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 R E P O R T A B L E

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7600 OF 2014

ALLAHABAD BANK & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KRISHNA NARAYAN TEWARI …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, CJI.

1. In  this  appeal  by special  leave the appellant  calls  in

question the correctness of a judgment and order dated 28th

October,  2013  passed  by  the  High  Court  of  Judicature  at

Allahabad, Lucknow bench, whereby Writ Petition No.2867 of

2006 filed by the respondent has been allowed and an order

dated 29th July,  2005 passed by the Disciplinary Authority

and that  dated 5th January,  2006 passed by the Appellate

Authority  directing  removal  of  the  respondent  from  the

service of the appellant-bank quashed.  The High Court has

as  a  result  directed  the  appellant  bank  to  provide  all

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service/retiral benefits to the petitioner within ninety days of

the order.  The challenge mounted by the appellant arises in

the following circumstances:   

2. The respondent was employed with the appellant-bank

and  was  during  the  relevant  period  posted  as  Officer

in-charge at the appellant-bank’s Sultanpur branch in District

Sultanpur in the State of Uttar Pradesh.  He was, by an order

dated  10th December,  2004,  placed  under  suspension  in

contemplation of a disciplinary enquiry which was initiated

against  him with the service of a charge-sheet dated 10th

February, 2005.  The respondent pleaded not guilty but the

Enquiry Officer  concluded the enquiry proceedings rather

quickly  within  a  span  of  just  about  forty-five  days  and

submitted a report  dated 27th May,  2005 holding that  the

respondent was guilty on all counts except two which were

held  proved  but  only  partially.  The  Disciplinary  Authority

accepted the findings and passed an order imposing upon

the respondent the major penalty of removal from service.   

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3. Aggrieved,  the  respondent  preferred  a  departmental

appeal which was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by its

order  dated  5th January,  2006.   The  respondent  then

questioned the said two orders before the High Court in a

writ petition which as noticed earlier has been allowed by

the High Court in terms of the order impugned in this appeal.

4. The High Court came to the conclusion that neither the

Disciplinary  Authority  nor  the  Appellate  Authority  had

applied their mind or recorded reasons in support of their

conclusions.  Relying upon the decisions of this court in Roop

Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (2009) 2 SCC 570,

Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police & Ors. (1999) 2 SCC

10,  Nand  Kishore   v.  State  of  Bihar (1978)  3  SCC  366,

Kailash Nath Gupta v. Enquiry Officer, Allahabad Bank & Ors.

(2003) 9 SCC 480,  State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi

Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and Mohd. Yunus Khan v.

State of U.P. & Ors. (2010) 10 SCC 539, the High Court held

that the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the

appellate  authority  were  unsustainable  in  law.   The  High

Court found that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary

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Authority  and  affirmed  by  the  Appellate  Authority  were

perverse and were based on no evidence whatsoever.  The

High Court  observed that  the Appellate  Authority  had not

applied its mind independently and simply cut and pasted

the findings of the Disciplinary Authority while dismissing the

appeal.   

5. On  behalf  of  the  appellant-bank  it  was  contended

before us that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in

re-appreciating the evidence and holding the respondent not

guilty.   It  was  argued  that  so  long  as  there  was  some

evidence on which the Disciplinary Authority could rest its

findings, sufficiency or insufficiency of such evidence could

not  be  gone  into  by  a  Writ  Court.   Alternatively,  it  was

submitted that even if there was any infirmity in the orders

passed  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  or  the  Appellate

Authority,  on  account  of  absence  or  insufficiency  of  the

reasons  in  support  of  the  findings  recorded  by  them,  the

proper course for the High Court was to remand the matter

back to the Appellate Authority or the Disciplinary Authority

as the case may be for doing the needful afresh.  The High

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Court  could  not,  on  account  of  absence  of  reasons  or

unsatisfactory appraisal of the evidence by them, quash the

order  of  punishment  and  direct  release  of  the  service

benefits due to the respondent.   

6. On behalf of the respondent it was on the other hand

contended  that  the  enquiry  conducted  against  the

respondent  and  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  the  Enquiry

Officer,  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Authority

suffered  from  fatal  defects.   Firstly,  because  the  enquiry

conducted by the Enquiry Officer was unfair and had resulted

in gross miscarriage of justice on account of the failure of the

Enquiry Officer to provide a reasonable opportunity to the

respondent to lead evidence in his defense.  In the second

place the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer and so

also  the  Disciplinary  Authority  were  unsupported  by  any

evidence whatsoever and were perverse to say the least.  In

the third place, the orders were unsustainable also for the

reason  that  the  same  did  not  disclose  due  and  proper

application  of  mind  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the

Appellate  Authority.   The  order  passed  by  the  Appellate

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Authority was, in particular, bad in law as the same did not

examine  the  material  on  record  independently  and  had

simply relied upon the findings of the Disciplinary Authority

without adverting to the points which the respondent had

raised in  support  of  his  challenge.  It  was lastly  submitted

that  the  respondent  has  since  superannuated  and  was  a

physical  wreck  having  suffered  a  heart  attack  and  a

debilitating  stroke  which  had  confined  him  to  bed.   Any

remand of the proceedings to the Appellate Authority to pass

a fresh order or the Disciplinary Authority for re-examination

and fresh determination of the respondent’s guilt would not

only be harsh but would tantamount to denial of justice to

him.  The High Court was in that view justified in taking a

pragmatic view of the matter and in directing continuity of

service  to  the  respondent  and  release  of  all  service  and

retiral benefits to him upto the date of his superannuation.

