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Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.  396  OF 2016

[Arising out of SLP [Crl.] No.3584 of 2011]

Amal Kumar Jha                       … Appellant

            Vs.

State of Chhatisgarh & Anr.                       … Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ARUN MISHRA, J.

Leave granted.

The appeal arises out of the order dated 21.1.2011 passed by the  

High Court of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur, thereby affirming the order dated  

29.6.2002  passed  by the  Sessions  Judge  and Judicial  Magistrate  First  

Class,  Dharamjaigarh,  rejecting  the  application  filed  by  the  accused  

appellant  for  discharge  on  the  ground  of  requirement  of  sanction  to  

prosecute under section 197(1) Cr.P.C.

As  per  the  prosecution  case,  the  appellant  was  in-charge  of  

Patthalgaon Hospital, District Raigad where on 1.1.1995 L.T.D. operation  

of Runiabai was conducted by Dr. A.M. Gupta. Thereafter she was sent  

home. As Runiabai vomited Dr. A.M. Gupta was approached. He sent one  

Aklu Ram to administer some treatment. However on 2.2.1995 she was

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brought  to  the  Primary  Health  Centre,  Patthalgaon  where  she  was  

admitted and died at 2 p.m. Her post mortem was conducted. After 25  

days,  First  Information Report  was lodged and ultimately Police filed  

chargesheet  under  section  304-A IPC  on  16.10.1996  in  the  court  of  

Judicial Magistrate First Class, Dharamjaigarh, as against appellant A.K.  

Jha, Dr. A.M. Gupta and Aklu Ram. Charges under section 304-A were  

framed as against Dr. A.M. Gupta and the appellant. Both of them filed  

an application for discharge under section 197 Cr.PC on the ground that  

sanction  to  prosecute  was  required  and  they  could  not  be  prosecuted  

without  previous  sanction.  Vide  order  dated  27.6.2001  passed  by  the  

Judicial Magistrate First  Class, the application filed by Dr. A.M. Garg  

had been allowed. However, the application filed by the appellant was  

rejected  on  the  ground  that  he  was  in-charge  of  the  Primary  Health  

Centre and he failed to provide Government jeep for shifting the patient  

Mrs. Runiabai to District Hospital, Raigad whereas the appellant himself  

travelled  in  the  jeep  to  attend  an  official  monthly  meeting  at  Raigad  

which  was  District  Headquarters.  The  Primary  Health  Centre  did  not  

have ambulance. Thus, negligence was attributed to the appellant for not  

providing the said vehicle for  shifting the patient  to District  Hospital,  

Raigad.  A revision  was  preferred  against  the  rejection  of  prayer  and  

thereafter a petition was filed under section 482 Cr.P.C. before the High  

Court, the same having been dismissed, the appellant is before us.

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It  was  vehemently  contended  by  learned  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the appellant that the allegations constituted failure to provide  

official vehicle for shifting the patient to District Hospital, Raigad. As it  

was an act in discharge of official duty, as such the sanction to prosecute  

was necessary. Whereas the application filed by Dr. A.M. Gupta had been  

allowed,  the prayer made by the appellant  has been illegally rejected.  

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State supported the order and  

contended  that  it  was  negligence  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  in  not  

providing official vehicle to the patient due to which she could not be  

shifted  to  District  Hospital,  Raigad  and  died.  Thus,  sanction  was  not  

required in the instant case.

It is apparent from the facts of the instant case that the allegation  

against the appellant is of omission in discharge of official duty in not  

providing  Government  vehicle  for  shifting  the  patient  from  Primary  

Health Centre to District Hospital, Raigad; whereas he himself travelled  

in the vehicle in question for attending the monthly official meeting at the  

District  Headquarters.  In  our  considered  opinion,  it  was  an  act  or  

omission in discharge of the official duty. The sanction to prosecute was  

necessary. In this case, the accused was acting in discharge of his official  

duty  when  he  refused  to  provide  the  official  vehicle.  The  refusal  is  

directly and reasonably connected with his official duty, thus sanction is  

required for prosecution as provided under section 197(1) Cr.PC. It is not

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disputed that no ambulance was provided to the Primary Health Centre.  

