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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 354 OF 2006

ADI SAIVA SIVACHARIYARGAL  NALA SANGAM & ORS. ...PETITIONER (S)

VERSUS

THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL  NADU & ANR. ...RESPONDENT (S)

WITH W.P. (C) No. 355 of 2006 W.P. (C) No.383 of 2006

AND W.P. (C) No. 384 of 2006

J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1. Religion incorporates the particular belief(s) that a group  

of people subscribe to.  Hinduism, as a religion, incorporates  

all  forms  of  belief  without  mandating  the  selection  or  

elimination of any one single belief.  It is a religion that has no  

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single  founder;  no  single  scripture  and  no  single  set  of  

teachings.  It has been described as Sanatan Dharma, namely,  

eternal faith, as it is the collective wisdom and inspiration of  

the centuries that Hinduism seeks to preach and propagate.  It  

is  keeping in mind the above precepts that  we will  proceed  

further.

2. Before highlighting the issues that confronts the Court in  

the present case the relevant Constitutional provisions in Part  

III  of the Constitution may be taken note of.  Article 13, in  

clear and unequivocal terms, lays down that all laws including  

pre-constitution  laws  which  are  inconsistent  with  or  in  

derogation of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III are  

void.  Sub-Article (3) brings within the fold of laws, all Rules,  

Regulations, Notification, custom and usage having the force  

of law.  While the several provisions of Part III would hardly  

need to be re-emphasized, specific notice must be had of, in  

the context of  the present case, the provisions contained in  

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.  While Article 25 makes  

the freedom of conscience and the right to profess, practice  

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and propagate the religion to which a person may subscribe, a  

fundamental right, the exercise of such right has been made  

subject to public order, morality and health and also to the  

other provisions of Part III.  Article 25(2)(b) makes it clear that  

main part of  the provisions contained in Article  25 will  not  

come in the way of the operation of any existing law or prevent  

the  State  from  making  any  law  which  provides  for  social  

welfare  and reform or  for  throwing  open of  Hindu religious  

institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of  

Hindus.   Similarly,  Article  26 while  conferring  the  right  on  

every religious denomination to manage its own affairs makes  

it clear that the right to manage the affairs of any religious  

denomination is restricted to matters of religion only.

3. The  provisions  of  Part  III,  as  noted  above,  therefore  

makes it amply clear that while the right to freedom of religion  

and to  manage the  religious affairs  of  any denomination  is  

undoubtedly  a  fundamental  right,  the  same  is  subject  to  

public  order,  morality  and  health  and  further  that  the  

inclusion of such rights in Part III of the Constitution will not  

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prevent the State from acting in an appropriate manner, in the  

larger public interest, as mandated by the main part of both  

Articles  25  and 26.   Besides,  the  freedom of  religion being  

subject  to  the  other  provisions  of  Part  III,  undoubtedly,  

Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution has to be harmoniously  

construed with the other provisions contained in Part III.

4. The necessary facts  may now be noticed.   In order  to  

amend and consolidate the law relating to administration and  

governance of  Hindu religious and charitable institutions in  

the State of Tamil Nadu, the State Legislature has enacted the  

Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,  

1959  (hereinafter  referred  to  as  ‘the  Tamil  Nadu  Act’).   A  

passing reference may be made, at this stage, to Section 55 of  

the  Tamil  Nadu Act  which provided that  in case where the  

office holders or servants of a religious institution are required  

to be filled up on the principle of  hereditary succession the  

person next in line of succession is entitled to succeed.  There  

were some exceptions to the above rule i.e. where the person  

next in line is a minor or suffers from some incapacity.  The  

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aforesaid provision (Section 55) was amended alongwith other  

related provisions by the Amendment Act of 1970 which came  

into force on January 8, 1971.  By the aforesaid amendment  

the principle of next in line of succession was abolished.  The  

amendment  came to  be  challenged before  this  Court  which  

challenge  was  considered  by  a  Constitution  Bench  of  the  

Court.  In its judgment in Seshammal and Others, Etc. Etc.   

Vs.  State  of  Tamil  Nadu1  the  Constitution  Bench,  while  

upholding the validity of the amendment, dealt with a further  

question,  namely,  though  the  principle  of  next  in  line  was  

validly abolished,  whether the appointment of office bearers or  

servants  of  the  temples  are  required  to  be  made  from  a  

particular  denomination/group/sect  as  mandated  by  the  

Agamas i.e. treatises pertaining to matters like construction of  

temples;  installation of  idols  and conduct  of  worship of  the  

Deity.   The  Constitution  Bench  after  an  elaborate  

consideration of the matter,  details of  which will  be noticed  

subsequently, seems to have answered the aforesaid question  

in the affirmative.   

1 (1972) 2 SCC 11

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5. No  controversy  surfaced  after  the  Constitution  Bench  

judgment in  Seshammal (supra) until a G.O. No. 118 dated  

23.05.2006  was  issued  by  the  Government  of  Tamil  Nadu,  

Department of Tamil Development, Cultural and Endowments  

to  the  effect  that,  “Any  person  who  is  a  Hindu  and  

possessing the requisite qualification and training can  

be  appointed  as  a  Archaka  in  Hindu  temples”.   An  

Ordinance  (No.  5  /2006)  dated  14.07.2006  followed  the  

aforesaid  G.O.  seeking  to  further  amend  sub-section  (2)  of  

Section 55 of the Tamil Nadu Act. The said provision of the Act  

i.e. Section 55(2), by virtue of the 1971 amendment referred to  

above and the 2006 Ordinance, read as follows.   

“(2)  No person shall be entitled to appointment   to  any  vacancy  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)   merely on the ground that he is next in the line   of  succession  to  the  last  holder  of  office.”   [Change brought about by amendment of S.55(2)]

“or  on  the  ground  of  any  custom  or  usage”.   [Change brought about by Ordinance 5/2006)

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6. The Explanatory statement to the Ordinance in para 4  

indicated the purpose behind further amendment of Section  

55(2) in the following terms.

“Archakas  of  the  Temples  are  to  be  appointed   without  any  discrimination  of  caste  and  creed.   Custom or usage cannot be a hindrance to this.  It is   considered  that  the  position  is  clarified  in  the  Act   itself and accordingly, it has been decided to amend  Section 55 of the said Act suitably”.

7. The Ordinance was replaced by The Tamil Nadu Act No.  

15  of  2006  which  received  the  assent  of  the  Governor  on  

29.08.2006. The Act, however, did not contain the amendment  

to Section 55 as was made by the Ordinance.  In other words,  

the said amendment brought by the Ordinance was dropped  

from the Amending Act 15 of 2006.

8. The  present  writ  petitions  under  Article  32  of  the  

Constitution  have  been  instituted  by  an  Association  of  

Archakas and individual Archakas of Sri Meenakshi Amman  

Temple of Madurai.  The writ petitions were filed challenging  

the G.O. No. 118 dated 23.05.2006 and Ordinance No. 5/2006  

(at that point of time the Amending Act of 2006 had not come  

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into effect).  As the amendment of Section 55(2) made by the  

Ordinance had not been continued by the Amending Act 15 of  

2006 the said part of the challenge (as against the ordinance)  

made  in  the  writ  petitions  became  redundant  leaving  the  

legality and validity of the G.O. 23.05.2006 as the sole issue  

for consideration in the present writ petitions.

