AKHILESH YADAV Vs VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI .
Bench: ALTAMAS KABIR,H.L. DATTU
Case number: R.P.(C) No.-000272-000272 / 2007
Diary number: 7644 / 2007
Advocates: BHATIA Vs
SANTOSH KUMAR TRIPATHI
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.272 OF 2007 IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005
AKHILESH YADAV … PETITIONER VS.
VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.339 OF 2007 IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005
MULAYAM SINGH YADAV … PETITIONER VS.
VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
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WITH
REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.347 OF 2007 IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005
PRATEEK YADAV … PETITIONER VS.
VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
WITH
REVIEW PETITION (CIVIL) NO.348 OF 2007 IN
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL)No.633 of 2005
SMT. DIMPLE YADAV … PETITIONER VS.
VISHWANATH CHATURVEDI & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
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J U D G M E N T
ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI.
1. Certain questions of fact and law were raised
on behalf of the parties when the review petitions
were heard. Review petitions are ordinarily
restricted to the confines of the principles
enunciated in Order 47 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, but in this case, we gave counsel for
the parties ample opportunity to satisfy us that
the judgment and order under review suffered from
any error apparent on the face of the record and
that permitting the order to stand would occasion a
failure of justice or that the judgment suffered
from some material irregularity which required
correction in review. The scope of a review
petition is very limited and the submissions
advanced were made mainly on questions of fact. As
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has been repeatedly indicated by this Court, review
of a judgment on account of some mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record is permissible,
but an error apparent on the face of the record has
to be decided on the facts of each case as an
erroneous decision by itself does not warrant a
review of each decision. In order to appreciate
the decision rendered on the several review
petitions which were taken up together for
consideration, it is necessary to give a background
in which the judgment and order under review came
to be rendered.
2. One Vishwanath Chaturvedi, claiming to be an
Advocate by profession and unconnected with any
political party or parties, filed Writ Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005, inter alia, for the
following relief :-
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“(a)issue an appropriate writ in the nature of mandamus directing Respondent No.1 to take appropriate action to prosecute Respondent Nos.2 to 5 under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for acquiring amassed assets more than the known source of their income by misusing their power and authority;”
3. In the Writ Petition, the Writ Petitioner
provided instances of the wealth allegedly acquired
by the said Respondents beyond their known source
of income. After a contested hearing, this Court
was of the view that the inquiry should not be shut
out at the threshold because political elements
were involved. The prayer in the Writ Petition
was, therefore, moulded and the same was disposed
of on 1st March, 2007, with a direction upon the
Central Bureau of Investigation, hereinafter
referred to as the “CBI”, to inquire into the
allegations relating to acquisition of wealth by
the Respondent Nos.2 to 5. The CBI was also
directed to find out as to whether there was any
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truth in the allegations made by the Petitioner
regarding acquisition of assets by the said
Respondents disproportionate to their known source
of income and to submit a report to the Union of
India which could take further steps in the matter.
4. Soon, thereafter, the Respondent Nos.2 to 5
filed Review Petitions for review of the aforesaid
judgment dated 1st March, 2007 in Writ Petition
(Civil) No.633 of 2005 and the same was directed to
be posted before the Court on 16th March, 2007.
Subsequently, the Review Petitions were placed for
hearing before the Court on 20th March, 2007 and
ultimately on 10th February, 2009, the Court
directed notice to issue thereupon. On 1st April,
2009, when the Review Petitions were taken up for
hearing, a submission was made on behalf of the
Review Petitioners that one of the questions, which
could have a vital bearing on the matters, related
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to the question as to whether the Court could issue
directions to the CBI, notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946, which was under
consideration of the Constitution Bench in Civil
Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of 2001 filed by the State of
West Bengal. The hearing of the Review Petitions
was, therefore, adjourned till a decision was
pronounced by the Constitution Bench in the above
Appeals. The Constitution Bench ultimately held
that the High Court was within its jurisdiction in
directing the CBI to investigate into a cognizable
offence alleged to have been committed within the
territory of a State without the consent of that
State and the same would neither impinge upon the
federal structure of the Constitution nor violate
the doctrine of separation of powers and would be
valid in law. However, a note of caution was also
given and it was further observed that the extra-
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ordinary power conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of
the Constitution of India has to be exercised
sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations
where it becomes necessary to provide credibility
and instill confidence in investigations or where
the incident may have national and international
ramifications or where such an order may be
necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing
fundamental rights.
