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PETITIONER: ADI PHEROZSHAH GANDHI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: H.   M. SEERVAI, ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF  MAHARASHTRA, BOMBAY

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/08/1970

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) SHELAT, J.M. MITTER, G.K. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A. RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1971 AIR  385            1971 SCR  (2) 863  1970 SCC  (2) 484  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1975 SC2092  (21,22,52,57)  RF         1981 SC 116  (7)  E          1982 SC 149  (606,963)  F          1983 SC 990  (11)

ACT: Advocate Act (25 of 1961) s. 37--’person  aggrieved’,meaning of--Advocate-General  of  State taking part  in  proceedings before  Disciplinary  Committee of Bar  Council--If person aggrieved’ with a right of appeal.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant  was an advocate from  Maharashtra.   He  was convicted  by  a  Summary Court in London  on  a  charge  of pilfering from a Departmental Store and was sentenced to pay a  fine.  The State Bar Council called upon him sou motu  to show  cause why he should not be held guilty of  misconduct. he submitted his explanation and the Disciplinary  Committee of  the Bar Council was satisfied that there was  no  reason for  holding  him guilty of  professional  misconduct.   The Advocate-General  of the State who was sent a notice of  the proceedings  as required by s. 35(2) of the  Advocates  Act, 1961,  and bad appeared before the  Disciplinary  Committee, filed  an appeal to the Bar Council of India under s. 37  of the  Act, under which, any person aggrieved by an  order  of the  Disciplinary  Committee of the State Bar  Council  made under  s.  35 of the Act, may prefer an appeal  to  the  Bar Council of India.  The appellant objected that the Advocate- General  had  no  locus  standi to  file  the  appeal.   The objection was overruled by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar  Council of India and the appellant was found guilty  of professional misconduct. in  appeal to this Court, on the question of the  competency of the Advocate-General to file the appeal under s. 37. HELD : (Per Hidayatullah.  C.J., Shelat and Mitter, JJ.) The was  not a person aggrieved, within the meaning of  37  and therefore,  the  appeal  filed by him  was  incompetent  and hence,  finding  of the Disciplinary Committee  of  the  Bar

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Council of India should be get aside. [887 H; 904 E] (Per   Hidayatullah   C.J.)  (1)  The   expression person aggrieved’ must be construed by reference to the context  of the enactment in which it and all the circumstances.   Under the Act, disciplinary proceedings before a State Bar Council commence  on a complaint to it or suo motu and are  referred to  its Disciplinary Committee.  The Disciplinary  Committee can reject the matter summarily; but if it proceeds to  hear it further, notice thereof is sent to the concerned advocate and  to  the advocate-General of the State.   The  Advocate- General  may  appear  personally  or  by  counsel.   If  the Disciplinary  Committee  after giving the Advocate  and  the Advocate-General  an opportunity to be heard holds  hat  the Advocate  is not guilty of any misconduct it makes an  order it her dismissing the complaint, or where the proceeding was started by in Bar Council makes an order that the matter may be  filed.. If it finds the advocate guilty- it  may  either reprimand the advocate or suspend 864 the advocate from practice for a specified period or  remove his  name from the roll of Advocates.  From the decision  of the  Disciplinary  Committee  of the State  Bar  Council  an appeal lies to the Bar Council of India at the instance of a person aggrieved’.  The appeal is heard by the  Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and from its  decision an appeal lies to this Court. [884 E-H; 885 A-B] (a)  In these proceedings before the disciplinary  committee the Advocate-General is not in the nature of a party  having independent rights which lie can claim nor is he injured  by the decision.   The decision does not deny him anything  nor does it ask him to do anything.  He is also not intended  to be bound by the decision.  He does not represent the Bar nor has  he  a  right  to speak on  behalf  the  body  of  the advocates.  Such a privilege is neither expressly  conferred on him nor can it be implied from the provisions of the Act. [885 C-D; 886 A-B] (b)  In  the  State  Bar Councils  (except  in  Delhi),  the Advocate-General  of the State is an ex-officio member,  but his functions are not different from those of other members. He  has a right of pre-audience, but the Advocates Act  does not  confer  any  other right on him.   When  the  Committee considers  in limini to decide whether the matter should  be proceeded  with at all, the Advocate General’s  presence  is not  considered necessary.  Therefore, the  Advocate-General is  not  a prosecutor on behalf of the Bar Council.   He  is noticed  and brought before the Committee because he is  the Chief Counsel of the State and therefore his assistance at the  hearing  is useful.  He is generally a lawyer  of  some standing  having  made  a mark in  the  profession  and  his contribution  to  the  deliberations  of  the   Disciplinary Committee   is  welcome,  because,  thus  the   Disciplinary Committee is helped to reach a proper conclusion.  The  fact that he can appear through counsel shows that the  intention is  merely to have his opinion as an amicable curiae who  is neither  siding with the complainant nor with  the  Advocate and who will thus have an unbiased and impartial approach to the  case.   He must after he has done his  duty  leave  the matter  to  the  complainant and the  advocate  or  the  Bar Council  to take the matter further if they choose. [883  C, E-F; 885 E-H; 886 A] (c)  If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order but a person who is heard in a dispute between others merely to be of assistance in reaching the right conclusion he  can hardly have a grievance.  Any person who feels  disappointed with  the result of a case is not a person aggrieved’.   He

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must  be  disappointed  of a benefit  which  he  would  have received  if  the order had gone the other way.   The  order must cause him a legal grievance by wrongfully depriving him of  something or must have a tendency to injure  him.   That the order is wrong or that it acquits some one who he thinks ought  to  be convicted does not by itself give  rise  to  a legal grievance. [876 A-C] Therefore,  it  cannot  be  said  that  by  reason  of   the provisions of the Advocates Act, the Advocate-General of the State  enjoys  such a position that be must  necessarily  be treated  as a person aggrieved’ entitling him to  file  an appeal. [882 H; 886 G] -In  re.   Sidebotham  Ex.  Sidebotham, (1880)  14  Ch.   D. 458(C.A.).  In  re.   Lamb Exp.  Board of  Trade,  [1894]  2 O.B.D.  805, 812, In re.  Kitson,, Exp.  Sugden  (Thomas)  & Sons,  Ltd.  [1911] 2 K.B.’ 109, 112-114.  Bln.  re.   Brown Exp.  Debtor v. official Receiver (1943) Ch.  D. 177.  Ellis Exp.  Ellis (1876)2 Ch.  D. 779, In re.  Words Exp.   Dalton (1874)40  L.T.  297(C.A.), R. v. London  County  Keepers  of Peace  and Justice [1890] 20 Q.B.D. 357, Jennings v.  Kelly, [1940] A.C. 206 (H.L.). In 865 re.  Reviere (1884) 2 Ch.  D. 48, Robinson v. Currey  [1881] 7 Q.B.D. 465, 470 (C.A.); Seven Oaks Urban District  Council v.  Twynham (1929) 2 K.B. 440,’ 443,  Eating-Corporation  v. Jones   L.  R.  [1959]  1  Q.B.D.  384,  B.  M.  Madani   v. Commissioner  of Workmen’s Compensation Bombay, C.A. 877  of 1968  decided on October 10, 1968 and Municipal  Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Chandulal Shamldas Patel, C.A. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred to. (2)  It  could  not be said that in the present  case  there were several points of general public interest which  needed to  be  solved  and  therefore,  if  the  decision  of   the Disciplinary  Committee of the State Bar Council was  wrong, the  Advocate-General,  in public interest, could  take  the matter further. [886 G-H] Unlike  the  position  of an Attorney  General  in  a  Crown Colony,  the Advocate-General of a State in India  does  not represent the Executive or the Legislature or the Judiciary, or the Central Government in disciplinary proceedings before the  Disciplinary Committee.  The magniloquent phrases  such as  Leader of the Bar, Keeper of the, Conscience of the  Bar have  no meaning neither under the Advocates Act  nor  under the Bar Councils Act, 1926.  They are just honorific  titles given   by the courtesy but are not grounded on  law,  the keepers of the conscience of the Bar being the Bar Councils. [883 F-G; 886 C-D] In  the  present case,the appellant was not  precluded  from questioning  the  charge  in  the  disciplinary  proceedings because  of  the decision of the Criminal Court  in  London. His  explanation was accepted by the Disciplinary  Committee of the State Bar Council.  They were also satisfied that the summary  proceedings  in  the  criminal  trial  in   England offended against the principles of natural justice, and that therefore,  the conviction of the appellant in  England  did not  show  any  moral turpitude in the  appellant.   If  the Advocate  General’s view on these matters were not  accepted by  the  Disciplinary  Committee  he  could  not  have   any grievance.  He could not make it his own cause or a cause on behalf of others whom he did not represent.  He had done his duty and the matter should have rested there. [887 C-F] Attorney-General of Gambia v. Pierre Saar N’Jie, [1961] A.C. 617 (P.C.) referred to. (3)  (a)  The  facts that in Advocate-General of  Bombay  v. Phiroz  Rustamji  Barucha  37  Bom.   L.R.  722  (P.C.)  the

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standing of the Advocate-General to apply for special  leave in  a proceeding relating to professional misconduct  of  an Advocate  was questioned before the Privy Council, but  that the  Privy  Council  refused special leave  on  a  different ground cannot import a rejection of the objection as to  the standing of the  Advocate-General. [881-E] (b)  The  observations in B. Nageshwara Rao v.  The  Hon’ble Judges  of the Madras High Court, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1055  that in  an  appeal  arising out of a proceeding  under  the  Bar Councils  Act,  it  was inappropriate  to  make  the  Judges respondent,  and that the appropriate parties should be  the concerned Advocate the complainant (if any), the Bar Council and  the Advocate-General of the State, do not  advance  the case of the Advocate-General in this case. [882 E] (Per  Shelat  and  Mitter,  JJ.) (1)  A  State  Bar  Council consists  of  a number of members  including  the  Advocate- General  of the State ex-officio.  Under the  provisions  of the  Advocates  Act, subject to a right of  appeal  to  this Court  under  s. 38, inquiries into  charges  of  misconduct against L169CI/71-11 866 advocates are to be in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bar Councils.  If a complaint is received against an Advocate it is  referred  to  the Disciplinary Committee  of-  the  Bar, Council  or the Bar Council can take such a step  suo  motu. It  is however not obligatory to refer each and  every  com- plaint but only when the Bar Council is satisfied that there is  a  prima facie case for investigation. if it is  not  so satisfied it can throw out the complaint as frivolous.   And it  is  only  when  the  Disciplinary  Committee  does   not summarily  reject the complaint that a date has to be  fixed for  its  hearing and notice there of must be given  to  the advocate concerned and the Advocate-General of the State but it  is  not incumbent on the Advocate-General to  appear  in person; he can appear through another advocate and place his view-point before the Disciplinary Committee.  The  Advocate and a complainant who makes allegations against an  advocate are persons aggrieved entitled to file an appeal under s. 37 if  an order is made against the advocate, or the  complaint is  dismissed by the Disciplinary Committee.  But the  State Bar Council cannot be such a person as the order is made  by itself  and acting through its Disciplinary Committee.  [889 B-C; 891 B-C] Generally  speaking a person is said to be aggrieved  by  an order  which is to his detriment, pecuniary or otherwise  or causes  him some prejudice in some form or other.  A  person who  is not a party to a litigation has no right  of  appeal merely  because the judgment or order contains some  adverse remarks against him.  A person who is not a party to a  suit may  prefer  an appeal,, with the leave,  of  the  appellate court  when  the  judgment would be  binding  on  him.   But because  a person has been given notice of some  proceedings wherein  he  is  given  a  right  to  appear  and  make  his submissions,  he  does  not without more, have  a  right  of appeal   from   an  order  rejecting  his   contentions   or submissions.   To place the Advocate-General in the  company of  "persons  aggrieved" one must be able to  say  that  the Disciplinary  Committee committed an error which it was  his duty  to  attempt  to set right  because  of  some  function attributable  to  him  as  the  Advocate  General  or   some obligation  cast upon him by the Act or the general  law  of the  land to safeguard and maintain standards of conduct  of Advocates laid down by the Bar Council of India. [892 B-F] (a)  The  Advocate-General is entitled to a hearing  if  the

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complaint  is  not  rejected  summarily.   But  it  is   not obligatory  on him to take part in the proceedings.   It  is only   when  he  feels  that  a  case  requires  a   careful investigation  and  proper elucidation of the facts  or  the exposition of the law on the subject that he is called  upon to  render assistance.  He has to take a fair and  impartial attitude  and  render all assistance to the Bar  Council  to enable  it to arrive at a proper decision.  His role is  not that  of a prosecutor nor is he a defence counsel on  behalf of the advocate.  Ms duty is to put before the  Disciplinary Committee  the  facts  in their proper  perspective  and  to advance  the proper inference to be drawn.  Once he does  so there is an end of the matter so far as he is concerned; and he cannot have any grievance because the decision of the Bar Council  is  against his submission or not to  his  liking’. [896 G-H; 897 A-C] (b)  Article  165(2)  of  the  Constitution  epitomizes  the functions and duties of the Advocate-General.  It lays  down that he has to discharge the functions conferred upon him by or  under  the Constitution or any other law  for  the  time being  in force.  It is not open to the Advocate-General  to intervene  in  any suit or legal proceeding apart  from  the provisions  of  the Codes of Civil and  Criminal  Procedure, merely because he thinks public interest is involved in  the matter.  Considering the matter 867 historically,   the  Legislature,  while  passing  the   Bar Councils  Act,  1926, and the Advocates Act,  1961,  thought that  the  Advocate-General should be heard inasmuch  as  he occupied  the  position of a general referee  on  points  of professional  etiquette very much like the  Attorney-General in England.  Once he does this duty enjoined upon him by the statute.  of making such submissions as he thinks proper  at the  hearing, his functions qua the enquiry come to an  end. As  a referee he has no further interest in the matter,  and if  the Disciplinary Committee makes an order  -against  the advocate  which  the Advocate-General  considers  harsh  and unreasonable  he  is  not called upon  to  file  an  appeal. Neither is he interested in prosecuting the. matter  further if  he takes the view that the punishment meted out  is  not commensurate with the misconduct of the advocate. [897  D-E, G-H; 900 C-F] Robinson  v. Currey, 7 Q.B.D. 465, Ex parte Sidebotham.   In re  Sidebotham,  14  Ch.   D. 458  465,  Ex  parte  Official Receiver.   In re Read, Brown & Co. 19 Q.B.D. 174, 178,  the Queen v. Keepers of the Peace and Justices of the County  of London, 25 Q.B.D. 359, 361; Rex v. London Quarter  Sessions, Exparte  Westminster Corporation (1951) 2 Q.B.D. 508,  Seven Oaks Urban District Council v. Twynham, (1929) 2 Q.B.D. 444, Ealing  Corporation  v.  Jones,  (1954)  1  K.B.  384,  390, referred to. (2)  The  Advocate-General  of  a State in India  is  not  a representative of the Government.  Neither the  Constitution nor  the  Advocates  Act holds him so nor  is  be  a  person representing public interest, unlike the Attorney-General in a Crown Colony’ except as provided in statutes.  He may draw the  attention  of the Bar Council to any misconduct  of  an advocate  and  appear at the hearing.  Once the  hearing  is over  and a finding is recorded he has done his duty and  be cannot be said to be aggrieved within the meaning of s.  37. Every day courts of law are called upon to decide  questions of  law inter parties which may be of general importance  to the  public.  The Advocate-General cannot prefer  an  appeal merely   because  the  question  is  one   of   considerable importance  to the public inasmuch as he is not a  party  to

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it; and he has no locus stand to do so, even in a case where the statute only gives him an opportunity of appearing at  a hearing  and  making  his submission.   A  decision  of  the Disciplinary Committee cannot necessarily be said to raise a point of public interest merely because the Advocate General feels  that  it is erroneous or that he himself  would  have arrived at a different in India is not the guardian angel of the  Bar, nor is he the champion of public interest  in  any matter save as specified in a statute. [902 D-G; 904 B-E] Attorney  General  of Gambia v. Pierre Saar N’  Jie,  (1961) A.C. 617, (P.C.), referred to. (3)(a)  The decision of the Judicial Committee in  Advocate- General, Bombay v. Phiroz Barucha, 37 B.L.R. 722 (P.C.) does not  help the Advocate-General, because it did  not  decide the point as to the maintain ability of the appeal. [903  C- D]  (b) It  did  not appear that any argument was  advanced  in Nageswara  Rao  v. The Hon’ble Judges of  the’  Madras  High Court, [1955] S.C.R. 1055, 1064 about the proper parties  to the appeal before this Court arising from proceedings  under the  Bar  Councils  Act; and the point  as  to  Whether  the Advocate  General was a person aggrieved was neither  raised nor argued.  Therefore. the observation in the case that 868 the Advocate-General of the state is an appropriate party in the appeal should, not be accepted. 1903 G-H] (Per  Vaidialingam  and Ray, JJ. dissenting)  :  The  appeal filed  by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra was  competent as he was a person aggrieved’ under s. 37 of the Advocates Act, 1961. [908 B-C; 920 G-H] (Per  Vaidialingam,  J.)  : (1)  The  question  whether  the Advocate  General is a person aggrieve& under s. 37  of  the Advocates Act will have to be tackled with reference to the, scheme and provisions of the Act.’ Under the Act, the  State Bar  Councils  and the Bar Council of India have  been  made autonomous  units and various functions regarding the  legal profession  have  been entrusted to  them  including  taking disciplinary   action   against   delinquent   members   and conducting  inquires.   Barring a ,right of appeal  to  this Court  under  s.  38 the courts are completely  out  of  the picture.  Under ss. 3 (2) (a), 23 (4) and 35, the  Advocate- General  of  the  State  is  given  a  very  important   and responsible  position and the Act has given due  recognition to his status by virtue of his being the highest law officer in the State, and as one who may be trusted to place a  dis- interested  and dispassionate view before  the  Disciplinary Committee  to enable it to come to a proper  decision  with respect to the advocate concerned and the legal  profession. Apart  from  being an ex officio member of  the  State  Bar Council,  he  has also a right of  pre-audience  over  other advocates. [909 D-G; 911 G-H; 912 B-D; 916 A] Under ss. 35 and 37, (i) the State Bar Council can suo  motu or on receipt of a complaint, when it has reason to  believe that  an advocate has been guilty of professional  or  other misconduct,  refer the case- to its  Disciplinary  Committee (ii)  If  the  Committee  does  not  summarily  reject   the complaint,  it  is bound to fix a date for its  hearing  and also  bound to give notice to the advocate and the  Advocate General  of the State; (iii) The Committee is bound to  give an  opportunity  of  being heard to  the  Advocate  and  the Advocate-General and there is no distinction in the opportu- nity so afforded to both of them; (iv) The  Advocate-General may  appear in person or through counsel; (v) the  Committee can  pass one or other of the orders enumerated in s.  35(a) to  (d)  and  the  orders have to  be  communicated  to  the

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Advocate-General   also,  and  under  s.  37, any   person aggrieved’ is entitled to file an appeal to the Bar  Council of India.  Unlike under the Bar Councils Act, the  Advocate- General  is  associated with  the  disciplinary  proceedings right  from the stage of the inquiry by the Committee.   The notice to the Advocate-General cannot be a formal and  empty notice,  because  he should begin an  opportunity  of  being heard.  Even though there may be no lis’ and the  Advocate- General may not be a party’ in the usual sense, he is  also entitled,  like  the advocate against whom  the  inquiry  is being  conducted, to place before the Committee all  aspects of the matter in favour of and against the advocate.  He  is allowed to appear by counsel, because, he may not be able to appear  personally and participate in all  the  disciplinary proceedings.   He need not be vindictive or take sides,  but by  virtue of his special and dispassionate role he will  be able to place all relevant material to enable the  Committee to come to a proper and correct finding. [912 D-H; 913 A-H: 914 A-B] (a)  The fact that the Advocate General does not  allege  an infringement  of  any  legal  rights of his  own  is  of  no consequence.   It  may  be that in  a  particular  case  the Advocate General may feel that the finding arrived at either in  favour of the advocate or against him or the  punishment imposed on the advocate, is not justified by the evidence on record.   Under such and similar circumstances the  Advocate General  will be competent, as a person aggrieved, to  bring up the matter before the Appellate Committee so that justice may be done..[914-G; 915 A-C] 869 Sevenoaks  Urban District Council,v.  Twynham [1929] 2  K-B. 440 Ealing Corporation v. Jones [1959] 1 Q.B. 584, Madani v. Commissioner of Workmen’s Compensation, Bombay, C.A. 877  of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968. Re.  Sidebotham 14 Ch.  D. 458, The Queen v. The Keepers  of the, Peace and Justices of the County of London, 25  Q.B.D., 357,  Re.   Reed,  Brown & Co. 19 Q.B. 174,  Rex  v.  London Quarter Sessions (1951) 2 K.B. 508 and Municipal Corporation of  the  City of Bombay v. Chandulat Shamaldas  Patel,  C.A. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970, referred to. (b)  The  fact  that  the  Legislature  provided  that   the Advocate-General should be associated with the  disciplinary proceedings  from the very beginning of the  inquiry  brings him  under s. 37 as a person aggrieved’ and hence the  fact that the Committee decided in favour of the Advocate has  no bearing on the question. [914 G-H] (c)  The fact that the Advocate-General is not given  notice before  rejecting  a complaint summarily does  not  militate against  the view that he is a person  aggrieved’  because, probably, the Legislature felt that if there was a  wrongful summary  rejection of a complaint, it could be set right  by the  Bar  Council of India under a. 48A  by  exercising  its signal powers. [916 FF] (d)  In this view it is unnecessary  to mention the Advocate General specifically a person aggrieved’ in a. 37. [918 A] (2)  Ile  analogy  of  the  Attorney-General  in  a   Colony representing  the  Crown and being the  guardian  of  public interest  as stated in Attorney-General of Gambia v.  Pierre Sarr  N’  Jie  (1961)  A-C. 617 cannot  be  brought  in  for interpreting s.37 of the Advocates Act, and the observations therein  must be related to the particular legal  provisions which  were considered.  But even that decision-  recognised that  the words person aggrieved’ are very wide and  should not be subjected to any restrictive interpretation. (912  A- B; 920 A-B, E]

