revenue authorities, the Tribunal the  

primary grievance of the plaintiffs was the  

conformation of sale of their immovable property  

held in a public auction by the Deputy  

Commissioner and their illegal dispossession from  

the suit schedule property. Before all the forums,  

the plaintiffs have lost their case and those others  

have been confirmed by this court in the writ  

petitions and writ appeal filed. Thus the orders  

passed by the revenue authorities have become  

final, in the sense, auction of the immovable  

property by a public authority and delivery of the  

possession of the same is not disturbed by any of  

the revenue authorities or the Tribunal or by this  

Court; however the same is also not confirmed by  

the Tribunal pursuant to the remand order passed  

by the Mysore Revenue Tribunal in the appeal

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No.486/1967. Thirdly, the subject matter is the  

same in all the proceedings, namely, suit schedule  

property bearing No.63, measuring 23 acres and 15  

guntas situate at the Bisaleri village, Davanagere  

district.   

32. The doctrine of res judicata would apply in  

these proceedings, for the reason, the claim in the  

earlier litigation was between the same parties, the  

cause of action and the subject matter was also the  

same or identical and by judicial pronouncement by  

a competent Court the possession of the defendants  

is not disturbed. Therefore, plaintiffs are precluded  

from re-litigating an issue that has already been  

decided. Even otherwise also, the plaintiffs father  

or at least the plaintiff’s could have brought  

forward an issue for possession of the suit schedule  

property, in the earlier proceedings but chose not to  

do so and therefore cannot subsequently re-agitate  

the issue, which they could have done in the earlier  

proceedings. Therefore, in my view, the judgment and  

decree passed by the learned trial Judge requires to be  

sustained on the principles of res judicata, may not be on  

the ground that this Court while disposing of the writ  

petition No.14012/1989 disposed off on 31.07.1989 has  

observed that the order passed by the Karnataka  

Appellate Tribunal remanding the matter regarding the  

confirmation of sale has been set aside by this Court. The  

observations made by this Court is an apparent error on  

facts and that could not have been taken note of by the  

trial Court, while deciding the lis between the parties and  

that in my opinion, being an error on facts could have  

been ignored by the trial Court.”    

(emphasis supplied)  

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20. On the aforementioned conclusion reached by the High  

Court, it proceeded to dismiss the first appeal preferred by the  

appellants. The appellants have approached this Court by way  

of special leave inter alia contending that the issue regarding  

confirmation of auction sale was reopened in view of the  

decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal dated 27th  

September, 1967. In absence of confirmation of sale and non-

issuance of fresh sale certificate to the respondents, no  

manner of right, title or interest or whatsoever over the suit  

schedule property enured in favour of the respondents. The  

fact that the respondents’ ancestor late Balakerappa was put  

in possession of the suit schedule property, on the basis of  

sale certificate and confirmation of sale on 3rd May, 1966 will  

not impair the interest of the appellants in any manner nor  

denude them from pursuing their remedy of restoration of  

possession of the suit property, the ownership whereof  

remained with the appellants. According to the appellants, the  

High Court as well as the Trial Court committed manifest error  

in invoking the principle of res judicata to non-suit the

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appellants and dismiss the suit for possession on the basis of  

their title and to declare them as owners of the suit property.  

21. The respondents, on the other hand, would contend that  

the Trial Court as well as the High Court had justly rejected  

the suit preferred by the appellants as it was hit by the  

principles of res judicata.  The respondents have supported  

the analysis and conclusion reached by the Trial Court as well  

as the High Court in this regard.  They pray for dismissal of  

the appeal being devoid of merits.   

 22.   We have heard Mr. Kashi Vishweshar, learned counsel  

appearing for the appellants land Mr. E.C. Vidya Sagar,  

learned counsel for the respondents.   

23. The factual matrix noticed by the Trial Court and  

reiterated by the High Court in the impugned judgment is  

indisputable. In that, the predecessor in title of the appellants  

had committed default in paying tax for which the suit  

property was put to auction in which the predecessor in title of  

the respondents was the highest bidder. The auction sale was

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confirmed by the competent authority.  The correctness of the  

confirmation of sale without deciding the application for  

setting aside the sale, preferred by the predecessor of the  

appellants, was questioned by him. The matter had reached  

the High Court by way of Writ Petition No.1810/1971, filed by  

Andanur Umapathiyappa predecessor of the appellants, which  

was dismissed with the observation that if the writ petitioner  

was willing to deposit the sale amount, the Deputy  

Commissioner could exercise his suo motu power to set aside  

the said sale as provided in terms of Section 177 of the Mysore  

Land Revenue Act. This observation, however was assailed by  

the respondents by way of Writ Appeal No.152/1973 before  

the Division Bench.  The Division Bench allowed the said  

appeal. The relevant extract of the order passed by the  

Division Bench dated 7th January, 1975, having some bearing  

on the matter in issue, reads thus:   