5. Thereafter, the Review Petitions were again
taken up for hearing on 8th February, 2011.
6. Five broad propositions were canvassed on
behalf of the Review Petitioner, Shri Akhilesh
Yadav, namely,
(i) Can this Court direct a CBI inquiry without the consent of the State concerned?
(ii)Does a Court have jurisdiction to refer the matter to the CBI for
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investigation without forming a opinion as to whether a prima facie case of the commission of an offence had been made out?
(iii) Can the Supreme Court order a CBI investigation without expressly invoking its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India?
(iv)Could the Supreme Court have entertained the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent No.1 in the Review Petition under the garb of a public interest litigation? and
(v) Does the judgment and order dated 1st March, 2007, passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.633 of 2005 warrant a review thereof?
7. Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Advocate,
appearing for the Review Petitioners, Shri Akhilesh
Yadav and Smt. Dimple Yadav did not press the first
proposition, since, as indicated hereinbefore, the
said question had been settled by the Constitution
Bench.
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8. On the second proposition, Mr. Dwivedi urged
that in the decision rendered by this Court in
Common Cause, A Registered Society Vs. Union of
India & Ors. [(1999) 6 SCC 667], a Bench of three
Judges of this Court had specifically held that the
CBI should not be involved in an investigation
unless a prima facie case is found and established
against the accused. Mr. Dwivedi pointed out that
this Court had inter alia observed that the right
to life engrained in Article 21 of the Constitution
means something more than mere survival or animal
existence. A man had, therefore, to be left alone
to enjoy life without fetters and should not be
allowed to be hounded either by the police or CBI
only to find out as to whether he had committed any
offence or was living as a law abiding citizen.
This Court also observed that even under Article
142 of the Constitution, this Court could not issue
such a direction ignoring the substantive
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provisions of law and the constitutional rights
available to a person.
9. On the third proposition relating to cases
where this Court had directed the CBI to
investigate, Mr. Dwivedi submitted that there were
cases involving gross atrocities and State apathy
and there were also cases which stand on a
different footing and are concerned with
corruption. Learned counsel submitted that in the
present case no prima facie case of corruption had
been established against the review petitioners
and/or any of the proforma respondents and,
accordingly, the direction given to the CBI to
conduct investigations against them was ex facie
illegal. Referring to various judgments in which
directions had been given by this Court to the CBI
to conduct investigation, there were special
reasons for doing so in each case and not without a
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prima facie case having been made out against them
in such cases. Mr. Dwivedi urged that the CBI has
no jurisdiction to inquire or investigate into a
matter where there is no material to show prima
facie that an offence has been committed. Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that in the case of A.R. Antulay
Vs. R.S. Nayak [(1988) 2 SCC 602], this Court had
held that no jurisdiction can be conferred beyond
the scope of the Act by Courts of law even with
consent. He also urged that in the case of Supreme
Court Bar Association Vs. Union of India [(1998) 4
SCC 409], this Court had observed that even the
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution vested
in this Court could not be exercised in a manner
which was contrary to the Statute. It is only on
account of special reasons where it was felt that
an investigation by the local police would prove to
be ineffective, that directions had been given to
the CBI to take up the investigation. Mr. Dwivedi
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submitted that there were no such special reasons
in the instant case which warranted the directions
being given to the CBI to conduct investigation
into the allegations of corruption and police
excesses as well as human rights violations.
10. As far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is concerned, Mr.
Dwivedi submitted that except for the fact that she
is the wife of Akhilesh Yadav, who had been a
Member of Parliament since 2000, there is no other
ground to treat her as a public servant for the
purposes of inquiry by the CBI. Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that Smt. Dimple Yadav carried on her own
business in agricultural produce and had her own
income which had been wrongly clubbed by the Writ
Petitioner with the assets of Shri Akhilesh Yadav
to bring her within the ambit of the investigation
by the CBI under the provisions of the Prevention
of Corruption Act. It was further submitted that
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there is also no allegation that Smt. Dimple Yadav
had, in any way, aided or abetted any public
servant to commit any act which could have
attracted the provisions of the Prevention of
Corruption Act and including Smt. Dimple Yadav in
the inquiry against those who could be said to be
public servants, amounts to harassment of a private
individual having a separate source of income in
respect of which no offence under the aforesaid Act
could be made out. Mr. Dwivedi contended that the
inquiry directed to be conducted by the CBI in
relation to the assets held by Shri Adkhilesh Yadav
and Smt. Dimple Yadav was contrary to the procedure
established by law and could not have been ordered
even upon invocation of powers under Article 142 of
the Constitution and was, therefore, liable to be
set aside in review.
