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1 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.  368     OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P (C) No.26043 of 2010]

A. Srimannarayana               ... Appellant

VERSUS

Dasari Santakumari & Anr.          …Respondents  

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 369  OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P (C) No.1495 of 2011]

O R D E R

1.   Delay condoned.

2.   Leave granted.

3.  These appeals arising out of the aforesaid  

special  leave  petitions  have  been  filed  against  

the judgment and order dated 15.07.2010 in R.P.  

No. 2032 of 2010 passed by the National Consumer  

Disputes  Redressal  Commission  (hereinafter  

referred  to  as  “the  National  Commission”),  New  

Delhi.

4.    Relevant facts are taken from Special Leave  

Petition (C) No.26043 of 2010.

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2 5.    The appellant and respondent No.2, who are  

doctors, conducted an operation on the left leg of  

the husband of the complainant. Sometime after the  

operation,  the  patient  died  on  13.07.2008.  

Respondent No. 1, wife of the deceased, filed a  

complaint  against  the  appellant  and  respondent  

No.2, before the District Consumer Forum. We may  

notice here that respondent No.2 is the appellant  

in Civil Appeal No………………………of 2013 arising out of  

SLP(C)  No.1495  of  2011.  The  complaint  was  duly  

registered and notice was issued to the appellant  

and respondent No.2. Against the issuance of the  

notice,  the  appellant  filed  a  revision  petition  

before  the  State  Consumer  Disputes  Redressal  

Commission,  Hyderabad  on  the  ground  that  the  

complaint could not have been registered by the  

District Forum without seeking an opinion of an  

expert in terms of the decision of the Supreme  

Court  reported  in  Martin  F.  D’Souza Vs.  Mohd.  

Ishfaq (2009) 3 SCC 1. In this revision petition,  

respondent No.2 filed IA No.2240 of 2009 praying  

for  stay  of  proceedings  before  the  District  

Consumer Forum. The State Commission rejected the  

revision  petition  by  granting  liberty  to  the  

appellant to file the necessary application before

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3 the  District  Forum  to  refer  the  matter  to  an  

expert.  He did not file any application before  

the District Forum, but challenged the aforesaid  

order of the State Commission by filing revision  

petition  No.  2032  of  2010  before  the  National  

Commission.  The  revision  petition  has  been  

dismissed  by  the  National  Commission  by  relying  

upon the subsequent judgment of this Court in  V.  

Kishan Rao Vs. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital &  

Anr. (2010)  5  SCC  513,  wherein  this  Court  has  

declared that the judgment rendered in Martin F.  

D’Souza  (supra)  is  per  incuriam.   Hence  the  

present  special  leave  petitions  challenging  the  

aforesaid order of the National Commission dated  

15.07.2010.   

6.    Heard Mr. Rao, learned counsel appearing on  

behalf of the appellant and respondent No.2 and  

Mr.  K.K.  Kishore,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  

behalf of the respondent No.1, at length.

7.     Mr. Rao has tried to persuade us that the  

judgment of this Court in the case of  V. Kishan  

Rao  Vs.  Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital & Anr.  

(supra),  has  erroneously  declared  the  earlier

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4 judgment of this Court in the case of  Martin F.  

D'Souza Vs. Mohd. Ishfaq (supra) as per incuriam,  

on  a  misconception  of  the  law  laid  down  by  a  

three-Judge Bench of this Court in  Jacob Mathew  

Vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2005) 6 SCC 1. We are  

not inclined to accept the submission made by Mr.  

Rao.  The  judgment  in  Jacob  Mathew  (supra)  is  

clearly  confined  to  the  question  of  medical  

negligence leading to criminal prosecution, either  

on the basis of a criminal complaint or on the  

basis  of  an  FIR.   The  conclusions  recorded  in  

paragraph  48  of  Jacob  Mathew  (supra)  leave  no  

manner  of  doubt  that  in  the  aforesaid  judgment  

this Court was concerned with a case of medical  

negligence  which  resulted  in  prosecution  of  the  

concerned doctor under Section 304A of the Indian  

Penal  Code.  We  may  notice  here  the  relevant  

conclusions which are summed up by this Court as  

under:

xxx  xxx xxx xxx

xxx  xxx xxx xxx

“(5)  The  jurisprudential  concept  of  negligence  differs  in  civil  and  criminal law.  What may be negligence  in  civil  law  may  not  necessarily  be  negligence  in  criminal  law.   For  negligence to amount to an offence, the

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5 element of mens rea must be shown to  exist. For an act to amount to criminal  negligence,  the  degree  of  negligence  should be much higher i.e. gross or of  a very high degree. Negligence which is  neither gross nor of a higher degree  may  provide  a  ground  for  action  in  civil law but cannot form the basis for  prosecution.  