9. Preliminary  Objections  have  been  raised  to  the  

maintainability of the writ petitions by Shri P.P. Rao and Shri  

Colin  Gonsalves,  learned  senior  counsels  appearing  for  

respondents .  It has been urged that the present writ petitions  

have not  been filed as public interest litigations and in the  

absence  of  any  specific  orders  in  implementation  of  the  

impugned  G.O.  dated  23.05.2006  the  writ  petitions  are  

premature.   It  is  further  contended  that  even  if  the  writ  

petitions are to be considered as PILs the same raise questions  

with regard to appointment in public office i.e.  Archakas in  

public temples and therefore the writ petitions will also not be  

maintainable as public interest litigations.  It is further urged  

that  as  and  when  the  G.O.  is  given  effect  to  by  actual  

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appointment of an Archaka or Archakas, as may be, it will be  

open for the petitioners to raise the issue and establish that  

there is a usage or custom or customary practice governing  

the temple in question which require the appointment of the  

Archaka to be made from a particular denomination.   

10. It is difficult for us to accept the contentions advanced on  

behalf of the respondents with regard to the maintainability of  

writ  petitions  on  two  counts.   Firstly,  it  is  difficult  to  

appreciate as to why the petitioners should be non-suited at  

the threshold merely because the G.O. dated 23.05.2006 has  

not  been  given  effect  to  by  actual  orders  of  the  State  

Government.   The institution of  a  writ  proceeding need not  

await actual prejudice and adverse effect and consequence. An  

apprehension of such harm, if the same is well founded, can  

furnish a cause of action for moving the Court.  The argument  

that the present writ petition is founded on a cause relating to  

appointment in a public office and hence not entertainable as  

a public interest litigation would be too simplistic a solution to  

adopt to answer the issues that have been highlighted which  

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concerns the religious faith and practice of a large number of  

citizens  of  the  country  and  raises  claims  of  century  old  

traditions and usage having the force of law.  The above is the  

second ground, namely, the gravity of  the issues that arise,  

that impel us to make an attempt to answer the issues raised  

and  arising  in  the  writ  petitions  for  determination  on  the  

merits thereof.    

11. Shri K. Parasaran, learned senior counsel appearing for  

the petitioners has submitted that the issues arising in the  

case  stand  squarely  covered  by  the  pronouncement  of  the  

Constitution Bench in Seshammal (supra). In fact, according  

to the learned senior counsel, the issues in the present case  

are res judicata; the same having been decided inter-partes in  

Seshammal (supra); the Archakas of the Agamas Temples and  

the respondent-State both being parties to the said decision.  

Specifically,  Shri  Parasaran,  has urged that  in  Seshammal  

(supra) the Constitution Bench has unambiguously held that  

the appointment of an Archaka has to be as per the Agamas  

governing the  particular  temple and any deviation from the  

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said age old custom and usage would be an infringement of  

the  freedom  of  religion  and  the  rights  of  the  religious  

denomination  to  manage  its  own affairs,  as  guaranteed,  by  

Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution. The impugned G.O., by  

its  prescription,  as  noted,  therefore,  seeks  to  override  the  

declaration  of  law  made  by  the  Constitution  Bench  in  

Seshammal (supra).

12. Shri Parasaran has further urged that curtailment of the  

freedoms guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution  

can  only  be  made  by  the  legislature  and  even a  legislative  

exercise  in  this  regard  is  circumscribed  by  the  limitations  

contained in both Articles 25 and 26.  In the present case the  

amendment of Section 55 of the Tamil Nadu Act as made by  

Ordinance  No.6  of  2005  has  not  been  continued  by  the  

Amendment  Act  No.15  of  2006  (as  already  noted).  The  

impugned G.O. has, therefore, to necessarily lose its efficacy.  

Reliance herein is placed on the following passage from the  

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report  in  Sanjeev  Coke  Manufacturing Vs.  M/s  Bharat  

Coking Coal Limited & Anr.2

“25………..The deponents of the affidavits filed into   court  may speak for  the parties on whose behalf   they swear to the statements. They do not speak   for  the  Parliament.  No  one  may  speak  for  the   Parliament and Parliament is never before the court.   After Parliament has said what it  intends to say,   only the court may say what the Parliament meant   to say. None else. Once a statute leaves Parliament   House, the Court is the only authentic voice which   may echo (interpret) the Parliament……..”

13. It was further contended that the G.O. wrongly relies on  

the  decision  in  the  case  of  N.  Adhithyan Vs.  Travancore  

Devasom Board and Others3 to justify its promulgation.  The  

reliance placed on  Adhithyan (supra), in the face of the law  

laid down in  Seshammal (supra), is wholly misplaced.  Shri  

Parasaran has further argued that the impugned GO has to be  

read on its own terms and the validity thereof cannot be saved  

by what appears to be a “concession” made by the State in  

Para 51 of  the counter  affidavit  to  the effect  that  the State  

would respect the distinction between Saiva and Vaishanava  

2 (1983) 1 SCC 147 3 (2002) 8 SCC 106

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temples and the Archakas in each of such temples shall  be  

appointed from either the Saivas or Vaishanavas, as may be,  

taking  into  account  the  indoctrination  of  the  concerned  

Archakas in the Agamas.  According to Shri Parasaran, neither  

all  Saivas nor all  Vaishnavas are  ipso facto  denominational.  

Only a Saiva who satisfies the eligibility under the Sivagama  

and  a  Vaishnava  satisfying  the  eligibility  under  the  

pancharatna  or  vaikhanasa  can  be  referred  to  as  

denominations.   A  person  who  is  a  member  of  such  

denomination alone can be appointed as a Archaka of a Saiva  

or a Vaishnava temple, as the case may be.   

14. On  the  other  hand,  Shri  P.P.  Rao  and  Shri  Colin  

Gonsalves,  learned  Senior  Counsels  appearing  for  the  

respondents  have  contended  that  the  decision  of  the  

Constitution  Bench  in  Seshammal (supra)  upholding  the  

Constitution  validity  of  the  Amendment  Act  of  1970  had  

opened the avenue to all qualified Hindus irrespective of caste,  

denominations,  etc  to  be  appointed  as  Archakas.   It  is  

contended that once the hereditary principle was held to be  

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flexible,  the  exclusive  right  of  a  particular  group  to  

appointment necessarily stood negated and it is qualification  

coupled with merit and eligibility that has to be the crucial test  

for  appointment,  consistent  with  Articles  14  and  16  of  the  

Constitution.   Learned counsels have specifically  referred to  

the Government Order No.1 of  2007 and in this regard the  

recommendation of the High Powered Committee appointed for  

making recommendations for effective implementation of the  

impugned GO dated 23.5.2006. It is contended, by referring to  

the  report  of  the  High  Powered  Committee,  that  the  same  

demonstrates the lack of familiarity of even temple priests with  

the Agamas and their lack of knowledge of such Agamas and  

the  practices  of  the  Temples  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the  

Agamas.   It  is  submitted that  not  only  the  contents  of  the  

Agamas have become uncertain, even assuming otherwise, the  

same cannot be an authority to confer legitimacy to a practice  

which is inconsistent with and contrary to the provisions of  

the Constitution, specially those contained in Part III thereof.  

It  is  further submitted that  the impugned GO is consistent  

with and in fact effectuates the Fundamental Right of Equality  

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and equal opportunity and no contrary practice overriding the  

said provisions of the Constitution would be legally acceptable.  

Learned  Counsels  have  further  submitted  that  there  is  no  

conflict between the judgments in Seshammal (supra) and N.  

Adithayan (supra) and it is possible to read the law declared  

in  both  the  cases  in  a  manner  consistent  with   the  

Constitutional requirements and principles.

15. An additional issue has been struck by Shri Gonsalves,  

learned Senior Counsel,  that the impugned GO needs to be  

upheld on the touchstone of the principle enshrined by Article  

17 of the Constitution.    The exclusive right of  a particular  

group  to  enter  the  sanctum  sanctorum  of  a  temple  and  

perform the rituals on the ground that performance of such  

rituals by any other person would defile the image is a thought  

and  action  which  is  prohibited  by  Article  17  of  the  

Constitution.  Violation  and  consequently  commission  of  

offences under the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 has also  

been urged.   