 “The result of the dismissal of the writ petition is  

that there is no application now pending for setting  

aside the sale. However, under the proviso, the Deputy  Commissioner has the power to exercise his discretion to  set aside the sale subject to such conditions as he may  deem proper, notwithstanding the fact that the

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application made for setting aside the sale has been  rejected. Whether it is a case for setting aside the sale  and on what conditions the sale should be set-aside are  matters which are within the exclusive discretion of the  

Deputy Commissioner. This court, in the exercise of  its jurisdiction, cannot direct the Deputy  

Commissioner to exercise the discretion if the  

conditions imposed by this Court are satisfied. It is  

not for this court to lay down any conditions. That  

matter should have been left open.    Therefore, we allow this appeal and hold that  the Writ Petition should have been dismissed  

without making any observation as to how the  

discretion under the proviso to Section 177 of the  

Karnataka Land Revenue Act should be exercised.  

No costs.”   (emphasis supplied)  

With this decision, the issue regarding validity of auction sale  

attained finality against the appellants.  

24. The matter did not rest at that as the revision petition  

filed by the respondents as well as the appellants in relation to  

application filed by the appellants for invoking the discretion  

of the Deputy Commissioner to set aside the auction were then  

made subject matter of another writ petition filed by the  

respondents, being Writ Petition No.14012/1981. The learned  

Single Judge of the High Court of Karknataka at Bangalore by  

judgment dated 31st July, 1989 considered the tenability of the

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orders passed by the Revenue Authorities and the Appellate  

Tribunal, in particular, orders dated 4th August, 1978, 24th  

March, 1980 and 31st January, 1981. The order dated 31st  

July, 1989 passed by the learned Single Judge is, in our  

opinion, crucial to answer the issue that arises for our  

consideration. The order dated 31st July, 1989 reads thus:  

“ORDER  

 This Writ Petition is of the year 1981. I hope by  

disposing it off I would have given quietus to a  controversy which appears to have arisen in the year  1966 when the predecessor in interest of the respondents  one Andanur Umapathiyappa lost 26 acres of land for  

having defaulted in payment of income tax arrears for  recovery of which sum, lands were sold by public auction  and purchased by the contesting respondent who was  also placed in possession immediately.    

 2. It is common ground that the lands have been in  

possession of the petitioner since the date of the auction  sale and notwithstanding many endeavours made by the  respondents to wrest it from the petitioner by reason of a  charmed life they had managed to sustain their holding  over the lands.     3. In this last ditch battle for recovery of these  

lands the point raised is of the tenability of an  

application made for setting aside the auction sale  

by moving the Deputy Commissioner to exercise his  

suo moto powers under Section 177 of the  

Karnataka Land Revenue Act, although auction  

sale having been affirmed long back. That application  the Deputy Commissioner disposed off on 9.6.75, for  some reasons he rejected the same. But the respondents  filed another application on 17.06.1975 to the Deputy

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Commissioner seeking a review of the earlier order. The  Deputy Commissioner having held application to be  maintainable despite opposition by the petitioner a  revision petition having been filed from that order before  

the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, the Deputy  Commissioner‟s order was in the first instance upheld  but retracted later on a review petition and an order  made dismissing the revision petition. Petitioners  challenge the sad or per (sic) as also the order of the  

Deputy Commissioner dated 29.09.1975 holding a review  petition before him to be maintainable.     4. Sri Gopal who appears for the auction purchaser  who is aggrieved by these orders urges that respondents  had any right at all to seek interference by the Deputy  

Commissioner under the provisions of section 177 of the  land Revenue Act. This Court in G.D. NAVAREKAR Vs.  The Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal and others (1973  (1) MLJ 331) has settled the law on the question of  exercising of suo moto power by a revenue authority  under section 177 with particular reference to its  

modality, it says:     „Suffice it to state that power is to be exercised in  the interest of justice and subject to such conditions as  the authority may deem proper and it does not confer a  right on the petitioner to ask the Assistant Commissioner  

to invoke the issue.‟     5. It was pointed out by this Court in the decision  referred to supra, that no one has a right to move the  Deputy Commissioner to exercise his suo moto powers  under section 177 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act.  