(6)  The word 'gross' has not been used  in  Section  304A  of  IPC,  yet  it  is  settled that in criminal law negligence  or recklessness, to be so held, must  be  of  such  a  high  degree  as  to  be  'gross'.  The  expression  'rash  or  negligent act' as occurring in Section  304A  of  the  IPC  has  to  be  read  as  qualified by the word 'grossly'.   

(7) To prosecute a medical professional  for  negligence  under  criminal  law  it  must  be  shown  that  the  accused  did  something  or  failed  to  do  something  which  in  the  given  facts  and  circumstances  no  medical  professional  in  his  ordinary  senses  and  prudence  would have done or failed to do.  The  hazard  taken  by  the  accused  doctor  should  be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  injury which resulted was most likely  imminent.  

(8)  Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule  of evidence and operates in the domain  of  civil  law  specially  in  cases  of  torts and helps in determining the onus  of  proof  in  actions  relating  to  negligence.  It cannot be pressed in  service  for  determining  per  se  the  liability  for  negligence  within  the  domain  of  criminal  law.  Res  ipsa  loquitur  has,  if  at  all,  a  limited  application  in  trial  on  a  charge  of  criminal negligence.”

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8.   The guidelines in Paragraph 48 were laid down  

after  rejecting  the  submission  that  in  both  

jurisdictions  i.e.  under  civil  law  and  criminal  

law,  negligence  is  negligence,  and  

jurisprudentially  no  distinction  can  be  drawn  

between negligence under civil law and negligence  

under criminal law. It was observed that :-

“12. ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… ……………………………………………………………  The  submission  so made cannot be countenanced inasmuch  as it is based upon a total departure  from the established terrain of thought  running ever since the beginning of the  emergence of the concept of negligence  up  to  the  modern  times.   Generally  speaking, it is the amount of damages  incurred which is determinative of the  extent  of  liability  in  tort;  but  in  criminal law it is not the amount of  damages but the amount and degree of  negligence  that  is  determinative  of  liability.  To  fasten  liability  in  criminal law, the degree of negligence  has  to  be  higher  than  that  of  negligence enough to fasten liability  for damages in civil law. The essential  ingredient  of  mens  rea cannot  be  excluded  from  consideration  when  the  charge in a criminal court consists of  criminal negligence.  

28.  A medical practitioner faced with  an emergency ordinarily tries his best  to redeem the patient out of his suf- fering. He does not gain anything by  acting with negligence or by omitting  to do an act. Obviously, therefore, it  will be for the complainant to clearly

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7 make out a case of negligence before a  medical practitioner is charged with or  proceeded against criminally. A surgeon  with shaky hands under fear of legal  action cannot perform a successful op- eration and a quivering physician can- not administer the end-dose of medicine  to his patient.  

29.  If the hands be trembling with the  dangling  fear  of  facing  a  criminal  prosecution in the event of failure for  whatever reason — whether attributable  to himself or not, neither can a sur- geon successfully wield his life-saving  scalpel  to  perform  an  essential  surgery, nor can a physician success- fully  administer  the  life-saving  dose  of medicine. Discretion being the bet- ter part of valour, a medical profes- sional  would  feel  better  advised  to  leave  a  terminal  patient  to  his  own  fate in the case of emergency where the  chance of success may be 10% (or so),  rather than taking the risk of making a  last  ditch  effort  towards  saving  the  subject and facing a criminal prosecu- tion if his effort fails. Such timidity  forced upon a doctor would be a disser- vice to society.”  

9.    The aforesaid observations leave no manner  

of doubt that the observations in Jacob Mathew  

(supra)  were  limited  only  with  regard  to  the  

prosecution  of  doctors  for  the  offence  under  

Section 304A IPC.

10.   The  aforesaid  observations  and  conclusions  

leave  no  manner  of  doubt  that  the  judgment  

rendered by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in the

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8 case  of  Martin  F.  D’Souza  (supra)  has  been  

correctly declared per incuriam by the judgment in  

V.  Kishan  Rao  (supra)  as  the  law  laid  down  in  

Martin F. D’Souza (supra) was contrary to the law  

laid down in Jacob Mathew (supra).

11.   In view of the above, we are of the opinion  

that  the  conclusions  recorded  by  the  National  

Commission in the impugned order does not call for  

any interference. The civil appeals are dismissed.  

…………………………………………………………J.    [Surinder Singh Nijjar]

………………………………………………………J.                                 [Anil R. Dave]

New Delhi; January 09, 2013.