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11. As far as the fourth proposition is concerned,
as to whether the Supreme Court could have
entertained the writ petition filed by the
Respondent No.1 in the review petition in the garb
of Public Interest Litigation, Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that the writ petitioner had not made any
specific allegation against the review petitioners
which merited a direction by the Court to the CBI
to conduct an investigation into the allegations
relating to acquisition of wealth by the Respondent
Nos.2 to 5 in the writ petition, beyond their known
sources of income. Furthermore, the Writ Petitioner
had links with the Indian National Congress,
although, he had denied any connections with the
Congress Party. Mr. Dwivedi urged that the
Respondent No.1 herein had no locus standi to
maintain the writ petition as a Public Interest
Litigation, since it was more of a personal enmity
rather than a public cause which had resulted in
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the filing of the writ petition. Mr. Dwivedi
submitted that the entire exercise had been
undertaken to malign the Respondent Nos.2 to 5 and
was without any factual basis and the writ petition
had been filed only to harass the Respondent No.2
to 5 therein and to tarnish their reputation
amongst the people of Uttar Pradesh and also other
parts of the country. Mr. Dwivedi submitted that
the writ petition had been filed with the mala fide
intention of discrediting the Review Petitioner and
his family members in the eyes of the local public
and to adversely affect their political fortunes in
the State.
12. In addition to Mr. Dwivedi’s submissions, Mr.
Mukul Rohatgi, learned Senior Advocate, who also
appeared for Smt. Dimple Yadav, submitted that
merely because she belongs to a family of
politicians, she had been included within the ambit
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of the scope of the investigation which was
unwarranted, since it did not have any nexus with
the objects sought to be achieved by such an
inquiry.
13. Mr. Rohatgi also submitted that since despite
his denial it was amply clear that the Writ
Petitioner, Mr. Vishwanath Chaturvedi, was a
representative of the Congress Party, the Writ
Petition ought to have been dismissed in limine.
Mr. Rohatgi submitted that the explanation given in
the judgment under review for invoking the Court’s
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution
relying on the decision of this Court in Mohd. Anis
Vs. Union of India [(1994) Supp. 1 SCC 145], needed
a second look in view of the decision in the
Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra). Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that in Mohd. Anis’s case
(supra), it had been held that in order to do
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complete justice, the Supreme Court’s power under
Article 142 of the Constitution was not
circumscribed by any statutory provision, and the
Supreme Court could direct an investigation by the
CBI into an offence committed within a State
without a notification or order having been issued
in that behalf, in public interest, to do complete
justice in the circumstances of a particular case.
However, in exercise of its powers under Article
142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court should
not direct a fishing inquiry without reference to
the facts and circumstances of the offence of
disproportionate assets under the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988. Mr. Rohatgi urged that
subsequently in the Supreme Court Bar Association
case (supra), this Court held that the powers
conferred on this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution are inherent in the Court and are
complementary to those powers which are
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specifically conferred on the Court by various
Statutes, though not limited by those Statutes.
These powers exist independent of the Statutes with
a view to do complete justice between the parties.
However, the powers conferred on the Court under
Article 142 of the Constitution, being curative in
nature, cannot be construed as powers which
authorize the Court to ignore the substantive
rights of a litigant while dealing with the cause
pending before it. It was further observed that
“Article 142, even with the width of its amplitude,
cannot be used to build a new edifice where none
existed earlier, by ignoring express statutory
provisions dealing with a subject and thereby to
achieve something indirectly which cannot be
achieved directly. The very nature of the power
must lead the Court to set limits for itself within
which to exercise those powers and ordinarily it
cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a
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subject, except perhaps to balance the equities
between the conflicting claims of the litigating
parties by ‘ironing out the creases’ in a cause or
matter before it.” It was submitted that the
decision in the Supreme Court Bar Association case
(supra) cannot be reconciled with the reasoning of
the decision in Mohd. Anis’s case (supra). Mr.
