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     NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4252 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.34261 of 2012]

Amina Bi Kaskar (D) Thr. Lr.         .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Union of India & Ors.          .. Respondent(s)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.4253 OF 2018 [Arising out of SLP (C) No.34647 of 2012]

J U D G M E N T

Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.

1) Leave granted.

2) These appeals have been filed against the final

judgment and order dated 27.09.2012 passed by the

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High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in L.P.A. Nos.656

and 657 of 2011 whereby the Division Bench of the

High  Court  dismissed  the  appeals  filed  by  the

appellants  herein  and  upheld  the  order  dated

14.07.2011 passed by the Single Judge in W.P. [C]

1426 & 1439/1999.

3) The issue involved in these appeals is short and

it relates to the question as to whether the Tribunal

was justified in dismissing the appellants’ appeals as

being barred by time and was justified in holding that

there was no sufficient cause for condoning the delay

in filing the appeals and secondly, whether the High

Court  was  justified  in  upholding  the  order  of  the

Tribunal.

4) Few  relevant  facts  need  to  be  mentioned  to

appreciate the short controversy.

5) An  order  was  passed  by  the  Competent

Authority  under  Section  7  of  the  Smugglers  and

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Foreign  Exchange  Manipulators  (forfeiture  of

Property)  Act,  1976  (hereinafter  referred  to  as

“SAFEMA”) against the appellants on 14.07.1998 and

14.10.1998 in relation to their properties.  

6) The  appellants  felt  aggrieved  of  the

aforementioned  orders  and  filed  appeals  on

20.10.1998  under  Section  12(4)  of  SAFEMA before

the  Appellate  Tribunal  for  Forfeited  Property,  New

Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”).  

7)  The  limitation  to  file  an  appeal  before  the

Tribunal is 45 days from the date of the service of the

order as prescribed under SAFEMA. However, if the

appeal is filed beyond the period of 45 days then on

sufficient cause being shown, the Appellate Authority

is  empowered  to  condone  the  delay  in  filing  the

appeal only up to 60 days but not beyond the period

of 60 days.

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8) In this case, the appeals were filed beyond the

period of 60 days, i.e., the appeals were filed on 81st

day  after  the  service  of  the  order.  The  appellants,

therefore, filed application for condonation of delay in

the  appeals  alleging  therein  that  there  was  a

sufficient  cause  in  filing  the  appeals  beyond  the

period of limitation.  

9) The  Tribunal  dismissed  the  appeals  as  being

barred by time. In other words, the Tribunal was of

the view that even, according to the appellants’ own

version mentioned in the appeals’ memo, there was

no sufficient cause made out for condoning the delay.

It  was  also  held  that  since  the  appeals  were  filed

beyond 60 days, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to

condone such delay.  

10) In other words, it  was held that the power to

condone the delay in filing the appeal is only when

the appeal is filed beyond 45 days but not beyond 60

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days. Since in this case, the appeals were filed on 81st

day, the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to condone the

delay beyond the  period of  60th day.  The Tribunal,

therefore, did not find any apparent error to review

their order in the absence of any power to review and

further any error to rectify such order.  

11) The appellants, felt aggrieved by the order of the

Tribunal, filed writ petition under Article 226/227 of

the  Constitution  before  the  High  Court.  By  order

dated  14.07.2011/27.07.2011,  Single  Judge  of  the

High Court dismissed the petitions.   

12) Against  the  order  of  the  Single  Judge,  the

appellants filed intra court appeals.   By impugned

judgment,  the  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court

dismissed the appeals and affirmed the order passed

by the Single Judge which has given rise to filing of

the present appeals by way of special  leave in this

Court.

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13) Heard  Dr.  Rajeev  Dhavan,  learned  senior

counsel  for  the  appellants  and  Mr.  K.

Radhakrishnan,   learned  senior  counsel  for  the

respondents.  

14) Having heard the learned counsel for the parties

at length and on perusal of the record of the case, we

find no merit in the appeals.