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(3)  The   decisions  in  Advocate-General  of   Bombay   v. Pitambardas  Gokuldas, 62 I.A. 235 and  Advocate-General  of Bombay  v. Phiroz Rustomji barucha, 37 B.L.R.  722(P.C.)  do not decide the question one way or the other, [917 A-D] (Per  Ray, J.) : (1) The purpose and the provisions  of  the Advocates  Act determine whether the Advocate-General  is  a person aggrieved within the meaning of s.37 of the Advocates Act.   Under  the Act, a State Bar Council is  empowered  to constitute a Disciplinary Committee.  Where on receipt of  a complaint  or otherwise a State Bar Council has,  reason  to believe   that  an  advocate  on  its  roll  is  guilty   of professional misconduct it shall refer the case for disposal to its Disciplinary Committee, and if the Committee does not summarily reject it, a date of hearing shall be fixed.   The provisions   relating   to   inquiries   into   professional misconduct of an advocate, establish first that the Advocate General  entitled  to  a  notice of  the  date  of  hearing, secondly,  that  no order can be made  by  the  Disciplinary Committee  without  giving him an opportunity,  and  thirdly that he may appear in person or through an advocate and that he has a right of preaudience.  He may not choose to  appear but if he does appear, his right is based on statute; and he does not appear as a mere friend of the court.  He is  heard because  he  is  the head of the Bar in the  State  and  the proceedings affect the discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the professional 870 conduct of an advocate.  Under Art. 165 of the  Constitution the   Advocate  General.has  to  discharge   the   functions conferred  on  him by the Constitution or any other  law  in force.  The Advocates Act concerns an advocate and it is  in the fitness of things that the Advocate General of the State is  heard  as  a person representing  the  profession  which assists   the  litigant  public  and  the  courts   in   the administration  of justice.  He is usually a person of  high standing  and  experience and will pot  adopt  any  partisan attitude in the proceedings.  The purpose of the inquiry  is not to redress the grievance of an individual complainant-in fact  ss.  35 and 36 do not contemplate any  notice  to  the complainant-but  to find out whether there is any breach  of professional standards and conduct. [926 C-H; 827 F-H; 928 A-C] (a)  It is not the intention of the statute that he would be merely a neutral observer before the Disciplinary  Committee and that he would have no duty to perform.  He would have to express his views, and if in a matter of sufficient  gravity a  totally  inadequate  punishment  is  imposed  or  if  the punishment  is  too severe the Advocate General would  be  a person  aggrieved’, to have it corrected.  The words  person aggrieved’  will be referable to the Advocate,  complainant, and the Advocate General or Attorney General as the case may be.   The Advocate-General and the Attorney General will  be persons aggrieved because they are interested in maintaining professional rectitude. [929 C-G] (b)  Further if the proceedings were held without notice  to the Advocate General or without giving him an opportunity of being   heard   he  would  be  a  person   aggrieved.    His participation   in  the  proceedings  does  not  alter   the position.   If  he has a right to be heard, he  may  have  a grievance as to the result of the hearing. [929 A-B] Re.   Exparte  Sidebotham 14 Ch.  D. 458;  Exparte  Official Receiver, In re.  Reed Bowen, 19, Q. B. D. 174,  Sevenoaks Urban British Council v. Twynhan (192-9) 2 K. B. 104,  Queen v.  Keepers  of  the Peace and Justices  of  the  County  of London,  25  Q.,  B. D. 357 and Madani  v.  Commissioner  of

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Workmen’s Compensation, Bombay, C.A. 877 of 1968 decided  on October 10, 1968, referred to. (2)  In  disciplinary proceedings there is no party  in  the usual sense.  The Advocate-General is not a party to a lis’ and has no personal or pecuniary or proprietary interest  in the  matter.   That is why the Act uses  the  words person aggrieved’ and not party aggrieved’.  But he is heard,  not because  he  is  a  party, but  because  he  represents  the interest of the profession and for the purpose of  upholding its  purity  and the preservation of correct  standards  and norms.   From  this point of view he will  be  an  aggrieved person  when he finds. that the interests of the Bar,  which is a matter of public interest, is not properly  safeguarded by  the  Disciplinary  Committee.  In  Attorney  General  of Gambia  v. Pierre Saar N’ Jie. (1961) A.C. 617 the  Judicial Committee  construed the words person aggrieved’ as not  to be subjected to a restrictive interpretation but to  include a  person who has a genuine grievance because an  order  has been  made  which prejudicially affected his  interest,  and that the words would include the Attorney General of  Gambia as representing the public interest. [927 E-F; 928 C-D, G-H; 929 G-H] (3)  The  decisions of the Judicial Committee  in  Advocate- General of Bombay v. Phiroz Barucha, 62 I.A. 235 and of this Court  in  B. Nageshwara Rao v. The Hon’ble  Judges  of  the Madras  High Court, [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1055 indicate  that  the Advocate General under the Bar Councils Act, 1926 had  locus standi to prefer an appeal. [925 D-E, G] 871

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal.No. 2259 of 1969. Appeal  under  s. 38 of the Advocate’s Act,  1961  from  the order  dated October 26, 1969 of the Disciplinary  Committee of the Bar Council of India in D.C. Appeal No. 18 of 1968. C.   K.  Daphtary, A. S. R. Chari, J. B. Dadachanji,  O.  C. Mathur, Ravinder Narain and S. Swarup, for the appellant., V.   S. Desai and B. D. Sharma,, for respondent No. 1. M.   C. Bhandare and S. B. Wad, for Respondent No. 2. V.   A.  Seyid  Muhammad and S. P.  Nayar,  for.   Attorney- General for India. A.   V. Rangam, for Advocate-General for the Tamil Nadu. M.   C. Setalvad, Rameshwar Nath, for Bar Council of India. O.   P. Rana, for Advocate-General for the State of U.P. A.   G.  Pudissery,  for Advocate-General for the  State  of Kerala. K.   Baldev Mehta, for Advocate-General for the State of Rajasthan. A.   P.  S.  Chauhan, A. D. Mathur and N. P. Jain,  for  Bar Council U.P. Sukumar  Ghose and  G. S. Chatterjee,  for-  the  Advocate General for the State of West Bengal. P.   Parmeswara  Rao,  for Advocate-General for  the  Andhra Pradesh. I.   N. Shroff, for Advocate-General for the State of Madhya Pradesh. J.   C.  Medhi, Advocate-General for the State of Assam  and Naunit Lal, for the Advocate-General for the State of Assam. HIDAYATULLAH, C.J., and MITTER J. on behalf of SHELAT  J.and himself  delivered separate judgments.  VAIDIALINGAM  andRAY JJ. delivered separate dissenting opinions. Hidayatullah, C.J.I agree with the judgment delivered by  my brother Mitter but in view of the importance of the question

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and  the  difference between my brethren I  have  chosen  to express myself separately. 872 We  heard  this appeal on a preliminary  point  raised    by the  appellant  that the appeal of the  Advocate-General  of Maharashtra  filed  before  the Bar  Council  of  India  was incompetent as the Advocate-General did not fall within  the expression  a person aggrieved’ to whom alone is given  the right  of appeal under S. 37 of the Advocates Act  of  1961, against the orders of the Disciplinary Committee of the  Bar Council of the State. The  facts  necessary to bring out the  controversy  may  be briefly   stated.   The  appellant  is  an   advocate   from Maharashtra.   The Bar Council of the State  of  Maharashtra had called upon him suo motu to show cause why he should not be held guilty of misconduct.  It appears that the appellant was  convicted before a Summary Court in London on a  charge of  pilfering  some articles from  departmental  stores  and sentenced  to  a  fine.  The record of  the  proceedings  in London  was  not  before the Bar Council of  the  State  and action  was  taken  on the basis of a brief  report  of  the incident in a newspaper.  The appellant explained before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State  that he  was  the victim of a misunderstanding but as he  had  no means of defending himself effectively, he was found  guilty and received a light sentence of fine.  He explained how  he had  fallen  into this unfortunate predicament and  did  not know  how  to extricate himself.  The order of  the  Summary Court  was  not a speaking order and  the  proceedings  were summary.   The  disciplinary committee were  satisfied  that there  was no reason to hold him guilty of  professional  or other   misconduct.   They,  therefore,  ordered  that   the proceedings be filed. The Advocate-General of the State, who was sent a notice  of the proceedings, as is required by the second sub-section of S. 35, and had appeared before the committee, purporting  to act  under s. 37 of the Act filed an appeal before  the  Bar Council  of  India.   It  was  heard  by  the   disciplinary committee  of  the  Bar  Council  of  India.   The  advocate objected  that the Advocate-General had no locus  standi  to file the appeal.  The objection was overruled and the appeal was  accepted.  The advocate was held guility of  misconduct and  suspended for a year from practice.  The  advocate  now appeals  under s. 38 of the Act to this Court.   His  appeal raises questions of merit but he contends at the  threshhold that  the  Advocate-General was not competent  to  file  the appeal under s. 37 of the Act. The  point in controversy before the disciplinary  committee of  the Bar Council of India and now before us, is  a  short one.  It is : whether the Advocate-General can be said to be a person  aggrieved’  by the  order  of  the  disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of the State Having heard  this point  in  detail  we took time to consider.  I  am  of  the opinion that it must be held in favour  873 of the advocate and the order of the disciplinary  committee of  the  Bar Council of India, now under appeal  before  us, must  be: set aside on this short ground without going  into the merits of the-case.               Section  37  of the Advocates Act  1961  reads               "37.  Appeal to the Bar Council of India.               (1)  Any person aggrieved by an order  of  the               disciplinary committee of a State Bar  Council               made  under section 35 may, within sixty  days               of the date of the communication of the  order

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             to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of               India.                (2)  Every such appeal shall be heard by  the               disciplinary  committee of the Bar Council  of               India which may pass such order thereon as  it               deems fit." The  expression a person aggrieved’ is not new, nor has  it occurred  for the first time in the Advocates Act.  In  fact it occurs in several Indian Acts and in British Statutes for more than a hundred years.  In the latter a right of appeal to  a person aggrieved’ is conferred in  diverse  contexts. It  occurs  in  the  Ale House  Act,  the  Bankruptcy  Acts, Copyright Act, Highway Act, Licensing Acts, Milk and Dairies (Amendment)   Act,   Rating  and  Valuation   Act,   Summary Jurisdiction  Act,  Union  Committee  Act,  Local  Acts,  in certiorari proceedings and the Defence of Realm  Regulations to  mention only a few.  The list of Indian Acts is  equally long. As a result of the frequent use of this rather vague phrase, which  practice,  as  Lord Parker  pointed  out  in  Dealing Corporation  v. Jones(1), has not been avoided, in spite  of the confusion it causes, selections from the observations of judges expounding the phrase in the context of these  varied statutes  were  cited  before us for  our  acceptance.   The observations   often  conflict  since  they  were  made   in different contexts and involved the special standing of  the party  claiming the right of appeal.  Yet these  definitions are  not entirely without value for they disclose a  certain unanimity on the, essential features of this phrase, even in the  diversity of the contexts.  The font and origin of  the discussion  is  the well-known definition of the  phrase  by James L.J. in In Re Sidehotham Ex. j. Sidebotham(2).  It was observed  that the words person aggrieved’ in s. 71 of  the Bankruptcy Act of 1869 meant :               "  not really a person who is disappointed  of               a  benefit  which he might have  received,  if               some order had been               (1) L. R. [1959] 1 Q. B. D. 384.               (2) (1880) 14 Ch.  D. 458 C. A                874               made.  A person aggrieved, must be a man  who               had suffered a legal grievance, a man  against               whom a decision has been pronounced which  had               wrongfully   deprived  him  of  something   or               wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully               affected his title to something." The important words in this definition are a benefit  which he might have received’ and a legal grievance’ against  the decision  which wrongfully deprives him of  something’  or affects his title to something. The definition was held in later cases to be not  exhaustive and  several other features of the phrase were pointed  out. Thus  under  the Bankruptcy Acts, where the Board  of  Trade summoned to support the validity of the appointment of a trustee,   went  before  the  judge,  and  failed,  it   was considered  a person aggrieved’ on the  principle  that  a person  who  is brought before the Court to :submit  to  its decision, but not a person who is heard in a dispute between others  must be treated as a person aggrieved’ (see  In  Re Lamb Ex., p. Board of Trade(1) per Lord Esher).  Here  again the words to notice are brought before the-court to  submit to  its  decision that, is to say, a person who  is  in  the nature of a party as contra-distinguished from a person  who is  next  described as a person who is heard in  a  dispute between  others. To distinguish between these two  positions

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Ist  may refer to a few more decisions.  In In  Re  Kitson, Ex.  p.  Sugden  (Thomas) & Sons  Ltd.(2),  it  was  further explained that.               "the  mere fact that an order is wrongly  made               does  not  of  itself give a  grievance  to  a               person not otherwise aggrieved."                         (per Phillimore J.) It  was  added  that  a person deprived  of  the  fruits  of litigation which he had instituted in the hope for them,  is a  person  aggrieved’.  Similarly, a creditor  who  did  not wish an adjudication order, to be made was held not-to be  a person  aggrieved-See In Re Brown Ex. p. Debtor v.  Official Receiver(3). The utmost that this series of cases goes is to be  found in the observations of James L.J. in Ellis Ex.  p. Ellis(4)  that  even  a person not bound  by  the  order  of adjudication  must be treated as a person aggrieved’ if  the order embarrasses him.  In a later case (In Re Woods Ex.  P. Ditton) (5) Cotton L.J. held that even so the person must be aggrieved by the very order and not by any of the consequen- ces  that ensue.  This was clarified in R. v. London  County Keepers of the Peace and Justices(6), by Lord Coleridge C.J. while (1)  [1894] 2 Q. B. D. 805 at 812. (3)  [1943] Ch.  D. D. 177. (5)  [1879] 40 L. T. 297 C.A. 79.. (2)  [1911] 2 K. B. 100 at 112-114. (4)  [1876] 2 Ch.  D. 707. (6)  [1890] 20 Q. B. D. 357 at 361.  875 dealing with the Highway Act, denying the right of appeal in these words               "Is  a person who cannot succeed in getting  a               conviction   against   another a person               aggrieved ? He may be annoyed at finding  that               what  he thought was a breach of the  law  is               not  a  breach  of law; but  is  he  aggrieved               because  some  one is held not  to  have  done               wrong  ?   It  is difficult to  see  that  the               section  meant  anything  of  the  kind.   The               section does not give an appeal to anybody but               a  person who is by the direct act of the  Ma-               gistrate   aggrieved-that  is  who   has   had               something  done or determined against  him  by               the Magistrate." These  observations again show that the person must  himself suffer  a grievance, or must be aggrieved by the very  order because it affects him. Two cases which may usefully be seen in the same context may next  be mentioned.  In Jennings v. Kelly(1) in relation  to the Government of Ireland Act 1920, Lord Wright did say that if  a  person was treated in certiorari  proceedings as  a competent  party  and notice was served on him  as  being  a proper party he would be a person aggrieved.’ The point  to bear in mind is that the person must be treated as a  party. However  the  force  of  the  observation  was  considerably weakened  because the party there was ordered to  pay  costs and  the  right of appeal was held to be available  on  that limited ground.  Further qualification is to be found in  In Re Riviere (1884) 26 Ch.  D. 48 where Lord Selborne observed               pro  ratione voluntas; the applicant must  not               come  merely saying I do not like this  thing               to be done, it must be shown that it tends  to               his  injury  or to his damage,  in  the  legal               sense of the word." The locus standi of the person aggrieved must be found  from

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his position in the first proceeding and his grievance  must arise from that standing taken with the effect of the  order on him. These cases are of course far removed from the one before me and  as Branwell L.J. observed in Robinson v. Currey(2)  the expression  is  nowhere  defined  and,  therefore,  must  be construed  by reference to the context of the  enactment  in which it appears and all the circumstances.  He pointed  out that the words are ordinarily English words, which are  to have the ordinary meaning put upon them., (1)  [174] A. C. 206. (2) [1881] 7 Q. B. D. 465, 470.  C. A. 876 From  these cases it is apparent that may person  who  feels disappointed  with the result of the case is not  a Person aggrieved.   He must be disappointed of a benefit  which  he would  have  received if the order had gone the  other  way. The,-order  must cause him a legal grievance  by  wrongfully depriving  him  of  something.   It is  no,  doubt  a  legal grievance  and  not a grievance about material  matters  but his,  legal grievance must be a tendency to injure That  the order  is  wrong or that it acquits some one who  he  thinks ought  to  be convicted does not by itself give  rise  to  a legal  grievance.   These principles are gathered  from  the cases  cited and do not, as I shall show later, do  violence to  the context in which the phrase occurs in,the  Advocates Act.  Although I am aware that in Seven Oaks Urban  District Council  v.  Twynham(1) Lord Hewart C.J.  uttered  words  of caution,  again  emphasised by Lord Parker  C.J.  in  Ealing Corporation  v.  Jones(2),  in  applying  too  readily   the definitions given in relation to other statutes but I do not think I am going beyond what Lord Hewart C.J. said and  what Lord Parker C.J. did in the case.  Lord Parker observed               ".... As Lord Hewart C.J. pointed out in Seven               Oaks  Urban District Council v. Twynam : But               as  has  been said again and again  there  is               often  little utility in seeking to  interpret               particular  expressions  in  one  statute   by               reference  to  decisions  given  upon  similar               expressions  in different statutes which  have               been  enacted alio intuitu.  The problem  with               which  we  are concerned is not, what  is  the               meaning  of the expression aggrieved’ in  any               one of a dozen other statutes, but what is its               meaning  in  this  part  of  this  statute  ?’               Accordingly, I only look at the cases to which               we  have  been referred to see  if  there  are               general-principles  which  can  be   extracted               which will guide the court in approaching  the               question   as  to  what  the   words person               aggrieved’ mean in any particular statute." If I may say respectfully I fully endorse this approach.   I am  now  in  a position to examine the  Advocates’  Act  but before so I must refer to a case near in point to this case, than any considered before. The  case  is  reported in Attorney  General  of  Gambia  v. Pierrie Saar N’jie(3).  A legal practitioner was held guilty of  professional misconduct but was acquitted on appeal  and an  appeal was taken to the Judicial Committee  against  the decision of the West African Court of Appeal.  This involved consideration of (1)  [1929] 2 K. B. 440, 443. (3)  [1961] A. C. 617. (2) L. R. [1959] 1 Q. B. D. 384.  877