Rohatgi submitted that all the decisions rendered
subsequent to the decision rendered in the Supreme
Court Bar Association case (supra), following the
earlier decision in Mohd. Anis’s case (supra), were
per incuriam. In support of his submission, Mr.
Rohtagi referred to the decision of this Court in
Textile Labour Association Vs. Official Liquidator
[(2004) 9 SCC 741] wherein while examining the
plenary power of this Court under Article 142 of
the Constitution, it referred to the decision in
the Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra).
Mr. Rohatgi concluded on the note that under
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Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court
could always correct any error made by it and to
that effect it could recall its own order, as was
held in M.S. Ahlawat Vs. State of Haryana [(2000) 1
SCC 278].
14. Mr. Ashok Desai, learned Senior Advocate, who
appeared for Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav, the Review
Petitioner in Review Petition (C) No.339 of 2007,
based his submissions mainly on the powers of the
Supreme Court to direct the CBI to conduct an
investigation in respect of an offence committed
within a State, without the consent of the State
Government as envisaged in Section 6 of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, hereinafter
referred to as ‘the 1946 Act’. Mr. Desai attempted
to distinguish the decisions rendered by this Court
in the case of Advance Insurance Company Vs.
Gurudasmal [(1970) 3 SCR 881 = (1970) 1 SCC 633]
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and in the case of Kazi Lhendup Dorzi Vs. CBI
[(1994) Supp. 2 SCC 116]. Mr. Desai submitted that
while in the first case, the Government of
Maharashtra had given its consent to the
investigation by the CBI, in the latter case the
question involved was not of grant of permission to
investigate into the case, but withdrawal of such
consent which had already been granted.
15. Mr. Desai reiterated the contentions, both of
Mr. Dwivedi and Mr. Rohatgi, that powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution could not be
invoked in contravention of the provisions of a
Statute and a fortiori the provisions of the
Constitution. Mr. Desai also urged that in the
Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra) not only
had the decision in Mohd. Anis’s case (supra) been
referred to, but this Court had expressly
disapproved the observation made therein by Mr.
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V.C. Misra that the law laid down in Prem Chand
Garg Vs. Excise Commissioner, U.P., Allahabad
[(1962) Supp. 1 SCR 885], in which it had been
observed that despite the width of the powers
conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 142(1),
even this Court could not under the said provision
make an order which was plainly inconsistent with
the express statutory provisions of substantive
law, much less, inconsistent with any
constitutional provision, was no longer good law.
16. Mr. Desai submitted that since the decision in
the Supreme Court Bar Association case (supra) had
not been considered by this Court while rendering
the judgment under review and the relief had been
moulded without any discussion on such issue, the
judgment was liable to be reviewed.
17. Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Senior Advocate, who appeared
for the Respondent No.5, Shri Prateek Yadav,
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reiterated the submissions made by Mr. Dwivedi, Mr.
Rohatgi and Mr. Desai in relation to the decision
rendered by this Court in the Supreme Court Bar
Association case (supra). Dr. Dhawan submitted
that the CBI, as a statutory body for the purpose
of conducting criminal investigation in extra-
ordinary circumstances with the consent of the
State Government, could exercise powers within the
limits and constraints of the Delhi Special Police
Establishment Act, 1946, which fact had not been
considered in the decisions rendered in State of
West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal [(1985) 1 SCC 317],
Bihar State Construction Co. Vs. Thakur Munendra
Nath Sinha [(1988) Supp. SCC 542] and also in Mohd.
Anis’s case (supra). Dr. Dhawan submitted that
within the constitutional framework, the CBI could
not encroach upon the powers of the police of
several States. Referring to Entry 80 in List I of
the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and
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Article 239AA, Dr. Dhawan submitted that the
Central Government was not entitled to extend the
powers and jurisdiction of the members of the
police force belonging to any area outside the
State so as to enable the police of one State to
exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area
outside that State without the consent of the State
Government of that State in which such area is
situated. Dr. Dhawan submitted that it was,
therefore, clear that the direction given by this
Court to the CBI, which is a creation of the Delhi
Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, to
investigate into a State subject, was contrary to
the constitutional safeguards engrafted in Entry 80
of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. Reference was also made by Dr.