7. We  have  given  our  anxious  consideration  to  the

submissions at the bar.  It is true that a writ court is very

slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a

Departmental Authority on the basis of evidence available on

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record.   But  it  is  equally  true  that  in  a  case  where  the

Disciplinary Authority records a finding that is unsupported

by  any  evidence  whatsoever  or  a  finding  which  no

reasonable  person  could  have  arrived  at,  the  writ  court

would be justified if not duty bound to examine the matter

and grant  relief  in  appropriate  cases.   The writ  court  will

certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant

orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if

the  enquiry  itself  was  vitiated  on  account  of  violation  of

principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in

the present case. Non-application of mind by the Enquiry

Officer or the Disciplinary Authority, non-recording of reasons

in  support  of  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  them are  also

grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering

with the orders of punishment.  The High Court has, in the

case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed

by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the  Appellate  Authority.

The  respondent’s  case  that  the  enquiry  was  conducted

without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading

evidence in defense has not been effectively rebutted by the

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appellant.  More importantly the Disciplinary Authority does

not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor

recorded reasons in support of his conclusion.  To add insult

to injury the Appellate Authority instead of recording its own

reasons  and  independently  appreciating  the  material  on

record,  simply  reproduced  the  findings  of  the  Disciplinary

Authority.  All  told  the  Enquiry  Officer,  the  Disciplinary

Authority  and the Appellate Authority  have faltered in  the

discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice.

The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the

orders  passed  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the

Appellate Authority.   

8. There is no quarrel with the proposition that in cases

where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either

procedurally  or  otherwise  the  proper  course  always  is  to

remand the matter back to the concerned authority to redo

the  same afresh.   That  course  could  have  been  followed

even in the present case.  The matter could be remanded

back to the Disciplinary Authority or to the Enquiry Officer for

a  proper  enquiry  and  a  fresh  report  and  order.  But  that

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course may not have been the only course open in a given

situation. There may be situations where because of a long

time lag or such other supervening circumstances the writ

court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to

direct  a  fresh  enquiry  or  fresh  order  by  the  competent

authority.  That is precisely what the High Court has done in

the case at hand.  The High Court has taken note of the fact

that the respondent had been placed under suspension in

the  year  2004  and  dismissed  in  the  year  2005.   The

dismissal order was challenged in the High Court in the year

2006  but  the  writ  petition  remained  pending  in  the  High

Court  for  nearly  seven  years  till  2013.   During  the

intervening  period  the  respondent  superannuated  on  30th

November,  2011.   Not  only  that  he  had  suffered  a  heart

attack  and  a  stroke  that  has  rendered  him  physically

disabled and confined to bed. The respondent may by now

have turned 65  years  of  age.   Any  remand either  to  the

Enquiry  Officer  for  a  fresh  enquiry  or  to  the  Disciplinary

Authority for a fresh order or even to the Appellate Authority

would thus be very harsh and would practically deny to the

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respondent any relief whatsoever. Superadded to all this is

the fact that the High Court has found, that there was no

allegation nor  any evidence to show the extent of loss,  if

any,  suffered  by  the  bank  on  account  of  the  alleged

misconduct of the respondent. The discretion vested in the

High Court in not remanding the matter back was, therefore,

properly exercised.  

 9. The next question is whether the respondent would be

entitled to claim arrears of salary as part of service/retiral

benefits  in  full  or  part.   The  High  Court  has  been  rather

ambivalent in that regard. We say so because while the High

Court has directed release of service/retiral benefits, it is not

clear whether the same would include salary for the period

between  the  date  of  removal  and  the  date  of

superannuation.   Taking  a  liberal  view  of  the  matter,  we

assume that the High Court’s direction for release of service

benefits would include the release of his salaries also for the

period mentioned above.  We are, however, of the opinion

that  while proceedings need not  be remanded for  a  fresh

start from the beginning, grant of full salary for the period

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between  the  date  of  dismissal  and  the  date  of

superannuation would not also be justified.  We, therefore,

allow this appeal but only in part and to the extent that while

orders  passed  by  the  Disciplinary  Authority  and  the

Appellate Authority shall stand quashed, and the respondent

entitled  to  continuity  of  service  till  the  date  of  his

superannuation with  all  service  benefits  on that  basis,  he

shall  be entitled to  only 50% of  the salary for  the period

between the date of his removal from service till the date of

superannuation. Retiral benefits shall also be released in his

favour.   The order passed by the High Court shall,  to  the

extent  indicated  above,  stand  modified.  The  parties  shall

bear their own costs.

…………………….…..…CJI.        (T.S. THAKUR)

……………………….…..…J.        (A.M. KHANWILKAR)

New Delhi January 2,  2017

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