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whether  the Attorney General could be said to be a person aggrieved’.  The facts need to be stated a little fully  as both  sides rely upon the observations of Lord  Denning  and they need to be explained carefully. A  barrister (a member of the English Bar) and also a  Soli- citor  (the  two  professions appear to  be  united  in  the Gambia)  practising in the Supreme Court of the  Gambia  was charged with professional misconduct and an order was  made, September 22, 1958, by the Deputy Judge (Abbot J.)  striking off his name from the roll of that Court, and directing that the  matter be reported to the Masters of the Bench  of  his Inn.   On  June  5, 1959 the West African  Court  of  Appeal (Bairamian,  Ag.P, Hurley Ag.  J.A. and Ames Ag.  J.A.)  set aside  the order on the ground that the Deputy Judge had  no jurisdiction.  The Attorney General of the Gambia  thereupon sought  leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council  but  this was  refused.  Then a petition was made for. special  leave. Special  leave  was  granted  subject  to  the   preliminary objection by the respondent that no appeal lay at the  inst- ance of the Attorney General.  The preliminary objection was rejected. Section  31  of the West African (Appeal to  Privy  Council) Order  in Council 1949 under which special leave  was  asked reads :               ,Nothing  in  this order  contained  shall  be               deemed  to  interfere with the  right  of  His               Majesty upon the humble petition of any person               aggrieved  by  any judgment of the  court,  to               admit  his appeal therefrom upon  such  con-               ditions as His Majesty in Council shall  think               fit to impose.               In  the Gambia disciplinary jurisdiction  over               barristers and solicitors is embodied in Rules               of the Supreme Court 1928.  Under those  rules               the Supreme Court’ Judge (and there is  only               one)   admits   and  enroll   barristers   and               solicitors of the Court, and Schedule I, Order               9, r. 7 says that :-               "The  Judge shall have power,  for  reasonable               cause,  to suspend any barrister or  solicitor               from practising within the jurisdiction of the               court  for any specified period, or order  his               name to be struck off the roll of court." Then there is the West African Court of Appeal and it  hears appeals  from  the Supreme Court’ in  civil  and  criminal matters.  In an earlier case in which a certain Mr. Mccauley was struck off the roll of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone and Mr. Mccauley sought to appeal to. the Full Court of West Africa it was ruled 878 by the Full Court that the decision of the Chief Justice was not  a decision of the Supreme Court’ and  was,  therefore, not  appealable  and  that the only  remedy  was  to  obtain special  leave to appeal to the Privy Council (see W. E.  A. Mccauley’ v. Judges of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone and Anr.(1). The legislature’ then added s. 14 which provided:               "An  appeal shall lie to the Court  of  Appeal               from  any  order  of the  judge  suspending  a               barrister  or solicitor of the  Supreme  Court               from  practice  or striking his name  off  the               roll,  and  for  the purposes.-  of  any  such               appeal any such order shalt be deemed to be an               order of the Supreme Court." The  words of the section show that the legislature did  not regard a decision in disciplinary matters as a judgment of a

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court but only deemed it to be so. The Full Court on the appeal of N’Jie from the order of  the Deputy  Judge held that a Deputy Judge could not  deal  with any  matter which was not a proceeding in the court  in  the exercise  of  judicial power.  The Judicial  Committee  held that  this  was  exercise,  of  judicial  power.   Then  the preliminary  objection  was considered.  The  objection  was that  the Attorney General had no locus standi not  being  a person  aggrieved.   This  was  overruled  by  the  Judicial Committee. Lord Denning referred to the definition of James L.J. in  In Re  Sidebotham  Ex. p. Sidebotham,(2) and said that  if  the definition  were to be regarded as exhaustive and were  held applicable, an aggrieved person’ would be only a person who was  a party to a lis, a controversy inter partes and had  a decision given against him.  The Attorney General would  not come within this restricted definition as there was no  suit between  two  parties  when  disciplinary  proceedings  were started ex mero motu by the court or at the instance of  the Attorney  General or some one against a legal  practitioner. But the definition of James L.J. was not exhaustive and  the words person aggrieved, were of wide import and should  not be subjected to a restricted interpretation.  They  included not  a  busy  body  but certainly  one  who  had  a  genuine grievance because an order had been made which prejudicially affected  his  interests.   Posing  the  question did  the Attorney  General have a sufficient interest’, the  Judicial Committee answered he had.  The Attorney General in a Colony represented the Crown as the guardian of public interest and it  was  his  duty  to bring before  the  Judge  a  case  of misconduct  to warrant action.  Then Lord Denning  proceeded to  distinguish  two  kind-, of cases to  determine  if  the Attorney General would be a person aggriev- (1) L. R. [1928J A. C. 344. (2) [1880] 40 Ch.  D. 458 (C.  A.)  879 ed.’  The  first was a case where the  judge  acquitted  the practitioner.   In  such a case no appeal was  open  to  the Attorney General under the Supreme Court Ordinance, and Lord Denning  added "He has done his duty and is not  aggrieved". In other words, he did not come within the words of the 3  1 st  section of the Order in Council.  The  Attorney  General could  not,  therefore, ask for special leave as  a person aggrieved’.   But the case was different if the judge  found the practitioner guilty and a Court of Appeal reversed  the decision  on  a  ground  which  went  to  the  root  of  the jurisdiction of the judge or was otherwise a point in  which the public interest was involved.  In that case the Attorney General was a person aggrieved’. The  observations  of Lord Denning clearly  meant  that  the Attorney  General could not pose as a person aggrieved’  to seek to bring a simple case of acquittal for reversal by the Judicial  Committee under the 31st section of the  Order  in Council   for  he  could  not  be  regarded  as  a person aggrieved’.   The  remark  was made  perhaps  to  repel an argument  that  every  case  of  acquittal  would  make  the Attorney General an aggrieved person’.  Lord, Denning  said that  this was not the true position.  The Attorney  General could only move the judge and there his duty ended.  The law gave  him no express right of appeal and he could not  claim to be a person aggrieved’.  He could only invoke the 3 1 st section if he could make out his grievance and it was  found to be as a person representing the Crown and the guardian of public  interest seeking to get reversed a  decision  which struck  at the root of the jurisdiction of the  disciplinary

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judge,  by  denying  that the Deputy  Judge  was  exercising judicial  power under s. 7 of the Supreme  Court  Ordinance. The  Crown was aggrieved by this decision and the,  Attorney General representing the Crown was an-aggrieved person. The  scheme of the law under which the  disciplinary  action was  taken and the appeal to the Privy Council was  brought gave   the  true  connotation  of  the  expression person aggrieved’.   In those cases in which no question of  public interest  was involved the Attorney General even if  he  had moved  the  judge and got an adverse decision could  not  be regarded as aggrieved but in a case in which, apart from the merits  of the case against the practitioner, some  grave  I question  of  public importance was involved,  the  Attorney General  representing  the  Crown could be  regarded  as.  a person aggrieved’. It was presumably after reading this case and  understanding it  as  I  have done, that the  Advocate-General  set  about making 880 out a question of public importance. He did not seem only to get the decision overturned on facts. This is what he said :               "The  appellant has filed this appeal  as  the               Advocate  General of Maharashtra.   Under  the               Advocates Act, 1961, (as under the Indian  Bar               Councils  Act,  1926),  the  Advocate  General               represents   the  public  interest  in   every               disciplinary  inquiry.  Under sec. 35  of  the               Advocates  Act, 1961, the Advocate General  is               entitled  to notice  in  respect  of   every               disciplinary  inquiry, is entitled to have  an               opportunity   of   being  heard   before   the               disciplinary committee passes any order.  This               appeal  raises  very  important  questions  of               principle   as   regards  the  effect   of   a               conviction of an Indian Advocate of an offence               recognised  by all civilised countries  as  an               offence   involving  moral   turpitude.    The               question   raised   also   related   to    the               requirements of natural justice in a  criminal               court, and the effect of the judgments of  the               Supreme  Court on the subject.  It raises  the               further  question whether an  Indian  Advocate               convicted   of  an  offence  involving   moral               turpitude  by a Court outside India is  immune               from disciplinary action because a minor  dif-               ferences of procedure in such countries  where               such  trial has been held, in complete  accord               with  principles  of  natural  justice.    The               profession  of  an advocate is  an  honourable               profession and the disciplinary provisions  of               the Advocates Act are designed to secure  that               per   guilty  of  offences   involving   moral               turpitude    are   subject   to    appropriate               disciplinary action." It is obvious that the Advocate-General has attempted to use the  observations  of Lord Denning in the  Gambia  case  and wishes to plead that he enjoys a special position in the Bar and  under  the Advocates Act and therefore is  entitled  to appeal as a ’ person aggrieved’.  This was the line  adopted by Mr. M. C. Setalvad, counsel for the Bar Council of India. On  the  other  band,  Mr. V. S.  Desai  appearing  for  the Advocate  General  argued that the  Advocate-General  having notice  of disciplinary proceedings, in any event,  must  be treated as a person aggrieved’ within ss. 35 and 38 of the Advocates  Act.   I  shall  consider  the  narrow   question

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presented by Mr. Setalvad latter.  I shall first take up for consideration  the larger question and the more  general - ,application of the expression person aggrieved.-, In  support  of his contention Mr. V. S. Desai  cited  three cases  from this Court, one from the Judicial Committee  and one  from  the  Bombay  High  Court.   They  all  relate  to disciplinary  proceedings  and I may  begin  by  considering them.  881 The  case of the privy Council reported in Advocate  General of  Bombay & Ors. v. Phiroz Rustamji Bharucha(1)  was next cited.   It  was  an application for special  leave  by  the Advocate  General  of  Bombay in a  proceeding  relating  to professional misconduct of an advocate.  The standing of the Advocate  General was questioned.  The report in the  Bombay Law  Reporter Series(2) reproduces more fully the  arguments than.  the  official  report and we  were  referred  to  the arguments.   The  point was not debated and there  does  not appear to be a pronouncement on this point either during the course  of argument or in the judgment since  special  leave was  refused on another ground.  Mr. Desai says that if  the Judicial  Committee  had found substance in  this  objection they  would  have  ruled out the Advocate  General  on  this ground  alone.   There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  the objection  was  considered  at all.   I  cannot  derive  any assistance  from this ruling because the prerogative of  the Crown  to  grant special leave as of grace in any  case  was always  there irrespective of the standing of  the  Advocate General.  The Privy Council often granted special leave  and even  heard  appeals on certificates wrongly  granted.  (See Sevak  Jeranchod Bhogilal v. Dakore Temple Committee(2)  and the  cases collected in Halsbury Laws of England (3rd  Edn.) Vol. 9 p. 380 paragraph 886 note (h).  This prerogative  the Judicial  Committee  has exercised on behalf  of  the  Crown particularly in cases of general interest see ibid p. 379 s. 885  note (s).  The provisions of the former s. 112  of  the Code of Civil Procedure show the extent of the  prerogative. Therefore.  because the Privy Council refused special  leave on one ground rather than another cannot import a  rejection of the objection as to the standing of the Advocate General. Next  we have an unreported decision of a Division Bench  of this Court reported in B. M. Madani v. Commissioner of Work- men’s,  Compensation.  Bombay(3).  In that case  the  anneal was  taken by the Commissioner for enhancement of  penalties against the delinquent advocate and the penalty was in  fact increased.   This Court held that he was entitled to do  so as  a -person aggrieved.  The  Particular  misconduct  was committed in relation to a claimant before the Commissioner. The  Advocate had pocketed the travelling allowance  granted by  the  Commissioner to the widow of  a  deceased  workman. There  may  be  some doubt whether the  Commissioner  was  a person  aggrieved’  by  the Denalty  imposed  in  the  first instance  but I do not pursue this matter.  The case can  be justified  on  the dictum in some cases that a  party  which moves  the court or a Person brought before the court to  be bound  by  its  order May be a person  aggrieved.,  See  for example the case of the Official Receiver in Re Payne Ex  p. Castle Mail Packets (1)  37  Bom.  L. R. 722 (PC)      (2) A. I. R. 1915  P.  C. 155. (3) C. A. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968. 69Sup.CI(P)71-12 882 Co.(1),  and  In  Re  Lamb Ex. p.  Board  of  Trade  already considered  by me.  Madani’s case does not help  to  resolve

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the dispute centering round the Advocate-General.  The  next case is reported in Bhataraju Nageshwara  Rao  v. The  Hon’ble Judges of the Madras High Court and  others(2). That  case arose under the Bar Councils Act, 1926  when  the Judges exercised disciplinary power.  In the case before the Supreme Court the Judges of the Madras High Court were shown as respondents.  This Court observed at page 1064 as follows               "Before parting with this appeal we desire  to               say  that it appears to us that it was  wholly               wrong  and inappropriate for the appellant  to               have made the Honourable Judges of the  Madras               High  Court  respondents to this  appeal.   It               appears that in some cases involving  contempt               of Court the Honourable Judges have been  made               parties.   It  is not necessary  for  us  to               express any opinion on this occasion as to the               propriety of that procedure in contempt  cases               but  we are clearly of the opinion that in  an               appeal  arising out of a proceeding under  the               Bar  Councils  Act  the  appropriate   parties               should   be   the  advocate   concerned,   the               complainant,  if any, the Bar Council  or  the               secretary thereof and the Advocate General  of               the State concerned to whom notice have to  be               issued  under section 12(3) of the Indian  Bar               Councils Act." This  does not advance the case of the Advocate  General  of Maharashtra any further. The last case of this Court is Municipal Corporation of  the City of Bombay v. Chandulal Shamaldas Patel and Ors.(8).  In land  acquisition  cases  started for  the  benefit  of  the Municipal Corporation certain notifications issued under the Land  Acquisition Act were set aside by the High Court,  and the Municipal Corporation sought to appeal.  It was held not to  be  a person grieved’.  This case, even if I  were  to- accept  it  as  correctly decided, does not  assist  us  in relation  to  our  Act passed with a  different  intent  and purpose and using the words in another context. The  last  case is from Bombay but it did  not  discuss  the point and cannot be held to have laid down a precedent.   It is useless to refer to it. I now proceed to examine the larger question whether by rea- son  of  the provisions of the Advocates  Act  the  Advocate General  of  the  State enjoys such position  that  he  must necessarily be treat- (1) [1886] 18 Q. B.  D. 154 C. A.  (2) [1955] 1 S. C. R. 1055. (3) C. A. No. 1716 of 1967 decided on August 1, 1970.  883 ed as a person aggrieved entitling him to file an appeal.For this purpose we have to examine critically the provisions of the Act to discover if the claim can be entertained. The  Advocates Act was passed to amend and  consolidate  the law  relating to legal practitioners and to provide for  the constitution  of  bar  Councils and an All  India  Bar.   It replaced  the  earlier Acts governing the  legal  profession particularly the Indian Bar Councils Act 1926.  Prior to the passing of the Advocates Act, the enrollment and  discipline of legal practitioners was in the hands of the courts and in the  case  of the advocates the High Court  entertained  and determined  cases  of  misconduct against  them.   Now  this jurisdiction  is completely transferred to the Bar  Councils of  the  States and the Bar Council of India.   In  the  Bar Councils  of the States (except Delhi) the  Advocate-General of  the  State  is  an ex  officio  member.   In  Delhi  the

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Additional   Solicitor-General  takes  the  place   of   the Advocate-General.   Other members are elected.  In  the  Bar Council  of India, the Attorney-General and  the  Solicitor- General  are  ex officio members and the other  members  are elected  one each by the State Bar Councils.  In  the  Union Territory  of Delhi the Additional Solicitor-General  is  ex officio  member.  The functions of the Advocate-General  are not  different from those of the other members in so far  as the  affairs  of the Bar Council are  concerned.   The  only matters where the Advocate-General, the Attorney-General and the  Solicitor-General and the Additional  Solicitor-General are  mentioned  are these.  The Act gives a  right  of  pre- auidence  over other advocates to the Attorney-General,  the Solicitor-General, the Additional Solicitor-General and  the Advocate-General.   The right of pre-audience gives  them  a standing  for hearing of cases but does not confer  on  them any  other rights.  The magniloquent phrases such as  Leader of  the  Bar, Keeper of the Conscience of the  Bar  have  no meaning  neither now, nor before under the Bar Councils  Act of  1926.  They are just honorific titles given by  courtesy but  are  not grounded on law.  Indeed the  Keepers  of  the Conscience  of the Bar are the Bar Councils and the  Leader of  the  Bar  may be someone who may even  have  refused  to accept Advocate-Generalship. The functions of the Bar Councils of the States and the  Bar Council of India throw some light on the remaining functions of the Advocate-General and may first be seen.  Section 6 of the Act lays down the functions of the State Bar Council and s. 7 those of the Bar Council of India.  Apart from  certain administrative  functions. which these councils, which,  are bodies  corporate, perform, their functions in  relation  to the  Bar are somewhat different.  Both have their own  rolls and they prepare and 884 maintain  the  rolls.  The State Bar Council entertains  and determines cases of misconduct of advocates oil its roil and safeguards the rights, privileges and interests of advocates on  its  roll.   The  Bar council of  India  lays  down  the standards   of  professional  conduct  and   etiquette   of, advocates, the procedure to be followed by its  disciplinary committee  and  the disciplinary committee of  each  of  the State   Bar  Councils.   The  Bar  Council  of  India   also safeguards  the  rights  and  privileges  and  interests  of advocates and exercises general supervision and control over State Bar Councils.  It also deals with and disposes of  any matter arising under the Advocates Act which may be referred to  it by a State Bar Council.  There are  other  functions which relate to the education etc. of those who wish to join the legal profession.  The Bar Council of India maintains a common  roll of advocates.  The Bar Councils also decide  in relation  to  their rolls all questions of  seniority.   The State  Bar Councils and the Bar Council of India  constitute one  or  more disciplinary committees and  under  Chapter  V questions  of the conduct of advocates on  their  respective rolls  are referred to them.  The disciplinary committee  of the Bar Council of India exercises superior powers  inasmuch as  it  hears appeals from the orders  of  the  disciplinary committees of the State Bar Councils and may even of its own motion withdraw for inquiry before itself for disposal, any proceeding  for  disciplinary action  against an  advocate pending  before the disciplinary committee of any State  Bar Council. The disciplinary proceedings commence both before the  State Bar  Council and the Bar Council of India on a complaint  or otherwise made respectively to the State Bar Council or  the

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Bar Council of India.  The Bar Councils in either case refer them   for   disposal  to  their   respective   disciplinary committees.   The  disciplinary committee in each  case  can reject  the complaint summarily, but if it proceeds to  hear the matter further it causes a notice thereof to be sent  to the  advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General  of  the State or the Attorney-General of India, as the case may  be. The   disciplinary  committee  after  giving  the   advocate concerned and the Advocate-General or the, Attorney General, as  the  case may be, an opportunity to be heard"  makes  an order   either  dismissing  the  complaint  or   where   the proceedings  are found to be not fit for  consideration  and are  started  at the instance of the Bar  Council,  ordering that they may be filed.  The committee may, if the  advocate is found guilty, reprimand him or suspend him from  practice for  such  period  as  it  deems  fit,  or  may  remove  him altogether from the roll of advocates.  The Advocate-General or the Attorney-General, as the case may be, need not appear personally but may appear through an advocate. 885 From the decision of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar  Council an appeal lies to the bar  Council  of  India which  is  heard by the disciplinary committee  of  the  Bar Council  of India which may pass such orders thereon  as  it deems fit.  From the decision or the disciplinary  committee of  the Bar Council of India an appeal lies to  this  Court. The  appeals  can be taken by a ’ person aggrieved’  by  the order  of  the  disciplinary committee  of  tile  State  Bar Council or the Bar Council of India, as the case may be.  It is  in  this context that we have to determine  whether  the Advocate-General can be regarded as a person aggrieved’. In view of the common roll maintained by the, Bar Council of India it appears to me that if anybody represents the Bar it would  be  the Bar Council of India and in the case  of  the States, the Bar Council of the, State.  The Advocate-General has  no  right  to  speak on behalf,, of  the  body  of  the advocates  as  if he represented them and  their  interests. Neither  is this privilege expressly conferred on  him,  nor can  it  be implied from any of the provisions of  the  Act. The question, therefore, arises : in what capacity does  the Advocate-General appear before a disciplinary committee  ? It  is obvious that he is not a prosecutor on behalf of  the Bar  Council  because if he was one, his presence  would  be more  necessary  at  the stage  at  which  the  disciplinary committee  considers in limini to decide whether the  matter should be proceeded with at all.  The next question is : why is he summoned at all ? In my opinion, the  Advocate-General is not noticed and brought before the court because he is  a prosecutor   or  is  to  be  bound  by  the  order  of   the disciplinary committee.  He represents no interest there and is heard merely because he is the chief counsel of the State and therefore his assistance at the hearing is useful.   The fact  that  he  need not appear by himself  and  may  appear through an advocate renders his position a little weaker  in the  matter  of his grievance If he is to be  treated  as  a perso n  aggrieved’  he must argue the case  himself.   The fact  that  he  appears through a  counsel  shows  that  the intention  is merely to have the opinion of a person who  is neither  siding with the complainant nor with  the  advocate and  who will thus have unbiased and impartial  approach  to the  case.   The Advocate-General is generally a  lawyer  of some  standing having made a mark in the profession and  his contribution  to  the  deliberations  of  the   disciplinary committee is welcome because thus the disciplinary committee is helped to reach a proper conclusion.

