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REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4021 OF 2007

AMBIKAPATHI AMMAL & ANR.     ...APPELLANTS VERSUS

SRI KANDASWAMY KOIL BY ITS  EXECUTIVE OFFICER THIRUPORUR  ...RESPONDENT

WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4590 OF 2007 CIVIL APPEAL NO.738 OF 2008

JUDGMENT RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. These  three  appeals  seek  to  challenge  the  common  order  of  the  High  Court of Judicature at Madras dated 29th  

January, 2007 passed in Second Appeal Nos.

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543 to 545 of 1994 by which the decree of  the dismissal of the suits filed by the  plaintiff  has  been  reversed  by  the  High  Court.

2. We have heard the learned counsels  for the parties.

3. The common case of the plaintiff  as pleaded in the suits filed is that the  plaintiff  is  the  owner  of  the  suit  properties by virtue of Patta No.1 granted  to it and that the defendants are either  lessees  under  the  plaintiff  or  sub- lessees/sub-assignees under the lessees of  the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff,  the  defendants  had  stopped  rendering

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service  to  the  temple  and  had  also  not  paid the rent due. Instead they had set up  title to the suit properties.  The leases  were  accordingly  terminated  by  issuing  notices under Section 106 of the Transfer  of  Property  Act.   Thereafter,  the  suits  for declaration of title and recovery of  possession were instituted.

4. The defendants in each of the suit  contested  the  case  of  the  plaintiff  and  filed their written statements.  According  to  the  defendants,  the  suit  properties  belonged  to  them  by  inheritance;  the  plaintiff is not the owner thereof.  In  any  case,  according  to  the  defendants,  they  had  acquired  title  to  the  suit

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properties by prescription on account of  their long possession.  The defendants had  filed  additional  written  statements  in  each of the case contending that they were  permanent  ryots  under  the  Tamil  Nadu  Estates  Land  Act,  1908  (hereinafter  referred to as “the 1908 Act”) and that  the  suit  properties  are  included  in  an  estate which was abolished under the Tamil  Nadu  Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion  into  Ryotwari)  Act,  1948  (hereinafter  referred to as “the 1948 Act”).  Hence,  according to the defendants, the plaintiff  had  no  locus  to  institute  the  suits  in  question.  

5.  The learned trial Court, as also the

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first appellate Court, took the view that  Patta  No.1  on  the  basis  of  which  the  plaintiff had claimed title had not been  exhibited.  Thereafter, the learned trial  Court and the first appellate Court went  into  the  case  pleaded  by  the  defendants  and held that the rent receipts issued by  the plaintiff to the defendants (Exhibits  B4, B5 to B8, B12 to B22 and B27 to B37)  establish that the suit properties were an  estate under the 1908 Act and further that  by virtue of the 1948 Act the said estate  stood abolished. On this additional ground  also the learned trial Court as well as  the first appellate Court decided against  the plaintiff.

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6. The  High  Court  in  Second  Appeal  framed the following substantial questions  of law for adjudication.

“(1) Whether  the  finding  that  Thiruporur  is  an  estate  taken over under Act 26/48  is based on no evidence?

(2) Whether patta holders under  EKABOGAM Mirasidar can claim  title to the lands?

(3) Whether  the  defendants  can  claim  title  by  prescription?”

7. In  answering  the  aforesaid  questions  the  High  Court  admittedly  did  not deal with the rights of the plaintiff  under  the  Patta  as  claimed  i.e.  Patta

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No.1. Instead, the High Court relying on  the rent receipts issued by the plaintiff  wherein the plaintiff had described itself  as  EKABOGAM  Mirasidar  proceeded  to  determine the status of Mirasidars and the  special  incidents  of  mirasi  tenures  relying  on  its  own  decision  rendered  in  Ramalinga  Mudali  and  another  vs.  T.S.  Ramasami Ayyar [AIR 1929 Madras 529] and  C.N. Varadappan vs.  The State of Madras  represented by the Collector of Chingleput  

at Saidapet, Madras and others [1963 (1)  MLJ 405]. On such consideration, the High  Court  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  title and ownership of the suit properties  vested  in  the  plaintiff  as  a  Mirasidar.