The question arises whether omission to provide the official jeep which  

was not meant for patients, would constitute an omission in discharge of  

his  duty.  Though public  servant  is  not  entitled  to  indulge  in  criminal  

activities in the course of his duty but the act in question had relation to  

discharge of official duty of the accused. It was clearly connected to the  

performance  of  his  official  duty.  When  such  is  the  case,  sanction  is  

required. This Court in Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. The State of   

Bombay [1955 (1) SCR 1177] has observed thus :

“Now  it  is  obvious  that  if  section  197  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure is construed too narrowly it can never be  applied, for of course it  is no part of an official’s duty to  commit an offence and never can be.   But it is not the duty  we have to examine so much as the act, because an official  act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well  as  in  dereliction  of  it.   The  section  has  content  and  its  language must be given meaning.  What it says is –

“when  any  public  servant  …..   is  accused  of  any  offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting  or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty……” We have therefore first to concentrate on the word ‘offence’.

Now an offence seldom consists of a single act.  It is  usually composed of several elements and, as a rule, a whole  series of acts must be proved before it can be established.  In  the  present  case,  the  elements  alleged  against  the  second  accused  are,  first,  that  there  was  an  “entrustment”  and/or  “dominion”;  second, that  the entrustment and/or dominion  was “in his capacity as a public servant”; third, that there  was  a  “disposal”;  and  fourth,  that  the  disposal  was  “dishonest”.   Now it is evident that the entrustment and/or  dominion here were in an official capacity, and it is equally  evident that there could in this case be no disposal, lawful or  otherwise, save by an act done or purporting to be done in an  official capacity.   Therefore, the act complained of, namely  the disposal, could not have been done in any other way.  If

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it was innocent, it was an official act; if dishonest, it was the  dishonest doing of an official act, but in either event the act  was official because the second accused could not dispose of  the  goods  save  by  the  doing  of  an  official  act,  namely  officially  permitting  their  disposal;  and  that  he  did.   He  actually permitted their release and purported to do it in an  official  capacity,  and  apart  from the  fact  that  he  did  not  pretend to act privately, there was no other way in which he  could  have  done it.   Therefore,  whatever  the  intention or  motive behind the act may have been, the physical part of it  remained unaltered, so if it was official in the one case it  was  equally  official  in  the  other,  and  the  only  difference  would lie in the intention with which it was done: in the one  event, it would be done in the discharge of an official duty  and in the other, in the purported discharge of it.  

The act of abetment alleged against him stands on the  same footing, for his part in the abetment was to permit the  disposal of the goods by the doing of an official act and thus  “willfully  suffer”  another  person to  use  them dishonestly:  section 405 of the Indian Penal  Code.   In both cases,  the  “offence” in his case would be incomplete without proving  the official act.  

We  therefore  hold  that  section  197  of  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure applies and that sanction was necessary,  and as there was none the trial is vitiated from the start.  We  therefore quash the proceedings  against the second accused  as also his conviction and sentence.”

This Court in  Matajog Dobey v. H.C. Bhari [1955 (2) SCR 925]  

has also considered when sanction is necessary. This Court has laid down  

thus :

“Is the need for  sanction to be considered as soon as the  complaint  is  lodged  and  on  the  allegations  therein  contained?  At first sight, it seems as though there is some  support for this view in Hori Ram’s case and also in Sarjoo  Prasad v. The King-Emperor (1945) F.C.R. 227.  Sulaiman,  J. says that as the prohibition is against the institution itself,  its applicability must be judged in the first instance at the  earliest stage of institution.  Varadachariar, J. also states that  the question must be determined with reference to the nature