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If he is not a person summoned to be bound by the order  but a person who is heard in a dispute between others merely  to be  of  assistance in reaching the right conclusion  he  can hardly have a grievance.  The Advocate-General must after he has  done his duty leave the matter to the complainant  and the advocate or the 886 Bar  Council to take the matter further if they choose.   In no  event the Advocate-General is in the nature of  a  party having independent rights which he can claim are injured  by the  decision.  The decision does not deny him anything  nor does  it  ask.  him to do anything.  It is  thus  that  Lord Denning  says  that in these  disciplinary  proceedings  the Attorney-General is not’ a party as in a lis and after  the decision,  his  duty  ends.  Lord Denning  points  this  out clearly  by  saying that the Attorney-General in  that  case could  not  have been aggrieved by the order of  the  Deputy Judge  if he had acquitted the delinquent advocate in  that case  The  Attorney-General’s  interest was  found  by  Lord Denning  in  relation to the Crown and the Colony and  that too for the special reason that appeal court had denied that the  Deputy Judge possessed jurisdiction to hear  the  case. In  our country the Advocate-General does not represent  the Executive   or   the  Legislature  or  the   Judiciary   in. disciplinary proceedings before the disciplinary  committee. His  function is advisory and more akin to an amicus  curiae He is not to take sides except in so far his arguments  lend weight  to  the case of the one side or that of  the  other. Beyond  that he is not interested in the dispute  either  in his  personal  capacity or in his capacity as  an  Advocate- General.   He  does not represent the  Government  in  these proceedings.   If the Government was interested  the  notice would have gone to it.  In other statutes, where the Central Government  is  vitally interested, as for example,  in  the Chartered  Accountants  Act, the notice does not go  to  the Advocate-General  but  to  Government  and  the   government appears through the Advocate-General.  The  Advocate-General under the Act finishes his duty when the hearing is over and he  cannot  be  considered to be a  party  interested  or  a perso n aggrieved’.  I do not find anything in the Act which indicates  that the Advocate-General is to be treated  as  a person  aggrieved’  by a decision whether in favour  of  the advocate  or  against him.  Indeed it would  have  been  the easiest  thing  to give a right of appeal to  the  Advocate- General  eo nomine without including him in the  compendious phrase  a person aggrieved’.  If he is  not  noticed,  the order  would  be held to deny him something  which  the  law entitled  him  to.  That is  quite  different.   The  larger proposition  contended  for by Mr. Desai is  therefore  not acceptable to me. This  brings me to the narrow ground on which  Mr.  Setalvad very  properly rested the case of the Bar Council of  India. That  narrow ground is that in this case there were  several Points of general public interest which needed to be solved and therefore, if the decision of the disciplinary committee of the State Bar Council was wrong, the Advocate-General  in the public interest could take the matter further.  I do not think  that I can subscribe to this approach either in  this case.   The  Advocate-General  presented his  views  that  a conviction in England showed moral turpitude 887 in  the  advocate.  I  do  not  think  that  this  inference necessarily  follows.   The advocate explained that  he  was held  guilty  in a summary court and received a  small  fine because  he  was not in a position to  prove  his  innocence

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before the Magistrate. Now  in  disciplinary  proceedings  the  advocate  was   not estopped  from questioning the charge that be was guilty  of corrupt  practice.  In a civil proceeding the decision of  a criminal court is not res judicata.  To give an example,  if a person is involved in a traffic offence in which some  one is  injured  he may in the criminal court  receive  a  light sentence  but  if  he is sued in a  civil  court  for  heavy damages he pan plead. and prove that he was not negligent or that accident was due to the contributory negligence of  the defendant.   The  decision of the criminal court  would  not preclude him from raising this issue before the civil court. The  advocate here explained that he was held guilty  before the Magistrate in the circumstances in which he was  placed. The.  fact of his conviction, as well as his full  statement bearing   on  his  conduct  were  before  the   disciplinary committee  of  the State Bar Council.  They  had  to  choose between  the  two, that is to say, the result of  a  summary trial Without going into merits and proof of the misconduct. Having  examined  the  advocate and  seen  the  record,  the disciplinary  committee  of the State Bar Council  chose  to accept  the  plea of the advocate and held that he  was  not guilty.    They  were  also  satisfied  that   the   summary proceedings  in  the  criminal  trial  in  England  offended against  the  principles  of  natural  justice.   They  were entitled  to  this view on which much can be  said  on  both sides.   If the Advocate-General’s view of the case was  not accepted by the disciplinary committee he could not have any grievance.   He could not make this into his own cause or  a cause  on  behalf of persons he did not represent.   He  had done his duty and the matter should have rested there.   For this  reason I am of the view in this case  the  Advocate- General was not a  person aggrieved, within the meaning  of s. 37 of the Advocates Act even on the narrow ground and the appeal filed by him before the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India was incompetent. The  conclusion  which I have reached does not mean  that  I have gone into the merits of the advocate’s plea.  Nor  does it indicate that 1, sitting as a judge. would have  accented the  plea of the advocate, if I were to decide the  ease  on facts.  That is a matter quite beside the point.  I refer to the plea because it was raised and was accepted by his peers on the’ disciplinary committee. I would. therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India. 888 Mitter,J. On the basis of a news item in the Times of  India of  August  27,  1966  the Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra  in exercise  of  its powers under S. 35 of the  Advocates  Act, 1961  issued  a notice to the appellant to face  an  inquiry into  his conduct by its disciplinary committee.   The  said committee  exonerated the appellant of the  charge  levelled against  him  and  held  that  he  was  not  guilty  of  any misconduct,  professional  or otherwise.   Relying  on  the provisions of S. 37 of the said Act the Advocate-General  of Maharashtra  who  had  appeared before  the  said  committee preferred  an  appeal  to the Bar  Council  of  India.   The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India disagreed with  the finding of the disciplinary committee of  the  Bar Council  of  Maharashtra observing that the conduct  of  the appellant  which was investigated into before the State  Bar Council  was quite undeserving of an advocate  and  directed his suspension from practice, for a period of one year.  The appellant  has  come tip in appeal to this  Court,  and  has urged  a preliminary point that the appeal by the  Advocate-

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General to the Bar Council of India was incompetent and  the finding and order of the disciplinary committee of the  said body ought to be set aside on that ground alone without  our going into the facts of the case. Notice  of this hearing was given to  the  Advocates-General and the Bar Councils of all the States as also the Attorney- General  of India and we have had the benefit  of  arguments advanced  before us not only on of the Advocate-General  for the  State  of Maharashtra but also’ on behalf  of  the  Bar Council of India, the Attorney-General of India and some  of the Advocates-General of the States. The   determination   of  this  question  depends   on   the interpretation   of  S.  37  of  the  Advocates  Act,   1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act’)               "(1) Any person. aggrieved by an order of  the               disciplinary committee of. a State Bar Council               made  under section 35 may, within sixty  days               of the date of the communication of, the order               to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar Council of               India.               (2)   Every such appeal shall be heard-by  the               disciplinary committee of the.  Bar Council of               India which may pass such order thereon, as it               deems fit." To  put the matter in a nut-shell the question is,  "Is  the Advocate-General   of  a  State  who  appears   before   the disciplinary  committee of a State Bar Council in  pursuance of  a  notice  given’ to him under s. 35(2) of  the  Act a person aggrieved’ within the meaning of the words used in s. 37 ?". 889 To decide this question we have to look into the Act to find out  the  role  of  the  Advocate-General  of  a  State   in proceedings of this kind.  The object of the Act is to amend and consolidate the law relating to legal practitioners  and to provide for the constitution of Bar Councils and an  All- India Bar.  All the States and the Union territories are  to be  under the jurisdiction of named State Bar  Councils  and there  is  also  to  be  a Bar  Council  of  India  for  the territories  to  which  the  Act  is  extended.    Generally speaking  a State Bar Council is to consist of a  number  of members  including  the  Advocate-General of  the  State  ex officio,  while the Attorney-General of India ex officio  is to  be  a  member of the Bar Council of  India.   The  other members  of the Bar Councils are to be elected in  terms  of the  Act.  Under s. 6 the functions of a State  Bar  Council are to be inter alia               (a)   to  admit  persons as advocates  on  its               roll;               (b)   to prepare and maintain such roll;               (c)   to  entertain  and  determine  cases  of               misconduct against advocates on its rail.               S.    7  lays  down the functions of  the  Bar               Council of India which are to be inter alia :               (a)   to prepare and maintain a common roll of               advocates:               (b)   to  lay down standards  of  professional               conduct and etiquette for’ advocates; and               (c)   to lay down the procedure to be followed               by   its   disciplinary  committee   and   the               disciplinary  committee  of  each  State   Bar               Council. Under  s.  9  a Bar Council has to constitute  one  or  more disciplinary committees each of which is to consist of three perso ns  of  whom  two are to be  persons  elected  by  the

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Council  from amongst its members and the third is to  be  a person  co-opted  by  the  Council  from  amongst  advocates possessing  the qualifications specified in the  proviso  to sub-s.(2) of s. 3 but is not a member of the council.  S. 15 empowers  Bar  Councils  to  make rules  to  carry  out  the purposes of the Act.  Chapter III of the Act containing  ss. 16 to 28 provides for admission and enrollment of advocates. the  determination of their seniority etc.  The right of  an advocate to practice is dealt with in Chapter IV. Chapter  V which contains ss. 35 to 44 deals with conduct of advocates. The relevant provisions thereof are set out as under-               "35(1)  Where  on receipt of  a  complaint  or               otherwise  a State Bar Council has  reason  to               believe that any advocate on its roll has been               guilty of professional or                890               other misconduct, it shall refer the case  for               disposal to its disciplinary committee.               (2)   The  disciplinary committee of  a  State               Bar  Council, if it does not summarily  reject               the  complaint.  shall  fix  a  date  for  the               hearing  of the case and shall cause a  notice               thereof to be given to the advocate  concerned               and to the Advocate-General of the State.               (3)   The  disciplinary committee of  a  State               Bar   Council   after  giving   the   advocate               concerned   and   the   Advocate-General    an               opportunity  of being heard, may make  any  of               the following orders, namely:-               (a)   dismiss  the  complaint  or,  where  the               proceedings were initiated at the instance  of               the   State  Bar  Council,  direct  that   the               proceedings be filed;               (b)   reprimand the advocate;               (c)   suspend  the advocate from practice  for               such period as it may deem fit;               (d)   remove the name of the advocate from the               State roll of advocates.                (4) .  .  .   .   .    .               (5)   Where  any  notice  is  issued  to   the               Advocate-  General under sub-section  (2)  the               Advocate-General   may   appear   before   the               disciplinary   committee  of  the  State   Bar               Council  either  in  person  or  through   any               advocate appearing on his behalf.               37.   Supra.               38.   Any person\aggrieved by an order made by               the disciplinary committee of the Bar  Council               of  India under section 36 or section 37  may,               within  sixty  days of the date on  which  the               order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal               to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may               pass such order thereon as it deems fit." S.42  gives the disciplinary committee of a Bar Council  the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of various matters including  the summoning  and  enforcing the attendance of any  person  and examining him on oath, requiring discovery and production of documents etc. and under sub-s. (2) all proceedings before a disciplinary  committee  of a Bar Council are to  be  deemed judicial proceedings within the meaning of sections 193  and 228 of the Indian Penal 891 Code.   S. 43 empowers the disciplinary committee of a  Bar- Council  to make such order as to costs of  any  proceedings

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before it as it may deem fit.  S. 44 gives the  disciplinary committee power to review any order passed by it of its  own motion or otherwise. The  above provisions of the Act make it clear that  subject to  a right of appeal to this Court under s. 38 the  inquiry into charges of misconduct against an advocate are to be in the  exclusive  jurisdiction  of  the  Bar  Councils.    Any complaint  against  the  conduct of an advocate  has  to  be preferred  before a State Bar Council and when  the  council has  reason  to believe on the strength of  such  complaint that an advocate on its roll has been guilty of professional or  other misconduct, it has to refer the case for  disposal to its disciplinary committee.  The council can take such  a step of its own motion.  Section 35(1) shows that it is  not obligatory on the State Bar Council to refer each and  every complaint  to  the  disciplinary committee.  It  has  to  be satisfied   that   there   is  a  prima   facie   case   for investigation,.   It can throw out a complaint if  the  same appears to be frivolous.  Sub-s. (2) of s. 35 shows that  it is  not incumbent on the disciplinary committee of  a  State Bar Council to proceed- further with the matter if it  takes the view that the complaint is without substance.  It is not obliged to call upon the advocate concerned to. explain  his conduct  or  to  inform the  Advocate-General  that  it  has rejected  the  complaint  summarily.  It is  only  when  the disciplinary committee is satisfied that the complaint ought not to be rejected out of hand that it has to fix a date for the  hearing  of  the case and give notice  thereof  to  the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-General of the State. It is mandatory on the disciplinary committee to give  such a  notice to both.  Sub-ss. (3) and (5) of s. 35 go to  show that  it is not incumbent on the Advocate-General to  appear at  the  hearing  and that it is within  his  discretion  to appear either by himself or through another advocate of  his choice  and  place  his viewpoint  before  the  disciplinary committee.  He is not a party to the proceedings but he  has a right to appear and to make submissions both on  questions of fact and questions of law. S.   3 7 does not in terms lay down who can prefer an appeal from  the order of the disciplinary committee of  the  State Bar  Council.   There  can be no  doubt  that  the  advocate agianst  whom an order is made would be a person  aggrieved. The State Ba Council cannot be such a person as the order is made by itself acting through its disciplinary committee.  A member  of the public may make a complaint to the State  Bar Council against an advocate on the ground of loss or  damage or  any serious Prejudice caused to him by the advocate,  be it  negligence or fraud e.g. collusion with the opponent  or misappropriation of 892 any  moneys belonging to him and there does not seem  to  be any  justifying  cause for holding that he is not  a  person aggrieved by an order which dismisses his complaint. The question arises as to whether the Advocate-General is  a person aggrieved because the disciplinary committee does not take  the same view of the matter as himself, be it  for  or against the advocate.  To place the Advocate-General in  the category of "person aggrieved’ one must be able to say  that the  disciplinary committee committed an error which it  was his  duty to attempt to set right because of  some  function attributable   to  him  as  the  Advocate-General  or   some obligation  cast upon him by the Act or the general  law  of the  land to safeguard and maintain standards of conduct  of advocates laid down by the Bar Council of India. Generally speaking, a person can be said to be aggrieved  by

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an  order which is to his detriment, pecuniary or  otherwise or  causes  him  some prejudice in some form  or  other.   A person  who is not a party to a litigation has no  right  to appeal  merely because the judgment or order  contains  some adverse  remarks  against him.  But it has been  held  in  a number of cases that a person who is not a party to suit may prefer  an appeal with the leave of the appellate court  and such leave would not be refused where the judgment would  be binding on him under Explanation 6 to section 11 of the Code of  Civil Procedure.  We find ourselves unable to  take  the view  that  because a person has been given notice  of  some proceedings  wherein he is given a right to appear and  make his  submissions,  he should without more have  a  right  of appeal   from   an  order  rejecting  his   contentions   or submissions.   An appeal is a creature of statute and  if  a statute  expressly  gives a person a right  to  appeal,  the matter rests there. Innumerable  statutes both in England and in India give  the right  of appeal to "a person aggrieved" by an  order  made and the provisions of such statutes have to be construed  in each  case  to  find out whether the  person  preferring  an appeal  falls  within that expression.  As was  observed  in Robinson  v.  Currey(1)  the words  "person  aggrieved"  are ordin ary  English  words  which are to  have  the  ordinary meaning  put  upon them’.  According to Halsbury’s  Laws  of England (Third Edition, Vol. 5) page 29 foot-note "h"               "The expression is nowhere defined and must be               construed  by reference to the context of  the               enactment  in  which it appears  and  all  the               circumstances               (1)   7 Q. B D. 465.               993               Attempts  have however from time to time  been               made  to  define  the  expression  in  various               cases.    In   Ex  parte  Sidebotham   In   re               Sidebotham(1) it was observed by James, L.J.               "But  the  words Person  aggrieved’  do  not               really  mean  a man who is disappointed  of  a               benefit  which he might have received if  some               other   order  had  been  made.    A person               aggrieved’  must be a man who has  suffered  a               legal grievance, a man against whom a decision               has  been  pronounced  which  has   wrongfully               deprived  him  of  something,  or   wrongfully               refused him something, or wrongfully               affected his title to something."               The  above  definition  of  James,  L.J.   was               described by Esher, M.R. in Ex Parte  Official               Receiver  In Re Reed, Bowen & Co.( as not  "an               exhaustive definition".  His Lordship added               "It  is an affirmative definition of a  person               who may appeal, and at all events it  includes               a  person  who has asked for  a  decision  for               which  he  had a right to ask.  and  has  been               wrongfully refused."               The  Queen,  v. The Keepers of the  Peace  and               Justices  of  the County of London (3)  was  a               case of an appeal by an informant against  the               judgment  of a justice of the peace  upon  the               hearing of an information or complaint by  the               vestry  of  the parish against  a  person  for               unlawfully  and wilfully obstructing the  free               passage  of a certain highway.   The  relevant               section provided:               "If  any person shall think himself  aggrieved

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             by.   any  order,  conviction,  judgment,   or               determination made, or by any matter or  thing               done  by  any  justice  or  other  person   in               pursuance  of  this Act....  such  person  may               appeal to quarter sessions."               In  holding that an informant had no right  of               appeal Lord Coleridge C.J. said:               "Is  a person who cannot succeed in getting  a               conviction against another a person aggrieved               ?’  He may be annoyed at finding that what  he               thought was a breach of law is not a breach of               law; but is he aggrieved’ because some one is               held not to have done wrong ? It is  difficult               to see that the section meant anything of that               kind." In Rex v. London Quarter Sessions Ex parte Westminster  Cor- poration(4)  a  borough council whose  cancellation  of  the registration  of  a  street trader had been  reversed  by  a magistrate on (1)  14 ch.  D. 458 at 465. (3)  25 Q. B. D. 357, 361. (2)  19 Q. B. D. 174 at 178. (4) 512 K. B. 508 894 appeal  by  the trader concerned under S. 25 of  the  London County Council (General Powers) Act, 1947 was held not to be a  person  aggrieved  by  an order of  a  court  of  summary jurisdiction  within the meaning of S. 64 of the  Act.   The argument  advanced on behalf of the corporation was that  it had   a  public  administrative  duty  to  perform  in   the regulation of the streets and Having been interfered with in the   execution  of  that  duty  by  the  decision  of   the magistrate,  they were persons aggrieved by his order.   One of  the  grounds  for refusal of  the  application  by  Lord Goddard,   C.   J.  was  that  the  order   made   did   not directly,affect the borough council in such a way as to make them "a person aggrieved" within the meaning of the section. According to the learned Chief Justice what the statute  did was  "to  substitute the opinion of the magistrate  for  the opinion of a borough council".  It was said that the court of  summary jurisdiction had to take into account  the  same matters as the borough council had to take into account, and if the court thinks that the cancellation of the licence  is not  justified,  it can restore the licence  to  the  street trader.   If  the court of summary jurisdiction  refuses  to grant  a  licence,  then  the  street  trader  is  a  person aggrieved,  because his livelihood is affected, or an  order is made directly affecting him. The  case of Sevenoaks Urban District Council  v.  Twynam(1) was  relied  upon by counsel appearing  for,  the  Advocate- General  of  Maharashtra support his argument  that  even  a person  who had no proprietary or pecuniary interest in  the subject matter of the litigation might be a person aggrieved so  as to give him a right to appeal.  The statute  in  this case  was however worded very differently from the  statutes which came up for consideration in the cases noted  earlier. S. 68(1) of the Public Health Act, 1925 laid down that:               "Where   for  the  purpose  of  relieving   or               preventing congestion of traffic it appears to               the local authority to be necessary to provide               within their district suitable parking  places               for vehicles" then  that  authority may, subject  to  certain  conditions, provide those parking places and might acquire land suitable for  use-  as a parking place.  The proviso to  the  section

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however laid down that no such order shall authorise the use of any part of a street so as unreasonably to prevent access to  any  promises adjoining the street, or the  use  of  the street  by any person entitled to the use thereof, or so  as to  be  a nuisance, or be made in respect of any part  of  a street  without  the  consent of  the  authority  or  person responsible for the (1)  [9291] 2 K. B. 440 at 444. 895 maintenance  of  the  street.  Sub-s.  (2)  of  the  section provided  that where a local authority proposes  to  acquire and for the purpose of using it as a parking place they  are to  give  notice  of the proposal specifying  the  land  and notify the date within which any objection is to be sent  to them  and the notice is to state that a right of appeal  was conferred  by the section.  Sub-s.(3) provided  that  before carrying  into  effect  any proposal  of  which  notice  was required to be given the local authority shall consider  any objection  which was sent to them in writing.  There was  no limit  there as to the kind of person making the  objection, or  the  kind  of  objection which  might  be  raised.   The respondent,  a rate payer, duly gave notice under sub  s.(3) on various grounds but he did not allege the infringement of any personal legal right and he objected in his capacity  as a rate payer and as a member of the public on grounds common to them all.  The urban council considered the objection and informed  him of their decision to proceed with the  scheme. The respondent appealed to petty sessions which allowed  his objection.   The appellant appealed to quarter sessions  and took the preliminary objection that the respondent was not a person  aggrieved because he had alleged no infringement  of any legal right personal to him. Referring  to the dicta of James L.J., Esher M.R. and  Lopes L.J. in the above cases Lord Hewart C.J. observed:               "I  think  this  respondent  did  ask  for   a               decision for which he had a. right to ask.  He               did  give notice of an objection of  which  he               was  entitled to give notice, but  the  person               making the objection is not to have an  appeal               unless he satisfies two conditions : (1)  that               he  is the author of the objection, and  (2)               that  he  is aggrieved by the refusal  in  the               sense  that  he has a special  and  individual               right infringed.  It seems to me that upon the               fair  construction of this sub-section,  which               is  by  no means a common  kind  of  statutory               provision, what is meant is that a person  may               make  an  objection  and  is  entitled  to   a               decision  upon  it,  and if  the  decision  is               adverse  to him, he may, it he thinks fit  and               subject to the usual consequences, appeal from               it   to  a  petty  sessional  court,  and   so               appealing,   may,  in  consequence  of   other               statutory  provisions, appeal, if need be,  to               the court of quarter sessions."               According to Avory J.               "There  is no limit there [in sub-s.  (3)]  of               the  kind of person or the kind  of  objection               which  may be made. it proceeds that after  so               considering the objection, they               896               are  to give notice of their decision  to  the               person by whom the objection was made, and any               person  who is aggrieved by such decision  may               appeal.   I cannot help thinking that  on  the