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16. The issues arising and the arguments made centre around  

the true meaning, purport and effect of the Constitution Bench  

judgment in Seshammal (supra) and in the above context the  

effect  of  the decision of  the numerically smaller  Bench in  N.  

Adithayan  (supra).  We will  therefore proceed to understand  

the above position at the outset.

17. The contours of the challenge in Seshammal (supra) has  

already  been  noticed.   To  repeat,  it  is  the  validity  of  the  

Amendment  Act  of  1970 which  sought  to  amend,  inter  alia,  

Section  55  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Act  that  was  questioned  in  

Seshammal (supra).  The Statement of Objects and Reasons for  

the amendment Act of 1970 is stated as follows:

“In the year 1969 the Committee on Untouchability,   Economic  and  Educational  Development  of  the   Scheduled  Castes  has  suggested in  its  report  that   the  hereditary  priesthood  in  the  Hindu  Society   should be abolished, that the system can be replaced   by an ecclesiastical organisation of men possessing  the requisite educational qualifications who may be   trained in recognised institutions in priesthood  and  that  the  line  should  be  open  to  all  candidates   irrespective  of  caste,  creed or  race.  In  Tamil  Nadu  Archakas, Gurukkals and Poojaries are all Ulthurai   servants  in  Hindu temples.  The duties  of  ‘Ulthurai   servants’ relate mainly to the performance of poojas   rituals and other services to the deity, the recitation   

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of  mantras,  vedas,  prabandas,  thevarams  and   similar  invocations  and  the  performance  of  duties   connected  with  such  performance  and  recitations.   Sections  55  and  56  of  the  Tamil  Nadu  Hindu   Religious  and  Charitable  Endowments  Act,  1959   (Tamil Nadu Act 22 of 1959), provide for appointment   of  office-holders  and  servants  in  the  religious   institutions by the trustees by applying the rule of   hereditary succession also. As a step towards social   reform  Hindu  temples  have  already  been  thrown  open to all Hindus irrespective of caste.…”

18. The arguments in support of the challenge were threefold  

namely,

“(a) The freedom of hereditary succession to the office   of Archaka is abolished although succession to it is   an  essential  and  integral  part  of  the  faith  of  the   Saivite and Vaishnavite worshippers.

(b) It is left to the Government in power to prescribe   or not to prescribe such qualifications as they may  choose to adopt for applicants to this religious office   while the Act itself  gives no indication whatever of   the principles on which the qualifications should be   based. The statement of objects and reasons which   is adopted in the counter-affidavit  on behalf  of the   State makes it clear that not only the scope but the   object  of  the  Amendment  Act  is  to  override  the   exclusive right of the denomination to manage their   own affairs  in the matter  of  religion by appointing   Archakas  belonging  to  a  specific  denomination  for   the purpose of worship.

(c) The Amendment Act gives the right of appointment   for  the  first  time  to  the  trustee  who  is  under  the   

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control of the Government under the provisions of the   principal Act and this is the very negation of freedom  of religion and the principle of non-interference by the   State as regards the practice of religion and the right   of a denomination to manage its own affairs in the   matter of religion.”

19. In  the  course  of  a  very  lengthy  discourse  and  after  

considering the works of learned scholars in the field; the law  

laid down by this Court in respect of Articles 25 and 26 till date  

and  particularly  the  efficacy  of  the  Agamas  the  Constitution  

Bench came to the following conclusion.

“Any  State  action  which  permits  the  defilement  or   pollution of the image by the touch of an Archaka not   authorised by the Agamas would violently interfere   with the religious faith and practices of  the Hindu   worshipper in a vital respect, and would, therefore,   be  prima  facie  invalid  under  Article  25(1)  of  the   Constitution.”

20. Thereafter, the Constitution Bench by referring to several  

earlier pronouncements of this Court specifically mentioned in  

para 13 of the Report identified the main principles underlying  

the provisions of Article 25 and 26 of the Constitution in the  

following manner.

“The first is that the protection of these articles is not   limited to  matters  of  doctrine or  belief  they extend   also  to  acts  done  in  pursuance  of  religion  and   

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therefore  contain  a  guarantee  for  rituals  and   observances,  ceremonies  and  modes  of  worship   which  are  integral  parts  of  religion.  The second is   that what constitutes an essential part of a religious   or religious practice has to be decided by the courts   with reference to the doctrine of a particular religion   and  include  practices  which  are  regarded  by  the   community as a part of its religion.”

21. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts before it the  

Constitution Bench identified the main thrust of the arguments  

made in support of the challenge to the amendment to be with  

regard  to  the  vesting  of  powers  and authority  in  the  temple  

trustee to appoint any person as an Archaka so long as he was  

holding a fitness certificate from one of the institutions referred  

to  in  Rule  12  of  the  Madras  Hindu  Religious  Institutions  

(Officers and Servants) Service Rules, 1964. The Said Rule 12  

required  that  an  Archaka  should  be  proficient  in  Mantras,  

Vedas, Prabandams etc., namely, that such a person is fit and  

qualified  for  performing  puja  and  having  knowledge  of  the  

rituals and other  services.   The Constitution Bench was told  

that  the  above  position  admits  a  situation  where  the  

requirement of Rule 12 can very well be dispensed with (by a  

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subsequent  amendment  of  the  Rules)  thereby  resulting  in  

conferment of virtually unguided and unbridled powers to the  

trustee to appoint any person as a Archaka notwithstanding the  

fact  that  worship  of  the  deity  by  a  person  other  than  one  

belonging to a particular denomination may have the effect of  

defiling the deity. As the temple trustee is to function under the  

control of the State under Section 27 of the Tamil Nadu Act the  

question  highlighted  before  the  Constitution  Bench  was  

whether  by virtue of  the amendment the State  had gained a  

right  to  step  into  and  control  the  Sanctum Sanctorum of  a  

temple  through  the  agency  of  the  trustee  and  the  Archaka  

thereby  transgressing  the  rights  granted  to  a  religious  

denomination by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

22. The Constitution Bench noticed that to counter the above  

situation the Advocate General of the State of Tamil Nadu had  

contended that the power given to the trustee by virtue of the  

amendment to Section 55 was not a unqualified power but was  

subject to the provisions of Section 28 of the Act which is in the  

following terms.

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“Section 28.-  Subject to the provisions of the Tamil   Nadu  Temple  Entry  Authorisation  Act,  1947,  the   trustee  of  every  religious  institution  is  bound  to   administer  its  affairs  and  to  apply  its  funds  and   properties in accordance with the terms of the trust,   the usage of the institution and all lawful directions  which  a  competent  authority  may issue  in  respect   thereof  and  as  carefully  as  a  man  of  ordinary   prudence would deal  with such affairs,  funds and   properties if they were his own.”

In this regard the Advocate General had virtually admitted  

that  if  the  usage  or  practice  of  the  institution  required  the  

Archaka of a temple to be of a particular denomination the said  

usage would be binding on the trustee and he would be bound  

to make appointment under Section 55 in accordance with such  

usage.  The usage, practice or custom requiring an Archaka to  

be  of  a  particular  denomination,  according  to  the  Advocate  

General, was founded on religious beliefs and practices whereas  

the next in line principle, if is to be regarded as a usage, was a  

merely secular usage on which a legislation would be competent  

under Article 25 (2)(a) of the Constitution. It was, alternatively,  

contended that if the hereditary principle is to be understood as  

a religious practice, alteration thereof can also be made by a  

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legislation under Article 25(2)(b), such legislation being for the  

purpose of social welfare and reform.   