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of  the  allegations  made  against  the  public  servant  in  the  criminal proceeding.  But a careful perusal of the later parts  of their judgments shows that they did not intent to lay down  any such proposition.  Sulaiman, J. refers (at page 179) to  the prosecution case as  disclosed by the complaint  or  the  police report  and he winds up the discussion in these words:  “Of course, if the case as put forward fails or the defence  establishes that the act purported to be done is in execution  of  duty,  the proceedings will  have to  be dropped and the  complaint dismissed on that ground”.    The other learned  Judge also states at page 185, “At this stage we have only to  see whether the case alleged against the appellant or sought  to be proved against him relates to acts done or purporting to  be done by him in the execution of his duty”.   It must be so.  The question may arise at any stage of the proceedings.  The  complaint  may  not  disclose  that  the  act  constituting  the  offence was done or purported to be done in the discharge of  official  duty;  but  facts  subsequently coming to light  on a  police  or  judicial  inquiry  or  even  in  the  course  of  the  prosecution evidence at the trial, may establish the necessity  for sanction.  Whether sanction is necessary or not may have  to be determined from stage to stage.   The necessity may  reveal itself in the course of the progress of the case.” In  Bhappa Singh v. Ram Pal Singh & Ors. 1981 (Supp) SCC 12  

this Court considered the grant of protection to an officer for official act  

done in good faith thus :

“6. In  view  of  the  circumstances  mentioned  in  the  last  paragraph, there is little  room for doubt that  the Customs  party was not out to commit dacoity either in the jewellery  shop or the chaubara, that they also committed no trespass  into either of those places, but that the purpose of the raid  was to find out if any illegal activity was being carried on  therein.  The presence  of  two licensed  Gold-smiths  in  the  chaubara speaks volumes in that behalf. It may further be  taken for granted that  the Customs party was manhandled  before they themselves resorted to violence, because there  was no reason for them to open fire unless they were resisted  in the carrying out of the raid peacefully.

7. Even though what we have just stated is a general prima  facie impression that we have formed at this stage on the

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materials available to us at present, it may not be possible to  come to a conclusive finding about the falsity or otherwise  of the complaint. But then we think that it would amount to  giving a go-by to Section 108 of the Gold (Control) Act, if  cases of this type are allowed to be pursued to their logical  conclusion,  i.e.,  to  that  of  conviction  or  acquittal.  In  this  view  of  the  matter  we  do  not  feel  inclined  to  upset  the  impugned order, even though perhaps the matter may have  required further evidence before quashing of the complaint  could be held to be fully justified. The appeal is accordingly  dismissed.”

In State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao 1993 (3) SCC  

339, this Court has considered the meaning of the ‘official act’  thus :

“6. Such being the nature of the provision the question is  how should  the  expression,  ‘any  offence  alleged  to  have  been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in  the discharge of his official duty’, be understood? What does  it mean? ‘Official’ according to dictionary, means pertaining  to an office. And official act or official duty means an act or  duty done by an officer in his official capacity. In S.B. Saha  v.  M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 it  was held: (SCC pp.  184-85, para 17)

“The  words  ‘any  offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed by him while acting or purporting to act in  the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section  197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as  a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too  narrowly,  the  section  will  be  rendered  altogether  sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit  an  offence,  and  never  can  be’.  In  the  wider  sense,  these words will take under their umbrella every act  constituting an offence, committed in the course of the  same  transaction  in  which  the  official  duty  is  performed  or  purports  to  be  performed.  The  right  approach to the import  of  these words lies  between  these two extremes. While on the one hand,  it is not  every offence committed by a public servant while  engaged  in  the  performance  of  his  official  duty,  which is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1),  an  act  constituting  an  offence,  directly  and

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reasonably  connected  with  his  official  duty  will  require  sanction  for  prosecution  under  the  said  provision.”