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             plain words of that statute it was intended to               give  a right of appeal to any person who  has               made  an  objection to the  proposal  and  has               received   notice  that  objection  has   been               overruled." In Ealing Corporation v. Jones(1) Lord Parker C.J.  remarked that it was easier to say what will not constitute a  person aggrieved  than  it  was  to  say  what  "person  aggrieved" included.  He observed that a person was not aggrieved  when being   a  public  body  it  had  been  frustrated  in   the performance of one of its public duties.  He amplified  this by saying that               "If costs have been awarded in a case  against               a local  authority,  it  is  clear  on   the               authorities that the local authority would  be               an  aggrieved person.  Equally, if the  result               of  the  decision has been to put  some  legal               burden on the public body concerned, that  has               been held to make it a person aggrieved."               According to Donovan J. in the same case-               "The  word aggrieved’  connotes  some  legal               grievances,  for  example,  a  deprivation  of               something,  an adverse effect on the title  to               something,  and so on, and I cannot  see  that               this is so here.  The local planning authority               has  simply been told that it  cannot  enforce               the discontinuance of the present use of  this               land   by  the  appellant  by  means   of   an               enforcement notice under S. 23." If one is to be guided merely by the provisions of the Advo- cates  Act it is difficult to see how  the  Advocate-General can  be  a person aggrieved because the  State  Bar  Council takes the view, whatever be its reasoning, that an advocate on  its  roll has not been guilty of  any  misconduct.   The entertaining  of complaints, the inquiry into them  and  the punishment to be meted out to the advocate are all  concerns of  the  Bar  Council.  The  Advocate-General  no  doubt  is entitled  to  a  hearing if the complaint  is  not  rejected summarily.   The  statute  expects him to take  a  fair  and impartial attitude.  He has to render all assistance to  the Bar  Council  so that a proper decision may be  arrived  at. His  role is not that of a prosecutor : nor is he a  defence counsel on behalf of the advocate.  He is not interested  in getting the advocate punished any more than he is interested in seeing that the character of a fellow member of, the  Bar is cleared even if his conduct be unworthy of an advocate. (1)  [1959] 1 Q. B. 384 at 390. 897 The  Act does not make it obligatory on him to take part  in the  proceedings where he thinks that the facts of the  case are  so plain that his assistance is not called for.  It  is only   when  he  feels  that  a  case  requires  a   careful investigation  and  proper elucidation of the facts  or  the exposition of the law on the subject that he is called  upon to  render  all  assistance in  the  proceedings.   When  he chooses  to  do.  so he does his duty by  appearing  at  the hearing  and putting before the disciplinary  committee  the facts  in their proper perspective and advancing the  proper inference  to be drawn therefrom.  Once he does so there  is an  end of the matter so far as he is concerned.- He  cannot have  any grievance because the decision of the Bar  Council is’ against his submission or not to his liking. The question then arises as to whether any, duty is cast  on the  Advocate-General by reason of his position to  question the  decision  of  the Bar Council if he  feels  it  in  the

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general interest of the members of the Bar or a wider public to  do so.  Art. 165(2) of the Constitution  epitomizes  the functions   and  duties  of  the  Advocate-General  in   the following words:-               "It shall be the duty of the  Advocate-General               to give advice to the Government of the  State               upon  such legal matters and to  perform  such               other duties of a legal character, as may from               time to time be referred or assigned to him by               the  Governor and to discharge  the  functions               conferred  upon him by or under the  Constitu-               tion  or any other law for the time  being  in               force.’. A  notable instance of his statutory duties is furnished  by Order  XXVII-A  of  the Code of  Civil  Procedure.   By  the provisions  of s. 91 of the Code of Civil Procedure no  suit for  a  declaration and injunction in the case of  a  public nuisance   can  be instituted except by him  or  with  his consent.  Similar powers are given and duties cast on him by s.  92  C.P.C.  in the case of  trusts  created  for  public purposes.   Section 526-A of the Code of Criminal  Procedure gives  an Advocate-General power to apply to the  court  for the committal or transfer of a case to the High Court  where any  person  subject to the Naval Discipline Act or  to  the Army  Act or to the Air Force Act is accused of any  of  the offences specified therein.  It is not open to the Advocate- General  to intervene in any suit or legal proceeding  apart from  the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure  because he thinks public interest is involved in the matter. Treating  the  matter historically, it may be said  that  in many  respects  the position of an  Advocate-General  before 1950  was  very similar to that of the  Attorney-General  in England.   Sections  100 and III of a statute  of  1813,  53 George M, C. 155. L169Sup.CI(P)/71-13 898 enabled the Advocates-General to exhibit to, the  respective Supreme  Courts of Judicature at any of the Presidencies  or to  the  Recorder’s  Court  at  Bombay  any  information  or information  for breaches of Revenue laws etc. as  might  be taken  by the Attorney-General in the court of Exchequer  in England or in the nature of action or actions at law or of a bill  or bills in equity as occasion might  require  against any  person or persons residing within such jurisdiction  as His Majesty’s Attorney-General for the time being was by law authorised to exhibit.  The wording of S. Ill shows that its object  was  to  dispel doubts which had  arisen  about  the competency of the Advocate-General or Principal Law  Officer of  the East India Company to take such action., S.  114  of the  Government of India Act, 1915 empowered  the  Advocate- General for any Presidency to take on behalf of His  Majesty such  proceedings  as  might  be  taken  by  His   Majesty’s Attorney-General in England.  S. 65(2) of the Government  of India  Act,  1935  laid down that it was  the  duty  of  the Advocate-General to give advice to the Provincial Government upon such legal matters and to perform such other duties of a  legal character as may from time to time be  referred  or assigned to him by the Governor. The position of the Attorney-General in England is stated by Hood  Phillips  on Constitutional  and   Administrative  Law (Fourth Edition) at p. 316 to be as follows :               "The  Law  Officers consist of  the  Attorney-               General and Solicitor-General for England, and               the  Lord Advocate and  Solicitor-General  for               Scotland.   They are regarded as the heads  of

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             the Bar in their respective countries, and  as               such  are referees on points  of  professional               etiquette.               The learned author goes on to note at p. 317               "The Attorney-General represents the Crown  in               civil  proceedings.in  which it  is  specially               concerned.   His consent is necessary for  the               prosecution  of certain offences,  e.g.  under               the   Official  Secrets  Acts.   In   criminal               proceedings  he or the  Solicitor-General,  or               their deputies, prosecute in important  cases.               It is the practice for the Attorney-General to               lead  in treason and important  constitutional               cases.   He may also file ex officio  criminal               information,  though  this  procedure  is  now               rarely  used.   He may stop the  trial  of  an               indictment  by entering a none  prosequi.   He               may also take over certain proceedings on  the               relation   of  private  individuals   (relator               actions)  e.g. public nuisance etc.......  The               Attorney-Generalls    procedural    privileges               include  the  right to demand a trial  at  Bar               privilege i.e. now, before a Divisional               899               Court), and the right to choose the venue  for               any civil or criminal proceedings in which the               Crown is concerned.’ Anson in his treatise on Law and Custom of the  Constitution Volume  II,  Part  I  (4th  Edition,  1935)  describes   the Attorney-General,   the  Solicitor-General  and   the   Lord Advocate  and  the  Solicitor-General for  Scotland  as  the chiefs of the legal profession in their respective countries and  states  that  in  England  and  Northem  Ireland   they represent the Bar when the Bar takes collective, action.  So far as England is concerned neither the Attorney-General nor the  Solicitor General appears to have had for a very  long time  any function to discharge or any duty to perform  when the,  conduct  of a barrister or a solicitor was  called  in question.  The power of inquiry was delegated by the  Judges to the Inns of Court so far as barristers were concerned and as  regards  solicitors the matter has for  some  time  been delegated to the Law Society. It  may not also be out of place to note the history of  the legislation  in  India  with  regard  to  enquiries  against members  of the legal profession prior to the Act  of  1961. Under  clause 10 of the Letters Patent of the High Court  of Calcutta  of the year 1865 the High Court was to have  power to make rules for the qualification and admission of  proper persons to be advocates, vakils and attorneys at law and was to  be empowered to remove or suspend them from practice  on reasonable  cause.  The Letters Patents of other High  Court contained  provisions.   The Legal  Practitioners  Act  1879 appears  to  have been the earliest Indian  statute  on  the subject.   Under  s.  13  of this Act  the  High  Court  was empowered after such enquiry as it though fit, to suspend or dismiss any pleader or muktyar who was guilty of  fraudulent or  grossly  improper  conduct  in  the  discharge  of   his professional duty.  The Bar Councils came into existence for the  first time under the Bar Councils Act, 1926.  But  even under  this Act the power to, reprimand, suspend  or  remove from  practice any advocate of the High Court  charged  with professional  or  other misconduct was left  with  the  High Court  under s. 10(1).  S. 10(2) laid down the procedure  to be adopted by the High Court when a complaint was made to it by  any Court or by the Bar Council or by any  other  person

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that  an advocate had been guilty of misconduct.   The  High Court could summarily reject the complaint or refer the case for  enquiry to the Bar Council or after  consultation  with the  Bar Council refer it to the Court of a  District  Judge and it also might. of its own motion refer any case where it had reason to believe. that any advocate had been so guilty. Under  s.  11  it was the duty of a  committee  of  the  Bar Council to inquire into a complaint made under s. 10,  Under s. 12(2) of the Act the finding of a Tribunal on an  inquiry referred to the Bar Council was to be forwarded to the  High Court through the Bar Council and the finding of a  District Court on such inquiry was to be forwarded 900 to  the High Court direct with a copy to the,  Bar  Council. S.  12(3) of the Act contained a provision somewhat  similar to s. 35(3) of the Act of 1961.  The hearing was however  to take place before the High Court, which I had to give notice of the date fixed for the purpose to the advocate concerned, to the Bar Council and to the Advocate-General and to afford them an opportunity of being heard before orders were passed in  the  case.  Under the Act of 1926  the  Advocate-General appeared  on  the  scene  only after  the  Bar  Council  had recorded its finding.  The significant departure in the  Act of  1961 from the analogous provision of the Act of 1926  is that the Advocate-General is given notice of hearing of  the case.   By  itself  this cannot affect  any  change  in  his position  as  regards  an inquiry into  the  conduct  of  an advocate.  It would be reasonable to hold that while passing the  statutes of 1926 and 1961 the Legislature thought  that the Advocate-General should be heard inasmuch as he occupied the position of a general referee on points of  professional etiquette very much like the Attorney-General in England. However that may be, once he does the duty enjoined upon him by  the  statute  of making such submissions  as  he  thinks proper at the hearing his functions qua the inquiry come  to an  end.   As a referee he has no further  interest  in  the matter.   If the disciplinary committee of, the Bar  Council makes  an  order against the advocate  which  the  Advocate- General   considers   harsh   and   unreasonable   in    the circumstances of the case, he is not called upon to file  an appeal to protect the interests of the advocate.  Neither is he interested in prosecuting the matter further if he  takes the view that the punishment meted is not commensurate  with the misconduct of the advocate. Elaborate  reference was made at the Bar to the decision  of the  Privy  Council  in Attorney-General of  the  Gambia  v. Pierre  Sarr  N’Jie(1).   In that case the  conduct  of  the respondent, a member of the English Bar admitted to practice as  a  barrister and solicitor of the Supreme Court  of  the Gambia  was  found  to dishonourable and as  such  an  order striking his name off the roll of the court was made by  the deputy Judge with a direction that it should be reported  to the  Masters of the Bench of the Inn to which  he  belonged. The  Chief  Justice of the Supreme Court of the  Gambia  had criticised  the  conduct of the barrister  severely  in  the course of a trial held before him and had sent a copy of his judgment   to  the  Attomey-General  of  the  Gambia.    The AttorneyGeneral  served a notice of motion on the  barrister for  an enquiry to be, made by the Chief Justice but as  the Chief   Justice  was  the  only  Judge  of  that  Court   he recommended  that  some  one other than  himself  should  be appointed as a deputy Judge to hold the (1)  [1961] A. C. 617, 630. 901 inquiry.   The Deputy Judge ordered his name to,  be  struck

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off  the roll.  His order was however set aside by the  West African Court of Appeal not on merits but on the ground that a Deputy Judge had only jurisdiction to represent the  Chief Justice in the exercise of his judicial powers and according to  the  Court of Appeal the power to strike the name  of  a legal  practitioner off the roll was not a  judicial  power. The  Attorney-General of the Gambia appealed to Her  Majesty in  Council.   The question of the  maintainability  of  the appeal-was also canvassed before the Board.  With regard  to inquiries  into the conduct of barristers and solicitors  in the  Crown colonies Lord Denning who delivered the  judgment of the Privy Council, said               "by the common, law of England the Judges have               the  right to determine who shall be  admitted               to practice as barristers and solicitors,  and               as  incidental  thereto the  judges  have  the               right  to suspend or prohibit  from  practice.               In England this power has for a very long time               been  delegated,  so  far  as  barristers  are               concerned,  to the Inns of Court; and,  for  a               much  shorter time, so far as  solicitors  are               concerned,   to  the  Law  Society.   In   the               colonies the Judges have retained the power in               their own hands,               His Lordship went on to remark at p. 631               "When  the  judges  exercise  this  power   to               suspend  or expel, they do not decide  a  suit               between  the parties.  There is no  prosecutor               as’  in a criminal case, nor any plaintiff  as               in  a civil suit.  The judges usually  act  on               their   own  initiative,  ex  mero  motu,   on               information which has come to their notice, or               to  the notice of one or other of them in  the               course of their duties."               Further,               "When  a  legal practitioner is  suspended  or               struck  off by the judges of a colony, he  has               always been at liberty to petition Her Majesty               in Council to restore him." Rejecting  the  argument that the Attorney-General  had,  no locus  standi to petition for special leave to appeal as  he was  not a person aggrieved, the Board referred to s. 31  of the  Order in Council, 1949 which gave very wide  powers  to His  Majesty  in Council to entertain the  petition  of  any person  aggrieved by any judgment of the court and to  admit his  appeal upon such conditions as His Majesty  in  Council would  think  fit to impose.  On the facts of the  case  the Board  held  that  the  Attorney-General  had  a  sufficient interest in the matter because the order made by the 902 West  African  Court of Appeal  prejudicially  affected  his interests. The reasoning of the Board was as follows:-               "The  Attorney-General in a colony  represents               the  Crown  as  the  guardian  of  the  public               interest.  It is his duty to bring before  the               Judge   any  misconduct  of  a  barrister   or               solicitor  which is of sufficient  gravity  to               warrant disciplinary action.  True it is  that               if   the  judge  acquits  the  petitioner   of               misconduct, no appeal is open to the Attorney-               General.   He  has done his duty  and  is  not               aggrieved.    But  if  the  Judge  finds   the               practitioner guilty of professional misconduct               and a Court of Appeal reverses the decision on

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             a ground which goes to the jurisdiction of the                             judge,  or  is otherwise a point in  w hich  the               public  interest is concerned,  the  Attorney-               General   is  a person  aggrieved’  by   the               decision and can properly petition Her Majesty               for special leave to appeal." It  is  clear  that Lord Denning considered  the  denial  of jurisdiction  of the deputy Judge to be a matter  of  public interest  and  therefore held the Attorney-General,  as  the Crown’s   representative,  to  be  a   person   sufficiently interested as to be a person aggrieved.  That surely is  not the   position   here,  nor  is  an   Advocate-General   the representative of the Government.  Neither the  Constitution nor  the Advocates Act 1961 holds him as the  representative of  the Government or as a person representing  the  public interest.   Whatever may be the, position of  the  Attorney- General in a colony as a representative of the Crown, he  is not  the  guardian of the public interest in  India  in  any matter except as provided for in the statutes.  He like  any other  person may draw the attention of the Bar  Council  to any misconduct of an advocate which according to him  merits disciplinary action.  The Act of 1961 provides for notice to be  given  to him of all such proceedings and  gives  him  a right to appear at the hearing but once the hearing is  over and  a finding recorded he has done his duty and  cannot  be said  to be aggrieved within the meaning of  the  expression used in s. 37.  It is only because the Attorney-General  for the  Gambia  had  an interest in seeing that  the  Court  of Appeal did not reverse the decision of the Deputy Judge on a ground  which went to the jurisdiction of the Judge  or  was otherwise a point in which the public interest was concerned that the Board held that he was a person aggrieved. Our  attention was drawn to a decision of the Judicial  Com- mittee in Advocate-General Bombay v. Phiroz Barucha(1) where the  Privy  Council entertained an appeal by  the  Advocate- General (1)  37 B.L.R. 722. 903 of Bombay against an advocate who had been found by the High Court  of Bombay to have been guilty misconduct but  against whom  no disciplinary action had been taken by  the  Judges. Although  there  was a good deal of discussion Lit  the  Bar about the maintainability of the appeal which was sought for by special leave, the Board remarked that the  circumstances were  not such as to justify it in advising His  Majesty  to grant such special leave principally on the ground that  the question was one of the exercise of statutory discretion  by the  Judges as to whether the circumstances of the  case  as established   before   the  High  Court   called   for   any disciplinary  action and the Board felt that the  action  of the  High  Court in exercising their discretion in  the  way they  had done was not such as His Majesty would be  advised further to consider. This  decision does not help the Advocate-General  of  Maha- rashtra  because  it  did not decide the  point  as  to  the maintainability  of the appeal.  It is well known  that  the Judicial Committee was never chary in granting special leave to appeal when it felt that the justice of the case demanded a further hearing. Mr.  Daphtary appearing for the appellant very  fairly  drew our  attention to an observation of this Court in  Bhataraju Nageswara  Rao  v.  The Hon’ble Judges of  the  Madras  High Court(1) which was a case of an appeal by special leave from an  order  of the High Court at Madras under s.  12  of  the

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Indian Bar Councils Act debarring the advocate for a  period of  five years on charges of misconduct which were  held  by the High Court as proved.  In the ultimate paragraph of  the judgment  this Court recorded its strong disapproval of  the frame of the appeal in that the Judges of the High Court had been  made  respondents  to it.  They  however  went  on  to observe that               "in  an  appeal arising out  of  a  proceeding               under  the  Bar Councils Act  the  appropriate               parties should be the advocate concerned,  the               complainant,  if any, the Bar Council  or  the               secretary thereof and the Advocate-General  of               the State concerned to whom notices have to be               issued  under section 12(3) of the Indian  Bar               Councils Act." With great respect we find ourselves unable to concur in the above so far as the Advocate-General is concerned.  It  does not  appear that any argument was advanced about the  proper parties to the appeal before this Court and the point as  to whether  the  Advocate-General was a  person  aggrieved  was neither raised nor argued.  The only party to appear  before this Court wag "the Judges of the High Court." (1) [1955] 1.S.C.R. 1055,1064 904 It appears that the Advocate-General of Maharashtra felt  in this case that the disciplinary committee of the Maharashtra Bar Council had gone wrong and that there was a question  of principle involved as regards the effect of a conviction  of an Indian advocate of an offence recognised by all civilised countries as an offence involving moral turpitude and  that, the  question also related to the requirements  of natural justice  in a criminal court.  Every day courts of  law  are called  upon to decide questions of law  inter-partes  which may  be of general importance to the public.  The  Advocate- General cannot prefer an appeal merely because the  question is one of considerable importance to the public inasmuch  as he is not a party to it and he has no locus standi to do  so even  in  a  case  where  the  statute  only  gives  him  an opportunity  of  appearing  at  a  hearing  and  making  his submissions. A decision by the disciplinary committee cannot  necessarily be  said to raise a point-of public interest merely  because the  Advocate-General feels that it is erroneous or that  he himself would have arrived at a different conclusion.   That at best is his personal opinion as regards the conduct of an advocate  who  has  to deal with the  public  and  the  non- acceptance thereof does not make him a person aggrieved.  An Advocate-General  in India is not the guardian angel of  the Bar,  nor  is  he the champion of public  interest  in  any matter save as specified in a statute. In  conclusion  we  hold that the appeal  by  the  Advocate- General  of  Maharashtra  to the Bar Council  of  India  was incompetent  and  this  appeal should  be  allowed  and  the finding of the Bar Council of India set aside. Vaidialingam,  J. With respect, I am not able to agree  with the views expressed by My Lord, and Mr. Justice Mitter  That the  appeal  filed by the  Advocate-General  of  Maharashtra before the Bar Council of India was incompetent. The preliminary point that has been argued before us in this appeal  relates to the maintainability of the appeal by  the Advocate-General  of Maharashtra before the Bar  Council  of India  under  S. 37(1) of the Advocates Act 1961-Act  25  of 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the  order of  the  Disciplinary  Committee  of  the  Bar  Council   of Maharashtra  (hereinafter referred as the  Committee)  dated