23. The Constitution Bench in Seshammal (supra) answered  

the question by holding that the hereditary principle which was  

of long usage was a secular principle and therefore a legislation  

to alter the said usage, i.e. the Amendment Act of 1970, was  

competent  under  Article  25(2)(a).   However,  the  Constitution  

Bench was quick to add that it is to the limited extent of the  

above  exception  alone,  namely,  the  liberty  to  make  the  

appointment from persons beyond next in line to the last holder  

that the trustee is released from the obligation imposed on him  

by Section 28 of the Tamil Nadu Act which otherwise requires  

the trustee to administer the affairs of the temple in accordance  

with  the  usage  governing  the  temple.  Para  22  of  the  

Constitution Bench judgment wherein the aforesaid view finds  

mention may be noticed verbatim.

“22.  In view of  sub-section (2)  of  Section 55, as it   now stands amended, the choice of the trustee in the   matter  of  appointment  of  an  Archaka  is  no  longer   limited by the operation of the rule of next-in-line of   succession  in  temples  where  the  usage  was  to   

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appoint the Archaka on the hereditary principle. The   trustee is not bound to make the appointment on the   sole ground that the candidate, is the next-in-line of   succession to the last holder of office. To that extent,   and to that extent alone, the trustee is released from  the obligation imposed on him by Section 28 of the   principal Act to administer the affairs in accordance   with  that  part  of  the  usage  of  a  temple  which   enjoined hereditary appointments. The legislation in   this respect, as we have shown, does not interfere   with any religious practice or matter of religion and,   therefore, is not invalid.”

24. A reading of  the judgment of  the Constitution Bench in  

Seshammal (supra)  shows  that  the  Bench  considered  the  

expanse of the Agamas both in Saivite and Vaishnavite temples  

to  hold  that  the  said  treatises  restricted  the  appointment  of  

Archakas to a particular religious denomination(s) and further  

that worship of the deity by persons who do not belong to the  

particular denomination(s) may have the effect of even defiling  

the idol requiring purification ceremonies to be performed.  The  

Constitution Bench further held that while the appointment of  

Archakas on the principle of next in line is a secular act the  

particular denomination from which Archakas  are required to  

be appointed as per the Agamas embody a long standing belief  

that  has  come  to  be  firmly  embedded  in  the  practices  

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immediately  surrounding  the  worship  of  the  image  and  

therefore such beliefs/practice constitute  an essential  part  of  

the  religious  practice  which  under  Section  28  of  the  Act  

(extracted  above)  the  trustee  is  bound  to  follow.  The  above,  

which the petitioners contend to be the true ratio of the law laid  

down by the Constitution Bench in  Seshammal (supra),  has  

been  questioned  by  the  respondents  who  argue  that  

Seshammal  (supra) is but the expression of an agreement of  

the Constitution Bench to what was a  concession made before  

it  by  the  Advocate  General  of  the  State.  According  to  the  

respondent in Seshammal (supra) the Constitution Bench had  

no occasion to deal with the issue arising herein, the challenge  

before it being confined to the validity of the Amendment Act of  

1970.  

25. The answers to the above will be dealt with a little later  

and for  the present  what  has  to  engage the attention of  the  

Court is the true ratio of the law laid down by the numerically  

smaller Bench in Adithayan (supra).

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26. The facts confronting the Court in Adithayan (supra) may  

now be noticed.   The challenge therein was by a Namboodri  

Brahmin to the appointment of a non-Namboodri Brahmin who  

was otherwise well qualified to be appointed as a priest in the  

temple in question.  The challenge was sought to be based on  

the ground that it has been a long standing practice and usage  

in  the  temple  that  its  priests  are  appointed  exclusively  from  

Namboodri  Brahmins  and  any  departure  therefrom  is  in  

violation of the rights of Namboodri Brahmins under Article 25  

and 26 of the Constitution. Upon a consideration of the various  

earlier  decisions  of  this  Court  specifically  referred  to  in  

Adithayan (supra), details of which need not again be noticed  

herein (such details are being separately noticed later, though  

in  a  different  context)  including  the  decision  in  Seshammal  

(supra) it  was held that rights claimed solely on the basis of  

caste cannot enjoy the protection of Article 25 and 26 and no  

earlier  decision  of  this  Court  including  Seshammal (supra)  

would support the contention that even duly qualified persons  

can be barred from performing Poojas on the sole ground that  

such a person is not  a Brahmin by birth or pedigree.   After  

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expounding  the  law  in  the  above  manner,  it  was  held  in  

Adithayan (supra) that even proof of any such practice since  

the  pre-constitutional  days  (which  in  any  case  was  not  

forthcoming) cannot sustain such a claim as the same would be  

in  derogation  of  constitutional  values  and  opposed  to  public  

policy or social decency.  We do not see how the above view of  

this Court in any way strikes a discordant note with the views  

expressed in any earlier decision including Seshammal(supra).  

The issues in Seshammal(supra) were entirely different and the  

discussions therein (para 12) proceeds on the basis that entry  

to  the  sanctum  sanctorum  for  a  particular  denomination  is  

without any reference to caste or social status. The reference to  

the opinion of Sri R. Parthasarathy Bhattacharya who has been  

referred to in the above para 12 of the report as an undisputed  

scholar on the subject was cited to show that apart from the  

followers of the 4 (four) traditions, so far as Vaishnava temples  

are concerned “…..none others, however high placed in society   

as Pontiffs or Acharyas, or even other Brahmins could touch the   

idols, do Pooja or enter the Garba Girha……..”  Exclusion solely  

on the basis of caste was not an issue in Seshammal(supra) so  

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as to understand the decision in  Adithayan (supra) to be, in  

any way, a departure from what has been held in Seshammal  

(supra).     

27. Before  we  go  on  to  deliberate  on  the  validity  of  the  

impugned G.O.  dated 23.05.2006 it  will  be useful  to  try  to  

understand what is Hinduism?  A broad answer is to be found  

in the preface to this report but, perhaps, we should delve a  

little  deeper  into  the  issue.   The  subject  has  received  an  

indepth consideration of the Country’s philosopher President  

Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in the celebrated work “ The Hindu way  

of Life”.  The said work has been exhaustively considered in  

Sastri  Yagnapurushadji  and  Others  Vs.  Muldas  

Bhudradas  Vaishya  and  Another4 in  the  context  of  the  

question  as  to  whether  Swaminarayan  sect  is  a  religion  

distinguishable  and  separate  from  the  Hindu  religion  and  

consequently  the  temples  belonging  to  the  said  sect  fell  

outside the scope of Section 3 of the Bombay Hindu Places  of  

Public Worship (Entry Authorisation) Act, 1956.  The aforesaid  

4 1966(3) SCR 242

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Section 3 of the Act  inter alia provided that every temple to  

which the Act applied shall be open to the excluded classes for  

worship in the same manner and to the same extent as other  

Hindus in general.  While the eventual decision of the Court  

which answered the question raised is in the negative, namely,  

that  the  sect  in  question  was  not  a  distinguishable  and  

different religion, it is the very learned discourse that is to be  

found in the report with regard to the true tenets of Hinduism  

that would be of interest so far the present case is concerned.  

The  following  passages  from the  report  are  truly  worthy  of  

reproduction  both  for  the  purpose  of  recapitulation  and  

illumination.

“……………..   …………..  …………   …………  When we think of the Hindu religion, we find it   difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  define  Hindu  religion or even adequately describe it.  Unlike   other religions in the world, the Hindu religion   does  not  claim  any  one  prophet;  it  does  not   worship any one God; it does not subscribe to   any one dogma; it does not believe in any one   philosophic concept; it does not follow any one   set of religious rites or performances; in fact, it   does  not  appear  to  satisfy  the  narrow  traditional features of any religion or creed. It   may broadly be described as a way of life and  nothing more.

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……………..  ………….. …………  …………

The Hindu thinkers reckoned with the striking  fact that the men and women dwelling in India   belonged to different communities, worshipped  different  gods,  and  practiced  different  rites   (Kurma Purana).(Ibid p.12.)