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The  claim  of  the  defendants  to  being  permanent ryots under the 1908 Act on the  basis  of  the  rent  receipts  issued  under  Section 63 of the said Act was negatived  by the High Court on the ground that the  said receipts were printed receipts also  covering another village which was a Inam  village.   Insofar  as  the  1948  Act  (Abolition  Act)  is  concerned,  the  High  Court took the view that the notification  required  to  be  published  under  Section  1(4) of the 1948 Act was not brought on  record  by  the  defendants;  neither  the  follow up steps as required under Sections  11  and  16  had  been  proved  by  the  defendants.  Accordingly it was held that

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the  defendants  had  failed  to  prove  that  the  1948  Act  had  any  application.  Similarly, on finding that the evidence on  record failed to establish the continuous  possession of the defendants, the claim of  acquisition  of  title  by  prescription  as  set up by the defendants was dismissed.  

8. Shri Jaideep Gupta, learned Senior  Counsel  appearing  for  the  appellants  in  Civil  Appeal  No.738  of  2008,  has  strenuously urged that Patta No.1 on the  basis of which the plaintiff had claimed  title  not  having  been  proved  the  High  Court  ought  not  to  have  proceeded  to  consider the defendants' case at all. In

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any  view  of  the  matter,  even  the  adjudication  of  the  defendants'  plea  is  vitiated by apparent illegalities inasmuch  as  the  rent  receipts  issued  by  the  plaintiff  to  the  defendants  were  under  Section 63 of the 1908 Act.  The said fact  by  itself,  according  to  the  learned  counsel,  had  proved  that  the  suit  properties  were  included  in  an  estate  under the 1908 Act. Shri Gupta has further  urged that even if the defendants can be  understood  not  to  have  proved  the  abolition  of  the  estate  under  the  1948  Act,  the  defendants  had  acquired  the  status of occupancy ryots under the 1908  Act which vested in them a permanent right

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of  occupancy  besides  heritable  and  transferable rights to the land. The above  arguments have been adopted by the learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  in  the  two  other appeals under consideration.   

9. Opposing,  Shri  K.  Ramamoorthy,  learned Senior Counsel appearing for the  respondent-plaintiff,  has  urged  that  the  Patta  No.1  being  a  century  old  document  could  not  have  been  legitimately  placed  before  the  Court  as  an  exhibit  in  the  case.  Shri Ramamoorthy, in this regard,  has drawn the attention of the Court to  Exhibit  A-21,  the  Thiruporur  Village  Resettlement Register, which, according to  him,  would  establish  the  existence  of

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Patta  No.1  in  favour  of  the  respondent- plaintiff.  Shri Ramamoorthy by relying on  the  decision  in  Ramalinga  Mudali  and  another vs. T.S. Ramasami Ayyar [AIR 1929  Madras 1929] has urged that under the land  tenures  legitimized  during  the  British  regime the plaintiff acquired the status  of Mirasidar which vested ownership rights  in  the  suit  land  in  favour  of  the  plaintiff.  Insofar as the applicability  of  the  1908  Act  is  concerned,  Shri  Ramamoorthy has drawn the attention of the  Court  to  the  findings  recorded  in  this  regard by the High Court. It is contended  that the rent receipts were issued in a  printed format both for Thiruporur Village

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as well as for Thandalam village and the  latter  village  was  Inam  estate.  No  positive  conclusion,  therefore,  can  be  drawn  with  regard  to  the  status  of  the  defendants  under  the  1908  Act.   In  any  case, according to Shri Ramamoorthy, the  defendants  had  failed  to  establish  that  the estate, even if assumed to exist,  was  abolished under the 1948 Act.   

10. The plaintiff's case was based on  Patta No.1. Admittedly, the said Patta was  not  exhibited.  According  to  the  respondent-plaintiff,  Exhibit  A-21  establishes  the  grant  of  the  aforesaid  Patta No.1 in favour of the plaintiff.  We  have perused the said exhibit which is a

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Land Resettlement Register.  Undoubtedly,  the said exhibit,  inter alia, shows that  Patta  No.1  is  in  favour  of  Singaravelu  Mudali Manager for the time being of Sri  Kandaswamiyar  Devasthanam.   Beyond  the  above,  Exhibit  A-21  does  not  throw  any  further light on the nature and extent of  the rights conferred on the plaintiff by  Patta  No.1.   There  is  also  no  oral  evidence on record to explain the nature  of  the  rights  granted  under  Patta  No.1.  In  such  a  situation,  the  materials  on  record  do  not  permit  any  conclusive  determination  of  the  title  of  the  plaintiff on the basis of Patta No.1. As  the  existence  of  Patta  No.  1  had  been