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October  19,  1968 holding the appellant not guilty  of  any professional  misconduct.  It is not necessary to  refer  to the allegations of professional misconduct made against the appellant as this appeal has yet to be heard on merits. Against   the  order  of  the  Committee,   acquitting   the appellant,  the  Advocate-General of Maharashtra Sri  H.  N. Seervai, filed 905 under  s.  37(1)D.C.Appeal  No. 18 of 1968  before  the  Bar Council  of  India.   The  said  appeal  was  heard  by  the Disciplinary   Committee  of  the  Bar  Council   of   India (hereinafter  referred to as the.  Appellate  Committee)  as required  by s. 37(2) of the Act.  A  preliminary  objection was  raised  on behalf of the appellant that  the  Advocate- General was not competent to prefer the appeal as he was not the   complainant  nor  were  the  proceedings  for   taking disciplinary action initiated at his instance and he is  not "any  person  aggrieved’  under s.  37(1).   The  State  Bar Council,  which  initiated the  proceedings  was  apparently satisfied  with  the decision of its Committee and  did  not take  any  further  action.  In, short,.  according  to  the appellant,   the  Advocate-General  was  not   "any   person aggrieved", under s. 37(1) of the Act.  The appeal was, also contested  by the appellant on merits.  The  Appellate  Com- mittee  by  its order dated October 26, 1969  overruled  the preliminary objection and held that the Advocate-General was competent  to  maintain the appeal under s. 37(1).   By  the same  order  the  Appellate  Committee  disagreed  with  the findings of the Committee and found the appellant guilty  of professional  misconduct  and ordered  his  suspension  from practice  for a period of one year.  The appellant was  also directed  to pay the costs of the proceedings.  It  is  this order of the Appellate Committee that is the subject of  the appeal before us. As  stated  earlier,  we have heard arguments  only  on  the question  of  the  maintainability  of  the  appeal  at  the instance  of the Advocate-General of Maharashtra before  the Bar  Council of India.  As the question raised was a  fairly important  one,  notice  had been issued  to  the  Attorney- General  of India, the Bar Council of India, the  Advocates- General  and  the Bar-Councils of  the  States.   Advocates- General  of most of the States were represented by  counsel. The  Attorney-General of India, the Bar Council of India  as well   as.  the  Bar  Council  of  Maharashtra   were   also represented by counsel before us. The  question  posed for our consideration is  whether  the, Advocate-General of a State comes within the expression "any person aggrieved" in s. 37(1) of the Act. Mr.  Daphtary, learned counsel for the appellant,  drew  our attention  to the various provisions of the Act and  pointed out  that matters concerning the legal profession  have  now been entrusted to the State Bar Councils and the Bar Council of  India and them powers to take disciplinary  action  have also  been  vested  in them.  Whatever  may  have  been  the position once occupied by the.  Advocate-General  vis-a-vis the legal profession, that has now been changed by the  Act. His appearance in disciplinary matters is only to assist the Committee and he has no further interest in 906 those  proceedings.   Whether an Advocate  is  acquitted  or convicted is no concern of the Advocate-General, because  he is  not interested in the actual decision of the  Committee. Hence  the Advocate-General cannot be considered to be  "any person  aggrieved by any order of the Committee so as to  be eligible to file an appeal under s. 37 of the Act.  In  this

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connection  Mr.  Daphtary  referred us  to  several  English decisions  where the expression person aggrieved’ has  been considered  and interpreted with references to the  statutes in which those expressions occur.  Relying on the principles laid  down  in those decisions, to which reference  will  be made  later,  Mr. Daphtary pointed out that  the  expression perso n  aggrieved’  should not be interpreted  as  covering every  person  who is disappointed or  dissatisfied  with  a decision  rendered by a Committee.  On the other  hand,  the counsel urged, that in order to be considered as a person aggrieved’ that person must be one who has suffered a  legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced and  which  has  wrongfully deprived  him  of  something  or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something.  An appeal must be by the party who  has endeavored to maintain the contrary of that which has  taken place.   The counsel further pointed out that the  Advocate- General is a public officer and cannot be considered to be a party   to  the  proceedings  before  the  Committee.    The Advocate-General  may be even annoyed with the  decision  of the Committee acquitting an Advocate, but that will not make him a person aggrieved’. Considerable  reliance  was placed by Mr.  Daphtary  on  the observations  of  Lord Denning in  Attorney-General  of  the Gambia  v.  Pierre  Sarr N’Jie(1) to  the  effect  that  the Attorney-General  in  a colony represents the Crown  as  the guardian  of the public interest and that it is his duty  to bring  before  the Judge any misconduct of  a  barrister  or solicitor   which  is  of  sufficient  gravity  to   warrant disciplinary  action  and  that if  the  Judge  acquits  the practitioner  of  misconduct,  no  appeal  is  open  to  the Attorney-General,  who  has done  his  duty  and  is   not aggrieved.   But  if, on the other hand, a Court  of  Appeal reverses  the  decision holding a  practitioner  guilty of professional  misconduct,  on  a ground which  goes  to  the jurisdiction of the Judge or is otherwise a point in which the public interest is concerned, the Attorney-General is  a perso n aggrieved’ by the decision and can properly petition Her  Majesty for special leave to appeal.   Drawing  support from  these  observations Mr. Daphtary urged  that  in  this case,  the  Committee had acquitted the  appellant  and  the Advocate-General having appeared through counsel before  the Committee  has  done  his duty, and as  such  he  cannot  be considered to be aggrieved.  No question of jurisdiction  of the Committee or any point in which the public interest is (1)  [1961] Appeal Cases 617. 907 concerned  arose  for decision in the appeal  filed  by  the Advocate-General,  so as to make the appeal  competent  even within the limited rule laid down by Lord Denning. Mr. V. S. Desai, learned counsel appearing for the Advocate- General  of  Maharashtra  and Mr. M.  C.  Setalvad,  learned counsel  appearing  for  the  Bar  Council  of  India   have supported the decision of the Appellate Committee holding in favour  of  the  competency  of  the  appeal  filed  by  the Advocate-General  as "any person aggrieved" under s.  37  of the  Act.  The counsel appearing for  the  Attorney-General, the  Bar  Council of Maharashtra and  the  Advocates-General represented before us have supported this view. Mr. V. S. Desai pointed out that the Act is a self-contained Code,  and that the various decisions where  the  expression perso n aggrieved’ has been interpreted must be  appreciated in  the particular context in which those expressions  occur in the statutes which were before the Courts.  The reasoning in those decisions may furnish a guide but cannot be applied

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ipso  facto  when  interpreting  s.  37  of  the  Act.   The expression " any person aggrieved" in s. 37 of the Act  will have  to  be understood and interpreted in  the  context  in which  it  appears, having due regard-to the scheme  of  the Act.   The  counsel also referred us  to  certain  decisions bearing  on  this  matter, to which we shall  refer  in  due course. Mr.  M. C. Setalvad, learned counsel, appearing for the  Bar Council  of  India urged in particular  that  the  Advocate- General  is  a  responsible person and is  the  highest  Law Officer of the State.  The legal profession is very  closely associated with the administration of justice by the Courts. The  Bar, in that context has to come into contact with  the public  to assist them in legal matters.   This  responsible position occupied by the legal profession has to be properly safeguarded  and that could be done only by  insisting  that its members are persons of high character and integrity  and who  observe rules of professional etiquette.  The  Act  has made  it  obligatory  to give  notice  in  the  disciplinary proceedings   to  the  Advocate-General  and  give  him   an opportunity  of  being  heard.  The purpose  for  which  the highest  Law Officer of the State, the Advocate-General,  is brought  in not only in the Act, but also in the Indian  Bar Councils Act of 1926 (Act 38 of 1926) (hereinafter  referred to  as  the  Bar Councils Act) is  to  subserve  the  public interest,  namely, of seeing that the integrity and  honesty of  the  legal  profession are maintained  and  that  proper decisions are given in disciplinary proceedings.  There  may be  cases of inadequate punishment or even harsh  punishment being  awarded  by the Committee.  The  Advocate-General  in proper  cases  can  bring up such  matters  before  the  Bar Council  of  India.  Mr. Setalvad further pointed  out  that there is no restriction placed in s. 37 denying the right of the Advocate-General to file an appeal against the orders of the Committee.  Having due regard to the scheme of the Act 908 and  particularly  of ss. 35 and  37,  the  Advocate-General comes  within  "any  person  aggrieved"  and  hence  he  was competent to file the appeal. I  have given careful consideration to the  various  aspects placed before us by all the learned counsel and I am of  the view  that the decision of the Appellate’ Committee  holding that the appeal filed by the Advocate-General of Maharashtra was competent is correct.  I am further of the view that the expression  "any person aggrieved" in s. 37 will have to  be interpreted  in the context in which it appears, having  due regard  to  the  provisions  of  the  Act  and  its  scheme. Considered  in  this  manner, it has to  be  held  that  the Advocate-General  comes within "any person aggrieved" in  s. 37. The decisions relied on by Mr. Daphtary have, no  doubt, interpreted  the expression person aggrieved’ occurring  in the  particular statutes which came up for consideration  in those  decisions, but in my opinion it will not be  safe  to adopt in toto the interpretation so placed, no doubt on  the identical  expression occurring in different  statutes  when construing  the  said expression in the Act before  us.   As pointed  out  by Lord Parker C.J. in Ealing  Corporation  v. Jones(1)  cases which have interpreted similar  expressions, can  be looked into "to see if there are general  principles which  can  be extracted which will  guide  the  court  in approaching  the  question  as to  what  the  words person aggrieved’  mean in any particular statute." I will  make  a brief  reference  to the decisions cited for  the  appellant later.   But  before doing so, it is desirable to  refer  to some of the provisions of the Act itself, so that the scheme

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of  the  Act  will  become  evident,  and  that  will  throw considerable on the interpretation of s. 37. Before I refer to the Act, I think it desirable to advert to some of the provisions of the Bar Councils Act.  Even at the outset  I may point out that the scheme of the Bar  Councils Act   was   different.   In  the  Bar  Councils   Act,   the disciplinary  jurisdiction over Advocates was vested in  the High  Court  [vide  s. 10(1)].  Under s.  10  (2)  the  High Court,.  if the complaint is not summarily rejected  by  it, had to refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar  Council or after consultation with the Bar Council, to the Court  of a  District Judge.  When a case is referred for  inquiry  to the  Bar Council under s. 1 1, the case was to  be  inquired into by the Committee of the Bar Council, referred to as the Tribunal,  and  that Tribunal consisted  of  the  particular number  of person mentioned in s. II (2) appointed  for  the purpose  by the Chief Justice.  The High Court had power  to make  rules under s. 12(1) prescribing the procedure, to  be followed  in the conduct of inquiries.  The finding  of  the inquiry  by  the Tribunal had to be forwarded  to  the  High Court.  On receipt of the finding, the High Court had to fix (1)  [1959] 1 Q.B.D. 384.  909 a  date  for  hearing of the case.  Under S.  12(3)  it  was obligatory  to  give notice, amongst other persons,  to  the Advocate-General  of the day fixed for hearing; and  it  was also  further  obligatory to give  the  Advocate-General  an opportunity  of  being  heard before  orders.  were  passed. Under  s.  12(4) the High Court could pass final  orders  or refer  the case back for further inquiry., Under sub-s.  (5) the High Court had also power, when passing final orders  to give  directions  regarding  payment of costs.   I  am  only referring to the material provisions of the Bar Councils Act to  show  that  the High Court  was  then  the  disciplinary authority  and  the  function of the Committee  of  the  Bar Council  was  only to submit a finding after  conducting  an inquiry as directed by the High Court.  It is however to  be noted  that the Advocate-General then was not associated  in the  inquiry  proceedings  before the Tribunal  of  the  Bar Council; but he-was entitled to be given notice of the  date fixed  for hearing and also to be heard in  the  proceedings before the High Court after receipt of the finding submitted by  the  Committee  of the Bar  Council.   Those  provisions clearly  establish  the important position occupied  by  the Advocate-General and recognised by the Bar Councils Act. The  scheme is slightly different when we come to  the  Act. The  State  Bar Councils and the Bar Council of  India  have been  made autonomous units and various functions  regarding the  legal profession have been entrusted to  them.   Taking disciplinary  action against the delinquent members  of  the Bar   and  conducting  inquiries  are  all  part  of   their functions.  Barring a provision of a right to appeal to  the Supreme  Court  under  s.  38 of the  Act,  the  Courts  are completely out of picture so far as the legal profession  is concerned.  The Act was one to amend and consolidate the law relating  to  legal  practitioners and to  provide  for  the constitution  of the Bar Councils of the States and the  Bar Council of India.  Section 3 makes provisions for the  State Bar Councils.  Under sub-section (2) the Advocate-General of the State is an ex-officio member.  Similarly the Additional Solicitor  General of India is an ex-officio member  of  the State  Bar Council of Delhi.  Section 6 (1 ) enumerates  the functions  of the State Bar Councils.  One of the  functions under cl. (c) relates to entertaining and determining  cases of misconduct against advocates on the roll of the State Bar

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Council.   Section 7 similarly enumerates the  functions  of the Bar Council of India.  Under cl. (c), the Bar Council of India  has  got the power to lay down the  procedure  to  be followed by its Disciplinary Committee and the  Disciplinary Committees of each State Bar Councils.  Section 9 deals with the  Bar  Council  constituting  one  or  more  Disciplinary Committees  in  the manner indicated  therein.   Section  23 gives  a  right of pre-audience to the  Attorney-General  of India, the Solicitor General of India, the Additional- 910 Solicitor General of India and the Advocate-Generals of  the States, as mentioned in sub-sections 1 to 4 respectively. Chapter V deals with the "conduct of Advocates" and contains the  group of sections 35 to 44.  Section 35 deals with  the punishment of Advocates for misconduct and is as follows               "Section 35 : Punishment of advocates for mis-               conduct:               (1)   Where  on  receipt  of  a  complaint  or               otherwise  a State, Bar Council has reason  to               believe that any advocate on its roll has been               guilty of professional or other misconduct, it               shall refer the case for disposal to its  dis-               ciplinary committee.               (2)   The  disciplinary committee of  a  State               Bar Council,    if   it  does  not   summarily               reject the complaint,shall fix a date for  the               hearing  of the case and shall cause a  notice               thereof to be given to the advocate  concerned               and to the Advocate-General of the State.               (3)   The  disciplinary committee of  a  State               Bar   Council   after  giving   the   advocate               concerned   and   the   Advocate-General    an               opportunity  of being heard, may make  any  of               the following orders, namely               (a)   dismiss  the  complaint  or,  where  the               proceedings were initiated at the instance  of               the   State  Bar  Council,  direct  that   the               proceedings be filed;               (b)   reprimand the advocate;               (c)   suspend  the advocate from practice  for               such period as it may deem fit;               (d)   remove the name of the advocate from the               State roll of advocates.               (4)   Where  an  advocate  is  suspended  from               practice under clause (c) of sub-section  (3),               he shall, during the period of suspension,  be               debarred  from  practicing, in  any  court  or               before any authority or person in India.               (5)   Where  any  notice  is  issued  to   the               Advocate-General  under sub-section  (2),  the               Advocate-General   may   appear   before   the               disciplinary   committee  of  the  State   Bar               Council  either in person or through any  advo-               cate appearing on his behalf."               Similarly s. 36(1) deals with the disciplinary               powers of the               Bar Council of India.  Sub-section (2) confers               powers on the 911 Appellate  Committee  of  its- own motion  to  withdraw  for inquiry  for  itself  any  disciplinary  action  against  an advocate  pending  before the Committee and dispose  of  the same.  Sub-section (3) provides for the Appellate  Committee when  disposing of a case under s. 36 observing, so  far  as may  be,  the  procedure laid down in  s.  35.   It  further

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provides  that references to the Advocate-General in  s.  35 are to be construed as references to the Attorney-General of India. Sections 37 and 38 which provide for an appeal to the Bar, Council  of India and to the Supreme Court       effectively run as follows               ’Section   37 : Appeal to the Bar  Council  of               India.               (1)   Any person aggrieved by a order of  the,               disciplinary   committee   of  a   State   Bar               Council(under  section 35) may,  within  sixty               days  of  date of the  communication  of,  the               order  to  him, prefer an appeal  to  the  Bar               Council of India.               (2)   Every such appeal shall be heard by  the               disciplinary  committee of the Bar Council  of               India which may pass such order, thereon as it               deems fit.,,               "Section 38.  Appeal to the Supreme Court:               Any  person aggrieved by an order made by  the               disciplinary  committee of the Bar Council  of               India  under  section 36 or  section  37  may,               within  sixty  days of the date on  which  the               order is communicated to him, prefer an appeal               to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may               pass such order thereon as it deems fit." Section   42(1)  deals  with  powers  of  the   disciplinary committee  of  a  Bar Council with  regard  to  the  various matters  provided  for  in  cls. (a)  to  (f).   Section  43 provides   for  making  of  orders  as  to  costs   by   the disciplinary  committee of a Bar Council.  Section 44  gives powers  of  review to the disciplinary committee  of  a  Bar Council.   Section  48A,  in Chapter-  VI,  deals  with  the revisional. powers of the Bar Council of India. It will be, seen from ss. 3 (2) (a), 23 (4) and 35 that the, Advocate-General  of  the State is given by the Act  a  very important  and responsible position.  Some  discussion  took place   before  us  whether  the  Advocate-General  can   be considered to be the person who is charged with the duty  of safeguarding  the professional integrity of the  members  of the  Bar, when powers and duties in that regard have  been- conferred under the Act on the- 912 State Bar Councils.  I do not think it necessary to go  into that aspect as I think a# inquiry in that regard  is  not relevant  for the present purpose of construing S. 37.   Nor can  the  analogy  of  the  Attorney-General  in  a   colony representing  the  Crown,  being  the  guardian  of   public interest,  as stated by Lord Denning in Attorney-General  of the  Gambia  v.  Pierree Sarr N’Jie(1)  be  brought  in  for interpreting  S. 37 of the Act, as we are only concerned  to find out the right given to the Advocate-General by the Act. So far as that is concerned, I am satisfied that the Act has given  due recognition to his status by virtue of his  being the  highest Law in the St-ate, as the Advocate-General  and who   may   be  trusted  to  place   a   disinterested   and dispassionate view before the Committee to enable it to come to  a  proper decision having due regard  to  the  Advocate concerned,  as well as the entire legal profession to  which he belongs.  Apart from his being under s’. 3 (2) (a) an ex- officio member of the State Bar Council, s. 23 (4) gives him a right of pre-audience over all other advocates. Coming  to s. 35, read with S. 37, which has been  extracted earlier,  the  main features that emerge  therefrom  are  as follows