Use of the expression, ‘official duty’ implies that the act or  omission  must  have  been  done  by  the  public  servant  in  course  of  his  service  and  that  it  should  have  been  in  discharge  of  his  duty.  The  section  does  not  extend  its  protective cover to every act or omission done by a public  servant in service but restricts its scope of operation to only  those acts or omissions which are done by a public servant  in  discharge  of  official  duty.  In  P.  Arulswami v.  State  of   Madras (1967) 1 SCR 201 this  Court  after  reviewing the  authorities right from the days of Federal Court and Privy  Council held:

“… It is not therefore every offence committed by a  public servant that requires sanction for prosecution  under Section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code;  nor even every act done by him while he is actually  engaged in the performance of his official duties; but  if the act complained of is directly concerned with his  official  duties  so  that,  if  questioned,  it  could  be  claimed to have been done by virtue of the office, then  sanction would be necessary. It is the quality of the act  that is important and if it falls within the scope and  range  of  his  official  duties  the  protection  contemplated  by  Section  197  of  the  Criminal  Procedure Code will be attracted. An offence may be  entirely unconnected with the official duty as such or  it may be committed within the scope of the official  duty. Where it is unconnected with the official duty  there can be no protection. It is only when it is either  within the scope of the official duty or in excess of it  that the protection is claimable.”

It has been widened further by extending protection to  even those acts or omissions which are done in purported  exercise of official duty. That is under the colour of office.  Official duty therefore implies that the act or omission must  have been done by the public servant in course of his service  and such act or omission must have been performed as part  of duty which further must have been official in nature. The  section has, thus, to be construed strictly, while determining

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its applicability to any act or omission in course of service.  Its  operation  has  to  be  limited  to  those  duties  which  are  discharged in course of duty. But once any act or omission  has  been  found  to  have  been  committed  by  a  public  servant in discharge of  his  duty then it  must  be given  liberal and wide construction so far its official nature is  concerned. For instance a public servant is not entitled to  indulge in criminal activities. To that extent the section  has to be construed narrowly and in a restricted manner.  But once it is established that act or omission was done by  the public servant while discharging his duty then the scope  of its being official should be construed so as to advance the  objective  of  the  section  in  favour  of  the  public  servant.  Otherwise  the  entire  purpose  of  affording  protection  to  a  public  servant  without  sanction  shall  stand frustrated.  For  instance a police officer in discharge of duty may have to  use force which may be an offence for the prosecution of  which the sanction may be necessary. But if the same officer  commits an act in course of service but not in discharge of  his duty then the bar under Section 197 of the Code is not  attracted. To what extent an act or omission performed by a  public servant in discharge of his duty can be deemed to be  official  was explained by this Court  in  Matajog Dubey v.  H.C. Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44 thus:

“[T]he offence  alleged to  have been committed (by  the accused) must have something to do, or must be  related in some manner with the discharge of official  duty  …  there  must  be  a  reasonable  connection  between the act and the discharge of official duty;  the act must bear such relation to the duty that the   accused  could  lay  a  reasonable  (claim)  but  not  a   pretended  or  fanciful  claim,  that  he  did  it  in  the   course of the performance of his duty.”

(emphasis supplied)

If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or  omission for which the accused was charged had reasonable  connection with discharge of his duty then it must be held to  be official to which applicability of Section 197 of the Code  cannot be disputed.”

In  State of  H.P. v. M.P. Gupta 2004 (2) SCC 349 this Court in

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regard to official duty has laid down thus :

“11. Such being the nature of the provision, the question is  how should  the  expression,  “any  offence  alleged  to  have  been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duty”,  be  understood?  What  does it mean? “Official” according to the dictionary, means  pertaining to an office, and official act or official duty means  an act or duty done by an officer in his official capacity.”  

In State of Orissa & Ors. v. Ganesh Chandra Jew 2004 (8) SCC 40  

this  Court  has  laid  down that  protection  under  section  197  would  be  

available  only  when the  act  done by the public  servant  is  reasonably  

connected  with the discharge of  his  official  duty.  This  Court  has laid  

down thus :