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proved but the nature of the rights under  the Patta was not clear, one cannot find  any fault with the exercise undertaken by  the High court to determine the claims of  the parties on the basis of preponderance  of  probabilities  and  in  this  regard  by  seeking  to  examine  the  status  of  the  plaintiff as Mirasidar. However, the High  Court  appears  to  have  acted  a  little  hastily  in  accepting  the  status  of  the  plaintiff as Mirsadars solely on the basis  of the description contained in the rent  receipts  and  further  in  accepting  the  position that as Mirsadars the plaintiff  had  been  vested  with  title  to  the  suit  land. In C.N. Varadappan vs. The State of

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Madras  represented  by  the  Collector  of  

Chingleput at Saidapet, Madras and others  

[1963 (1) MLJ 405] it was held and in our  opinion correctly that a mere recital in a  document  that  a  person  was  a  ekabogam  mirasdar or the mere fact that he was the  sole owner of kaniachi manyam at a given  time  would  not  necessarily  show  that  he  was the owner of the entire kudiwaram in  the  village  at  the  time  of  a  shrotriem  grant to him.  The meaning of all such  expressions  have  been  clearly  elaborated  in  the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  and  would  not  need  a  recital  again.  Furthermore, a reading of the judgment in  Ramalinga  Mudali  and  another  vs.  T.S.

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Ramasami  Ayyar (supra)  would  go  to  show  that the status of Mirasdar differs from  village to village and the exact status of  a Mirasdar is best determined on the basis  of the evidence that may come on record.  In  the  present  case,  the  High  Court  proceeded to recognize the status of the  plaintiff  as  a  Mirasdar  and  the  right/title of the plaintiff to the suit  land on that basis without there being any  evidence of such status (Mirasdar) of the  plaintiff  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  right held and enjoyed by the plaintiff,  even if its status as Mirasdar is assumed.  

11. Insofar as the question raised by  the  defendants  with  regard  to  the  suit

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land being included in an estate under the  1908 Act is concerned, we find that the  High  Court  had  not  given  any  specific  finding in this regard but has proceeded  to  answer  the  question  from  an  entirely  different  standpoint,  namely,  that  the  rent receipts issued were printed both for  Thiruporur  Village  and  Thandalam  village  and that Thandalam village was Inam estate  which was taken over under the 1948 Act.  On  the  above  basis,  the  High  Court  had  concluded that the abolition of the estate  under the 1948 Act was not proved by the  defendants.  12. Even  if  the  abolition  of  the  estate  under  the  1948  Act  had  not  been

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proved by the defendants, if the suit land  is included in an estate under the 1908  Act and the defendants were tenants under  the  plaintiff  the  same  would  confer  certain specific rights on the defendants  under Section 6 of the 1908 Act.  Such  rights which would flow from their status  as  occupancy  tenants  would  entitle  the  defendants  to  remain  in  possession  with  heritable  and  transferable  right  in  respect of the land. The issue before the  High Court therefore needed to be resolved  on  more  surer  foundation  that  what  has  been done.  

13. The foregoing discussions lead us  to the conclusion that the findings with

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regard to the title of the plaintiff on  the  basis  of  Patta  No.1  (Exhibit  A-21);  whether the plaintiff was Mirasdar and, if  so, the extent of their rights and further  whether the suit properties were included  in an estate under the 1908 conferring the  defendants the status of occupancy ryots;  all would require a fresh determination.  In  the  above  situation  it  will  not  be  proper  and  appropriate  to  maintain  the  findings of the High Court as recorded in  the  impugned  order.  We,  therefore,  set  aside  the  order  of  the  High  Court  and  remand  the  matter  for  fresh  decision  on  the  issues  indicated  above.   The  High  Court, if it so requires, may permit the

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parties to adduce additional evidence for  the  purpose  of  full  and  complete  adjudication  of  the  issues  indicated  in  the  present  order.   Consequently  and  in  the  light  of  the  discussion  that  has  preceded,  we  allow  these  appeals  to  the  extent indicated above.   

....................,J.             (RANJAN GOGOI)

....................,J.            (N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI MARCH 10, 2015.