AMRUTLAL LILADHARBHAI KOTAK Vs STATE OF GUJARAT
Bench: M.Y. EQBAL,PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE
Case number: Crl.A. No.-000186-000186 / 2010
Diary number: 27028 / 2009
Advocates: CHARU MATHUR Vs
HEMANTIKA WAHI
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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 186 OF 2010
Amrutlal Liladharbhai Kotak & Ors. …..Appellants
:Versus:
State of Gujarat …..Respondent
JUDGMENT
Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J.
1. This criminal appeal, by special leave, is directed against the
impugned common judgment dated June 17, 2009 of the High
Court of Gujarat whereby the High Court dismissed Criminal
Appeal No.1327 of 2004 filed by the appellants and confirmed the
order passed by the Trial Court. The High Court in the present
matter upheld the sentence as awarded by the Trial Court by
stating that the evidence led by the complainant (PW-1), the
elder sister of the deceased (PW-8) and the grandfather of the
deceased (PW-9) gets support from the evidence led by PW-7,
who are the friends and relatives of the deceased.
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2. The case of the Prosecution is that the marriage between
Truptiben (the deceased) and the appellant No.3 herein took
place on 01.05.1996. Truptiben was the daughter of one Kantilal
Dhanjibhai Karia of District Rajkot in Gujarat. After the marriage,
Truptiben was residing in a joint family with her in-laws appellant
Nos.1 and 2 and her husband appellant No.3 at Morbi, Gujarat.
Out of the said wedlock, a girl named Gopi was born.
3. On 23.03.2000 at around 1130 Hrs, while Kantilal Dhanjibhai
Karia was discharging his duties in the Bank of Baroda at Rajkot,
he received a telephonic message from Appellant No.1, that his
daughter is hanging by the fan and that he may immediately
come to Morbi. Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia informed about the said
telephonic message to his nearest relatives and thereafter, they
all proceeded towards Morbi.
4. In the meantime, Appellant No.1 had informed about the said
incident to Morbi City Police Station. The P.S.O, who was on duty
at the relevant time, made the relevant entry in the Station
Register and directed the ASI to investigate the matter. The ASI
went to the scene of the offence and carried out preliminary
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investigation. He recorded the statement of Appellant No.1 and
thereafter, sent a yaadi to the P.S.O to register the incident as an
accidental death, which came to be registered as A.D.
No.16/2000. Thereafter, investigation into the said incident was
taken over by Police Inspector Mr. Jaynarayan Rameshwar
Srivastav. The Investigating Officer informed Kantilal Dhanjibhai
Karia, the father of the deceased, of the said incident and in
return he asked the Investigating Officer not to disturb the
position of the dead body of his daughter till he arrives at Morbi.
5. The said Kantilal Dhanjibhai Karia, the father of the deceased
arrived at 1500 Hrs on the same day. He felt something fishy
behind the death of her daughter Truptiben, as the appellants
had demanded dowry several times in the past, which was
further strengthened by the fact that none of the appellants were
present in the house at the relevant point of time.
6. On the same day, i.e on 23.03.2000, in the evening hours, a
criminal complaint with regard to the said incident was filed by
the father of the deceased against the appellants, which
ultimately, came to be registered as I-C.R No. 92/2000 for offence
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punishable under Sections 498-A, 304-B & 306 read with Section
114 of the IPC. The body of the deceased was taken off the fan
and sent for post-mortem examination. The investigation was
carried out and the statements of several witnesses were
recorded.
7. After the registration of the complaint against the appellants, an
arrest warrant was issued by the concerned Judicial Magistrate,
1st Class, Morbi on report filed by the Investigating Officer under
Section 70 Cr.P.C, but the appellants were untraceable. They
were absconding for a period of thirty six days and ultimately on
29.04.2000 at around 2130 Hrs., the appellants surrendered
themselves at the Morbi City Police Station.
8. The appellants were produced in the court of the District & Addl.
Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.7, Morbi in Sessions Case
No.52/2000 and the trial was held. During the trial, the witnesses
were examined at length. The witnesses PW-1 , PW-8 and PW-9
stated that the deceased used to complain about the mental
torture and harassment frequently meted out to her by the
accused due to the insufficient dowry provided during the
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marriage. This evidence was supported by PW-7, the friend of the
deceased who stated that the deceased had informed her that
she was subject to frequent mental torture and harassment by
the accused for bringing less dowry. This witness was also cross-
examined at length by the other side alike the other witnesses
and based on the evidence provided by the witnesses, the
accused were convicted for the offences punishable under
Sections 498A, 304B & 306 IPC read with Section 114 IPC.
9. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment and
order passed by the Sessions Court, the appellants preferred an
appeal before the High Court. The counsel for the appellants
contended before the High Court that the evidence stated by the
relatives of the deceased are interested witnesses and their
statements could not be solely relied upon.