In this case review application having been  

disposed off by the Deputy Commissioner on  

9.6.1975 may be even for wrong reasons as pointed  

out by Mr. Gopal for the petitioner, having become  

final it seems to me that it was wrong on the part  

of the appellate Tribunal to have lent support to  

the application made by the respondents  

demanding or seeking exercise of suo moto powers  

by Deputy Commissioner acting under Section 177

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of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. Therefore, it  

seems to me on this short ground the writ petition  

has to succeed and hence it is I allow this writ  

petition and quash the impugned order of the  

Appellate Tribunal and that of the Deputy  

Commissioner Annexure-C, E and F. No costs.”  (emphasis supplied)  

25. This decision was challenged by the appellants by way of  

writ appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court which,  

however, was summarily dismissed vide order dated 8th  

December, 1989, The same reads thus:   

 “O R D E R  

 The view taken by the learned Single Judge with regard  to Section 177 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act does  

not call for interference. Hence, this Appeal is rejected.”    

With the rejection of this appeal, even the issue of tenability of  

application under Section 177 of the Act became final against  

the appellants.   

 26. After all these proceedings, the appellants resorted to a  

civil suit before the Civil Judge (Senior Division) at  

Davanagere, being O.S. No.27/90, for declaration of ownership  

and possession.  In the suit, the principal issue was that in

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absence of an order of the competent authority confirming the  

auction sale and without issuing fresh sale certificate in favour  

of the respondents, the respondents or for that matter their  

predecessor in title, had not acquired any right, title or  

interest or whatsoever over the suit schedule property.   

Therefore, the possession of the suit property given to the  

predecessor of the respondents was required to be restored in  

absence of a fresh order of confirmation of sale. The argument  

though attractive at the first blush, has received deep  

attention not only of the Trial Court but of the High Court  

also, as can be noticed from the analysis in paragraphs 20 and  

21 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:   

“20. Admittedly, in the present case, the Deputy  Commissioner without considering the application filed  by the defaulter on 3.2.1966 had confirmed the auction  sale of the immovable property on 7.1.1966 on the  recommendation made by the Assistant Commissioner in  favour of the highest bidder in the auction namely, the  

father of the defendants late Sri belekerappa. This action  of the Deputy Commissioner was taken exception to by  the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal in the appeal  filed by the plaintiffs father in appeal No.486/1967 (LR)  and the Tribunal by its order had set aside the order of  the confirmation of sale passed by the Deputy  

Commissioner vide his order dated 3.6.1966 and had  remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner to pass

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fresh order in accordance with law after considering the  application filed by the plaintiffs father. On such remand,  since plaintiffs father did not appear before the Deputy  Commissioner on the date fixed for hearing, the Deputy  

Commissioner has rejected the application for non- prosecution. The order so made has reached the finality  in view of the order made by this Court in  W.P.No.1810/1971 and in W.A. No.152/1973. Even after  disposal of all these proceedings, the Deputy  Commissioner has not passed any fresh order in  

confirming the sale, pursuant to the remand order passed  by the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal made in  appeal No.486/1967 (LR) dated 27.9.1967 and further  has not issued fresh sale certificate. These factual  aspects which is not disputed by the learned Counsel for  appellants would demonstrate that the defendants are in  

possession of the suit schedule property pursuant to  order of confirmation of sale passed by the Deputy  Commissioner, which had been set aside by the Revenue  Appellate Tribunal.    21. The other proceedings initiated by the father of the  

plaintiffs is to approach the Deputy Commissioner to set  aside the sale by filing an application under Sec. 177 of  the Act. Though, initially the Deputy Commissioner had  rejected the application as not maintainable before him,  on an application filed for review of his order, he had  entertained the application by observing in his order that  

an application filed by the defaulter to initiate suo-motu  powers by him under proviso to Section 177 of the Act is  maintainable. The correctness or otherwise of this order  was questioned by the legal representatives of the late  Sri Belekerappa – the defendants before the Revenue  Appellate Tribunal in Revision Petition No.304/1973 filed  

under Sec. 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act. The  Tribunal by its order dated 30.1.1981 holds that the  Deputy Commissioner was justified in invoking his  powers under Sec. 177 of the Act on an application filed  by the defaulter to set aside the sale and therefore, has  rejected the revision petition and have directed the  

Deputy Commissioner to consider the petition/application  filed by the father of the plaintiffs under Sec.177 of the

26    

Act in accordance with law. It is the correctness or  otherwise of this order was the subject matter  

before this Court in W.P. No.14012/1981 and this  

Court while allowing the petition and setting aside  

the order passed by the Karnataka Appellate  

Tribunal in Revision Petition No.304/1973 has  

made a passing observation to the effect that ‘in  

this last ditch battle for recovery of these lands,  

the point raised is of the tenability of an  

application made for setting aside the auction sale  

by moving the Deputy Commissioner to exercise his  

suo-motu powers under Sec.177 of the Karnataka  

Land Revenue Act, although the auction sale  

having been confirmed long back.’ It is this  

observation of the learned Single Judge, which has  

been confirmed in W.A. No.2176/1989 has weighed  

the mind of the learned trial Judge to hold that the  

suit is hit by principles of res judicata.”    