“7. The  protection  given  under  Section  197  is  to  protect  responsible public servants against the institution of possibly  vexatious criminal proceedings for offences alleged to have  been committed by them while they are acting or purporting  to act as public servants. The policy of the legislature is to  afford adequate protection to public servants to ensure that  they are not prosecuted for anything done by them in the  discharge of their official duties without reasonable cause,  and if sanction is granted, to confer on the Government, if  they  choose  to  exercise  it,  complete  control  of  the  prosecution.  This  protection  has  certain  limits  and  is  available  only  when  the  alleged  act  done  by  the  public  servant  is  reasonably  connected  with  the  discharge  of  his  official  duty  and  is  not  merely  a  cloak  for  doing  the  objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in  excess  of  his  duty,  but  there  is  a  reasonable  connection  between the act and the performance of the official duty, the  excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public  servant of the protection. The question is not as to the nature  of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained  an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a  public servant,  but  whether it  was committed by a public  servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of  his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it

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must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an  offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting  or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It  is not the duty which requires examination so much as the  act,  because the official  act can be performed both in the  discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it.  The act must fall within the scope and range of the official  duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the  act which is important and the protection of this section is  available if the act falls within the scope and range of his  official  duty.  There  cannot  be  any  universal  rule  to  determine whether there is a reasonable connection between  the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay  down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard  would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of  the public servant to commit the act complained of could  have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his  official  duty.  If  the  answer  to  this  question  is  in  the  affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by  the  public  servant  while  acting  in  the  discharge  of  his  official  duty and there was every connection with the act  complained of  and the official  duty of  the public servant.  This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197  does  not  get  immediately  attracted  on  institution  of  the  complaint case.”

In K. Kalimuthu v. State by DSP 2005 (4) SCC 512 this Court has  

observed that official duty implies that an act or omission must have been  

done by the public servant within the scope and range of his official duty  

for protection. This Court has laid down thus :

“12. If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the  act  or  omission  for  which  the  accused  was  charged  had  reasonable  connection  with  discharge  of  his  duty  then  it  must be held to be official to which applicability of Section  197 of the Code cannot be disputed.

x x x x x

15. The question relating to the need of sanction under  Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered

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as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations  contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of  the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary  or  not  may  have  to  be  determined  from  stage  to  stage.  Further,  in  cases  where  offences  under  the  Act  are  concerned,  the  effect  of  Section  197,  dealing  with  the  question of prejudice has also to be noted.” In  Manorama Tiwari & Ors. v. Surendra Nath Rai 2016 (1) SCC  

594, it was held that the appellants were discharging public duties while  

performing surgery in a Government hospital, hence prosecution was not  

maintainable without sanction from the State Government.  

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Sheetla Sahai & Ors. 2009 (8) SCC  

617, this Court has laid down thus :

“59. For  the  purpose  of  attracting  the provisions  of  Section  197 of  the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  it  is  not  necessary  that  they must  act  in  their  official  capacity  but  even where public  servants  purport  to act  in their  official  capacity,  the same would attract  the provisions of  Section  197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It was so held by  this Court in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das (2006) 4 SCC  584.  The  question  came  up  for  consideration  before  this  Court  in  Matajog Dobey v.  H.C.  Bhari AIR 1956 SC 44  wherein it was held: (AIR pp. 48-49, para 17)

“17.  Slightly differing tests have been laid down in  the  decided  cases  to  ascertain  the  scope  and  the  meaning of  the relevant  words occurring in Section  197 of the Code; ‘any offence alleged to have been  committed by him while acting or purporting to act in  the discharge of his official duty’. But the difference  is only in language and not in substance.

The  offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed  must  have  something to do, or must be related in some manner, with  the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can  arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an  offence;  the  only  point  to  determine  is  whether  it  was  committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a  reasonable connection between the act and the official duty.  It  does not  matter  even if  the act  exceeds what is strictly

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necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will  arise  only at  a  later  stage  when the trial  proceeds on the  merits. What we must find out is whether the act and the official  duty  are  so  interrelated  that  one  can  postulate  reasonably  that it was done by the accused in the performance of the  official  duty,  though  possibly  in  excess  of  the  needs  and  requirements of the situation. In  Hori Ram Singh v.  Crown  1939 FCR 159 Sulaiman, J. observes:

‘The section cannot be confined to only such acts as  are done by a public servant directly in pursuance of  his public office, though in excess of the duty or under  a mistaken belief as to the existence of such duty. Nor  is it necessary to go to the length of saying that the act  constituting  the  offence  should  be  so  inseparably  connected with the official duty as to form part and  parcel of the same transaction.’