10. The High Court opined out that the deceased died of a suicidal
death is not a dispute though the evidence on record, more
particularly, the photographs of the dead body at Exhibits 49/1 to
49/7 and the inquest Panchnama, say an altogether different
story. The High Court further observed that since it was an appeal
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under Section 374 Cr.P.C, it did not want to enter into the other
aspect of the case and instead focus on the present appeal. The
evidence led by the complainant (PW-1), the elder sister (PW-8)
and the grandfather of the deceased (PW-9) gets support from
the evidence led by (PW-7) who are the friend and relatives of the
deceased. The High Court further opined out that the evidence of
PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 clearly establishes that the
appellants were greedy people, who had started to demand
dowry right from the date of marriage i.e on 01.05.1996. It is the
case of the appellants that the essential ingredient of Section
304-B IPC regarding the existence of cruelty soon before the
death has not been established by the prosecution. The High
Court thus upheld the ultimate conclusion and the resultant order
of conviction recorded by the Trial Court.
11. We have heard the learned counsels on both the sides.
12. The counsel for the appellant contended that the prosecution has
failed to substantiate the guilt of the appellants under Sections
306 and 304B of IPC. The counsel further contended that to
satisfy the conditions of Sections 304-B and 306 of the IPC, it
must be shown that the deceased was incited, provided or
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virtually driven to committing suicide by the accused. The
counsel for the appellant stated that in the case of Kishori Lal
v. State of M.P., (2007) 10 SCC 797, this Court has held that in
cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct
or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The
mere fact that the husband treated wife with cruelty is not
enough.
13. The counsel for the appellants further stated that in the case of
Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 281,
this Court has held that the object of Section 498A of the IPC is to
get to the root of dowry menace and its unleashing will lead to a
legal terrorism. The provision is to be used as a shield and not as
an assassin’s weapon. The counsel further contended that in the
case of Sakatar Singh & Ors. v. State of Haryana, (2004)
11 SCC 291, this Court has held that such evidence which is not
based on the personal knowledge of the witness cannot be the
foundation for basing of conviction. The learned counsel for the
appellant further contended that in the case of M. Srinivasulu
v. State of A.P., (2007) 12 SCC 443, it was held by this Court
that a presumption under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence
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Act can be only raised in case of dowry death, if there is concrete
proof of cruelty and harassment meted out to the deceased by
the accused. The learned counsel for the appellants further
contended that merely because the accused was absconding, the
said fact cannot be made the basis for inferring his guilt. The
learned counsel cited the case of Matru v. State of U.P.,
reported in (1971) 2 SCC 75 , where it has been held that the
appellants’ conduct in absconding by itself does not necessarily
lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man
may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected
of a grave crime.
14. We would like to conclude that going by the version provided by
PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9, there is a reasonable apprehension
of the crime committed by the accused. With regard to the
position of law involving applicability of Sections 498A, 304B and
306 of the IPC, in the case of Balwant Singh and Ors. v. State
of Himachal Pradesh, (2008) 15 SCC 497, it has been held that
Section 304B and Section 498A of the IPC are not mutually
inclusive. If an accused is acquitted under one section, it does not
mean that the accused cannot be convicted under another
section. According to Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act,
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presumption arises when a woman has committed suicide within
a period of seven years from the date of the marriage. In this
case, after going through the documentary evidence and the
version of the witnesses, the accused were convicted under
Sections 304B and 498A of the IPC. In the present case that we
are dealing with, a reasonable apprehension can be raised, for
that the accused committed a crime under Section 304B of the
IPC and a presumption can be raised under Section 113 B of the
Indian Evidence Act, since seven years of marriage had not been
completed.
15. With regard to the applicability of Sections 113A and 113B of the
Indian evidence Act, in the case of State of Punjab v. Iqbal
Singh and Ors., (1991) 3 SCC 1, this Court observed that the
legislative intent is clear to curb the menace of dowry deaths,
etc, with a firm hand. It must be remembered that since crimes
are generally committed in the privacy of residential homes, it is
not easy to gather direct evidence in such cases. That is why the
legislature has by introducing Sections 113A and 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, tried to strengthen the prosecution hands by
permitting a presumption to be raised if certain foundational facts
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are established and the unfortunate event has taken place within
a period of seven years.
16. With regard to whether any direct link has been shown between
dowry demand and death, in the case of Dinesh v. State of
Haryana, 2014 (5) SCALE 641, the accused has been convicted
under Sections 113B and 304B of the IPC, on the basis of
presumption, since certain foundational facts were established. In
the present case, it has been established from the versions of
PW-1, PW-7, PW-8 and PW-9 that there was a demand for dowry
and the deceased was being mentally harassed.
17. In the case of Thanu Ram v. State of M.P., (2010) 10 SCC 353,
this Court has observed certain criteria with regard to
establishment of guilt in the cases of dowry death. The first
criterion being that the suicide must have been committed within
seven years of marriage. The second criterion is that the husband
or some relative of the husband had subjected the victim to
cruelty, which led to the commission of suicide by the victim. This
is when Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act indicates that in
such circumstances, the Court may presume, having regard to all
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the circumstances of the case, that such suicide has been
abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. In the
present case that we are dealing with, both the above mentioned
criteria have been satisfied, since the deceased died within seven
years of marriage and with the version of the witnesses, it has
been further proved that there was cruelty meted out to the
deceased immediately before her unfortunate death.
18. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the impugned
judgment passed by the High Court or the Trial Court. The appeal
is accordingly dismissed.
………..…….…………………..J (M.Y. EQBAL)
………..……………….………..J (PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE) New Delhi;
February 26, 2015.