Dhawan to the principles evolved by the Privy
Council in King Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed [AIR
1945 PC 18] and Bhajan Lal Vs. State of Haryana
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[(1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335], wherein it was observed
that judicial review is subject to the principles
of judicial restraint and must not become
unmanageable in other aspects relating to the power
of the Union or State Governments. Reference was
also made to Section 5 of the 1946 Act which listed
the classes of offences which may be inquired into
by the CBI.
18. Dr. Dhawan also contended that while
entertaining a public interest litigation, it was
always necessary for the Court to be extra cautious
since at the very initial stage no opportunity is
given to the Respondent to state his case before
notice is issued and at times it could result in
premature reference to the CBI on a view short of a
prima facie case, particularly where the public
interest litigation was politically motivated to
adversely affect the political consequences of the
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persons involved. Dr. Dhawan lastly submitted that
the direction given to the CBI after completion of
the inquiry to submit its report to the Union of
India was clearly contrary to law and could not be
sustained under any circumstances.
19. In addition to the above petitions, we had also
considered I.A. Nos.16 and 17 of 2009 which had
been filed by one Shri Ashutosh Srivastava, who
appeared in-person in support of his application
for being impleaded. Having heard learned counsel
for the Respondents and the Applicant in-person, we
had reserved orders on the same.
20. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we
are not inclined to implead Shri Srivastava in
these proceedings and his application for being
impleaded stands rejected.
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21. Appearing for the Writ Petitioner, Vishwanath
Chaturvedi, Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior
Advocate, submitted that every order in which a
mistake may be noticed does not automatically call
for a review and that the power of review could be
invoked only in circumstances as contained in Order
47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC).
Referring to the decision dated 16th June, 2008 of
this Court in State of West Bengal Vs. Kamal
Sengupta and Anr. in Civil Appeal No.1694 of 2006,
Mr. Tulsi submitted that the term “mistake or error
apparent” which finds place in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC,
by its very connotation signifies an error which is
evident per se from the record of the case and does
not require any detailed examination, scrutiny and
elucidation either of the facts or legal position.
In fact, in Parsion Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8
SCC 715] it was observed that if an error is not
self-evident and detection thereof requires long
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debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be
treated as an error apparent on the face of the
record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In
other words, an order or decision or judgment
cannot be corrected merely because it is erroneous
in law or on the ground that a different view could
have been taken on a point of fact or law, as the
Court could not sit in appeal over its own
judgment. Similar views were expressed by a Five-
Judge Bench of the Federal Court in Sir Hari
Shankar Pal and Anr. Vs. Anath Nath Mitter & Ors.
[(1949) FCR 36], wherein it was, inter alia,
observed that a decision being erroneous in law is
certainly no ground for ordering review.
22. Various other decisions were also referred to
which will only serve to duplicate the decisions of
this Court on the said issue.
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23. As has been indicated in paragraph 5 of this
judgment, five broad propositions were canvassed on
behalf of the review petitioner, Shri Akhilesh
Yadav, which were mainly confined to the
jurisdiction of the High Court and the Supreme
Court to direct a CBI inquiry in respect of an
offence alleged to have been committed within a
State, without the consent of the State concerned.
Along with the above, the locus standi of the writ
petitioner to maintain the writ petition was also
raised on behalf of Shri Yadav. While the
submissions on behalf of all the review petitioners
were centered around the said two propositions, a
specific issue was raised by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi as
to whether the investigation and/or inquiry could
also be extended to the assets of Smt. Dimple
Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav, since she had
neither held any post under the Government nor was
she involved in the activities of her husband or
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father-in-law, Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav. The
acquisition of wealth by her was attributed to her
agricultural income and not to any source of income
through her husband and her father-in-law.
24. Same were the submissions made by Dr. Rajiv
Dhawan, appearing for Shri Prateek Yadav, and, in
addition, it was submitted that the said Respondent
did not get a reasonable opportunity of stating his
case before the judgment was delivered in Writ
Petition (C) No.633 of 2005 on 1st March, 2007.