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             (1), The State Bar Council can suo moto or  on               receipt of a complaint, when it has reason  to               believe  that an advocate has been  guilty  of               professional  or  other misconduct  refer  the               case to its committee.               (2)   If  the  Committee  does  not  summarily               reject  the  complaint, it is bound to  fix  a               date  for hearing of the case, and it is  also               further  bound to give notice of the  date  of               hearing, apart from the advocate concerned, to               the Advocate-General of the State.               (3)   The  Committee is bound in, the  inquiry               to give an opportunity of being heard both to-               the  advocate  concerned  and  the   Advocate-               General.  After such an inquiry the  Committee               can pass one or other of the orders enumerated               in clauses (a) to               (d) of s. 35.               (4)   The  Advocate-General may appear  before               the Committee in person or through an advocate               appearing on his behalf.               (5)   The  orders of the Committee have to  be               communicated  to the Advocate-General and  the               advocate concerned.               (1) [1961] 1 A. C. 617.               913               (6)   Against  the orders passed under s.  35,               any  person aggrieved is entitled to  file  an               appeal  under  s. 37, to the  Bar  Council  of               India. While  under the Bar Councils Act, the Advocate-General  was associated  with the disciplinary proceedings only when  the matter was being decided by the High Court, after receipt of the  findings submitted by the Tribunal of the Bar  Council, it is significant to note that under the Act, the  Advocate- General  is  associated with  the  disciplinary  proceedings right  from  the stage of inquiry by the  Committee.   Under sub-section  (2)  of s. 35 the Committee is  bound  to  give notice  of  the  date of hearing not only  to  the  Advocate concerned but also to the Advocate-General of the State.  It will  be noted that disciplinary proceedings may  have  been occasioned  because of a complaint made by a third party  or may  have been initiated suo Moto by the State Bar  Council. In whatever manner the proceedings may have been  initiated, the  Advocate-General is entitled to be given notice of  the date of hearing.  It cannot be a formal and empty notice, to the   Advocate-General,  because  sub-section  (3)   clearly indicates  that  the  Advocate-General should  be  given  an opportunity of being heard.  It is significant to note  that sub-section (3) of s. 35 which, deals with the giving of  am opportunity  of being heard both to the  advocate  concerned and  the Advocate-General does not make any  distinction  in the  opportunity  so  afforded to both of  them.   The  same opportunity that the Advocate concerned has under sub-s. (3) is  also  afforded  to  the  Advocate-General.   It  is  not necessary  to  go to the extent of holding that there  is  a "lis" before the Committee and that the Advocate-General  is a  "party"  in  the  sense  that  expression  is  ordinarily understood in law.  The advocate concerned win be interested in  disputing  the  allegations  made  or  charges  levelled against  him  and he will be entitled to  lead  evidence  in support of his plea.  If there is a complainant, he will  of course  lead  evidence to support his case.   The  Advocate- General, on the other hand, is also entitled to place before the Committee all aspects of the matter including facts that

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may  be  in favour of the advocate whose  conduct  is  under inquiry.  This is because of the important position occupied by him.  It may be that the Advocate-General may not be able to appear personally and participate in all the disciplinary proceedings  and that is why provision has been made  in  s. 35(5)  enabling  the Advocate-General to  appear  either  in person  or  through any advocate appearing  on  his  behalf. Just  as the Advocate concerned will have an opportunity  of examining  his witnesses and cross-examining  the  witnesses produced  against him, the Advocate-General or  the  counsel appearing  on  his behalf will also have a right  of  cross- examining the witnesses produced in the case so as to elicit information  about  the charge  of  professional  misconduct levelled against the advocate concerned. The 9 SupCI/71-14 914 Advocate General need not be vindictive and take sides as  a party  to  a litigation and see that the advocate  is  found guilty.   On  the other hand, by virtue of the  special  and dispassionate  role occupied by him, he will be able  during the  inquiry to place such materials or evidence which  will enable  the  Committee  to  come to  a  proper  and  correct finding, in the interest of both the legal practitioner  and legal profession to which he belongs. It  is  in  this context of the  close  association  of  the Advocate-General with the disciplinary proceedings that  the expression person   aggrieved’  in  S.  37  has   to   be interpreted.   There can be no controversy-. that an  appeal will lie against the various orders that the Committee may pass  as  enumerated in cls. (a) to (d) of S. 35  (3).   The question  is at whose instance the appeal will lie.  If  the complaint  is dismissed, the complainant will be  a person aggrieved’  who can file an appeal under S. 37.  In fact  it has been held by this Court in B. M. Madani v.  Commissioner of  Workmen’s Compensation, Bombay(1) that when  proceedings are  initiated on a complaint by a party and  the  Committee after finding the advocate guilty of the charges, passed  an order reprimanding with a warning, an appeal filed by  such a  complainant  before the Appellate Committee only  on  the question   of  sentence  imposed,  was-competent   as,   the complainant  was a person aggrieved’.  Similarly, an  order adverse  to  the advocate concerned, can be the  subject  of appeal at his instance. There  is no controversy that the order passed by  the  Com- mittee was communicated to the Advocate-General.  As already pointed  out a series of steps is contemplated under S.  35; reference  to  the  Committee, of  a  case  of  professional misconduct;  notice of the, date of hearing to be  given  to the   Advocate-General;  Advocate-General  being  given   an opportunity  of  being heard at the hearing;  the  Advocate- General being entitled to appear before the Committee either in  person or through an Advocate; his being entitled to  be communicated  with  a copy of the order passed by  the  Com- mittee.  It is in that context and for these purposes that I have  considered the meaning of the expression  "any  person aggrieved"  in  S.,  37-(1).  The fact  that  the  Advocate- General does not allege an infringement of any legal  rights of his own is of no consequence.  The particular-  preceding in   which  the  Advocate-General  is  given  a   right   to participate  relates to an inquiry into the  allegations  of misconduct against an advocate.  Upon a fair construction of S.  37 read with S. 35 of the Act, the Advocate-General,  in my  opinion  is  "any  person aggrieved"  and  as  such  was entitled  to  file the appeal under S. 37 (1 )  against  the order  passed  by the Committee.  The same  reasoning  will

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apply to the Attorney-General of India under S. 38. (1)  (Civil Appeal No. 877 of 1968 decided on 8-10-1968). 915 It may be that in a particular case the Advocate-General may feel that the findings arrived at in favour of the  advocate by  the Committee is not justified by the evidence and  that decision  will  have  to be reconsidered  by  the  Appellate Committee;  or it may even be that in a particular case  the sentence  imposed by the Committee may not  be  commensurate with  the guilt of the advocate; or it may also be that  the sentence  imposed on an, advocate by the Committee  is  very harsh  or the finding of guilt is not correct.   Under  such and  similar circumstances in the interests of the  Advocate and  the  legal  profession, the  Advocate-General  will  be competent  to  bring  up the  matter  before  the  Appellate Committee so that justice may be done. In  this  context the observations of Lord  Hewart  C.J.  in Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam(1) are  apposite. The  question before the Court in that decision was  whether an  objector  to  a proposal made by a  local  authority  to acquire land in order to provide parking place for  vehicles and whose objections were overruled was a person aggrieved’ under  s.  68(3) of the Public Health Act 1925 and  as  such entitled to appeal.  It was found that the objector  alleged no ground of objections personally to himself.  Nevertheless it  was held that such an objector was a person  aggrieved’ and entitled to appeal.  Lord Hewart C.J. at page 443 states :               "The question therefore is : Is it true to say               that  in  these circumstances and  within  the               meaning  of  (this part of this  statute  this               respondent was a person.... aggrieved’ ?  Now               undoubtedly those words, a person aggrieved’,               have  very often been considered, and, if  one               looked  at  the mere terms  apart  from  their               context   and   apart  from   the   particular               circumstances, it would have been, quite  easy               to marshal decisions of contradictory  import.               But as has been said again and again there  is               often  little utility in seeking to  interpret               particular  expressions  in  one  statute   by               reference  to  decisions  given  upon  similar               expressions  in different statutes which  have               been  enacted alio intuitu.  The problem  with               which  we  are concerned is not, what  is  the               meaning  of the expression aggrieved’ in  any               one of a dozen other statutes, but what is its               meaning in this part of this statute ? It is a               little important to see what this part of this               statute is dealing with." The  above  extract has been quoted with  approval  by  Lord Parker C.J. in Ealing Corporation v. Jones(’). I have already indicated earlier that the problem before  us whether  the Advocate-General is a person aggrieved’  under s. 37 (1) [1929] 2 K. B. 440. (2) [1959] 1. Q. D. 384. 916 of  the  Act will have to be tackled with reference  to  the scheme and provisions of the Act and that is exactly what  I have done and arrived at the conclusion that he is a  person aggrieved. Mr.  Daphtary argued that when the Committee  consisting  of members  of the legal profession, has decided in  favour  of the  Advocate, the Advocate-General can have  no  grievance. This,in my view is really begging the question.  Why did the

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Legislature  then bring in the Advocate-General at  all  and why has it associated him- in disciplinary proceedings  from the  very beginning  of  the  inquiry  ?  That  and  other circumstances, already pointed out by me, bring him under s. 37 as "any person aggrieved." Mr.  Daphtary  then urged that if the  Advocate-General  was expected  to safeguard the interest of the Advocate and  the legal  profession by seeing that proper decisions are  given by  the  Committee, that purpose is not served  when  powers have been given to the Committee under s. 35(2) to summarily reject  a  complaint and the Advocate-General will  have  no remedy  against  such rejection.  The short answer  to  this contention  is that a right of appeal must  be  specifically conferred by statute.  Section 37(1) gives a right of appeal against an order passed under s. 35.  The orders which could be  passed after hearing the case are enumerated in  clauses (a)  to  (d) of S. 35 (3).  It is not necessary  for  me  to express  any opinion whether an order summarily rejecting  a complaint  can  also be the subject of an  appeal  under  S. 37(1) as that section is in very wide terms.  In any  event, Mr.  Daphtary’s  contention will only amount to  this  viz., that the Advocate-General is not associated at the stage  of summary  rejection of a complaint.  That  circumstance  does not  militate  against  the view already  expressed  by  me. Probably the Legislature may have felt that if there is  any wrongful  summary rejection of a complaint it could  be  set right  by the Bar Council of India under S. 48A.   But  once the Committee decides to hear the cases and passes an  order under  s.  35, the Advocate-General gets a right  of  appeal under S. 37(1). Mr. V. S. Desai referred us to the decision of the  Judicial Committee  in  Advocate  General of  Bombay  and  others  v. Pitamberdas Gokuldas Mehta and others(1) wherein,  according to him, an appeal by the Advocate-General of Bombay  against the  decision of the High Court of Bombay Pleaders  Act  was entertained by the Judicial Committee.  He has also referred us  to the discussion between the Court and counsel  in  the said  decision  reported in Advocate-General  of  Bombay  v. Phiroz  Rustomji Bharucha(2) which, according to  him,  will show that though an objection about the locus standi of  the Advocate-General to file an (2)  37 Bombay Law Reporter 722. (1)  Indian      Appeals 235. 917 appeal  under  such circumstances was raised,  but  was  not accepted  by  the Judicial Committee.  I have  gone  through both  the  reports  and  there is  no  indication  that  the question  of maintainability of an appeal by  the  Advocate- General  was  decided one way or the other by  the  Judicial Committee. Mr. Daphtary has referred us to the decisions in Re.   Side- botham(1),  in re.  Reed, Bowen & Co.,(2), The Queen v.  The Keepers  of  the  Peace  and  Justices  of  the  County   of London(3),  Rex.  v. London Quarter Sessions(4)  and  Ealing Corporation  v.  Jones(5), wherein  the  expression person aggrieved’  occurring  in  different statutes  came  up  for interpretation.   The  principles  that  emerge  from  those decisions appear to be that a person aggrieved’ must be  a person who has suffered a legal grievance or who has claimed a title to something and his claim has been negatived or who has  maintained  to  the  contrary  in  the  proceedings  or litigation.   It  has  been further held in  some  of  those decisions  that  the said expression does not  take  in  any person  who  may be affected by the order or  who  may  feel disappointed  or even annoyed at the decision.  In the  view

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that I take that the expression person aggrieved’ in s.  37 of  the  Act  has  to be interpreted in  the  light  of  the provisions  of and scheme of the Act as well as the  context in  which  those  expressions  appear. I  do  not  think  it necessary to consider in great detail those decisions  which have been rendered on different statutes. The  decision  in The Municipal Corporation of the  City  of Ahmedabad   v.  Chandulat  Shamaldas  Patel  and   others(6) referred to by Mr. Daphtary, in my opinion, does not  assist the  appellant.   In  that decision it was  held  that  when certain notifications issued under the Land Acquisition  Act were set aside by the High Court, the Municipal Corporation, on  whose  behalf  the ;acquisition was being  made  by  the Government,  cannot be considerd to be a person  aggrieved’ entitled  to  challenge  the order of the  High  Court.   An additional reason has also been given against the competency of  the  appeal that even an order for costs  has  not  been passed against the Municipal Corporation.  That decision was rendered  on the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, and  so does not help the appellant. It  was  urged  on  behalf of  the  appellant  that  if  the Advocate-General was really intended to be given a right  of appeal under s. 37 (1), the Legislature should have used the expression any  person  including  the   Advocate-General aggrieved by an order. (1)  14 Chancery Davison 458. (3)  25 Q. B. D. 357. (5)  [1959] I. Q. D. 384. (2)  19 Q. B. 174. (4)  [1951] 2 K. B. D. 508. (6) (Civil Appeal No. 1716 of 1967 decided on 1-8-1970) 918 I  am of the view that it was unnecessary to make  any  such provision because the expression as it stands clearly  takes within its fold the Advocate-General also. This leaves me with the decision in Attorney-General of  the Gambia v. Pierre Sarr N.’Jie(1) which has been very strongly relied  on  by Mr. Daphtary.  One Mr. X a  member  of  the, English  Bar  was admitted to practice as  a  barrister  and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Gambia.  The Deputy  Judge made an order striking his name off the roll of that  Court. This  decision  was reversed by the West  African  Court  of Appeal   on  the  ground  that  the  Deputy  Judge  had   no jurisdiction in the matter.  The Attorney-General of  Gambia sought  leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council;  but  the West African Court of Appeal declined to grant him leave  on the ground that notice had not been given in due time to Mr. X. The Attorney-General then made a petition to Her  Majesty for  special leave to appeal from the judgment of  the  West African  Court  of Appeal, setting aside the  order  of  the Deputy  Judge as well as refusing to grant leave to  appeal. The Attorney-General’s petition was granted; but liberty was reserved  to  Mr. X to raise the preliminary point  that  no appeal lay at the instance of the Attorney-General.   During the course of arguments the Judicial Committee rejected  the preliminary objection. It is to be noticed that against the decision of the  Deputy Judge striking his name off the roll, Mr. X filed an  appeal to the West African Court of Appeal under s. 14 which was as follows               "An  appeal shall lie to the Court  of  Appeal               from  any  order  of the  Judge  suspending  a               barrister  or solicitor of the  Supreme  Court               from  practice  or striking his name  off  the               Roll  and for the purposes of any such  appeal

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             any such order shall be deemed to be an  order               of the Supreme Court." I am particularly referring to this decision because certain observations  of  Lord Denning on which  reliance  has  been placed  by  Mr.  Daphtary will have to  be  understood  with reference to this provision of law.  Exercising jurisdiction under  this  section, the West African Court of  Appeal  set aside the order of the Deputy Judge.  In the first  instance the  Attorney-General sought leave to appeal to Her  Majesty in Council from the West African Court of Appeal under s.  5 of  the West African (Appeal to the Privy Council) Order  in Council. 1949, which is as follows               "Applications  to  the,  court  for  leave  to               appeal  shall  be made by motion  or  petition               within  21 days from the date of the  judgment               to be appealed from, and the               (1)   [1961] A. C. 617.               919               applicant shall give the opposite party notice                             of  his intended application." The West African Court of Appeal declined to grant leave to appeal to the Attorney-General on the ground that notice-had not  given within the time mentioned in the above  order  to Mr.  X.  The  Attorney-General made an  application  to  the Judicial Committee for special leave to appeal from the  two orders mentioned above of the West African Court of  Appeal. That  petition  was filed under s. 31 of  the  West  African (Appeal to Privy Council) Order in Council, 1949, which runs as follows               "Nothing  in  this order  contained  shall  be               deemed  to  interfere with the  right  of  His               Majesty upon the humble petition of any person aggri eved  by  any judgment of the  Court  to               admit  his appeal therefrom upon  such  condi-               tions  as His Majesty in Council  shall  think               fit to impose."               The question that arose before their Lordships               was whether the Attorney-General was a person               aggrieved’ under the above order.               In  discussing this question Lord  Denning  at               page 634 observes :               ".......  The words person aggrieved’ are  of               wide  import and should not be subjected to  a               restrictive  inter  pretation.   They  do  not               include,  of  course a mere busy body  who  is               interfering  in  things which do  not  concern               him:  but they do include a person who  has  a               genuine  grievance because an order  has  been               made    which   prejudicially   affects    his               interests.    Has   the   Attomey-General    a               sufficient  interest for this purpose?   Their               lordships  think that he has.   The  Attorney-               General  in a colony represents the  Crown  as               the  guardian of the public interest.   It  is               his  duty  to  bring  before’  the  judge  any               misconduct  of a barrister or solicitor  which               is   of   sufficient   gravity   to    warrant               discriplinary action.  True it is that if  the               judge acquits the practitioner of  misconduct,               no appeal is open to the AttorneyGeneral.   He               has  done his duty and is not aggrieved.   But               if the judge finds the practitioner guilty  of               professional misconduct, and a Court of Appeal               reverses  the decision on a ground which  goes               to  the  jurisdiction  of  the  judge,  or  is

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             otherwise a point in which the public interest               is   concerned,  the  Attorney-General  is   a               person   aggrieved’ by the decision  and  can               properly  petition  Her  Majesty  for  special               leave  to  appeal.  It was for  these  reasons               that their Lordships rejected the  preliminary               objection  and held that the  Attorney-General               was a               920               person aggrieved’ by the decision of the  West               African Court of Appeal." The  observations made in the above extract, in my  opinion, have to be related to the particular provision of the  order in Council which the Judicial Committee was considering.  In the case before the Judicial Committee, the Attorney-General had  initiated  the  disciplinary  proceedings  against  the Barrister.  Under S. 14, there was only a very limited right of  appeal  and  that  too in favour  of  the  barrister  or solicitor  in respect of the orders mentioned therein.   The Attorney-General,  though he may have been  the  complainant under  S.  14 had no right of appeal if  the  barrister  was acquitted.  That is why Lord Denning states that it is  true that if the Judge acquits the practitioner of misconduct  no appeal  is  open to the Attorney-General.  This  view,  with respect,  is correct because S. 14 does not give a right  of appeal to the Attorney-General.  Lord Denning, no doubt, has further stated that the Judicial Committee has rejected  the preliminary objection in view of the fact that it was of the opinion   that  in  the  case  before  it  a   question   of jurisdiction  or a point of public interest is involved  and therefore, the Attorney-General is a person aggrieved. I  have already indicated that-there are no restrictions  or limitations  imposed in S. 37 of the Act giving a  right  of appea l only to the advocate who may have been found guilty. On the other hand, the words "any person aggrieved" in S. 37 are  very  wide,  and as observed by  Lord  Denning  in  the opening part of the above extract these words should not  be subjected to a restrictive interpretation.  In the view that I take that the Advocate-General has an unqualified right of appeal under s. 37(1) I do not think it necessary either  to refer  to  Art. 165 of the Constitution nor do  I  think  it necessary  to  consider  the further  question  whether  the appeal filed by the Advocate-General before the Bar  Council of India relates to any question of jurisdiction or a  point of public interest. To  conclude,  the appeal filed by the  Advocate-General  of Maharashtra before the Appellate Committee was competent and this point has to be held against the Appellant.  The result will  be that the appeal before us will have to be heard  on merits. RAY, J. I agree with Vaidialingam, J. I desire to express my separate opinion in view of the importance of the  question raised in this appeal. This  is an appeal from the order dated 26 October, 1969  of the  Disciplinary  Committee  of the Bar  Council  of  India suspending     the  appellant from practice for a period  of one year. 921 An  appeal to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar  Council of  India  was  preferred by Shri H.  M.  Seervai,  Advocate General  of Maharashtra against the order dated 17  October, 1968  of  the Bar Council of Maharashtra  holding  that  the appellant  was  not  guilty of  professional  misconduct  or otherwise. Before  the  Disciplinary Committee of the  Bar  Council  of