15) In  our  opinion,  when  even  according  to  the

appellants,  the  orders  impugned  in  the  appeals

before the Tribunal were served on them on 29/30th

July 1998, then in such event, the question as to the

manner  in  which  the  service  was  effected  and

whether  it  was  in  accordance  with  the  procedure

prescribed  under  Section  22  of  SAFEMA  has  no

significance  and  really  does  not  arise  for

consideration.  

16) We, however, consider it apposite to reproduce

Para 3 of the impugned judgment for perusal:

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“Some  facts  would  be  necessary  to decide  these  appeals.  The  competent authority  under  SAFEMA  passed  an  order dated  14.07.1998  for  forfeiture  of  several properties under Section 7 of SAFEMA. The common  appeal  filed  on  behalf  of  the appellants was beyond the period of 60 days from  the  passing  of  the  order  dated 14.07.1998 by the competent authority. We may  point  out,  at  this  stage,  that  the appellants had admitted in their said appeal before  the  Tribunal  that  the  order  dated 14.07.1998 was served upon them on 29/30th July, 1998. This admission has clearly been made in paragraph 3 as well as paragraph 8 of the appeal.  The clear admission was to the following effect: ‘that  the  said  order  dated  14.07.1998  was received by the  appellant  sometime around 29-30th of July, 1998’.

A condonation of delay application was also filed alongwith the said appeal before the said Tribunal. Paragraph 4 of the said condonation of delay application reads as under:

“The impugned order dated 14.07.1998, was served on the appellant on 29/30th July,  1998,  and  the  appellant  should have preferred an appeal within 45 days therefrom. The appellants are illiterate and  paradanashini  widows  and  the appellant No. 1 has the duty of bringing up  for  minor  children  and  an  ailing aged mother who is appellant No. 2 in addition to other social obligations.”

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17) In the light of the aforementioned finding of fact

recorded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High

Court, we do not consider it necessary to examine the

question  though  vehemently  argued  by  Dr.  Rajeev

Dhavan,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the  appellants,

namely, whether in a given case service of the order

on  the   appellants’  lawyer  is  proper  or  not  and

whether  the  service  on  the  appellants’  minor

daughter  was  in  accordance  with  the  procedure

prescribed under Section 22 of SAFEMA or not.

18) If the appellants had the knowledge of the order

passed against them and which they admit to have as

per their own admission mentioned above, pursuant

to which they filed appeals, then in our opinion, so

called  irregularity  in  the  manner  of  effecting  the

service  of  the  order  on  them  etc.  was  of  no

consequence and cannot be termed as illegal  per se

(if found to exist though denied by the Revenue).

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19) In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  the

decisions cited by learned senior counsel in Kuntesh

Gupta Dr.(Smt.) vs. Management of Hindu Kanya

Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur(U.P.) & Ors., 1987 (4) SCC

525,  Yakub  Abdul  Razak  Memon vs.  Competent

Authority, 1997 (11) SCC 421,  Chingleput Bottlers

vs.  Majestic  Bottling  Co.,  AIR 1984  SC1030 and

Attorney  General  For  India  &  Ors.  vs.  Amartlal

Prajivandas  &  Ors.,  1994  (5)  SCC  54  are

distinguishable on facts.

20) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the

considered view that the Tribunal, Single Judge and

Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  were  right  in

dismissing the appeals as being barred by limitation

holding that there was no sufficient cause in filing

the appeals beyond the period of limitation and that

the Tribunal did not have power to condone the delay

beyond 60 days.

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21) This being a finding of fact in a given case and

apart from it, neither being illegal and nor perverse,

we do not find any good ground to interfere in such

finding and accordingly uphold the same.

22) The  appeals  thus  fail  and  are  accordingly

dismissed.

………………………………..J  (R.K. AGRAWAL)

           …..………………………………J.      (ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE)

New Delhi, April 20, 2018