25. As far as the first contention is concerned,
the same has been set at rest by the Constitution
Bench in State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. The
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West
Bengal & Ors., being Civil Appeal Nos.6249-6250 of
2001. In the very first paragraph of its judgment
the Constitution Bench set out the issue, which had
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been referred to it for its opinion in the
following terms :
“The issue which has been referred for the opinion of the Constitution Bench is whether the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the Central Bureau of Investigation (for short “the CBI”), established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (for short “the Special Police Act”), to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government.”
26. After considering the various decisions on this
point, as also Article 246 of the Constitution, the
Constitution Bench ultimately answered the
reference in the manner following :
“In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the
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doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly.”
27. A note of caution was also given by the
Constitution Bench, which, in fact, finds place in
all the decisions relating to this issue, namely,
that the power which is vested in the superior
courts should be exercised sparingly, cautiously
and in exceptional situations where it becomes
necessary to provide credibility and instill
confidence in investigations or where the incident
may have national and international ramifications
or where such an order may be necessary for doing
complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights.
The said note of caution is an echo of the
observations made by this Court in Supreme Court
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Bar Association Vs. Union of India & Anr. [(1998) 4
SCC 409], that such an inquiry by the CBI could be
justified in certain circumstances to prevent any
obstruction to the stream of justice.
28. That this Court had jurisdiction to direct the
CBI to make an inquiry into the accumulation of
wealth by Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav and his family
members in excess of their known source of income,
based on the allegations made in the writ petition,
cannot be questioned. By its judgment dated 1st
March, 2007, this Court merely directed an
investigation into the allegations made in the writ
petition and to submit a report to the Union
Government. The submissions made on behalf of the
review petitioners in this regard, must, therefore,
be rejected, except in regard to the direction
given to the CBI to submit a report of its inquiry
to the Union Government.
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29. In addition, the submissions made qua Smt.
Dimple Yadav merits consideration, since when the
order under review was passed, she had neither held
any public office nor Government post and was
essentially a private person notwithstanding her
proximity to Shri Akhilesh Yadav and Shri Mulayam
Singh Yadav. On reconsideration of her case, we are
of the view that the investigation launched against
her on the issue of amassing wealth beyond her
known source of income, is liable to be dropped.
The review petition, so far as Smt. Dimple Yadav is
concerned, is, accordingly, allowed and the
investigation conducted by the CBI against her
should, therefore, be dropped.
30. As far as the other review petitioners are
concerned, we have to keep in mind the fact that
the scope and ambit of a review proceeding is
limited and the order dated 1st March, 2007, in
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respect of which review has been sought, was
neither irregular nor without jurisdiction and was
passed after considering the submissions made on
behalf of the respective parties. The review
proceedings cannot be converted into an appeal.
31. The judgment under review does not, in our
view, suffer from any error apparent on the face of
the record, except for the directions given in the
case of Smt. Dimple Yadav. There is another error
which we ourselves are inclined to correct. While
disposing of the writ petition and directing the
CBI to inquire into the alleged acquisition of
wealth by the Respondent Nos.2 to 5, the CBI was
directed to submit a report to the Union of India
and on receipt of such report, the Union of India
was given the liberty to take further steps
depending upon the outcome of the preliminary
inquiry into the assets of the said respondents.
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Since, the CBI is an independent body and is under
no obligation to report to the Union of India in
regard to investigations undertaken by it, the
direction to submit a report of the inquiry to the
Union of India and the liberty given to the Union
of India to take further steps on such report is
not contemplated in the scheme of the Delhi Special
Police Establishment Act, 1946. It is for the CBI
to decide what steps it wishes to take on the basis
of the inquiry conducted. We, therefore, modify
the order dated 1st March, 2007, and direct that the
directions given to the CBI to submit a report of
its inquiry to the Union of India and the liberty
given to the Union of India to take further steps
on such report, be deleted from the order.
32. The review petitions are disposed of with the
following directions :
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i) The CBI shall drop the inquiry into
the assets of the Respondent No.4, Smt.
Dimple Yadav, wife of Shri Akhilesh Yadav;
ii) The CBI may take such independent
action, as it considers fit, on the basis of
the inquiry conducted by it pursuant to
the directions given by this Court in the
judgment under review, without seeking any
direction from the Union of India or on the
basis of any direction that may be given by
it.
…………………………………………………CJI. (ALTAMAS KABIR)
………………………………………………………J. (H.L. DATTU)
New Delhi Dated: December 13, 2012.