(emphasis supplied)  

27.   As is noticed from the judgment of the leaned Single  

Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No.14102/1981 dated  

31st July, 1989, reproduced in its entirety in earlier part  

(paragraph 24) of this judgment, the entire issue with regard  

to the confirmation of the auction sale and the sale certificate  

issued in favour of the predecessor of the respondents, was  

the subject matter before the High Court between the same  

parties in respect of the same land and including the cause of  

action. On that finding, the Trial Court as well as the High

27    

Court non-suited the appellants by dismissing the suit filed by  

them for declaration of ownership and possession, being hit by  

the principles of res judicata, as can be discerned from the  

discussion in paragraphs 31 and 32 of the impugned  

judgment, which have been extracted in paragraph 19 of this  

judgment. We are in complete agreement with the analysis of  

facts and the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court and  

affirmed by the High Court.   

 28. For arriving at such conclusion, the Trial Court and High  

Court have applied the settled legal position in reference to the  

decisions of this Court as noticed by the High Court in the  

impugned judgment. The principle of res judicata as enshrined  

in Section 11 of CPC, is founded on the maxim “Nemo Debet  

Bis Vexari Pro Una Et Eadem Causa”.  In a  recent decision     

in the case of Nagabhushanammal Vs. C.  

Chandikeswaralingam,8 this Court observed thus:  

“15. „Res judicata‟ literally means a „thing adjudicated‟ or  „an issue that has been definitively settled by judicial  

                                                           8   (2016) 4 SCC 434

28    

decision‟.9 The principle operates as a bar to try the same  issue once over. It aims to prevent multiplicity of  proceedings and accords finality to an issue, which  directly and substantially had arisen in the former suit  

between the same parties or their privies and was  decided and has become final, so that the parties are not  vexed twice over; vexatious litigation is put an end to and  valuable time of the court is saved. (See Sulochana Amma  v. Narayanan Nair.10)  

16. In Jaswant Singh v. Custodian of Evacuee Property11  

this Court has laid down a test for determining whether a  subsequent suit is barred by res judicata: (SCC p. 657,  para 14)  

„14. … In order that a defence of res judicata may  

succeed it is necessary to show that not only the  cause of action was the same but also that the  

plaintiff had an opportunity of getting the relief  which he is now seeking in the former proceedings.  The test is whether the claim in the subsequent suit  or proceedings is in fact founded upon the same  cause of action which was the foundation of the  former suit or proceedings.‟  

17. The expression „cause of action‟ came to be interpreted  

by this Court in Kunjan Nair Sivaraman Nair v.  Narayanan Nair12 at para 16. To quote: (SCC p. 286)  

„16. The expression „cause of action‟ has acquired a  

judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense,  cause of action means the circumstances forming  

the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion  for the action. In the wider sense, it means the  necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit,  including not only the infraction of the right, but the  

                                                           9   Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edn., 1336-37.  

10   (1994) 2 SCC 14  

11   (1985) 3 SCC 648  

12  (2004) 3 SCC 277  

29    

infraction coupled with the right itself.  Compendiously the expression means every fact  which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove,  if traversed, in order to support his right to the  

judgment of the court. Every fact which is necessary  to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of  evidence which is necessary to prove each fact,  comprises in „cause of action‟.  

18. In Halsbury‟s Laws of England (4th Edn.), the  

expression has been defined as follows:  

„Cause of action‟ has been defined as meaning  

simply a factual situation the existence of which  entitles one person to obtain from the court a remedy  against another person. The phrase has been held  from earliest time to include every fact which is  material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to  

succeed, and every fact which a defendant would  have a right to traverse. „Cause of action‟ has also  been taken to mean that particular act on the part of  the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of  complaint, or the subject-matter of grievance  founding the action, not merely the technical cause  

of action.”  

29. The principle of res judicata applies on all fours to the  

present case as has been rightly held by the Trial Court and  

affirmed by the High Court in the impugned judgment, in  

particular, in paragraphs 31 and 32 thereof, which have been  

reproduced in paragraph 19 above.  

30    

30. We, accordingly, affirm the judgment and orders under  

appeal and dismiss these appeals being devoid of merit.   

31. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed with costs.   

.………………………….CJI.        (Dipak Misra)   

…………………………..….J.                (A.M. Khanwilkar)  

…………………………..….J.               (Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud)  

New Delhi;  

March 6, 2018.