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India  a preliminary objection was taken by  AdiPheroz  Shah Gandhi as to the maintainability of the appeal preferred  by the Advocate General of Maharashtra. The appellant pressed the same preliminary objection in this Court,  namely,  that the Advocate General of the  State  of Maharashtra  could not prefer an appeal against an order  of the Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council. The  relevant  provision for appeal to the  Bar  Council  of India  is  to be found in section 37 of the  Advocates  Act, 1961  (hereinafter referred to as the Act).  There  are  two sub-sections  of section 37.  The first  sub-section  enacts that  any person, aggrieved by an order of the  Disciplinary Committee  of  the State Bar Council made under  section  35 may,  within sixty days of the date of the communication  of the  order  to him, prefer an appeal to the Bar  Council  of India.  Sub-section (2) of section 37 states that every such appeal  shall be heard by the Disciplinary Committee of  the Bar Council of India. The present appeal is under section 38 of the Act which con- fers  right  of appeal to the Supreme Court  by  any  person aggrieved by an order made by the Disciplinary Committee  of the Bar Council of India. The entire controversy in this appeal centers on the meaning of  the  words any person aggrieved by  an  order  of  the Disciplinary  Committee of the State Bar Council’  occurring in sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Act.  The same words also occur in section 38 of the Act. Mr. Daphtary on behalf of the appellant contended first that the  Advocate General did not represent public interest  and could  not therefore be said to be a person aggrieved by  an order  of  the Disciplinary Committee.  Secondly,  that  the provisions  in  section  35 of the  Act  that  the  Advocate General  was  entitled  to a notice  from  the  Disciplinary Committee of the date of hearing and the provision that  the Advocate   General   was  entitled  to  be  heard   by   the Disciplinary  Committee could not have the effect of  making the  Advocate  General a party, and, thirdly,  the  Advocate General  was an impartial person and his duty would  end  by making   submissions,  if  any,  before   the   Disciplinary Committee and he would 922 not be a person aggrieved either by an order of dismissal of a  complaint  against the Advocate or by  any  order  passed against the Advocate. Notices were given to the Attorney General and the Advocates General of different States in view of the importance of the question involved in this appeal.  Mr. V. S. Desai on behalf of  the  Advocate General of Maharashtra,  Mr.  Setalvad  on behalf  of the Bar Council of India, Dr. Seyied Muhammad  on behalf  of the Attorney General, Mr. Datar counsel  for  the Maharashtra State Bar Council of India, Dr. Seyied  Muhammad on  behalf  of the of other States all  contended  that  the Advocate  General  would  have the right under  the  Act  to prefer  an appeal as a person aggrieved by an order  of  the Disciplinary Committee of a State Bar Council. Various  decisions were cited at the Bar to  illustrate  the meaning  of  the  words person aggrieved’.   One  group  of decisions  is based on the locus classics in  Re.   Ex-parte Sidebotham(1).   The other line of decisions is to be  found in Ex-parte Official Receiver, In Re.  Reed.  Bowen & Co.(2) and  Sevenoaks Urban District Council v. Twynam(3).   James, J.  in the case of Ex-parte Sidebotham said that "a person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which  has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully  refused

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him   something,  or  wrongfully  affected  his   title   to something." Lord Esher, M. R. on the other hand in  Ex-parte Official Receiver In Re.  Reed, Bowen & Co.(2) said that the meaning given by James, L.J. to the words person aggrieved’ would  not be an exhaustive definition and the  words  would include  a person who has asked for a decision for which  he had a right to ask, and has been wrongfully refused.  In the Sevenoaks(3) case Lord Hewart, C.J. said "that when a person might make an objection and was entitled to a decision  upon it he would, if the decision was adverse to him be, able  to appeal". These  decisions indicate that the words person  aggrieved’ would  have different shades of meaning in  accordance  with the  tenor  of the relevant statute.   The  observations  of James,  L.J. in the case of Ex-parte Sidebotham turn on  the meaning  of  the words person aggrieved’ occurring  in  the English  Bankruptcy  Act, 1914 which, inter  alia,  provided that the orders of the Court in bankruptcy matters except in cases  specially  excluded  were subject to  appeal  at  the instance of any person aggrieved even if he had not appeared in  the  court below.  It is in the context of  the  English Bankruptcy Act that creditors, trustees, administrators of a debtor (1) 14 Ch.  D. 458 (3) [1929] 2 Y..B. 404. (2) 19 Q.B.D. 174. 923 or  bankrupt  would have a legal grievance  against  whom  a decision  has been pronounced which has wrongfully  deprived him  of something, or wrongfully refused him  something,  or wrongfully affected his title to something. Lord Hewart, C.J., in Sevenoaks case(1) said "the problem is not what is the meaning of the expression person aggrieved’ in  one  or dozen statutes but what is its meaning  in  this part  of the Statute".  In that case the relevant  provision of  the  Public  Health Act conferred a  power  on  a  local authority  to provide within that district suitable  parking place  for  vehicles.   The statute  further  in  that  case contemplated  a notice of the proposal to acquire  land  for using it as a parking place and objections, if any. to  such proposal.   When objections were made, the  local  authority would  have  to consider them.  In the  Sevenoaks  case  the Urban  Council considered the objection of a rate payer  and thereafter  proceeded with the scheme of the parking  place. Lord  Hewart,  C.J. in giving meaning to the  words person aggrieved’  in  that case said that first a  person  was  an author  of an objection, and, secondly, he was aggrieved  by the  refusal of his objection.  It was held that  a  special individual  right was infringed.  In the  Sevenoaks(1)  case there  was neither a pecuniary nor a proprietary  grievance. The  action  of the local authority in providing  a  parking place  invited  objections.   It  is  the  refusal  of  that objection  which  constituted  a  grievance  and  it  was  a grievance sustainable in law. Mr.  Daphtary relied on the observations of James,  L.J.  in Re. Sidebotham (2) that a, disappointed person would not be a  person  aggrieved’ and also on the observations  of  Lord Coleridge  in Queen v. Keepers of the Peace and Justices  of the County of London (3 ) that one would not be an aggrieved person because someone was held not to have done wrong.   In other  words,  it was said that the Advocate  General  would make  submissions  or  advance  contentions  and  the   non- acceptance by the Disciplinary Committee of such submissions would  not constitute either a legal grievance or  rejection of a remedy asked for.

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Mr.  Daphtary  also leaned heavily on the  decision  of  the Judicial  Committee in Attorney General of Gambia v.  Pierre Sarr N’ Jie(4) in support of two propositions.  First,  that the Judicial Committee found in the Gambian case that in the colonies the Attorney General represented the Crown and  was therefore the guardian of the public interest.  Mr. Daphtary submitted that the Advocate General did not represent public interest  in our country and therefore could not be said  to be  a guardian of public interest.  Secondly,  the  Judicial Committee in the Gambian case said that in (1)  [1929] 2 K.B. 404. (3)  25 Q.B.D. 357. (2)  14 Ch.  D. 458. (4)  [1961] A. C. 617. 924 relation to disciplinary proceedings if a legal practitioner was  acquitted  of  misconduct no appeal  was  open  to  the Attorney  General because he had done his duty and  was  not aggrieved.   Extracting  that proposition from  the  Gambian case  Mr.  Daphtary submitted that  similarly  the  Advocate General  could not have any grievance where an Advocate  was acquitted. The  purpose and the provisions of the Advocates  Act,  1961 will  determine  whether the Advocate General  is  a  person aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant sections in the Act.   It  may  not  be out of place to  refer  to  the  Bar Councils Act, 1926 which dealt with disciplinary conduct  of practitioners.   Prior to the Advocates Act the  High  Court under  the Bar Councils Act, 1926 had power to  suspend  any advocate from practice whom it found guilty of  professional or  other misconduct.  Under the said 1926 Act upon  receipt of a complaint made to it by any court or by Bar Council  or by  any  other person that any Advocate had been  guilty  of misconduct,  the High Court if it did not  summarily  reject the  complaint  referred  the case for enquiry  to  the  Bar Council  or after consultation with the Bar Council  to  the Court  of a District Judge and the High Court might  of  its own motion refer any case in which it had reason to  believe that any such Advocate had been so guilty.  If any case  was referred  under the Bar Councils Act, 1926 for enquiry,  the case  was  to be enquired into by the Committee of  the  Bar Council  which  was  called  the  Tribunal.   The   Tribunal consisted  of  not less than three and not  more  than  five members of the Bar Council appointed for that purpose by the Chief  Justice or Chief Judge of the High Court, and one  of the members so appointed was the President of the  Tribunal. The  finding of a Tribunal was forwarded to the  High  Court through the Bar Council and the finding of a District  Court was to be forwarded direct to the High Court with a copy  to the  Bar Council.  On receipt of the finding the High  Court was to fix a date for the hearing of the case and notice  of the date so fixed was to be given to the Advocate  concerned and  to  the Bar Council and to the Advocate  General.   The High Court was also required under the statute to afford the Advocate  concerned  and the Bar Council  and  the  Advocate General  an  opportunity of being heard before  orders  were passed in that case. Mr. Desai relied on the provisions of the Bar Councils  Act, 1926 to show that under the said Act notice was to be  given to  the Advocate General and that the Advocate  General  was entitled  to  be heard and he relied on a  decision  of  the Judicial  Committee in Advocate General of Bombay v.  Phiroz Bharucha(1)  and  the decision of this  Court  in  Bhataraju Nageshwara  Rao  v. The, Hon’ble Judges of the  Madras  High Court & Ors. (2 ) in support of two

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(1) 62 I. A. 235: 37 Bom.  L. R. 722. (2) [1955] 1. S.C.R. 1055. 925 propositions, namely, that the Advocate General could prefer an  appeal  and  in  an appeal  preferred  by  the  Advocate concerned,  the  Advocate General would be a  respondent  to such  an  appeal.  In Bharucha’s case(1)  certain  Advocates were members of Associations declared unlawful by Government and they were convicted of offences punishable under section 17(1)  of  the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908.   The  High Court  did not take any steps, against the Advocates an  the ground  that  it  did not consider  that  membership  of  an unlawful  Association would render the Advocates  unfit  for the  exercise  of the profession.  The Advocate  General  of Bombay  made  applications  for  special  leave  before  the Judicial  Committee  to appeal against the decision  of  the High  Court.   The  Judicial Committee  did  not  grant  any special  leave and agreed with the view of the  High  Court. No  question  was  raised in  the  applications  before  the Judicial   Committee  as  to  the  maintainability  of   the applications  for special leave.  It should be noticed  that under  the Bar Councils Act there was no provision  for  any appeal.   Mr,  Desai rightly relied on the decision  of  the Judicial  Committee  not for an actual  decision  that  the, Advocate  General had a right of appeal but for the  purpose of  showing  that the Advocate General had  not  only  locus standi  to make an application for leave but also  could  be said  to  have  been aggrieved by an order  in  relation  to professional  misconduct  of  an  Advocate.   The   Judicial Committee  would  not have entered into the merits  of  the. case if the Advocate General had no right to apply for leave to, appeal. The decision of this Court in Bhataraju’s case(2) was to the effect  that in an appeal preferred to the Supreme Court  by an  Advocate against whom an order of suspension was  passed by the High Court under section 12 of the Bar Councils  Act, the proper respondents would be the complainant, if any, the Bar Council and the Advocate General of the State  concerned and  not  the  High  Court.  The appeal  to  this  Court  in Bhataraju’s  case(2) was by special leave.  This Court  held that   the  Advocate  General,  the  Bar  Council  and   the complainant  would  be parties to the appeal on  the  ground that notices under the Bar Councils Act had been issued  top those persons.  The decisions of this Court and the Judicial Committee both indicate, that the Advocate General under the Bar  Councils Act had locus standi in making an  application for  leave  to appeal and being a respondent  to  an  appeal preferred by the Advocate. The  position held by the High Court under the Bar  Councils Act, 1926 is now occupied by the Bar Council under the Advo- cates Act.  There are State Bar Councils and there is also a Bar  Council  of  India.   Every  Bar  Council  is  a   body corporate.  The (1) 62 I.A. 2350            (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1055. 926 functions  of the State Bar Council are inter alia to  admit persons  as advocates on its roll; to prepare  and  maintain such  roll; to entertain and determine cases  of  misconduct against  advocates  on its roll; to  safeguard  the  rights, privileges  and  interest  of advocates on  its  roll.   The functions  of  the  Bar Council of India are  to  lay  down- standards  of professional conduct and etiquette  for  advo- cates,  to  lay  down the procedure to be  followed  by  the Disciplinary  Committee of the Bar Council of India and  the Disciplinary  Committees  of  the  State  Bar  Councils,  to

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safeguard the rights, privileges and interests of advocates. A  Bar Council is empowered under the Act to constitute  one or more Disciplinary Committees. Sections 35 to 44 deal with conduct of Advocates and  powers of th e Disciplinary Committees of the State Bar Councils as also of the Bar Council of India.  Under section 35 of  the Act  where on receipt of a complaint or otherwise  a  State Bar  Council has reason to believe that any advocate on  its roll  has been guilty of professional or, other  misconduct, it  shall  refer the case for disposal to  its  Disciplinary Committee.   The  Disciplinary  Committee  of  a  State  Bar Council,  if  it does not summarily  reject  the  complaint, shall  fix  a  date for the hearing of the  case  and  shall cause.  a  notice  thereof  to  be  given  to  the  advocate concerned  and  to the Advocate General of the  State.   The Disciplinary  Committee of a State Bar Council after  giving the   advocate  concerned  and  the  Advocate   General   an opportunity  of  being heard, may dismiss the  complaint  or reprimand  the advocate, suspend the advocate from  practice for  such period as it may deem fit, or remove the  name  of the  advocate from the State roll of advocates.   Where  any notice  is  issued  to the Advocate  General,  the  Advocate General may appear before the Disciplinary Committee of  the State  Bar Council either in person or through any  advocate appearing  on his behalf.  These provisions establish  first that  the  Advocate General is entitled to a notice  of  the date of hearing, secondly, that no order can be made by  the Disciplinary Committee without giving an opportunity to  the Advocate  General  of being heard, and,  thirdly,  that  the Advocate  General may appear in person or through any  advo- cate.   It  cannot  be said that  the  Advocate  General  is appearing  as  a  friend of the Court.   The  right  of  the Advocate  General to appear is based on statute.   The  word may’ is used to indicate the choice of the Advocate General to appear in person or through any advocate.  He may choose not  to appear at all.  But when the Advocate  General  does appear,  he  does so by virtue of the statutory  rights  and powers  conferred on him.  It is, therefore, necessary  to know as to why notice under the Act is given to the Advocate General  and why he is to be heard before an order is made by the Disciplinary Committee. The  Judicial Committee in the Gambian case found  that  the name  of  N’Jie was struck off the roll of  barristers  and solicitors of 927 the  Supreme  Court  of Gambia by an order  of  Abbott,  J., Deputy  Judge of the Supreme Court in the Colony of  Gambia. The  Deputy  Judge had jurisdiction to represent  the  Chief Justice  in the exercise of his judicial powers.  The  power to  strike the name of the legal practitioner off  the  roll was  held  by the Judicial Committee not to  be  a  judicial power but an administrative one of the Chief Justice of  the Supreme Court of Gambia.  Therefore, the order of Abbott, J. was without jurisdiction.  The West African Court of  Appeal under those circumstances set aside the order of Abbott,  J. The Attorney General of Gambia thereupon preferred an appeal to  the Judicial Committee.  An appeal to the Privy  Council lay  under section 31 of the West African (Appeal  to  Privy Council)  Order in Council, 1949.  Broadly stated, the  pro- vision  was to the effect that any person aggrieved  by  any judgment  of  the  Court  could prefer  ail  appeal  to  His Majesty.  The Judicial Committee construed the words person aggrieved’ occurring in section 31 of the West African Order in  Council,  1949  not to be  subjected  to  a  restrictive interpretation  but  to include a person who has  a  genuine

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grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affected  his interest.  The Attorney General of Gambia  was found  to have sufficient interest for the purpose  and  the interest  was  held to be a public one  which  the  Attorney General represented.  The Judicial Committee also said  that if the Judge found the practitioner guilty of misconduct and the  West  African Court of Appeal of  Gambia  reversed  the decision which went to the jurisdiction of the Judge, or was otherwise  a point in which public interest  was  concerned, the  Attorney  General would be a person  aggrieved  by  the decision.   The  Judicial  Committee  construed  the   words perso n aggrieved’ to include the Attorney General of Gambia as representing the public interest. The  most significant feature in sections 35 and 36  of  the Act is that the Disciplinary Committee does not either  give any  notice  to or hear the complainant.   On  the  contrary notice is given under section 36 to the Attorney General and under section 35 to the Advocate General.  The Disciplinary Committee  without giving the Attorney General in  one  case and  the Advocate General in another case an opportunity  of being  heard  cannot  pass any order  against  the  Advocate concerned.   The  Attorney General under Article 76  of  the Constitution  and the Advocate General under Article 165  of the  Constitution have to discharge the functions  conferred on  them by or under the Constitution or any other  law  for the  time  being in force.  The Advocates Act  concerns  the Advocate  and  it  is  in the fitness  of  things  that  the Attorney  General  and the Advocate General of a  State  are heard  as persons representing the profession which  assists the litigant public and the courts in the administration  of justice.  The Attorney General and the Advocates General  of States are persons of high standing 928 and  with  long  experience  in the  profession  and  it  is indisputable that they will ever adopt any partisan attitude in  proceedings  before  the  Disciplinary  Committee.   The Advocates  Act  gives special preeminence  to  the  Attorney General and the Advocate General in disciplinary proceedings because  it is not an attempt of the Disciplinary  Committee to redress the grievance of an individual complainant but to find  out  whether  there  is  any  breach  of  professional standard  and  conduct.   The high  tradition,  dignity  and purity of the Bar is to be maintained.  The Attorney General and  the Advocate General are heard because they are  heads of   their  respective  Bar  and  the   proceedings   affect discipline and dignity of the Bar and touch the professional conduct of an Advocate. They  are not parties to a lis’.  They have no personal  or pecuniary  or  proprietary interest in the  matter.   It  is manifest  that their locus standi and interest is  based  on professional  code  of  conduct  and  for  the  purpose   of upholding the purity of the Bar and preservation of  correct standards and norms in the profession.  The Attorney General and  the  Advocates  General will  uphold  the  professional discipline, dignity and decorum and that is why no order  is made  by the Disciplinary Committee without giving  them  an opportunity of being heard. The issue before the Disciplinary Committee is whether there has been professional misconduct and the question has to  be looked at purely from the point of view of profession.   The profession touches the public on the one hand and the courts on  the other.  On no other basis could the presence of  the Advocate General be explained. In a recent decision of this Court in B. M. Madnani v.  Com- missioner  of Workmen’s Compensation, Bombay(1) the  Commis-

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sioner of Workmen’s Compensation preferred an appeal for en- hancement of penalties against the Advocate concerned.  This Court  held that the Commissioner was entitled  to  maintain the appeal as a person aggrieved.  Mr. Daphtary at one stage contended that a complainant would not be a person aggrieved within the meaning of the relevant section of the  Advocates Act to prefer an appeal.  The decision of this Court  repels that submission. It  may not be out of place to notice that the Act uses  the words person   aggrieved’  and  not  the   words party aggrieved’.   First in disciplinary proceedings there is  no party.  It is a matter touching the professional conduct  of the Advocate.  The enquiry is by the Disciplinary Committee. The Advocate is heard.  The Attorney General in one case and the  Advocates General in other cases are heard.   They  are heard  not  because  they  are  parties  but  because   they represent  the interest of the profession.   They  represent the standards to be maintained in the profession.  Suppose, (1)  C.A. No. 877 of 1968 decided on October 10, 1968. 929 the  Disciplinary Committee held proceedings without  giving notice  to  the Advocate General or made  an  order  Without giving  the Advocate General an opportunity of being  heard. In  either  Case  the Advocate General  would  be  a  person aggrieved.  Would the participation by the Advocate  General in the proceedings before the Disciplinary, Committee  alter the position ? Neither. on logic   nor on principle could it be said that the Attorney General and the Advocates  General who have the right to be heard could not     be      persons aggrieved by the decision. If they have the right to      be heard  they  may  have grievance as to  the  result  of  the hearing. The  Attorney  General  and the  Advocates  General  receive notice  and  are  entitled  to be heard  by  virtue  of  the provisions  in the statute.  They are  performing  statutory duties.   They  are  not  contemplated  in  the  statute  as ordinary counsel.  It was not them intention of the  statute that  they  would  be merely neutral  observers  before  the Disciplinary  Committee  and  they would  have  no  duty  to perform.  They would have to express their views one way  or the  other.  It is true that they would be  completely  free from personal favour or disfavour in these matters  touching the  professional   conduct.  Their  presence   before   the Disciplinary  Committee is explicable only on the ground  of adhering   to  the  correct  professional  code.  It   would therefore be open to them     Attorney-General    and    the Advocate General to take the view that       in a matter  of sufficient gravity a completely inadequate punishment  would not  be in public interest of the  profession.  Similarly,if the  punishment  is severe in a case, which  did  not  merit such.action,  the Attorney General and the Advocate  General would be persons aggrieved to have it corrected. To accede to the contention of Mr. Daphtary that the words, ’person   aggrieved’  refer  only  to  Advocates  would   be misreading the provisions. The words person aggrieved’ will be referable to,the Advocate concerned, the complainant  and the Attorney General or the Advocate General as the case may be.  The Attorney General and the Advocate General  will  be persons aggrieved because they are interested in maintaining the  professional  rectitude. The Attorney General  and  the Advocate General have the right of pre-audience. Such  right determines that they are leaders of the profession in  their respective  fields.  They  will ask  formatting  the  proper standards of professional ethics. It is from  that point  of view that the Attorney General and the Advocate General will

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be aggrieved persons when they will find that them  interest of   the   Bar,   the,  public  interest   have   not   been proper      safeguarded  by decisions  of  the  Disciplinary Committee of-the Bar  Council. 169 Sup CI/(P)-71-15 930 For these reasons I am of opinion that the Advocate  General of the  State of Maharashtra is competent to appeal  as  a person aggrieved  under section 37 of the  Advocates  Act, 1961.                            ORDER In  accordance with the opinion of the majority, the  appeal is allowed and the order of the Bar Council of India is  set aside. There shall be no order as to costs. V.P.S. 931