……………..  ………….. …………  …………

“It  presents  for  our  investigation  a  complex   congeries of creeds and doctrines which in its   gradual accumulation may be compared to the   gathering together of the mighty volume of the   Ganges,  swollen  by  a  continual  influx  of   tributary  rivers  and  rivulets,  spreading  itself   over  an  ever-increasing  area  of  country  and  finally resolving itself into an intricate Delta of   tortuous steams and jungly marshes ........ The   Hindu religion is a reflection of  the composite   character of the Hindus, who are not one people   but many. It is based on the idea of universal   receptivity. It has ever aimed at accommodating   itself to circumstances, and has carried on the   process of adaptation through more than three   thousand  years.  It  has  first  borne  with  and   then,  so  to  speak,  swallowed,  digested,  and  assimilated  something  from  all  creeds."   ("Religious Thought & Life in India" by Monier   Williams, P. 57.)

The  history  of  Indian  thought  emphatically   brings  out  the  fact  that  the  development  of   Hindu religion has always been inspired by an  endless quest of the mind for truth based on the   consciousness  that  truth  has  many  facets.   Truth  is  one,  but  wise  men  describe  if   differently.  The  Indian mind has,  consistently   through  the  ages,  been  exercised  over  the   problem of the nature of godhead the problem  

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that faces the spirit at the end of life, and the   interrelation  between  the  individual  and  the   universal  soul.  "If  we  can  abstract  from  the   variety  of  opinion",  says  Dr.  Radhakrishnan,   "and  observe  the  general  spirit  of  Indian   thought, we shall find that it has a disposition   to  interpret  life  and  nature  in  the  way  of   monistic  idealism,  though this  tendency is  so   plastic, living and manifold that it takes many   forms  and  expresses  itself  in  even  mutually   hostile teachings".(Ibid, p.32.)

Though  philosophic  concepts  and  principles  evolved  by  different  Hindu  thinkers  and  philosophers  varied  in  many  ways  and  even  appeared  to  conflict  with  each  other  in  some  particulars, they all had reverence for the past   and accepted the Vedas as the sole foundation   of  the  Hindu philosophy.  Naturally  enough,  it   was realised by Hindu religion from the very   beginning  of  its  career  that  truth  was  many- sided  and  different  views  contained  different   aspects  of  truth  which  no  one  could  fully   express.

Do  the  Hindus  worship  at  their  temples  the   same set or number of gods ? That is another   question which can be asked in this connection;   and the answer to this question again has to be   in  the  negative.  Indeed,  there  are  certain   sections of the Hindu community which do not   believe in the worship of idols; and as regards   those sections of  the Hindu community which  believe in the worship of idols their idols differ   from community to community and it cannot be   said that one definite idol or a definite number   of  idols  are  worshipped  by  all  the  Hindu  in   general. In the Hindu Pantheon the first goods   that  were  worshipped  in  Vedic  times  were  

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mainly  Indra,  Varuna,  Vayu and Agni.  Later,   Brahma,  Vishnu  and  Mahesh  came  to  be   worshipped.  In  course  of  time,  Rama  and  Krishna secured a place of pride in the Hindu   Pantheon,  and  gradually  as  different   philosophic  concepts  held  sway  in  different   sects  and  in  different  sections  of  the  Hindu   community,  a  large  number  of  gods  were   added,  with  the  result  that  today,  the  Hindu  Pantheon presents the spectacle of a very large   number  of  gods  who  are  worshipped  by  different sections of the Hindus.

The  development  of  Hindu  religion  and  philosophy shows that from time to time saints   and  religious  reformers  attempted  to  remove  from the Hindu thought and practices elements   of  corruption and superstition and that led to   the formation of different sects. Buddha stated   Buddhism;  Mahavir  founded Jainism;  Basava  became  the  founder  of  Lingayat  religion,   Dnyaneshwar  and  Tukaram  initiated  the   Varakari  cult;  Guru  Nanak  inspired  Sikhism;   Dayananda  founded  Arya  Samaj,  and  Chaitanya began Bhakti cult; and as a result of   the  teachings  of  Ramakrishna  and  Vivekananda,  Hindu religion  flowered into  its   most attractive, progressive and dynamic form.   If we study the teachings of these saints and   religious reformers, we would notice an amount   of  divergence  in  their  respective  views;  but   underneath that divergence, there is a kind of   subtle  indescribable  unity  which  keeps  them  within the sweep of the broad and progressive   Hindu religion.

Tilak faced this complex and difficult problem of   defining  or  at  least  describing  adequately   Hindu  religion  and  he  evolved  a  working   

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formula  which  may  be  regarded  as  fairly  adequate  and  satisfactory.  Said  Tilak  :   "Acceptance  of  the  Vedas  with  reverence;   recognition of the fact that the means or ways   to salvation are diverse and realisation of the   truth that the number of gods to be worshipped  is  large,  that  indeed  is  the  distinguishing  feature of Hindu religion. This definition brings   out succinctly the broad distinctive features of   Hindu religion. It is somewhat remarkable that   this  broad  sweep  of  Hindu religion  has  been  eloquently  described  by  Toynbee.  Says  Toynbee  :  "When  we  pass  from the  plane  of   social  practice  to  the  plane  of  intellectual   outlook,  Hinduism  too  comes  out  well  by  comparison with the religions an ideologies of   the  South-West  Asian  group.  In  contrast  to   these Hinduism has the same outlook as the   pre-Christian  and  pre-Muslim  religions  and  philosophies  of  the  Western  half  of  the  old   world. Like them, Hinduism takes it for granted   that there is more than one valid approach to   truth and to salvation and that these different   approaches are not only compatible with each  other, but are complementary".

28. The  fact  that  reference  to  Hindus  in  the  Constitution  

includes  persons  professing  the  Sikh,  Jain  and  Buddhist  

religions  and the  statutory  enactments  like  Hindu Marriage  

Act, Hindu Succession Act etc. also embraces Sikhs, Jains and  

Buddhists within the ambit of the said enactments is another  

significant fact that was highlighted and needs to be specially  

taken note of.

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29. What is sought to be emphasized is that all  the above  

would show the wide expanse of beliefs, thoughts and forms of  

worship that Hinduism encompasses without any divergence  

or friction within itself or amongst its adherents.  It is in the  

backdrop of the above response to the question posed earlier  

“what is Hinduism”? that we have to proceed further in the  

matter.  

30. Image  worship  is  a  predominant  feature  of  Hindu  

religion.   The origins  of  image worship is  interesting and a  

learned discourse on the subject is available in a century old  

judgment of  the Madras High Court in  Gopala Mooppanar  

and Others Vs. Subramania Iyer and others5.  In the said  

report the learned Judge (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.) on the basis of  

accepted texts and a study thereof had found that in the “first  

stage”  of  existence  of  mankind  God  was  worshiped  as  

immanent  in the heart  of  everything and worship consisted  

solely in service to ones fellow creatures.  In the second age,  

the spirit of universal brotherhood has lost its initial efficacy  

and  notions  of  inferiority  and  superiority  amongst  men  5 AIR 1915 Madras 363

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surfaced leading to  a situation where the  inferior  man was  

asked to worship the superior man who was considered as a  

manifestation  of  God.   Disputes  arose  about  the  relative  

superiority  and  inferiority  which  was  resolved  by  the  wise  

sages  by  introducing  image  worship  to  enable  all  men  to  

worship  God  without  squabbles  about  their  relative  

superiorities.  With  passage  of  time  there  emerged  Rules  

regulating worship in temples which came to be laid down in  

the treatises known as Agamas and the Thantras.  Specifically  

in Gopala Moopanar (supra), it was noticed that the Agamas  

prescribed rules as regards “what caused pollution to a temple  

and as regards the ceremonies for  removing pollution when  

caused.”  In the said judgment it is further mentioned that,  

“There  are,  it  is  well  known Thanthries  in  Malabar  who are   

specialists in these matters of pollution.   As the temple priests  

have got the special saivite initiation or dheeksha which entitles   

them to touch the inner most image, and as the touch of the   

persons who have got no such initiation, even though they be   

Brahmins, was supposed to pollute the image, even Brahmins   

other than the temple priest were in many temples not allowed   

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to go into the garbhagraham.  The Agamas also contain other  

prescriptions including who is entitled to worship from which  

portion of the temple.  In one of the Agamas it is said (as freely   

translated)  thus  :  “Saivite  Brahmin  priests  are  entitled  to   

worship in the anthrala portion.  Brahmins learned in the Vedas   

are entitled to worship in the arthamantapa, other Brahmins in   

the front Mantapa, Kings and Vaisyas in the dwaramantapa,   

initiated Sudras in the Bahir Mantapa” and so on.”   The legal  

effect of the above prescriptions need not detain us and it is  

the portion underlined which is  of  particular importance as  

the discussions that follow would reveal.