The interpretation that found favour with Varadachariar, J. in  the same case is stated by him in these terms at p. 56:

‘There  must  be  something  in  the  nature  of  the  act  complained of that attaches it to the official character  of the person doing it.’

In affirming this view, the Judicial Committee of the Privy  Council observed in  Gill case  : AIR 1948 PC 128 (IA pp.  59-60)

‘A public servant can only be said to act or to purport  to act in the discharge of his official duty, if his act is  such as to lie within the scope of his official duty. …  The test may well be whether the public servant,  if  challenged, can reasonably claim that, what he does,  he does in virtue of his office.’ Hori  Ram  case 1939  FCR  159  is  referred  to  with  approval  in  the  later  case  of  Lieutenant  Hector   Thomas Huntley v.  King Emperor 1944 FCR 262 but  the test laid down that it must be established that the  act complained of was an ‘official’ act appears to us  unduly to  narrow down the scope of  the protection  afforded by  Section  197  of  the  Criminal  Procedure  Code as defined and understood in the earlier  case.  The decision in Albert West Meads v. R. AIR 1948 PC  156  does  not  carry  us  any  further;  it  adopts  the  reasoning in Gill case AIR 1948 PC 128.”

60. The said principle has been reiterated by this Court in B.  Saha v.  M.S. Kochar (1979) 4 SCC 177 in the following

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terms: (SCC pp. 184-85, paras 17-18) “17.  The  words  ‘any  offence  alleged  to  have  been  committed by him while acting or purporting to act in  the discharge of his official duty’ employed in Section  197(1) of the Code, are capable of a narrow as well as  a wide interpretation. If these words are construed too  narrowly,  the  section  will  be  rendered  altogether  sterile, for, ‘it is no part of an official duty to commit  an  offence,  and  never  can  be’.  In  the  wider  sense,  these words will take under their umbrella every act  constituting an offence, committed in the course of the  same  transaction  in  which  the  official  duty  is  performed  or  purports  to  be  performed.  The  right  approach to the import  of  these words lies  between  these two extremes. While on the one hand, it is not  every  offence  committed  by a  public  servant  while  engaged in the performance of his official duty, which  is entitled to the protection of Section 197(1), an act  constituting  an  offence,  directly  and  reasonably  connected with his official duty will require sanction  for prosecution under the said provision. As pointed  out by Ramaswami, J. in Baijnath v. State of M.P. AIR  1966 SC 220 : (AIR p. 227, para 16)

‘16.  …  It  is  the  quality  of  the  act  that  is  important, and if  it  falls within the scope and  range  of  his  official  duties  the  protection  contemplated  by Section  197 of  the  Criminal  Procedure Code will be attracted’.

18. In sum, the sine qua non for the applicability of  this section is that the offence charged, be it one of  commission or omission, must be one which has been  committed by the public servant either in his official  capacity or under colour of the office held by him.”  (emphasis in original)”

In view of the aforesaid discussion,  it  is clear that the omission  

complained of due to which offence is stated to have been committed,  

was  intrinsically  connected  with  discharge  of  official  duty  of  the  

appellant,  as  such  the  protection  under  section  197  Cr.PC  from  

prosecution without sanction of the competent authority, is available to

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the appellant. Thus, he could not have been prosecuted without sanction.  

It would be for the competent authority to consider the question of grant  

of sanction in accordance with law. In case sanction is granted only then  

the  appellant  can  be  prosecuted  and  not  otherwise.  Resultantly,  the  

impugned orders are set aside, the appeal is allowed.

                   ……..……………………….J.                     (V. Gopala Gowda)

New Delhi;                      ……………………………..J. April 26, 2016.                      (Arun Mishra)