31. The  Ecclesiastical  jurisprudence  in  India,  sans  any  

specific  Ecclesiastical  jurisdiction,  revolves  around  the  

exposition of the constitutional guarantees under Articles 25  

and 26 as made from time to time.  The development of this  

branch of jurisprudence primarily arises out of claimed rights  

of religious groups and denominations to complete autonomy  

and  the  prerogative  of  exclusive  determination  of  essential  

religious  practices  and  principles  on  the  bedrock  of  the  

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constitutional  guarantees  under  Articles  25  and  26  of  the  

Constitution and the judicial understanding of the inter-play  

between Article 25(2)(b) and 26(b) of the Constitution in the  

context  of  such  claims.   In   The  Commissioner,  Hindu  

Religious  Endowments,  Madras   Vs.  Sri  Lakshmindra  

Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt6 (Shirur Mutt)  while  

dealing with the issue of autonomy of a religious denomination  

to  determine  what  rights  and  ceremonies  are  essential  

according to the tenets of its religion it has been stated that -

“Under  article  26(b),  therefore  a  religious   denomination  or  organization  enjoys  complete   autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites   and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets   of the religion they hold and no outside authority has   any  jurisdiction  to  interfere  with  their  decision  in   such matters.” – (Page 1028)

32. Besides the above, recognition of the aforesaid principle  

is also to be found in the fact that in  Shirur Mutt (supra),  

though  the  eventual  conclusion  of  the  Court  upholds  the  

validity  of  the  Act  (Madras  Hindu  Religious  and  Charitable  

Endowments Act, 1951) certain specific provisions i.e. Section  

6 1954 SCR 1005

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21 which empowered the Commissioner and his subordinates  

to enter the premises of any religious institution at any time  

for  performance of  duties  enjoined  under  the  Act  has  been  

struck  down  indicating  consistency  with  the  principle  

extracted above. The relevant of the report (page 1030/31) will  

require a specific notice and therefore is extracted below.

“We agree, however, with the High Court in the view  taken by it about section 21. This section empowers  the Commissioner and  his  subordinate  officers  and  also  persons  authorised  by  them  to  enter  the   premises  of  any religious institution  or  place  of   worship  for  the  purpose  of  exercising  any  power   conferred or any duty imposed by or under the Act. It   is well known that there could be no such thing as   an unregulated and unrestricted right of entry in a   public  temple  or  other religious institution,  for   persons  who  are  not  connected  with  the  spiritual   functions  thereof.  It  is  a  traditional  custom  universally  observed  not  to  allow  access  to  any   outsider to the particularly sacred parts of a temple   as for example, the place where the deity is located.   There are also fixed hours of worship and rest for the   idol  when  no  disturbance  by  any  member  of  the   public is allowed. Section 21, it is to be noted, does  not confine the right of entry to the outer portion of   the  premises;  it  does  not  even  exclude  the  inner   sanctuary  "the  Holy  of  Holies"  as  it  is  said,  the   sanctity of which is zealously preserved. It does not   say that the entry may be made after due notice to   the head of the institution and at such hours which   would not interfere with the due observance of the   rites and ceremonies in the institution. We think that   

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as  the  section  stands,  it  interferes  with  the   fundamental  rights  of  the  Mathadhipati  and  the   denomination of which he is head guaranteed under   articles 25 and 26 of  the Constitution.  Our attention   has been drawn in this  connection to  section 91 of  the  Act  which,  it  is  said,  provides  a  sufficient   safeguard  against  any  abuse  of  power  under   section 21. We  cannot  agree  with  this  contention.   Clause  (a)  of  section 91 excepts  from  the  saving  clause all express provisions of the Act within which   the  provision  of  section 21 would  have  to  be  included.  Clause  (b)  again  does  not  say  anything   about  custom  or  usage  obtaining  in  an  institution   and  it  does  not  indicate  by  whom  and  in  what   manner  the  question  of  interference  with   the religious and  spiritual  functions  of  the  Math   would  be  decided  in  case  of  any  dispute  arising   regarding  it.  In  our  opinion,  section 21 has  been  rightly held to be invalid.” - (Page 1030/31)

33. The  decision  of  this  Court  in  Sri  Venkataramana  

Devaru and Others Vs.  State of Mysore and others7 may  

now be considered.  In the said case this Court was called  

upon to answer as to whether Section 3 of the Madras Temple  

Entry Authorization Act violated the guarantee under Article  

26(b) insofar as Gaura Saraswati Brahmins are concerned by  

making  provisions  to  the  effect  that  Shri  Venkataramana  

Temple at Moolky was to be open to all  excluded classes of  

7 AIR 1958 SC 255

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Hindus.  It was the contention of the aforesaid sect that the  

temple  in  question  was  founded  for  the  exclusive  use  and  

benefit of Gaura Saraswati Brahmins.  This Court in its report  

elaborately  discussed  the  practice  of  idol/image  worship;  

regulation  thereof  by  the  Agamas  and  the  efficacy  and  

enforceability of such Agamas.  Paras 17 and 18 of the Report  

which deals with the above aspect may be usefully extracted  

below.   

“17. The  Gods  have  distinct  forms  ascribed  to   them and their worship at home and in temples is   ordained as certain means of attaining salvation.   These injunctions have had such a powerful hold   over the minds of the people that daily worship of   the deity in temple came to be regarded as one of   the obligatory duties of a Hindu. It was during this   period that temples were constructed all over the   country  dedicated  to  Vishnu,  Rudra,  Devi,   Skanda,  Ganesha and so  forth,  and worship in   the  temple  can  be  said  to  have  become  the   practical religion of all sections of the Hindus ever   since.  With the growth in importance of  temples   and of worship therein, more and more attention   came to be devoted to the ceremonial law relating   to the construction of temples, installation of idols   therein and conduct of worship of the deity, and  numerous are the treatises that came to be written   for  its  exposition.  These are known as Agamas,   and there are as many as 28 of them relating to   the  Saiva  temples,  the  most  important  of  them  being the Kamikagama, the Karanagama and the   

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Suprabedagama,  while  the  Vikhanasa  and  the   Pancharatra  are  the  chief  Agamas  of  the   Vaishnavas.  These  Agamas,  contain  elaborate   rules as to how the temple is to be constructed,   where the principal deity is to be consecrated, and   where the other Devatas are to be installed and   where the several classes of worshippers are to   stand and worship.  The following passage from  the  judgment  of  Sadasiva  Aiyar  J.  in  Gopala   Muppanar v. Subramania Aiyar : (1914) 27 MLJ   253,  gives  a  summary  of  the  prescription  contained in one of the Agamas :

"In the Nirvachanapaddhathi it  is said that   Sivadwijas  should  worship  in  the   Garbargriham,  Brahmins  from  the  ante   chamber  or  Sabah  Mantabam,  Kshatriyas,   Vysias  and  Sudras  from  the  Mahamantabham,  the  dancer  and  the   musician from the Nrithamantabham east of   the  Mahamantabham  and  that  castes  yet   lower  in  scale  should  content  themselves   with the sight of the Gopuram."

The  other  Agamas  also  contain  similar   rules.”

18.  According to the Agamas, an image becomes  defiled if there is any departure or violation of any   of the rules relating to worship, and purificatory   ceremonies (known as Samprokshana) have to be   performed for restoring the sanctity of the shrine.   Vide  judgment  of  Sadasiva  Aiyar  J.  in  Gopala   Muppanar  v.  Subramania  Aiyar  (supra).  In   Sankaralinga Nadan v. Raja Rajeswara Dorai,  it   was  held  by  the  Privy  Council  affirming  the   judgment of the Madras High Court that a trustee   who agreed to admit into the temple persons who   were not entitled to worship therein, according to   

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34. The explicit reiteration of the Court’s power to decide on  

what  constitutes  an  essential  religious  practice  in  Sri  

Venkataramana Devaru (supra) again found manifestation in  

Durgah Committee, Ajmer and another Vs.  Syed Hussain  

Ali and others8.  Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then  

was) was of the view,

“……. that in order that the practices in question  should be treated as a part of religion they must   be regarded by the said religion as its essential   and integral part; otherwise even purely secular   practices  which  are  not  an  essential  or  an  integral part of religion are apt to be clothed with   a religious form and may make a claim for being  treated as religious practices within the meaning   of  Article  26.  Similarly,  even  practices  though   religious  may  have  sprung  from  merely   superstitious beliefs and may in that sense be   extraneous and unessential accretions to religion   itself.  Unless  such  practices  are  found  to   constitute  an  essential  and  integral  part  of  a   religion their claim for the protection under Article   26 may have to be carefully scrutinised; in other   words, the protection must be confined to such   religious  practices  as  are  an  essential  and an   integral part of it and no other.”

35. Almost half a century later, we find a reiteration of the  

same  view  in  the  majority  judgment  rendered  in  

8 AIR 1961 SC 1402

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Commissioner  of  Police  and  Others   Vs.  Acharya  

Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta and Another9 though the  

minority  view in the  said case preferred to  take a  contrary  

opinion relying,  inter alia, on Shirur Mutt (supra) and Jesse  

Cantwell  Vs.  State of Connecticut10 and United States Vs.  

Ballard11.   Para  57  of  the  minority  opinion  containing  the  

discordant note would be worthy of reproduction.

“57. The  exercise  of  the  freedom  to  act  and  practise  in  pursuance  of  religious  beliefs  is  as   much important as the freedom of believing in a   religion.  In fact  to  persons believing in religious   faith,  there  are  some  forms  of  practising  the   religion by outward actions which are as much  part of religion as the faith itself. The freedom to   act and practise can be subject to regulations. In   our  Constitution,  subject  to  public  order,  health   and morality and to other provisions in Part III of   the  Constitution.  However,  in  every  case  the  power of regulation must be so exercised with the   consciousness that the subject of regulation is the   fundamental  right  of  religion,  and  as  not  to   unduly  infringe  the  protection  given  by  the   Constitution. Further, in the exercise of the power   to regulate, the authorities cannot sit in judgment   over the professed views of the adherents of the   religion and to determine whether the practice is   warranted by the religion or not. That is not their   function. (See  Jesse  Cantwell v.  State  of  

9 (2004) 12 SCC 770 10 84 L Ed 1213 : 310 US 296 (1939) 11  88 L Ed 1148 : 322 US 78 (1943)

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Connecticut,  L  Ed  at  pp.  1213-1218,  United  States v. Ballard, L Ed at pp. 1153, 1154.)”

36. That the freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of  

the Constitution is not only confined to beliefs but extends to  

religious practices also would hardly require reiteration.  Right  

of  belief  and practice is guaranteed by Article 25 subject to  

public order, morality and health and other provisions of Part-

III  of  the Constitution.   Sub-Article  (2)  is  an exception and  

makes the right guaranteed by Sub-article (1) subject to any  

existing law or to such law as may be enacted to,  inter alia,  

provide for social welfare and reforms or throwing or proposing  

to  throw  open  Hindu  religious  institutions  of  a  public  

character to all classes and sections of Hindus.  Article 26(b)  

on the other hand guarantees to every religious denomination  

or section full  freedom to manage its own affairs insofar as  

matters of religion are concerned, subject,once again, to public  

order, morality and health and as held by this Court subject to  

such laws as may be made under Article 25(2)(b). The rights  

guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26, therefore, are circumscribed  

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and  are  to  be  enjoyed  within  constitutionally  permissible  

parameters.  Often occasions will arise when it may become  

necessary to determine whether a belief or a practice claimed  

and asserted is a fundamental part of the religious practice of  

a  group  or  denomination  making  such  a  claim  before  

embarking upon the required adjudication. A decision on such  

claims  becomes  the  duty  of  the  Constitutional  Court.  It  is  

neither an easy nor an enviable task that the courts are called  

to perform. Performance of such tasks is not enjoined in the  

court by virtue of any ecclesiastical jurisdiction conferred on it  

but  in  view  of  its  role  as  the  Constitutional  arbiter.   Any  

apprehension  that  the  determination  by  the  court  of  an  

essential  religious  practice  itself  negatives  the  freedoms  

guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 will have to be dispelled on  

the  touchstone of  constitutional  necessity.   Without  such a  

determination there can be no effective adjudication whether  

the claimed right it is in conformity with public order, morality  

and  health  and  in  accord  with  the  undisputable  and  

unquestionable notions of social welfare and reforms. A just  

balance can always be made by holding that the exercise of  

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judicial  power  to  determine  essential  religious  practices,  

though always available being an inherent power to protect the  

guarantees  under  Articles  25  and  26,  the  exercise  thereof  

must always be restricted and restrained.  

37. Article 16 (5) which has virtually gone unnoticed till date  

and, therefore, may now be seen is in the following terms :     

“16(5)  - Nothing  in  this  Article  shall  affect  the   operation  of  any  law  which  provides  that  an  incumbent  of  an  office  in  connection  with  the   affairs  of  any  religious  or  denominational   institution or any member of the governing body   thereof shall  be a person professing a particular   religion or belonging to a particular denomination.”

38. A  plain  reading  of  the  aforesaid  provision  i.e.  Article  

16(5),  fortified  by  the  debates  that  had  taken  place  in  the  

Constituent  Assembly,  according  to  us,  protects  the  

appointment of Archakas from a particular denomination, if so  

required to  be  made,  by  the  Agamas holding  the  field.  The  

debates in the Constituent Assembly referred to discloses that  

the suggestion that  the operation of  Article  16(5)  should be  

restricted  to  appointment  in  offices  connected  with  

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administration  of  a  religious  institution  was  negatived.  The  

exception in Article 16(5), therefore, would cover an office in a  

temple which also requires performance of religious functions.  

In fact, the above though not expressly stated could be one of  

the basis for the views expressed by the Constitution Bench in  

Sheshammal (supra).  

39. The  preceding  discussion  indicates  the  gravity  of  the  

issues  arising  and the  perceptible  magnitude  of  the  impact  

thereof on Hindu Society.  It would be, therefore, incorrect, if  

not  self  defeating,  to  take  too  pedantic  an  approach  at  

resolution  either  by  holding  the  principle  of  res  judicata or  

locus to bar an adjudication on merits or to strike down the  

impugned  G.O.  as  an  executive  fiat  that  does  not  have  

legislative approval, made explicit by the fact that though what  

has  been  brought  by  the  G.O.  dated  23.05.2006  was  also  

sought  to  be incorporated in  the statute  by the  Ordinance,  

eventually, the amending Bill presented before the legislature  

specifically omitted the aforesaid inclusion. The significance of  

the aforesaid fact, however, cannot be underestimated.  What  

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is sought to be emphasized is that the same, by itself, cannot  

be determinative of the invalidity of the G.O. which will have to  

be tested on certain other premises and foundation treating  

the same to be an instance of exercise of executive power in an  

area not covered by any specific law.  

40. The issue of untouchability raised on the anvil of Article  

17 of the Constitution stands at the extreme opposite end of  

the pendulum. Article 17 of the Constitution strikes at caste  

based practices built on superstitions and beliefs that have no  

rationale  or  logic.  The  exposition  of  the  Agamas  made  a  

Century back by the Madras High Court in Gopala Moopnar  

(supra) that exclusion from the sanctum sanctorum and duties  

of  performance  of  poojas  extends  even  to  Brahmins  is  

significant.   The prescription with regard to the exclusion of  

even Brahmins in Gopala Moopnar (supra) has been echoed  

in the opinion of  Sri Parthasarthy Bhattacharya as noted by  

the  Constitution  Bench  in  Seshammal (supra).  Such  

exclusion is not on the basis of caste, birth or pedigree.  The  

provisions of Article 17 and the Protection of Civil Rights Act,  

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1955,  therefore,  would  not  be  of  much significance  for  the  

present case. Similarly, the ‘offer’ of the state in its affidavit to  

appoint  Shaivite  as  Archakas  in  Shiva  temples  and  

Vaishnavas  in  Vaishanvite  Temples  is  too  naïve  an  

understanding of a denomination which is, to say the least, a  

far more sharply indentified subgroup both in case of shaivite  

and vaishanvite followers. However, what cannot be ignored is  

the  ‘admission’  inbuilt  in  the  said  offer  resulting  in  some  

flexibility  in  the  impugned  G.O.  that  the  state  itself  has  

acknowledged.

41. Sheshammal (supra)  is  not  an  authority  for  any  

proposition as to what an Agama or a set of Agamas governing  

a particular or group of temples lay down with regard to the  

question  that  confronts  the  court,  namely,  whether  any  

particular denomination of worshippers or believers have an  

exclusive  right  to  be appointed as Archakas to perform the  

poojas.  Much  less,  has  the  judgment  taken  note  of  the  

particular class or caste to which the Archakas of a temple  

must belong as prescribed by the Agamas. All that it does and  

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says is that some of the Agamas do incorporate a fundamental  

religious belief of the necessity of performance of the Poojas by  

Archakas  belonging  to  a  particular  and  distinct  

sect/group/denomination,  failing  which,  there  will  be  

defilement of deity requiring purification ceremonies. Surely, if  

the Agamas in question do not proscribe any group of citizens  

from being appointed as Archakas on the basis  of  caste  or  

class the sanctity of Article 17 or any other provision of Part III  

of the Constitution or even the Protection of Civil Rights Act,  

1955 will not be violated. What has been said in Sheshammal  

(supra) is that if any prescription with regard to appointment  

of Archakas is made by the Agamas, Section 28 of the Tamil  

Nadu Act mandates the Trustee to conduct the temple affairs  

in accordance with such custom or usage. The requirement of  

Constitutional conformity is inbuilt and if a custom or usage is  

outside  the  protective  umbrella  afforded  and  envisaged  by  

Articles  25  and  26,  the  law  would  certainly  take  its  own  

course.  The  constitutional  legitimacy,  naturally,  must  

supersede all religious beliefs or practices.

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42. The difficulty lies not in understanding or restating the  

constitutional values. There is not an iota of doubt on what  

they are. But to determine whether a claim of state action in  

furtherance  thereof  overrides  the  constitutional  guarantees  

under Article 25 and 26 may often involve what has already  

been  referred  to  as  a  delicate  and  unenviable  task  of  

identifying essential religious beliefs and practices, sans which  

the religion itself does not survive. It is in the performance of  

this  task  that  the  absence  of  any  exclusive  ecclesiastical  

jurisdiction  of  this  Court,  if  not  other  shortcomings  and  

adequacies, that can be felt. Moreover, there is some amount  

of uncertainty with regard to the prescription contained in the  

Agamas.   Coupled  with  the  above  is  the  lack  of  easy  

availability of established works and the declining numbers of  

acknowledged  and  undisputed  scholars  on  the  subject.   In  

such a situation one is reminded of the observations, if not the  

caution note struck by Mukherjea, J. in Shirur Mutt (supra)  

with regard to complete autonomy of a denomination to decide  

as to what constitutes an essential religious practice, a view  

that has also been subsequently echoed by this Court though  

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as a “minority view”.  But we must hasten to clarify that no  

such view of the Court can be understood to an indication of  

any bar to judicial determination of the issue as and when it  

arises.   Any  contrary  opinion  would  go  rise  to  large  scale  

conflicts  of  claims  and  usages  as  to  what  is  an  essential  

religious practice  with no acceptable  or  adequate  forum for  

resolution.  That apart the “complete autonomy” contemplated  

in Shirur Mutt (supra) and the meaning of “outside authority”  

must not be torn out of the context in which the views, already  

extracted, came to be recorded (page 1028).  The exclusion of  

all  “outside  authorities”  from deciding  what  is  an  essential  

religion practice must be viewed in the context of the limited  

role of  the State  in matters relating to religious freedom as  

envisaged by Articles 25 and 26 itself and not of the Courts as  

the arbiter of Constitutional rights and principles.  

43. What then is the eventual  result? The answer defies a  

straight forward resolution and it is the considered view of the  

court  that  the  validity  or  otherwise  of  the  impugned  G.O.  

would depend on the facts of each case of appointment.  What  

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is found and held to be prescribed by one particular or a set of  

Agamas for a solitary or a group of temples, as may be, would  

be  determinative  of  the  issue.  In  this  regard  it  will  be  

necessary to re-emphasise what has been already stated with  

regard  to  the  purport  and  effect  of  Article  16(5)  of  the  

Constitution, namely, that the exclusion of some and inclusion  

of a particular segment or denomination for appointment as  

Archakas  would  not  violate  Article  14  so  long  such  

inclusion/exclusion is not based on the criteria of caste, birth  

or any other constitutionally unacceptable parameter.  So long  

as the prescription(s) under a particular Agama or Agamas is  

not  contrary  to  any  constitutional  mandate  as  discussed  

above, the impugned G.O. dated 23.05.2006 by its blanket fiat  

to the effect that,  “Any person who is a Hindu and possessing   

the requisite qualification and training can be appointed as a   

Archaka in Hindu temples” has the potential of falling foul of  

the dictum laid down in Seshammal (supra).  A determination  

of  the  contours  of  a  claimed  custom  or  usage  would  be  

imperative  and  it  is  in  that  light  that  the  validity  of  the  

impugned G.O. dated 23.05.2006 will  have to be decided in  

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each case of appointment of Archakas whenever and wherever  

the issue is raised.  The necessity of seeking specific judicial  

verdicts  in  the  future  is  inevitable  and  unavoidable;   the  

contours of the present case and the issues arising being what  

has been discussed.   

44. Consequently and in the light of the aforesaid discussion,  

we dispose of all  the writ petitions in terms of our findings,  

observations and directions above reiterating that as held in  

Seshammal (supra) appointments of Archakas will have to be  

made in accordance  with  the  Agamas,  subject  to  their  due  

identification  as  well  as  their  conformity  with  the  

Constitutional mandates and principles as discussed above.

………..........…………………J.            [RANJAN GOGOI]

…………..........………………J.             [N.V. RAMANA]

NEW DELHI, DECEMBER 16, 2015.

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